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PREfACE                                                                                                                  
The present collection of essays arose out of the Vekhi Centenary Conference 
1909–2009, held in July 2009 at the University of Bristol, and below we 
list our grateful acknowledgement to those who supported the conference 
and made it possible. The conference, of course, could not have taken place 
without the presence of all who attended it for some or all of the three days. 
We would also like, therefore, to thank all the participants at the conference 
for their invaluable contributions to the event in terms of papers presented 
and discussions engaged in, all of which have fed into and enriched this 
volume.
We have adopted the Library of Congress transliteration system for 
the rendering of Russian names and terms, including the names of Russian 
authors familiar to an English-speaking readership. We have opted to give 
titles of Russian and other foreign-language works in the original on first 
mention, and thereafter in English translation, except in the case of the Vekhi 
symposium itself, which we refer to consistently as Vekhi, partly to avoid 
having to make the difficult choice between its translation as Landmarks 
or Signposts, but also in acknowledgement of the widespread currency of 
the term Vekhi in the scholarship and teaching on the symposium. All 
quotations from Vekhi are taken from: Vekhi/Landmarks: A Collection of 
Articles about the Russian Intelligentsia, trans. and ed. Marshall S. Shatz and 
Judith E. Zimmerman (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).
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conference and provided full administrative support in the person of 
Samantha Barlow, to whom we are particularly grateful for the successful 
delivery of the conference. Our thanks go also to the British Association 
for Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES), the University of Bristol 
Alumni Foundation, the University of Bristol Faculty of Arts Research 
Director’s Fund, and University College London (UCL) through the School 
of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), all of which provided 
additional financial support. The University of Bristol Conference Office 
and Wills Hall also made a valuable administrative contribution to the 
staging of the conference. We offer our sincere gratitude to UCL SSEES for 
its assistance in the publication of this book.
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intRoduC t ion                                                                                                      
Robin  Aiz le wo o d,  Rut h  Co at e s,  Ever t  van  der  Zwe er de
The collection of essays entitled Vekhi, published in 1909 and usually 
translated as “Landmarks” but also as “Signposts” or “Milestones,” is 
indeed one of the landmark texts of Russian intellectual history, and more 
broadly of Russian political, philosophical, and religious culture. It is the 
central text of what became in effect a trilogy, starting with Problemy 
idealizma (Problems of Idealism, 1902) and ending with Iz glubiny (Out 
of the Depths, 1918), with a substantially common set of contributors 
from among the leading figures in Russian intellectual life. Of the seven 
Vekhi authors—Nikolai Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, Semen Frank, Mikhail 
Gershenzon, Aleksandr Izgoev, Bogdan Kistiakovskii, and Petr Struve—
all except Gershenzon and Izgoev appear in Problems of Idealism, and all 
except Gershenzon and Kistiakovskii in Out of the Depths.1 Taken together, 
the three works chart a trajectory from a relatively benign, constructive 
intellectual climate at the start of the century to the tumult of the 1917 
revolution, with Vekhi, written in the aftermath of the 1905 revolution, in 
between.2 What unites the three symposia is a critique of the “positivist” 
(materialist, utilitarian, crudely rationalist) ideology of the Russian 
radical intelligentsia, from a predominantly (though not exclusively) 
liberal and neo-idealist perspective that was informed by the neo-Kantian 
movement in German academic philosophy originating in the last third 
of the nineteenth century and lasting into the twentieth. While Problems 
of Idealism offers this critique in measured academic terms, Vekhi is more 
polemically directed against the intelligentsia, the bearer of “positivism,” 
and the role that it played in the revolution of 1905. Out of the Depths, 
a book that scarcely saw the light of day in its time, offers a cry of biblical 
despair in response to the revolutionary apocalypse of 1917, analysing its 
spiritual, intellectual, social, and cultural roots. 
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The trenchant critique of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia 
put forward in Vekhi did more than touch a nerve: it generated an 
extraordinary range of responses, mainly and from all sides critical, and 
within a year it had been reprinted in its fifth edition (which included 
a bibliography of some 200 articles and reviews provoked by the 
collection).3 The republication of Vekhi at the end of the Soviet period, 
sanctioned at the highest level, can be considered the central symbolic 
event in relation to intellectual history at the time in the “return of Russian 
philosophy”:4 if Vekhi could be published, any pretence of ideological 
control was at an end. As far as testaments to the seriousness with which 
ideas have at times been taken in Russia are concerned, Vekhi is right up 
there in the first rank. 
The scholars who have contributed to this volume, which has grown 
out of a centennial conference in 2009, have found it most interesting 
to locate Vekhi in a very wide range of contexts, in terms of history of 
ideas, discipline, and theory: to read it not as a “landmark” or “signpost” 
in an evaluative sense, but as a point of focus, intersection, or liminality, 
perhaps a “crossroads,” to borrow the title proposed by one of the Vekhi 
contributors, Frank.5 Vekhi is not, however, just any point of focus for 
wider and diverse analyses of Russian intellectual history, whether of its 
own particular period or in longer perspective, for three reasons. First, 
and not least, it contains some formidable essays. Second, the strength 
and urgency of Vekhi in its specific and broader contexts—as a reaction 
to the 1905 revolution and larger social processes, on the one hand, and 
as evidence of the level of richness and diversity that had been reached in 
Russian intellectual culture of the early twentieth century, the so-called 
Silver Age, on the other; and in both respects in relation to the subsequent 
fate of Russian society and culture—make it one of those documents that 
come to have, or in this case almost immediately acquire, a significance 
which goes beyond its contents as otherwise viewed. The third reason 
relates to what one may call the neo-idealist project, with philosophical, 
religious, and political dimensions in Russian culture, which had been 
given its most cogent articulation in Problems of Idealism.6 This project 
is at a moment of crux in Vekhi, where its vital and fruitful contribution 
is accompanied by a sense, albeit nascent, latent, or even resisted, of 
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its “limitations” in the Russian context. This is a constructive moment. 
In terms of intellectual history, it is of considerable significance and 
importance. 
Contemporary reception and scholarship alike have elaborated on the 
common critique of the intelligentsia’s worldview, which, it should be noted, 
is a problematic notion in itself,7 while also, in some cases, highlighting 
differences of both emphasis and fundamental principle amongst the Vekhi 
contributors.8 The common understanding that the Vekhi contributions 
were produced independently of each other, and that their joining together 
behind the central platform of the collection is a sign of the strength and 
urgency of the critique, should of course be seen in the context of various 
interactions over some years between the contributors (which continued 
to be carried on in conversation and correspondence leading up to the 
publication).9 It is perhaps not all that surprising that Gershenzon, the 
initiator of Vekhi, could aspire in his “Preface” to read a “common platform” 
into the collection,10 and could do so to a large extent successfully, although 
it is also clear that the “common platform” was easier to maintain as 
a shared negative critique than as a set of positive principles.11 This “common 
platform” is “the recognition of the theoretical and practical primacy of 
spiritual life over the external forms of community, in the sense that the 
inner life of the person is the sole creative force of human existence and 
it, not the self-sufficient principles of the political order, is the sole firm 
basis for any building of society” (xxvii). The “Preface” refers to a gathering 
of “people who have united here in a common task,” but at the same time 
there is an explicit recognition that in some other respects the contributors 
could “differ greatly among themselves both on basic questions of ‘faith’ and 
in their practical preferences” (xxvii). In referring to Vekhi as a “common 
task,” Gershenzon appropriates an intelligentsia catchword going back to 
Chernyshevskii, while the contributors’ unity with autonomy provides 
a model directly opposed to the mass ideological conformity, in the Vekhi 
critique, of the radical intelligentsia.
Gershenzon’s presentation of the collection as a unity of different, 
autonomous voices touches upon larger questions that are variously 
present in the foreground and/or background of Vekhi. One such question 
concerns unity and difference, all-unity and polyphony, to name just some 
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of the concepts involved in discussing, for example, thinkers as diverse as 
Leont’ev, Solov’ev and Bakhtin. This is a central subject of inquiry in Russian 
thought. Vekhi also offers an encounter between conceptions of community 
and the individual person that are activated within complex historical and 
contemporary frameworks. In keeping with our suggestion that Vekhi 
represents a moment of crux in the neo-idealist project in Russian thought 
of the Silver Age, we can see here an encounter, whether of conciliation or 
contestation, between the evolving notion of community in the Russian 
intellectual and cultural tradition (itself with roots in German thought) 
and the autonomous person of the Kantian tradition, belatedly entering the 
arena having hitherto been a relatively minor strand in conceptions of the 
person in Russian philosophy.12 Indeed, given the unequivocal advocacy 
in Gershenzon’s essay of each individual’s “creative self-consciousness” as 
the necessary pre-requisite for any positive transformation, alongside his 
advocacy of the Slavophile legacy with its notions of integral wholeness, 
community, and sobornost’, one may posit an unresolved tension within 
Gershenzon himself, as well as across Vekhi, as to the competing tendencies 
inherent in the notion of a unity of different, autonomous voices. We return 
to this question—in a different, broadly political key—in the conclusion to 
our Introduction.
While the themes of philosophical truth and religious values, which 
are to the forefront in the essays of Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Frank, and 
Gershenzon, are readily harnessed in support of the collection’s advocacy 
of the “primacy of spiritual life over the external forms of community,” the 
same is not so self-evident of sociology, law, and politics, which are to the 
forefront in the essays of Izgoev, Kistiakovskii, and Struve. It may be a valid 
criticism to say that Vekhi does not conceptualize the hierarchy and relation 
of the inner and the external in an adequate way, although the key concept 
of “creativity” and creative agency is clearly central to this relation, but it is 
not the case—contrary to the impression that the “Preface” may produce—
that the external is deemed insignificant. In fact, concern for external forms 
is both prominent and pervasive, alongside advocacy of the “primacy of 
spiritual life.” Vekhi presents itself as a “theme with variations,” in which 
philosophical, religious, and socio-political strands combine to make up 
the collection’s content in support of the “common platform.” The collection 
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promotes each of its strands as an overarching theme of the collection as 
a whole, but not the overarching theme. 
In a wide range of ways, the articles in this volume address these 
same, diverse questions, but from a perspective 100 years on. One of 
the many things that make Vekhi such a productive point of focus for 
scholarly attention is precisely that it both coheres and points in many 
directions. These directions include: theoretical questions of Russian 
religious, political, legal, and speculative philosophy, as well as trends and 
narratives in this tradition (Poole, van der Zweerde); the same questions 
approached through the lens of individual thinkers in their evolution 
and their past and present affinities and interactions (Aizlewood, Coates, 
Hamburg, Rampton, Rosenthal, Smith, Takho-Godi); topics concerning 
the object of the critique, the intelligentsia (Finkel, Read); and, last but 
not least, tropes and rhetoric in Russian culture and the invocation of the 
Russian literary tradition in the Vekhi critique (Nethercott). Indeed, the 
Vekhi authors’ rhetorical strategies are commented upon in a number of 
articles. 
In the next three sections of our Introduction we address the question 
of Vekhi and politics, philosophy, and religion. In each case this question 
is approached somewhat differently, and includes, to a greater or lesser 
extent, consideration of the question of the intelligentsia (the subject also 
of individual articles in the volume). In relation to politics, Vekhi is placed 
in the context of—and is used as a lens through which to view—Russian 
social and political processes of the early twentieth century in the light 
of theoretical formulations of political form, the politeia. In relation to 
philosophy, the question posed is how Russian philosophy appears from 
a reading of Vekhi in historical, contemporary, and present-day 
perspectives. In relation to religion, a thorough-going critique is made of 
Vekhi’s conceptualization of the religious sphere, both doctrinally and in 
respect to Russian religious actualities and practice. This tri-partite view 
of Vekhi and Russian political, philosophical, and religious culture is 




Vekhi and Russian Politics
It is a commonplace to state that Russia, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, went through a period of rapid and often tumultuous 
political, economic, social, demographic, intellectual, and cultural 
development. It is also a commonplace to state that the autocratic political 
system failed to respond adequately to these developments: its attempts at 
reform were half-hearted, and the regime was often paralyzed by internal 
opposition between reformists and reactionaries. Vekhi provides a lens—
one among many—through which these political realities can be viewed 
and put into perspective. But it does more than that: it also reflects these 
developments in the very position of its authors’ collective, viz. in the 
shifting place of intelligenty in a society that was undergoing a process of 
societal differentiation.
The year of publication of Vekhi, 1909, is partway between the revolution 
of 1905 and those of 1917. At the time, obviously, it could not be known that 
within five years Russia would be engaged in a war of unprecedented scale 
that would lead, among other consequences, to the decomposition of all 
three European empires. From a contemporary perspective, 1909 was a few 
years after the 1905 revolution, which had brought half-hearted political 
reforms. The October Manifesto by Nicholas II was, although clearly 
a concession, not a move toward constitutional monarchy; rather, it served 
to constrain “the new constitutional liberties into the old legal framework 
of the autocracy.”13 The battle between monarchist and parliamentary 
forces that went on between 1905 and 1917 remained undecided, but the 
parliamentary experiment was “definitely over” after the Second Duma 
was dismissed in June 1907 (the First Duma had functioned less than 
three months in 1906; the Second served a little over three months)—the 
Third Duma lasted its full term (1907–12), but was “custom-made to fit the 
government’s requirements,” and none of the Vekhi authors served in it.14
With all the setbacks of generalization, it seems fair to qualify the 
first decade of the twentieth century in Russia as a period in which it 
still proved impossible to find a broadly accepted appropriate political 
form for a society that had changed very rapidly in terms of economy, 
industrialization, urbanization, demography, education, and (civil) society. 
— 16 —
Robin Aizlewood, Ruth Coates, and Ever t van der Zweerde
To be sure, none of the processes under way in Russia was specifically 
“Russian”—on the contrary, Russia was rapidly picking up processes that 
should be qualified as generally European and, partly at least, global. The 
nineteenth century was a period of profound societal transformation, of 
which industrialization, urbanization, and (social) democratization are key 
markers.15 The Russian Empire took part in these developments belatedly 
and “inconsistently.” After a period of reforms initiated by Alexander II, 
which matched and facilitated these developments (e.g., the abolition 
of serfdom), subsequent Russian governments embarked on a road of 
essentially conservative policies that oscillated between reluctant reform 
and reactionary restoration of the old order. In the early twentieth century, 
this increasingly generated tensions between the autocrat, who clung to 
the old regime, and the government (led by Witte and later Stolypin, who 
was prime minister in 1909), which often was more realistic, but which 
tended to impose reform without seeking popular support.16 Oppositional 
movements differed in their assessment of these social processes, but shared 
the conviction of their inevitability. Russia, finally, was quickly becoming 
more strongly connected, socially, economically, and intellectually, with 
the rest of Europe, as can be seen, for example, in foreign investment in 
nascent Russian capitalism, but also in the fact that many young Russian 
intellectuals received parts of their educations in west European countries 
(this applied to all but one of the Vekhi contributors).
All across Europe, and beyond its boundaries, these socio-economic 
processes were accompanied by calls for political reform that had varying 
degrees of success and different outcomes: Russia was not the only country 
in which World War I ended with political revolution. If we depart from 
a primacy of the social in the sense that there must be something that has 
political form, we can say that political forms are attempts to “match” 
social reality, i.e., to re-form the political form of society. At the same time, 
however, the question as to which forms do match better or worse is itself 
a political, not a “technical” one: direct democracy or popular government, 
representative or parliamentary government, liberalism and corporatism 
thus are mutually contesting proposals to deal with a potentially conflictual 
social reality that is taking shape. The general assumption behind these 
remarks is that to the extent to which the external conditions and/or the 
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inner dynamics of a given society change, the political form or regime of 
that society must adapt, re-gauge, and re-invent itself, and at this point 
different, mutually exclusive alternatives are always present.17 In Western 
Europe and North America, the chosen alternative was generally one or 
another form of representative democracy, which, along with a tendency 
toward the generalization of suffrage, accounts for the so-called “first 
wave of democratization” theorized by the late Samuel Huntington.18 If 
abstraction is made from post-1917 developments, it is clear that in the 
early twentieth century Russia was riding this wave, too.
The notion of “regime” deserves some attention here. If we follow Leo 
Strauss, we can understand it as a rendering of the classical concept of 
politeia, i.e., the overall political life-form of a society: “Regime is the order, 
the form, which gives society its character … the manner of living of society 
and in society … that whole, which we today are in the habit of viewing 
primarily in a fragmentized form….”19 Regime thus includes such things 
as parliaments, political parties, governments, and constitutions; it covers 
the forms of both state (Staatsform) and government (Regierungsform); 
it includes various procedures, repertoires, and practices; it includes, 
finally, a particular ethos, i.e., a set of matching values and virtues. It is in 
this sense that we can see the period under consideration as a period of 
transition from the old to a yet-unknown new regime. Both the creation of 
a book like Vekhi and the debate around it, as public events in a relatively 
free Russia, fall within the horizon of the regime as far as the conditions 
of their possibility and legitimacy are concerned. The fact that both were 
legitimately there is indicative of the “actually existing” regime of Russian 
society at the time: it is hard to imagine Vekhi’s publication prior to 1900 or 
after 1920.
If the regime is the overall political life-form, society is what this life-
form is the form of. The crux to understanding the Vekhi episode from the 
perspective of political culture lies, arguably, in the discrepancy between 
the attempts to devise a new regime on the one hand, and the ongoing 
development and differentiation of society on the other. Here, it may be 
helpful to invoke the notion of functional differentiation as developed by 
Niklas Luhmann: it describes the development of relatively autonomous 
and (as Luhmann put it) autopoiètic “social systems” like church, market, 
— 18 —
Robin Aizlewood, Ruth Coates, and Ever t van der Zweerde
state bureaucracy, and civil society, unimaginable in antiquity and absent 
or kept out in pre-modern societies like tsarist Russia.20 The gradual 
replacement of a hierarchical society by a functionally differentiated one 
goes hand-in-hand with societal democratization in the Tocquevillean 
sense referred to above: given the fact that Russia was, comparatively 
speaking, a strongly hierarchical society, these changes acted as a shock. 
This societal differentiation comes to the fore in democratization, in the 
professionalization of parts of the population—think of the increasing 
political weight of the so-called zemstvo professionals (doctors, 
lawyers, statisticians, engineers, etc.), or of the military officers,21 and in 
individualization—all of which came not only at the expense of the old, 
tsarist regime, but also at the expense of the Russian intelligentsia as it 
had come to understand itself. On this point Mikhail Gershenzon proved 
himself a visionary when he wrote: 
The crisis of the intelligentsia is still just beginning. […] Instead of 
society shifting direction along the whole front…, the personality on its 
own will begin to determine the direction of society. […] Now we are 
entering a new era fraught with many difficulties. It is an era when … 
each one will have to determine the meaning and direction of his life for 
himself, and each will feel responsible for all he does and all he fails to do. 
(66–67)
The liberalization of Russian political and cultural life after 1905 had 
allowed for a plurality of political parties, but also for a large number of 
professional organizations and trade unions (legalized in 1906 and already 
numbering several dozen by that time).22 It had, with new legislation on 
religion initiated by Witte, put an end to the close connection between the 
autocratic state and the synodal church, thus depriving the state of its “central 
ideological pillar,” facilitating the economic and political participation of 
non-Orthodox citizens, and eventually liberating the Russian Orthodox 
Church from its subordination to the state.23 It had also, finally, made 
possible the very publication of Vekhi itself, and of the pluriform debates 
around it. The authors of Vekhi were both beneficiaries and supporters of 
this liberalization: in this respect, they were “natural liberals” and their shift 




It is against this backdrop of, on the one hand, differentiation, 
democratization, and individualization, and, on the other, the failed 
attempt at a constitutional regime, that we must understand both Vekhi and 
the often vehement reactions to it (see Finkel and Read, in this volume). 
Whether in acceptance or contestation, Vekhi reflects upon the very 
societal differentiation of which it is an instance, e.g., the differentiation 
of philosophy and religion from each other, and of both from politics. The 
religious idealism to which, following Vladimir Solov’ev in this respect, 
some of the Vekhi authors subscribed was already a reaction against the 
separation of philosophical thought and traditional religion that had taken 
place in Russian academic circles (though see Poole on an emerging new 
model of political theology in Vekhi). A differentiation of philosophy, 
religion, and politics, however, also puts an end to the traditional idea that 
it is from philosophers or thinkers that one would have to expect an answer 
to society. At this point, in addition to the shift in political position, there is 
a shift in position vis-à-vis politics. (On Vekhi and political philosophy, see 
van der Zweerde’s contribution.)
What Vekhi clearly does not do is present its readers with a political 
program or substantiate a particular political position or ideology, as its 
precursor Problems of Idealism had arguably done. As Lionel Kochan and 
John Keep put it, “it must be admitted that the Vyekhi group were better at 
raising questions than providing answers.”24 It should be noted, however, 
that members of this group had been much more explicit and positive at 
an earlier stage, both intellectually, as seen in Problems of Idealism, and in 
a directly political sense. If Vekhi, therefore, contains a sense of doubt and 
despair, this reflects not only a change in philosophical outlook, but also 
actual disappointment in reformist politics, something in which several of 
the authors had been actively engaged.
Indeed, the authors of Vekhi were much better at raising questions 
than in providing answers. In doing so, they undermined the primacy of 
the “What is to be done [chto delat’]?” question, and refused to sacrifice 
their intellectual seriousness to the urgency of matters political. But there is 
more at stake: if we see 1905–17 as a period in which Russia rapidly got 
rid of its “Old Regime,” as Richard Pipes has called it,25 and if we connect 
this with the notion of a “Crisis of Authority,” as Orlando Figes qualified 
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the 1891–1917 period, with crisis referring to political, religious, and 
intellectual crises,26 we should invoke at this point Claude Lefort’s idea 
that the transition from ancien régime to political modernity—the 
modern, liberal-democratic regime—is connected to a “dissolution 
of the markers of certainty [dissolution des repères de la certitude].”27 
Politically, the markers of certainty that had characterized the “old 
regime” and that had received ideological expression in the triplet 
“Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality” (Samoderzhavie, Pravoslavie, 
Narodnost’) as a would-be expression of national unity, had been 
replaced by the shallow and partisan “God, Tsar, and Fatherland” of the 
Union of the Russian People, representing a part rather than the whole 
of Russian society.28 Neither of these slogans, nor the triplet of “People, 
Revolution, and Socialism” of the Left, could convince intellectuals like 
the Vekhi contributors, and certainly not those of the stature of Bulgakov, 
Frank, or Kistiakovskii. Their key categories—truth, law, virtue, justice, 
faith, value (these are the core ones, but the list is open to debate)—were 
not alternative “markers of certainty” for a society as a whole, but rather 
for those “scattered individuals” (Berdiaev: 1) who had to “determine 
the meaning and direction” of their own lives and could only hope to 
become part of “a mighty, unconscious instrument of God’s terrestrial 
purpose” (Gershenzon: 67, 69). So, indeed, Vekhi was “symptomatic of 
the intelligentsia’s new mood of doubt and self-questioning,”29 but then 
this mood itself was symptomatic of the advent of a new type of society 
that radically put an end to the idea of the intelligentsia as a kind of 
alternative absolute authority. Rather than milestones on an unknown 
and pluriform path, the Vekhi were landmarks in an intellectual, not 
political, landscape, and if they were signposts, they were of such a kind 
that the key notions engraved on their surface—truth, law, justice, and 
more—were of greater importance than the direction in which they 
pointed (on the special relationship of Kistiakovskii to the questions of 
law, truth, and justice, see Rampton).
A key aspect of Vekhi, pointing at both the eternal question of the 
relation of intellectuals to political power—to put it platonically, the 
relation between philosopher and king—and the societal transformation 
of Russia at the time of its appearance, is thus connected to what is both 
— 21 —
Introduc t ion
author and object of the collection of essays, the famous intelligentsia (one 
of the words that Russia contributed to international parlance, along with 
pogrom and sobornost’) as a political factor. Three phenomena deserve to 
be mentioned here. First of all, during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, the meaning of “intelligentsia” had shifted, as Richard Pipes puts 
it, from “descriptive and objective” to “normative and subjective”: “By the 
1890s it was no longer enough for a Russian to have an education and 
play a part in public life in order to qualify; one had to stand in staunch 
opposition to the entire political and economic system of the old regime, 
and be willing to participate actively in the struggle for its overthrow.”30 As a 
normative concept, the intelligentsia had become radical and revolutionary. 
Secondly, in the first decade of the twentieth century, this self-appointed 
revolutionary force faced real changes, both economically and politically, 
which made the self-perception of the intelligentsia problematic. Vekhi 
was written by people who “were certainly themselves members of the 
intelligentsia in the eyes of the government and its supporters,” and yet 
questioned the very status of the group to which they belonged.31 Thirdly, 
as a sociological category, descriptive and objective, the notion underwent 
change, too, with the increasing importance, as noted above, of a new, 
professional zemstvo intelligentsia made up of lawyers, doctors, engineers, 
etc., who aspired to political influence and had begun to organize 
themselves after 1905, for example in the League of Unions led by Pavel 
Miliukov, yet lacked the overall revolutionary orientation of the radical 
intelligentsia. (On Vekhi and the intelligentsia, see Finkel, Nethercott, 
and Read.)32
Particularly interesting in this respect is the position of the academic 
intelligentsia which populated the universities under conditions of increased 
intellectual freedom: all the Vekhi authors had a university education, and 
Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Frank, Kistiakovskii, and Struve taught at university, 
the latter three even at the time they were working on Vekhi.33 If Vekhi, 
therefore, is a book that reflects confusion, it is not so much academic 
confusion about the meaning of the notion of “intelligentsia,” but rather 
the confusion of that very group itself.
A major reason for the continued appeal of Vekhi, finally, making it 
interesting not only as the historical document which it is, is that it addresses 
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a number of issues that are of continuing relevance to modern society: the 
differentiation of society into a plurality of relatively autonomous (sub-)
systems, the rise of the masses of the population as a political factor, most 
clearly manifested in the gradual extension of the franchise, the gradual 
shift from merely policing society to actually shaping it, and the role of the 
intellectual vis-à-vis political power. Vekhi is, itself, both a “piece of history,” 
and a text that raises issues which, if not of “eternal” relevance, take it well 
beyond its context. Certainly this has to do with the fact that at least three 
of its authors—Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank—are important twentieth-
century thinkers in their own right, who continue to be widely read and 
translated, and continue to receive mention in encyclopedias and general 
histories of philosophy.34
Vekhi and Russian Philosophical Culture
The Vekhi collection was published at a very interesting moment in the 
history of Russian philosophy. Twenty years before, Solov’ev and Fedorov 
were well established in their philosophical paths, but they were still “works 
in progress”; twenty years after, nearly all of the Vekhi contributors (to 
consider this partial but significant sample) had been exiled from Soviet 
Russia,35 and their philosophical positions had developed and clarified in 
directions only adumbrated at the time of Vekhi. Moreover, the Silver Age 
in Russian philosophy is quite a different phenomenon from its counterpart 
in literature: Russian literature at the start of the twentieth century (more 
broadly, from 1890 to 1930) knew, as it were, what it was—including in 
European contexts—and knew this to an extremely self-conscious degree 
that was hugely productive and not atrophying. Russian philosophy, 
on the other hand, knew (or had reason to know) that it had become 
something, but was still in the early stages of knowing for sure what that 
was: this too proved to be hugely productive. The early twentieth century 
was an unprecedented period of publication and republication of primary 
philosophical sources from the nineteenth century, of the most diverse new 
philosophical endeavors, and, last but not least, of the scholarly analysis of 
Russian philosophy at a level not undertaken before, including on the part 
of Russian philosophers themselves.36 
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Our purpose in this section of the Introduction is to ask the same 
question posed, explicitly or implicitly, by the Vekhi authors: how does 
Russian philosophy appear from the perspective of Vekhi? How does the 
history of Russian philosophical thought present itself, what is the range 
of thinkers included and which among them are foregrounded, how would 
one characterize the state of Russian philosophy toward the end of the first 
decade of the twentieth century? In this connection it is important to note 
that, as similarly proposed in the previous section, Vekhi both reflects on 
and embodies the philosophical situation of which it is part, and interesting 
questions are again raised as to whether and how we might wish to interpret 
Vekhi as “landmarks,” “milestones,” “signposts,” or all or none of these. An 
immediate answer might be that Vekhi offers none of the above, in that 
it shows a cast of thinkers still orienting themselves philosophically in 
a dynamic, contested, and evolving field, still seeking to define their own 
understanding of a philosophical tradition that, in Berdiaev’s words, “must 
be both universal and national—only then will it be culturally fruitful” 
(13). On the other hand, Vekhi populates the past and present philosophical 
landscape it surveys with a wide range of figures, including “landmarks” 
(such as, in the concluding paragraph of the “Preface,” Chaadaev, Solov’ev 
and Tolstoi [xxxviii]). It also calls, at a more general level, for the embedding 
of philosophical culture in Russia, clearly echoing the original such call on 
the part of Chaadaev some 80 years before (see Aizlewood’s article). 
Two main things emerge, and both pose for the contemporary and 
present-day reader alike some key—and to this day open—questions 
about the scope of Russian philosophy and/or philosophy in Russia. First, 
somewhat against the grain of the neo-idealism that may be supposed to 
define, more or less, the philosophical orientation of the collection, Vekhi, 
whether by design or not, locates itself in a more heterogeneous tradition 
or in a plurality of traditions: classical, European, and Russian. The primary 
traditions may be, on the one hand, neo-Kantian, reflecting the fact that 
several of the Vekhi contributors had studied in Germany and experienced 
the Kantian tradition first-hand; and, on the other hand, “concrete 
idealism”—to adopt the term Berdiaev uses, following Sergei Trubetskoi—
which starts from Khomiakov and features the “brilliant phenomenon” that 
is Solov’ev (12–13). But Vekhi also recognizes the presence of other strands 
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in the tradition in which it is located, including a strand or tradition that is 
“anti-philosophical,” and emphasizes the importance of Russian literature 
in any account of Russian philosophy. So far, therefore, it seems that Vekhi 
would position both itself and Russian philosophy in a relative rather than 
absolute position vis-à-vis Boris Groys’s elegant and fruitful insight that 
Russian philosophy constructs itself as “other” to western philosophy (or its 
perceived mainstream), and shows the closest affinity with that tradition’s 
internal “other.”37 Such a conceptual framework may also apply, at least in 
part, to the strand that Berdiaev identifies as “distinguished by an anti-
philosophical spirit” (14), with “anti-philosophical” understood as radical 
alterity. However, alterity and the “anti-philosophical” need not necessarily 
indicate lack of philosophical culture. A case in point here would be Shestov 
(who does not figure within Vekhi’s range of vision): he pursues a life-
long project of unmasking the pretensions of rationalist philosophy, from 
Socrates onward, while being steeped in philosophical culture. Shestov 
leads us to the second main thing to emerge: the date of Vekhi (1909) 
means that the wealth and diversity of Russian philosophy in the first 
third of the twentieth century was as yet far from fully apparent, and this 
indeed applies equally to the Vekhi authors Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank 
themselves, whose main philosophical direction and output were still in 
the future. 
Let us start with one particular aspect of the question as to the state of 
Russian philosophy: namely, does it tend toward optimism or pessimism. 
As Randall Poole, one of the contributors to this volume, has pointed out 
in his “Introduction” to Vekhi’s precursor volume Problems of Idealism, 
that collection represents a “more constructive work than its successors: its 
positive task was to advance neo-idealism as a theory of liberalism,” while 
Vekhi and Out of the Depths concentrated on critique.38 Indeed, Problems 
of Idealism is a confident work and one which is impressive in a different 
way from Vekhi, concerned as it is more fully and more strictly with 
philosophical material. It is not only that Vekhi, in contrast, concentrates on 
the prevalence of a “very low level of philosophical culture” (1) among the 
intelligentsia, as Berdiaev puts it. In addition, the rhetoric at times posits 
just a handful of people on the other side. Berdiaev sets the tone early on 
in the essay with which Vekhi opens: “Only scattered individuals possessed 
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a high philosophical culture” (1). However, his critique of the intelligentsia’s 
ignorance of “original Russian philosophy,” to go with their superficial 
borrowing of European ideas, brings with it an account of Russian 
philosophy and some of its protagonists over a span of 80 years (12–15): 
this is not, one might judge, such a fragile tradition. But ambivalence of this 
kind lurks throughout Vekhi, most plaintively when the expression of hope 
or call for reorientation, a rhetorical flourish with which each essay (apart 
from Izgoev’s) concludes, is read against the overwhelmingly damning 
critique that has preceded it. 
It makes a difference to the collection as a whole—and to the way we 
read the questions about Russian philosophy it poses—that it is Berdiaev 
who takes up the specific theme of philosophy in the opening essay. One 
can put forward a number of reasons for this assertion, which may involve 
a certain retrospectivity of reading in light of his subsequent career. First, he 
already has a diverse philosophical background and, in line with the highly 
individual cast that his philosophy will assume, is temperamentally averse 
to thinking within a school; second, he is remarkably open to engagement 
with a wide range of Russian thinkers and through his career is a prolific 
author of studies of both individual thinkers and the Russian tradition as 
a whole.39 So what, then, is Berdiaev’s account of Russian philosophy in 
his Vekhi essay? Overall what emerges is mainly a religious philosophy, but 
not exclusively so. This is also true of the collection as a whole. As such, 
Vekhi is in line with a major strand in the historiography, including what 
for many is still the most accomplished history of Russian philosophy, that 
of Zen’kovskii.40 Conversely, it is ironic that the line of logic that links Vekhi 
and its critique to the 1917 revolution is reflected also in the dominant 
paradigm or framework applied to Russian intellectual history through 
much of the twentieth century, namely that it leads from the Enlightenment 
to Marxism and the revolution.
When decrying the way that Russian thinkers of the intelligentsia 
have not only borrowed superficially but have also distorted as they did so, 
Berdiaev effectively denies that a whole succession of Russian thinkers of 
positivist, populist, Marxist, empiriocritical, and Nietzschean inclinations 
(Chernyshevskii, Pisarev, Lavrov, Mikhailovskii, Bogdanov, Lunacharskii, 
et al.) can be thought of as philosophers—indeed, Berdiaev places the 
— 26 —
Robin Aizlewood, Ruth Coates, and Ever t van der Zweerde
word in inverted commas when talking of them. Implicitly or explicitly, 
this view is shared by the other Vekhi contributors and is taken over 
from Problems of Idealism (even if that volume goes out of its way to be 
emollient).41 This is not the place in which to argue the individual cases, but 
suffice it to say that this view has its merits in most cases (which does not 
mean that these thinkers may not be significant from other perspectives). 
On the other hand, in a nod toward himself and his fellow contributors, 
Berdiaev’s assessment of Russian engagement with Neo-Kantianism, as 
well as with Kant, Fichte, and German idealism, is positive (10). When he 
goes on to consider the “original Russian philosophy” that is ignored by the 
intelligentsia (12–15), his account—as has already been noted—combines 
plurality with the proposed main, distinctive trend of “concrete idealism,” 
centred on Vladimir Solov’ev (not surprisingly, given Solov’ev’s huge 
presence in Russian philosophy of the late nineteenth century onwards) 
and associated also with Sergei Trubetskoi (author of a magisterial essay, 
“What the History of Philosophy Teaches,” in Problems of Idealism).42 
Berdiaev devotes a page or so to characterizing this trend, which develops 
in opposition to “Hegel’s abstract idealism and rationalism” (12–14). 
Before and after this, however, Berdiaev paints a heterogeneous 
picture, which raises important questions about the scope of philosophy in 
the Russian case. These questions are familiar now, but were not so then, 
as is indicated in the opening paragraph of this section. In his opening 
paragraph on “original Russian philosophy,” the first name he mentions 
is that of Chaadaev, whose Lettres Philosophiques/Filosoficheskie pis’ma 
(Philosophical Letters, 1828–30) offer a critique of Russian philosophical 
culture some 80 years before Vekhi. Chaadaev is followed in this pantheon 
by Solov’ev and Dostoevskii, the latter “of course” being “the greatest 
Russian metaphysician” (12). Berdiaev then generalizes to refer to the 
“metaphysical spirit of the great Russian writers,” which apparently 
includes Tolstoi, even though Tolstoi is equated with the intelligentsia in 
his hostility to “higher philosophy and creation” (12). (On the combination 
of ambivalence and hostility between Tolstoi and Vekhi see Hamburg, in 
this volume). When seeking to show that Russian philosophy is not just the 
“brilliant phenomenon” that is Solov’ev, Berdiaev goes on to list a number of 
philosophers, including the Slavophile Khomiakov, the Hegelian Chicherin, 
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and more recent philosophers of a broadly idealist, intuitivist, and/or 
religious persuasion (Kozlov, Sergei Trubetskoi, Lopatin, Losskii) as well 
as Nesmelov, the “most profound” figure from the theological academies 
(13). Reinforcing his awareness of academic philosophy, earlier in the essay 
he has also mentioned Iurkevich (3). Apart from the recognition that there 
is more to Russian philosophy than Solov’ev and his philosophical line 
(which indeed, however important it may be, does not define Berdiaev’s 
own subsequent development), the key point here concerns the implied 
common quality of philosophical culture, irrespective of philosophical 
tendency. This same question recurs, more problematically, at the end 
of his account, when he turns to “modern Russian mysticism,” which 
shares “the intelligentsia’s traditional hostility to philosophical endeavor” 
and lacks a “clear philosophical consciousness”: “Our most outstanding 
mystics—Rozanov, Merezhkovskii, Viacheslav Ivanov—do furnish rich 
material for a new statement of philosophical themes, but they themselves 
are distinguished by an anti-philosophical spirit, and anarchistic denial 
of philosophical reason” (14; on Merezhkovskii’s relationship to Vekhi see 
Rosenthal in this volume). Leaving aside the appropriateness (severally) 
of the characterization as mystics, this formulation—like the earlier 
formulation in respect to Tolstoi—is interestingly ambiguous or open, and 
may not exclude these thinkers from a contribution to philosophy. Thus, 
while maintaining the Vekhi line that due attention to philosophical reason 
is vital for philosophical culture, Berdiaev’s analysis seems to allow for 
a more inclusive approach too. This tension is one of the intriguing and 
illuminating features in exploring what one might call the broad borderlands 
of Russian philosophical thought. Moreover, Berdiaev will become a case in 
point. While few if any would exclude Berdiaev as a philosopher, he is not 
known for his adherence to logical exposition.43 
Although Russian philosophy is less foregrounded by the other Vekhi 
authors than it is by Berdiaev, the picture that nevertheless continues to 
emerge is one of a heterogeneous phenomenon. To some extent a dis-
ciplinary demarcation of subject matter between the articles is observed, 
as, for example, in Izgoev (sociology) and Kistiakovskii (law, see Rampton), 
but the rhetorical strategy of the whole tends to erode such boundaries. 
Heterogeneity is also conveyed through the repeated references to Russian 
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literature and its great writers. On the one hand, these are lined up in 
opposition to the intelligentsia’s worldview, for example, by Struve (121); 
on the other hand, following Berdiaev, Dostoevskii and Tolstoi are clearly 
seen to transcend the purely literary realm: Dostoevskii is a recurrent 
presence in Bulgakov’s essay (see Coates), he is of fundamental significance 
for Frank’s critique of the intelligentsia’s “ethical nihilism,” and Gershenzon 
identifies him as one of our “best minds,” along with Chaadaev and the 
Slavophiles (59). Gershenzon it is who, amplifying Berdiaev’s reference to 
Khomiakov as the starting point for the Russian critique of the extreme 
“abstract idealism” reached in Hegel, gives considerable prominence to the 
Slavophiles in his essay: this may be incompatible with some others, such as 
Kistiakovskii, but it shows how the contributors to the “common platform” 
of Vekhi can trace quite different ideational genealogies. 
Struve is the one author after Berdiaev who lists a good number of 
intellectual figures, not only writers, in opposition to the intelligentsia: 
these extend from Radishchev and Chaadaev to Solov’ev (120), with the 
father of the intelligentsia identified as Bakunin. It is particularly interesting 
that Struve sees Herzen, despite his atheism, as someone alien to the 
intelligentsia type, even if he at times wears its “uniform” (121); Bulgakov, 
on the other hand, locates Herzen in the intelligentsia camp (20). It is 
true that Struve’s criterion for the honor of not being an intelligent is not 
philosophical, and that Herzen is another case in point when it comes to 
the borderlands of philosophy in the Russian tradition, but it is interesting 
how Vekhi reveals an ambiguity over where he may stand in that tradition 
on account of his liberal aristocratic conception of the freedom and 
autonomy of the person. Despite the different fundamental starting points 
of Herzen and Vekhi, the typological similarities that arise are not trivial. 
This is not a novel observation about Herzen in general, but nevertheless 
it is one that is worth making in the context of Vekhi. Thus, the first half of 
Berdiaev’s closing sentence, which reads “We will be freed from external 
oppression only when we are freed from internal bondage” (16), could be 
taken word for word from Herzen. Many of the contemporary reactions 
to Vekhi can be interpreted as protest against the Vekhi contributors’ 




Among the nineteenth-century thinkers that have so far emerged, 
two important figures have not been mentioned, and indeed they are not 
mentioned in Vekhi. They are, first, Nikolai Fedorov, whose “philosophy 
of the common task” (an appropriation of this catchphrase in a key quite 
different from that of Gershenzon in the “Preface”) calls for the unity 
through resurrection of all mankind and represents the second great 
project of all-unity (alongside that of Solov’ev) in late nineteenth-century 
Russian culture; and second, Konstantin Leont’ev, a philosopher of culture 
and values who is one of the most original of all Russian thinkers (and 
sometimes called the Russian Nietzsche). In different ways, Fedorov for 
his extravagant utopianism and Leont’ev for his unpalatable reactionary 
positions, neither fits comfortably into some narratives of Russian thought, 
and their subtextual presence in Vekhi may strike the reader as surprising, 
even outlandish. In the case of Fedorov, the presence is marginal, but not 
to be dismissed. It is to be found in Bulgakov, when the larger theme of the 
intelligentsia’s wilful ignorance of historical continuity and the narrower 
theme of generational discord (“fathers and sons”) focuses specifically on 
the question of progress and attitude to fathers: “Humanistic progress, on 
the other hand, is scorn for the fathers, aversion to the past and complete 
condemnation of it, historical and sometimes even personal ingratitude; 
it legitimizes the spiritual discord between fathers and children” (39). 
Whether consciously or not, Bulgakov is here articulating the “fathers and 
sons” motif in a way which echoes Fedorov in his wonderful critique of 
progress as immoral because of its scornful relegation of the fathers to the 
historical dustbin.44 The presence of Leont’ev, far less marginally, is to be 
found in Frank. Almost certainly, too, Frank is well aware that he is drawing 
on Leont’ev, since in Out of the Depths he identifies Leont’ev as a thinker of 
“genius” who was “completely unnoticed” by the Russian intelligentsia.45 
Frank pays considerable attention to cultural creativity and wealth, and 
the most eloquent and profound philosopher of culture in nineteenth-
century Russia is precisely Leont’ev. In particular—in the framework of 
a cyclical understanding of history—it is Leont’ev’s conception of the 
decline of culture in terms of “secondary simplification”46 that is relevant 
here, for “simplification” is also an idea that recurs in Frank’s critique of the 
intelligentsia’s negative attitude to culture and its creative potential for the 
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betterment of the human condition. This is expressed, for example, in the 
following: “The Russian intelligent feels a positive love for the simplification, 
impoverishment, constriction of life” (150). 
Let us now return to the questions of how to deal with those whom 
Berdiaev implicitly relates to Russian philosophy, for example Tolstoi and 
Rozanov, but who are “anti-philosophical” in spirit, and how to deal with 
Dostoevskii and other figures from the Russian literary tradition. These are 
important and open—not to mention contested—questions. In both cases, 
a reading of Vekhi would argue against a limiting approach to Russian 
philosophy that either excluded Dostoevskii, Tolstoi, and Rozanov, or did 
not address how Russian philosophical thought could be conceptualized in 
a way which related them, however conditionally, to philosophy. Fluidity 
in definitions of philosophy and philosopher in the Russian case (thought 
and thinker are sometimes preferred) is not in itself indicative of anything 
amiss, but the well-known, and not easily tractable, problem in approaching 
Russian philosophy is to find a way to maintain an appropriate rigor in 
defining how Russian thinkers, and in specific cases, such as Dostoevskii’s, 
Russian writers too, may be defined as engaged in a philosophical enterprise, 
and to recognize the fact that the Russian philosophical tradition is not 
fruitfully limited to a homogenizing definition of philosophy. A key 
concept facilitating the traverse of borders in Vekhi is creativity, which 
recurs in a number of essays and is especially prominent in Gershenzon 
and Frank; needless to say, it has a large conceptual reach. It addresses the 
border, and its traversing, between literature and philosophy, and also a no 
less important border and traversal: that between philosophy and religious 
metaphysics (with Dostoevskii a case in point for both, if we follow 
Berdiaev’s characterization of him as “the greatest Russian metaphysician” 
[12]).47 Interpretations of Russian philosophy have addressed these borders 
variously. For example, as Galin Tihanov points out, the prominent 
philosopher of the late Soviet period Merab Mamardashvili, while taking 
care, on the one hand, “to distinguish between Russian philosophy and 
Russian literature,” nevertheless avoided, on the other hand, “drawing an 
impenetrable line between philosophy and religious thought in Russia,” and 
“essayed to see them as discursive formations that often occupied the same 
territory and were involved in a dialectic of exchange and competition.”48 
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In addressing the flow between literature and philosophy, Edith Clowes has 
sought to illuminate the literariness of Russian philosophy, while—from the 
other direction—James Scanlan has undertaken a philosophical approach 
to Dostoevskii, which is methodologically and conceptually important.49 
Indeed, one might suggest that Russian philosophy presents itself as an 
excellent testing ground for interdisciplinary approaches. 
In conclusion, for all that the picture of Russian philosophy which 
emerges from Vekhi is marked by plurality and heterogeneity, alongside 
a certain dominant line of “concrete idealism,” it is nevertheless striking how 
much fuller and more diverse, compared to Vekhi, is our retrospective view 
of that philosophy in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Such a view 
emerges when we take into account, first, the subsequent development of the 
Vekhi philosophers themselves, and of those, such as Rozanov, who feature 
in Vekhi but whose most original and important oeuvre still lay ahead (the 
“late, great Rozanov,” as it is called), and, second, those philosophers who 
pass unnoticed in Vekhi or who have yet to make their entrance onto the 
philosophical scene. These include Bakhtin, Florenskii, Karsavin, Shestov, 
and Shpet, to name just a few; to these one would of course add the last of the 
great Silver Age thinkers, Aleksei Losev, the subject of Takho-Godi’s article. 
The sense of heterogeneity in the Russian philosophical tradition, which 
emerges somewhat against the grain in Vekhi, is a crucial intuition. It is 
curious and ironic that the hopes of the Vekhi contributors for a reorientation 
of the intelligentsia—to avert a still greater national disaster which remains 
more or less unnamed, but which provides the tragic occasion for Out of the 
Depths in 1918—are confounded, while, on the other hand the remarkable 
flowering of Russian philosophical culture still has much to reveal. One 
could ask why the intelligentsia’s ignorance of Solov’ev and other Russian 
philosophers, lamentable as this may be and however relevant it is to the 
critique of the intelligentsia as an intellectual phenomenon, has any bearing 
on the capacity of this philosophy to flourish. Intrinsically, it has little or no 
direct bearing. We should not forget, however, the subsequent fate of that 
culture, and of individual philosophers, in the Soviet period. In this respect, 
the pessimistic undercurrent of Vekhi is more than justified. 
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Vekhi and Religion
It is striking how central a focus Sergei Bulgakov is in the articles in this 
volume (Coates, Poole, Smith) that concern themselves with the religious 
dimension of Vekhi. Given that the entire collection is commonly taken to 
represent not least a rejection of the atheist orientation of the revolutionary 
intelligentsia, one might expect the critical net to be cast rather more 
widely. That it is not is suggestive of the possibility that Bulgakov’s essay 
treats the religious theme in an atypical and richer way. In this section of 
the Introduction we aim to review Vekhi’s status as a religious text, or at 
least as a text that promotes religious values. How does the rhetoric of Vekhi 
encourage the reader to construct the volume as religious? What does the 
use of religious language and imagery reveal about the nature of the Vekhi 
authors’ religious values? What is the relationship between the religious 
dimension of Vekhi and the religious culture of Russia, as embodied in 
the Russian Orthodox Church or expressed in the Slavophile tradition 
of Russian thought? We will argue that the essays tend overwhelmingly 
to engage what one might call the positive content of religion, that is, its 
concrete historical forms of expression, metaphorically as a weapon against 
the intelligentsia; and that the essays substantially reveal what the religious 
values of their authors are by making plain through this strategy what they 
are not. With the exception of Bulgakov’s essay, the contributions tend 
toward an abstract theism that is consistent with the Kantian orientation 
of the majority of their authors. Though this abstract theism has a certain 
austere nobility, it not only marks a transient moment in the development 
of Russian religious thought (Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank would all 
move on to other methodologies), but is also at odds with the broad thrust 
of Orthodox culture and thought. It is a great irony that a collection that 
promotes national cultural wealth should itself be religiously poor.
In his “Preface” to Vekhi, Gershenzon famously declares that the 
common platform of its contributors is “the recognition of the theoretical 
and practical primacy of spiritual life [dukhovnoi zhizni] over the external 
forms of community” (xxxvii). We might take note of how broad a term 
“spiritual life” is as Gershenzon employs it, and how typical his use of the 
adjective “dukhovnyi” is of the volume as a whole. Without exception 
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the Vekhi authors employ “spiritual” as deriving from the broader 
Russian meaning of “spirit” (dukh), that is, as “consciousness, thought, 
psychological capacities; the principle that determines behavior, actions,”50 
and only residually, if at all, in its narrower, strictly religious sense. Thus, 
Berdiaev writes of “the basic spiritual features of the intelligentsia’s world” 
(1), Bulgakov of the intelligentsia’s “spiritual arsenal” (18), Izgoev of the 
“spiritual qualities” of Russian youth (76), and Frank of the “spiritual forces” 
of the intelligentsia, which he qualifies as “its beliefs, its life experiences, its 
values and tastes, its intellectual and moral tone” (132). These quotations 
all apply the term “spiritual” to the intelligentsia, whose materialism and 
atheism is of course a defining feature. An interesting question to ask might 
be how much of the intelligentsia’s negative reaction to Vekhi was stimulated 
by the mere imputation to it of a “spiritual” life, and how far it sought in 
its own discourse to avoid such philosophically idealist language. How 
closely did intelligentsia materialists associate the broad semantic range of 
“dukhovnyi” with religious belief? Perhaps they did so more closely than 
one might expect, given the hyper-sensitivity of the socialist intelligentsia 
to any concept sharing a border with the sphere of religion. Be that as it 
may, as native English-speakers reading Vekhi in translation we should be 
aware of how our own contemporary primary understanding of “spiritual” 
as “concerned with sacred or religious things” or “concerned with the soul 
or spirit”51 colors our reading of a text in which “dukhovnyi” is consistently 
translated as “spiritual.” It is possible that part of our perception of Vekhi as 
a religious text can be attributed to this.
A further part of this perception is almost certainly due to the Vekhi 
authors’ extraordinarily widespread use of religious metaphor in relation 
to the intelligentsia. The very broad range of non-literally applied religious 
terms includes “faith,” “worship,” “salvation,” “repentance,” “idolatry,” “sin,” 
“martyrdom,” “deification,” “iconoclasm,” “monasticism,” and “holiness” 
(this list is not exhaustive). Only Bulgakov’s essay explicitly foregrounds 
as its central theme “the religious nature of the Russian intelligentsia,” 
and therefore has a formal and thematic rationale for the use of religious 
metaphor, yet a majority of the Vekhi authors (Kistiakovskii and Struve 
being the exceptions) to a greater or lesser extent choose religious imagery 
to characterize the intelligentsia. It would be very interesting to attempt 
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a formal linguistic analysis of religious metaphorical language in Vekhi. 
It ranges from conventionalized, “dead” metaphor (for example, the use 
of “faith” in Kistiakovskii’s statement that the intelligentsia “puts unusual 
faith in the articles and paragraphs of organizational statutes” [105]), to 
highly self-conscious extended metaphor, as in the following passage from 
Gershenzon’s essay: 
The political faith, like any other, by its nature demanded a heroic deed. 
But in every faith the same story is repeated: since only a few individuals 
are capable of heroic deeds, the crowd, which cannot perform them but 
wishes to be in communion with the faith, devises for itself some platonic 
confession that involves no practical commitment. And the priests and 
martyrs themselves tacitly legitimize this deception in order to keep the 
laymen at least formally within the church. In our political radicalism, 
the rank-and-file intelligenty constituted the laymen. One had only to 
acknowledge oneself a true son of the church and occasionally participate 
in its symbolism in order to ease one’s conscience and satisfy society. (67)
In part, this use of religious language by the Vekhi authors testifies to 
the fact that it had become conventional, even a cliché, to view revolutionary 
socialism as an ersatz religion, or even in some way, following Solov’ev, 
as genuinely religious. Struve’s resistance to religious language follows 
from his principled rejection of this convention as based on a concept 
of religion that is “formal” and has “no intellectual content” (119). Yet 
several of the contributors, even as they challenge the convention, buy into 
it with their imagery. (It is these tensions that Gershenzon has in mind 
when he half apologizes, in his “Preface,” for the apparent contradictions 
of his contributors on the question of the intelligentsia’s religiosity.) For 
example, Izgoev is happy to refer to the intelligentsia as a “monastic order,” 
as “sanctifying” everything that ends in death (85), but rejects the “frequent 
attempts to identify the contemporary revolutionaries with the ancient 
Christian martyrs” on the grounds that these are “two completely different 
spiritual types” (87). Frank, who after Bulgakov makes the most intensive 
use of religious imagery (not least in his expansion on the intelligent as 
a “militant monk of the nihilistic religion of earthly well-being” [150–51]), 
at the same time explores the use of religious metaphor, acknowledging 
it as “inevitable and often helpful” but castigating it as imprecise and 
“an inaccurate use of words” (134). He acknowledges the psychological 
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proximity of “authentic” religious faith and the intelligentsia’s faith in the 
future happiness of the people (141–42) while asserting that all genuinely 
religious worldviews involve “faith in the real existence of the absolutely 
valuable” (134). Bulgakov is the most self-conscious in employing religious 
imagery to depict intelligentsia ideology as religion “inside out” (see Smith), 
but at the same time he too is critical of the tendency, originating with 
Belinskii, to view the intelligentsia as carrying out the work of Christ (40). 
Ultimately, all the Vekhi authors agree that the religious analogy is imperfect, 
but this only begs the question as to why most find it so compelling.
An important effect of the prolific use of religious imagery is, as 
mentioned above, that it encourages the reader to construct the text of Vekhi 
as “religious.” At the same time, however, it tells us something very interesting 
about the nature of the Vekhi authors’ religiosity. We would suggest that two 
kinds of religiosity are at play in Vekhi, one serving as the mirror image of 
the other (cf. Smith): a pure religiosity and a defective one associated with 
empirical religion, which is manifested principally as negatively valorized 
metaphor used polemically against the radical intelligentsia. It is more often 
than not the case that if the Vekhi contributors attribute a religious quality 
to the intelligentsia through such negatively valorized metaphor, that 
quality is rejected in terms of their own conception of religion. A striking 
example of this is the negative assessment of the intelligentsia’s world-
view as “dogmatic,” as betokening an unacceptable rigidity of thought, an 
assessment prevalent particularly in the very writers who are commonly 
deemed the most religious. For Berdiaev the intelligentsia’s views are “fixed, 
like dogmas” (4); Bulgakov writes of the intelligentsia’s creedal atheism and 
“abstract dogmatism” (22, 27); and for Frank, intelligentsia revolutionism 
has “all the force of religious dogma” (144). In institutional Christianity, 
dogma has the positive role of asserting and protecting the central beliefs of 
the faith. In their negative interpretation of dogma, the Vekhi authors reveal 
their own, perhaps unconscious, debt to the very Enlightenment of which 
many are so critical. Uses of the terms “obscurantism” and “fanaticism” also 
reveal that debt, as do negatively slanted references to “catechism,” “credos,” 
and “miracle.”
The Vekhi authors’ disdain for dogma is reflected in the doctrinal 
sparseness of their promotion of religious values. Apart from Bulgakov’s 
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essay, which is the exception that demonstrates the rule, the contributions 
include little if any theological substance, indeed little that is identifiably 
Christian. (It should not be forgotten that three of the seven authors were 
Jewish.) Berdiaev shows a sympathetic awareness of patristic anthropology 
when he grounds the equality of human beings in their common status as 
children of God, and when he asserts that love reveals “God’s own image in 
every human being” (6), but this remains undeveloped.52 Struve’s reference 
to the “mystique of the state” (118), set in its context of a critique of the 
anarchic and atheistic features of intelligentsia ideology, does no more 
than connote a body of Orthodox thought on theocracy, from which 
nevertheless, intuitively, one feels that Struve would surely want to distance 
himself.53 Finally, Gershenzon’s religious philosophy is (uniquely in Vekhi) 
articulated in pantheistic terms very remote from Christian dogmatics, 
though he is not averse to coloring it with Christological language, such 
as when he writes of “a genuine transfiguration of universal flesh in an 
individual hypostasis” (54).
In general, the question of the value of the institutional church—the 
Russian Orthodox Church—is completely neglected in Vekhi, despite the 
fact that one of its main concerns is for the impoverished state of culture 
and civil society in Russia. Berdiaev makes a single quasi-positive comment 
about the ecclesiastical academies (major educational institutions in pre-
revolutionary Russia),54 to the effect that they represent “a milieu far from 
the intelligentsia’s heart” (13). Struve throws in a reference to Patriarch 
Hermogen (116). Izgoev appreciates the clergy as “the physically strongest 
group in the nation” (78)! Even Bulgakov, who was unique among the 
Vekhi contributors in descending from a priestly family and who in 1909 
had already begun his slow return to the church, ignores the institutional 
expression of Christianity (priesthood, liturgy, sacrament) and celebrates 
instead the figure of the ascetic, whose charismatic authority, as Irina Paert 
has recently documented, was at odds with the authority of the priestly 
hierarchy.55 Bulgakov’s essay goes furthest to explain why the Vekhi authors 
refer to the institutional church only in terms of negatively valorized 
metaphors with which to condemn the intelligentsia with its oblique 
reference to the “numerous evils of church life” under the Synodal system, 
“which we have no desire to either minimize or deny” (47). He is no less 
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vague, however, about the positive aspects of “church life” that left their 
trace on the first intelligentsia generation of ex-seminarians (21). Beyond 
these references, the authors have nothing to say about the Orthodox 
Church at all.56
It is also worth commenting that while the Vekhi authors see 
intelligentsia ideology as “sectarian” in comparison to mainstream Russian 
thought (Berdiaev develops this metaphor most fully), which all agree is 
at the same time more profound and religious-philosophical in character, 
they are ambivalent about the Slavophile tradition. Bulgakov, whose very 
Dostoevskian essay on the face of it appears to sit rather comfortably with 
aspects of Slavophile thinking, expressly wishes to avoid falling into the 
“clichés” of the Slavophiles’ “naive, rather starry-eyed” faith (17). Just 
as interestingly, Izgoev disavows the Slavophiles while simultaneously 
promoting conservative family values that he himself admits were best 
embodied in the prominent Slavophile families (73). Kistiakovskii is 
highly critical of the Slavophiles’ romantic disregard for legal values (95). 
The Vekhi authors’ individualism precludes them from an appreciation 
of Slavophile social thought and from a creative reception of its central 
philosopheme, sobornost’. As van der Zweerde, in this volume, points 
out, in Vekhi the “people” are by and large treated as an undifferentiated 
mass and as passive beneficiaries, or victims, of the intelligentsia’s agency, 
and not as an organic community of equals. It might be expected that 
Kireevskii’s “integral reason” would lend itself to adaptation by the 
Vekhi authors in their thinking about the “primacy of spiritual life over 
the external forms of community.” However, the importance of Kantian 
ethics for the majority forestalls this, too: practical reason serves instead 
of mystical intuition as the vehicle by which the Divine is apprehended. 
Gershenzon’s essay is the only one which is explicitly Slavophile (and by 
the same token the least Kantian) in spirit, with its specific tracing of the 
intelligentsia’s ills to the Petrine reforms, its analysis of the “disintegration 
of the personality” (57) as reason becomes separated from the sensual-
volitional life, and its insistence on the qualitatively different soul of 
the people (61), which Gershenzon attributes to their “religious and 
metaphysical” (he does not say “Christian”) ideas and beliefs (62). On 
this last point Bulgakov agrees, maintaining with the Slavophiles that 
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“[t]he people’s world-view and spiritual outlook are determined by the 
Christian faith” (44).
Absence from Vekhi of the Slavophile polemic against the West, 
including its religious dimension, is one of its most striking features. This 
is where Dostoevskii and Bulgakov part company, as Bulgakov pleads 
for “a more profound, historically conscious Westernism” to replace the 
“superficial” Westernism of the intelligentsia (25). Running through the 
essays in particular is an appreciation for the Protestant Reformation, 
which has produced in the West the religious individualism (as opposed 
to the neo-pagan individualism promoted by the Renaissance) that the 
Vekhi authors are seeking to cultivate in Russia. Following Max Weber, 
Bulgakov accepts the idea that the Reformation created the conditions for 
the development of both the legal state with its protection of individual 
freedoms and the industrial enterprise that is indispensable for the 
creation of wealth, including cultural wealth (24). Particular appreciation 
is shown for British government and culture (in five of the seven essays). 
As examples of the transformative power of sustained introspection, the 
Slavophile Gershenzon adduces the biographies of the Protestants John 
Bunyan and Thomas Carlyle (54), and Struve argues that even Calvinism 
and Jansenism, despite their emphasis on predestination, promoted the 
idea of personal achievement (119).
All of these observations about the religious attitudes displayed in Vekhi 
are consonant with what we know to be the shared philosophical orientation 
of all the contributors but Gershenzon: Kantian idealism. A non-dogmatic 
religious cosmopolitanism, individualism, and rationalism are in evidence 
that derive from Kant’s position as a late Enlightenment thinker of Protestant 
extraction who promoted “religion within the bounds of reason alone.” Of 
the six Kantians, only Bulgakov has moved decisively into a Christ-centred 
religion of revelation, though in terms of his philosophical methodology 
he has not yet abandoned Kant for Schelling, as he would in 1912 (with 
the publication of Filosofiia khoziaistva [The Philosophy of Economy]). The 
remainder are content with an abstract conception of religion as “faith 
in the real existence of the absolutely valuable,” to use Frank’s expression 
(134). It is natural that Kantian ethics should lead the Vekhi authors to stress 
the importance of the individual’s inner work on herself or himself that is 
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highlighted by Gershenzon in his “Preface.” Nevertheless, precisely because 
their vision is for a rich and creative national Russian culture founded on 
the aggregate productive labor of conscientious individuals (see Frank, 
139), the contributors are preoccupied with the problem of asceticism (only 
for Bulgakov is asceticism the solution, see Coates, in this volume). Their 
disparaging comparison of the revolutionary intelligentsia to monks is 
informed by a widespread prejudice against Russian Orthodox monasticism 
as life- and world-denying, undoubtedly informed by Vladimir Solov’ev’s 
anti-monastic views. In contradistinction to this type of asceticism, the 
Vekhi authors promote Weber’s innerweltliche Askese (ascesis in the world), 
which is, tellingly, another Protestant phenomenon.
In their religious individualism, just as much as in their political 
liberalism and philosophical idealism, the Vekhi contributors show 
themselves to be an isolated minority voice in Russian public discourse, 
as far removed from popular piety and the national institutional church 
as they are from the collectivism and atheist “faith” of the revolutionary 
socialists. In contemporary Russia, too, the resurgence of a nationalist and 
anti-rational Orthodoxy means that, in religion as in political philosophy, 
the voice of the Vekhi authors can surely be expected to have only marginal 
appeal.
Conclusion
Vekhi, as the central text in the trilogy that starts with Problems of Idealism 
and ends with Out of the Depths, can be seen as a sustained intervention 
by a core group of concerned intellectuals in Russia’s public affairs. Despite 
the fact that, like many interventions by intellectuals, it “failed” in the 
sense of not achieving its intended and stated goals, its relevance goes well 
beyond this prolonged episode. First of all, if we see this intervention as, 
primarily, a warning, we should note that it was followed by seventy years 
of the kind of regime that it had warned against; the warning, in that sense, 
was very much to the point. Of course, a “failure” can only be stated with 
the advantage of hindsight, and we should not too lightly project later 
developments onto Vekhi itself. Was the sense of “sadness” that we read 
on its pages shared by the authors at the time of writing? Which kind of 
— 40 —
Robin Aizlewood, Ruth Coates, and Ever t van der Zweerde
“success” is presupposed in its qualification as a “failure”? Secondly, the 
failure of an intervention does not exclude the possibility that valuable 
arguments are made in the intervention, arguments that go beyond the 
situation and context themselves. This applies, for example, to the reflections 
on nihilism, asceticism, and legal consciousness. Finally, Vekhi offers an 
example, arguably a historically unique one, of such an intervention by 
a core group of established intellectuals. If we compare the Vekhi group with, 
for example, the Charter 77 group around Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, 
we find that—at the time of intervening—the Vekhi contributors were 
dissidents within the intelligentsia, not with respect to the regime, as shown 
by the fact that the attacks on them came from other intelligenty, not from 
the authorities. In all these ways, Vekhi can be seen as part of an important 
case of possible interaction between “thought” and “society.”
Vekhi is of continued interest in the intellectual history of humankind 
for another reason, too. We might see it as an attempt to enter a “public 
sphere” in the Habermasian sense of Öffentlichkeit, as part of a functionally 
differentiating society. Such a public sphere was clearly on the rise in 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russia. At the same time, 
however, the status of that public sphere was still unclear: was it a sphere of 
public opinion, or was this sphere directed to public affairs? Several of the 
contributors to Vekhi were intellectuals who also occupied, or had occupied, 
public positions, such as Duma membership. The fate of Vekhi shows it 
ending up as a contribution to public opinion only, without making much 
of a political or societal impact, but at the time of its appearance it was 
unclear which model was at stake: the traditional “Platonic” model of the 
philosopher-king; in Enlightenment terms, the model of the enlightened 
absolute monarch to whom intellectuals could send letters, petitions, and 
projects (think, for example, of Radishchev, Karamzin, Aksakov, Solov’ev, 
and Fedorov); or again the more plural and diffuse model of a public arena 
in which intellectuals present their ideas and considerations, and which 
may have an indirect effect on the policies of the powers-that-be. Part 
of what makes Vekhi so fascinating is that it is projected into a space the 
nature of which it is not sure about. At this point, interesting parallels can 
be drawn with the situation in Russia and other countries today, a century 
later: a thriving public debate in a partly free space (Russians are speaking 
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and publishing far more freely than they did in Soviet times, both on the 
internet and in printed publications) with an impact on public affairs that 
is as diffuse as it is uncertain.
Finally, Vekhi draws our attention to the boundaries and interactions 
between religion and philosophy, philosophy and politics, politics and 
law, etc. It presents an example of an intellectual tradition that has tended 
toward disciplinary fusion (think of Solov’ev’s conception of “integral 
knowledge” or the diffuse boundary between philosophy and literature)57 
and now finds itself in a situation in which its field of action is apparently 
not limited to the intellectual domain, but may in actuality move beyond 
into the social, blurring the dichotomy between the two. At the same time, 
Russian society was going through a rapid process of professionalization 
and disciplinary differentiation, of which several of the authors were 
themselves part in their roles as politicians, university professors, party 
organizers, etc. From this angle, Vekhi offers a highly pertinent example 
of problems of interdisciplinarity: how are academic disciplines like law 
and political economy related to the type of reflection that had dominated 
the Religious-Philosophical societies in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which 
functioned in roughly the same period (1901–17), and of which three of 
the four Vekhi authors who participated in all three volumes—Problems of 
Idealism, Vekhi, and Out of the Depths—i.e., Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank, 
had been active members?58 How to relate the differentiation of academic 
disciplines and public discourses to the “holistic” approach that not only 
is typical of “Russian religious philosophy,” but also would be necessary, in 
the eyes of many of our contemporaries, for any intellectual endeavor with 
serious social and political import.
The world of the early twenty-first century, obviously, is not the same 
as that of one century earlier, nor is today’s Russia the same as the Russia of 
1909. Still, there are several points of principle that need to be addressed in 
all times, such as the relations between politics and ethics, between politics 
and philosophy, between philosophy and religion, and between philosophy 
and literature. Even if the answers given by the Vekhi contributors may not 
immediately appeal to the present-day reader, and may stand in need of 
contextualization, the questions they raise are fully relevant. The articles in 
the present volume offer the contextualization that is needed, paradoxically, 
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to decontextualize the original publication and appreciate the extent to 
which it addresses issues that should interest the present-day reader as well. 
It then becomes clear that Vekhi was not simply a publication about Russia 
by Russians and for Russians, but is part of something like a “global political 
memory” (much as the 1905 and 1917 revolutions themselves were), and 
constitutes a “relevant intellectual event” well beyond the pale of relevance 
of Russia then or now. The Vekhi authors’ battle—if that is what it was—was 
indeed lost, but the event of Vekhi opens up the question of the role of 
intellectuals in a “democratized” public sphere/debate, the question of the 
quality of that debate, the question of elites, the role of the humanities, the 
question of possible or real impact on government. Those questions are 
with us as they were with those original authors.
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Word Games?
The Russian “Intelligentsia” as a Question of Semantics
Fr ance s  Ne t her cot t
Endeavors to define the intelligentsia, or to chart its origins and development, 
have generated a vast literature attesting to both its complexity as a pe-
culiarly Russian phenomenon and its importance as a tool for analyzing 
the interconnecting strands of the nation’s political, social, and cultural 
history. Among the more widely accepted definitions in modern and some 
contemporary scholarship is one that differentiates between “cultured” and 
“ideologically committed” elites. In his seminal essay on the mid- to late-
nineteenth century intelligentsia, published in the early 1960s, Richard 
Pipes used this distinction to characterize the former as predominantly 
a social category, which he equated with educated society or the reading 
public more broadly. However, in his analysis of the “ideologically 
committed” elite, Pipes focused on its professed revolutionary esprit de 
corps, worldview, and beliefs. Drawing upon a history of ideas approach 
in order to reconstruct the substance of the debate that members of this 
group engaged in, and the terms of their self-ascribed mission to transform 
society, he effectively placed his analysis of the intelligentsia, more narrowly 
defined, at one remove from socio-historical enquiry.1 
It is this second aspect, namely the articulation or formulation of 
opinions by members of the intelligentsia about themselves that concerns 
me here. An analysis of the lexicon used in intelligentsia debates, particularly 
the terms referencing, across generations, the deeply embedded problem 
of collective identity and self-definition shows that members of the pre-
revolutionary, and specifically, the pre- and non-Marxist intelligentsia 
rarely drew on sociological criteria; rather, their endeavors to categorize 
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the “intelligent”/“intelligentsia” tended to rely on a variety of “rhetorical 
textual strategies” sourced in Russia’s rich literary canon.2 The Vekhi text 
bears out this observation very well. All the contributors engaged in 
a complex exercise of semantics as a means to demolish idealized images 
of the intelligent which, beginning in the 1860s and 1870s, had been 
assiduously fostered by activists in their work as literary critics and authors 
of romans à thèse. In its place, the liberal authors of the Vekhi collection 
projected an alternative image of a “religious humanistic intelligentsia,” 
as Frank expressed it (155).3 Inspired, in part, by the example of the 
“spiritual pioneers” of the 1830s and 1840s, and their successors in the 
latter part of the century, the Vekhi authors’ “model” intelligent had no 
obvious fictional counterpart, as such; indeed, their obvious preference 
for historical exemplars of humanistic ideals could be interpreted as an 
attempt to reinstate the boundaries between fact and fiction that the radical 
intelligentsia had for so long creatively ignored. But, if the substance of 
the Vekhi authors’ quest for collective self-definition challenged the ethos 
of the radical intelligentsia, the form of that quest nevertheless remained 
consistent with the practice, perfected by their adversaries, of drawing on the 
nation’s rich literary heritage to advance socio-political and philosophical 
ideas. Throughout the volume, the reader frequently encounters references 
to leading novelists and their protagonists, and to literary tropes such as 
metaphor, irony, and stereotyping, all of which worked together to provide, 
paradoxically, a composite resource for the construction of an ostensibly 
socio-political discourse in the run-up to the revolution of October 1917. 
In order, then, to explore how the Vekhi authors conceived the intelligentsia, 
as well as the humanistic alternative they proposed, study of the rhetorical 
and polemical devices they employed is arguably just as important as an 
analysis of the content of the views they espoused. 
Typecasting the Revolutionary Intelligentsia
In probing the mentality of the intelligentsia, the Vekhi contributors 
independently identified a number of salient character traits which, taken 
together, serve as an identikit of the “typical intelligent.” The principal 
features include: student-youth culture (studenchestvo), which Aleksandr 
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Izgoev associated with bad education, and Bogdan Kistiakovskii with 
unruly behavior (“socially and individually”), nihilism, maximalism, 
and atheism (91).4 In sum, these traits targeted the populist tradition, 
as Semen Frank states: “In his ethical core, the Russian intelligent has 
remained a stubborn, inveterate populist from the 1870s, approximately, 
to the present day. His God is the people, his one aim is the happiness of 
the majority, and his morality consists of service to this goal combined 
with ascetic self-restraint and with hatred or disdain for spiritual interests 
of intrinsic value” (140).5 Throughout the collection, these traits of the 
“typical intelligent” are twinned with their opposites, thereby providing 
a simple yet effective device to pass judgement. Time and again, the 
contributors contrast “youth,” both physiological and psychological, with 
maturity, as, for example, when Izgoev writes that “the highest praise 
you can give a Russian intelligent is to call him an old student” (77).6 
For the Vekhi contributors, the intelligent’s refusal to grow up and accept 
responsibility for his actions betrays a slavish mentality endemic to the 
intelligentsia as a whole. Depicted as a faceless, anonymous social group, 
the intelligentsia thus stands in stark contrast with the Vekhi contributors’ 
own elected pantheon of great thinkers and artists, all of whom are 
identified by name in tribute to their independence of mind. Mikhail 
Gershenzon and Izgoev, for example, contrasted the common or garden 
intelligent (rendered as “the intelligentsia mass,” “the average intelligent,” 
“the average mass intelligent”) to the elite Russian thinkers, Chaadaev, 
the Slavophiles, and Dostoevskii.7 “Only scattered individuals,” Nikolai 
Berdiaev wrote, “possessed a high philosophical culture, and this in itself 
set them apart from the world of the intelligentsia [intelligentshchina]” 
(1).8 According to Gershenzon, the incontestable sign of creative genius 
is one’s inner freedom. In view of the intelligentsia’s social-utilitarian 
morality, he could only conclude that, “in Russia, an almost infallible 
gauge of the strength of the artist’s genius is the extent of his hatred for 
the intelligentsia. We need mention only the greatest of them: Lev Tolstoi 
and Dostoevskii, Tiutchev and Fet” (60).9
As a “moral type,” as Frank labelled them (153), the atheism and 
nihilism professed by the intelligentsia described the sharpest opposition 
of all to the personalist Christian faith that a number of the Vekhi authors 
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shared. Yet, as well as openly reinforcing this contest of opinions, they 
also drew attention to a common advocacy of social engagement in order 
to perform a substantive critique of the radical intelligentsia’s worldview 
in the guise of rhetorical undermining. Not only did they strike at the 
contradictions embedded in the intelligentsia’s social credo, they also 
produced some of the most memorable cameos of the intelligentsia’s state 
of mind. Building on Dostoevskii’s original critique of the intelligentsia’s 
conscious appropriation of religious qualities, the Vekhi authors introduced 
the idea of monastic contemplation, effectively subverting the intelligent’s 
vocation of transforming society. Berdiaev and Sergei Bulgakov noted 
that, despite his declared commitment to social welfare, the intelligent had 
remained cloistered, remote from the world. Like a monk (an image which 
both Gershenzon and Frank used), he found “worldly vanity or diversions” 
deeply disturbing. But, inscrutably, if the intelligent shunned reality by 
inhabiting a world of phantoms, dreams, and pious faith, he also fervently 
sought to transform the world from within the “walls of his monastery and 
to propagate his faith in it.” “In summary,” wrote Frank, “we can define 
the classic Russian intelligent as a militant monk of the nihilistic religion of 
earthly well-being” (151; 150). 
Literary Models and Inflections
In their analysis of the symptoms of intelligentsia behavior, the Vekhi 
contributors drew quite extensively on the national literary canon. In doing 
so, they were in many respects following in the footsteps of the radical 
intelligentsia. However, whereas their predecessors had made enormous 
demands on literature so that it became a vehicle for social and political 
critique, the Vekhi authors sought to restore the autonomy of the cultural 
sphere, and they did so, in part, by appealing to a body of literature that 
the first-generation intelligentsia had rejected as socially irrelevant, but 
which had, for their critics, a powerful moral, aesthetic, and metaphysical 
resonance. Parrying references to intelligent-poets and novelists, such as 
Nekrasov, Uspenskii, or Garshin with the names of Chekhov, Dostoevskii, 
Fet, and Tolstoi, they mapped out the mutually exclusive worlds that—
in Gershenzon’s words—these genuine artists, as bearers of “artistic” 
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and “living truth,” on the one hand, and the intelligentsia, on the other, 
respectively inhabited: 
What the intelligentsia lived by quite literally did not even exist [for 
our best people—FN]; at the peak of the civic movement Tolstoi was 
glorifying the wise “stupidity” of Karataev and Kutuzov, Dostoevskii was 
studying the “underground,” Tiutchev was singing of primordial chaos, 
and Fet of love and eternity. […] The intelligentsia applauded … but it 
was not swayed. Moreover, through its spiritual leaders, the critics and 
journalists, it set up a tribunal to try the free truth of creativity, and it 
convicted Tiutchev of inattention and Fet of mockery, while Dostoevskii 
was pronounced reactionary and Chekhov indifferent. Its deeply 
prejudiced consciousness closed the intelligentsia’s soul to artistic as well 
as living truth. (60–61)
If the intelligentsia could, with some justification, dismiss the works 
of Chekhov and Dostoevskii as socially irrelevant, it was compelled either 
to ignore or to deny the hostile and rather troubling portrayals of the 
intelligentsia types that these writers created. Gershenzon noted that within 
Chekhov’s carefully drawn gallery of character studies, “there are barely five 
or six normal individuals. Nine-tenths of our intelligenty are neurasthenic” 
(65).10 Bulgakov sourced a similar observation in Dostoevskii’s novels: 
Following Dostoevskii, it has frequently been noted that the Russian 
intelligentsia’s spiritual make-up contains elements of religiosity which 
sometimes even approximate Christianity. The intelligentsia’s historical 
predicament was primarily responsible for fostering these traits: on the 
one hand, government persecution gave it a feeling of martyrdom and 
confessorship, while forcible isolation from life, on the other, produced 
dreaminess, occasional starry-eyed idealism, utopianism, and, in general, 
an inadequate sense of reality. (20)11 
Besides deferring to an alternative set of literary authorities, the Vekhi 
authors also relied on stylistic cadences of their own, both as a means to 
parody the intelligentsia’s self-representation as the progressive elite and 
to diagnose its sense of mission as a form of neurosis, as the following 
passage from Gershenzon illustrates: “The average intelligent … felt more 
unwell with every passing year. He was already living very badly in the 
mid-eighties. […] Scarcely any of them are healthy—they are all jaundiced, 
morose, anxious figures deformed by some secret dissatisfaction” (65). 
— 54 —
Frances Nethercot t
Izgoev mimicked the intelligentsia’s profession de foi: “Your convictions will 
lead you to your crucifixion: they are holy, they are progressive, you are 
right …” (84).12 Similarly, Bulgakov presented the intelligent as an aspiring 
“hero” in his own narrative, his youthfulness and courage fortified by the 
suffering and martyrdom he willingly endured. The ironic sting in the tale, 
as Bulgakov tells it, however, is that, having donned the “uniform of the 
intelligent,” “those heroic youths … in later life so easily and imperceptibly 
turn into ‘superfluous men’ or into Chekhovian and Gogolian types, ending 
up with wine or cards, if not worse” (33). In building his portrait, Bulgakov 
referenced a number of Russian (and German)13 romantic poets and 
novelists, but his depiction of the intelligentsia’s mental world and beliefs in 
terms of a man-deifying “all is allowed” motto obviously found its deepest 
inspiration in the novels of Dostoevskii: “The heroic intelligent … is not 
content with the role of the modest worker.… His dream is to be the savior 
of mankind, or at least, of the Russian people. He demands (in his dreams, 
of course) not the secure minimum but the heroic maximum” (28).14 
Even where the Vekhi authors identified leading representatives of the 
1860s–1870s generation by name, the focus still privileged a classification 
of the intelligentsia mentality. Thus Pisarev, the “barbaric iconoclast,” as 
Frank called him, emerges as the quintessential intelligent, the embodiment 
of his age’s “spiritual mood”— a utilitarian ethic of rational egoism: “Muffled 
and uncertain, the voice of aesthetic conscience sounds even more faintly 
and more timidly in the Russian intelligent’s soul. In this respect Pisarev 
and his puerile dethronement of our greatest national artist (Pushkin), 
and the entire Pisarev episode, that turbulent revolt against aesthetics, 
was not merely an isolated incident in our spiritual development. It was, 
rather, a lens that focused the rays of barbaric iconoclasm that still burns 
unquenched in the intelligentsia’s consciousness onto a single bright point” 
(134). In other respects, the Vekhi portrayal of the intelligentsia was, as 
the foregoing quotations suggest, closely modelled on the self-image of 
the early revolutionaries, which they had projected either through their 
fictional creations or by playing out their own lives “in character” as “new 
people” in accordance with the rules of the ideologically-engaged aesthetic 
they espoused.15 Among the most notorious and often-cited instances 
of this practice was the radical writer Dmitrii Pisarev and his alter-ego, 
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Evgenii Bazarov, Turgenev’s anti-hero in his celebrated novel Ottsy i deti 
(Fathers and Sons, 1862). Pisarev singled out Bazarov as the model of “our 
young generation”; he encapsulated its spiritual physiognomy.16 Bazarov 
“acknowledges no rule above or outside him, no moral law or principle,… 
espouses no elevated purpose, is not prone to self-reflection, yet despite—
or because—of that possesses enormous power.”17 Pisarev’s indebtedness 
to Turgenev’s fictional creation is again obvious in his own “credo of 
iconoclasm,” which he devised for the “thinking realist”: “[S]hatter what 
can be shattered—the test of what is worthwhile is that which resists the 
force of the blow. All the rest, broken into a thousand pieces, is nothing but 
useless, obsolete rubbish. In any case, strike out to the left and to the right: 
it won’t do any harm.”18 
Whether Pisarev’s readers approved or condemned his “guide to life,” 
they all seemed prepared to suspend disbelief, ignoring the boundaries, 
however porous, that exist between fact and fiction. Among his older 
contemporaries, the literary critic Nikolai Strakhov, for example, contended 
that Pisarev had made himself the “lyrical hero” of his articles, and thus 
was not so much a “theorist of bazarovshchina,” as a distorted reflection 
(inobytie) of Bazarov himself. In the process he rendered the fictional hero, 
if not more real, then certainly more profound, than his real-life admirer: 
“It goes without saying that Bazarov does not look at things the way 
Pisarev does. Even though he denies art its real value, Pisarev does in fact 
acknowledge it as such, whereas Bazarov rejects it outright because he has 
a deeper understanding of it.”19 According to Strakhov, Pisarev’s Bazarov-
style ramblings and homilies, together with an excessive preoccupation 
with his own “Bazarov image,” steered him along a false path resulting in 
numerous contradictions and empty claims, all of which placed him well 
below the “real Bazarov.”20 In much the same vein, the Vekhi contributors 
ignored the boundaries between fact and fiction. On the (largely correct) 
assumption that they required no contextualization for a Russian audience, 
fictional characters appear in their arguments to illustrate a point. Thus 
Frank, for example, could with complete ease refer to “our Bazarov” and the 
consequences of his cold, irrefutable logic for the intelligentsia worldview 
without referencing the names of either his creator or the novel in which he 
played out his nihilistic system.21 
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Definitions of the intelligentsia by both first generation radicals and 
their Silver Age critics, then, were sourced in a single semantic field of paired 
oppositions (youth versus maturity, sons versus fathers, nihilist versus 
idealist, atheist versus Christian believer) and a stock of literary types—
from the “superfluous man” to the rational egoist and repentant nobleman. 
By simply inverting the positive and negative qualifiers originally attached 
to intelligenty, men of letters, or the educated classes more broadly, the Vekhi 
contributors succeeding in transforming the heroes of early intelligenty 
narratives into caricatures. But if the force of the Vekhi critique depended 
on a mastery of rhetoric, metaphor, and parody, their engagement with 
the “intelligentsia question” was also informed by a new accent in literary 
criticism, which is perhaps best summarized as a preoccupation with 
questions of a metaphysical order, of religion and personhood that was 
symptomatic of the more speculative and apocalyptic mood of the Silver 
Age generation. Against the radical intelligentsia’s designs to champion 
an ideologically-engaged aesthetics, the Vekhi authors perceived the novel 
as an opportunity to explore man’s inner spiritual realm.22 Dostoevskii’s 
masterpieces, in particular, whose protagonists exemplified aspects of the 
human condition, and probed the deeper moral questions of good and 
evil, clearly answered the Vekhi authors’ concern to address the social and 
material goals of the radical intelligentsia in terms of their frightening 
moral implications. Thus, if, at one level, Nikolai Shelgunov’s assertion 
that Pisarev was “the prophet of the young generation,” and Frank’s verdict 
that his attempt to dethrone “our greatest national artist” (Pushkin) was 
“puerile,” read as straightforward polemical sallies, their respective broader 
assessments of Pisarev’s place in the intelligentsia movement referenced 
a shift in the literary-critical paradigm. Accordingly, Pisarev passed from the 
embodiment of a “social type,” worthy of emulation, into a very dangerous 
“psychological type,” driven by a fanatical abnegation and unswerving 
dedication to science. Berdiaev made a similar point in his contribution 
to Iz glubiny (Out of the Depths, 1918), the sequel volume to Vekhi written 
in response to the 1917 revolution. If, during the mid-nineteenth century, 
literary critics treated Gogol’ as the founder of the “realist” trend in 
Russian literature, early twentieth-century readers, caught up by a sense of 
imminent crisis and apocalypse, recast his work as “an artistic revelation of 
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evil.” This was not, Berdiaev stressed, a revelation “of a social and external 
evil linked with political backwardness and lack of enlightenment,” but evil 
“as a metaphysical and internal principle.”23
Defining the Vekhi Contributors
Endeavors by the Vekhi contributors to distance themselves from the 
intelligentsia tradition, and to redefine the social role and ideology of 
a radically different “critically thinking elite,” foreground a number of 
ambiguities with regard to their own identity as a group and their place in the 
intelligentsia tradition more broadly. If the substance of the Vekhi critique 
established unequivocally their rejection of the radical intelligentsia’s 
anti-statism and utilitarian aesthetics, formal self-designation proved 
elusive. 
Writing at the turn of the century, the historian of philosophy Sergei 
Trubetskoi noted that to be a “cultured person [kul’turnyni chelovek]” was 
aspirational, but to be called an “intelligent,” which to his mind carried the 
same negative connotations as “bureaucrat [chinovnik],” was an insult.24 
In view of the Vekhi authors’ open disavowal of the original intelligentsia 
model, it is tempting to class them as would-be intellectuals. However, 
there are several factors militating against this. Although in the Vekhi 
collection the word “intellectual” does occur, it is only as an adjective: for 
example, “the intelligent lacks what Nietzsche called ‘intellectual conscience’ 
[intellektual’naia sovest’]” (134).25 As a noun, the term did not, as yet, have 
much currency; in west European languages it had only recently been 
coined in an attempt to “recapture and reassert,” as Zygmunt Bauman 
argues, “that societal centrality and those global concerns which had been 
associated with the production and dissemination of knowledge during the 
age of Enlightenment.”26 Neither the Vekhi contributors nor their immediate 
contemporaries, who expressed a dislike for the term “intelligentsia,” were 
able to offer a single alternative label to profile their own self-ascribed 
role as a “critically thinking elite.” For want of a better solution, it was 
common practice to place the term “intelligentsia” in inverted commas or 
to seek circumlocutions when referring to a cultural elite that eschewed 
revolutionary extremism while still actively deliberating on questions of 
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social justice. Thus, in their bid to restore the values associated with the 
“spiritual pioneers” of the 1830s and 1840s and their successors active at the 
close of the nineteenth century, the Vekhi contributors glossed their elected 
role models variously as “thinkers [mysliteli],” “people of profound education 
[liudi glubokoi obrazovannosti],” “of profound intelligence [glubokogo 
uma],” people who are “especially talented [osobo darovitye].”27 Otherwise, 
the term “intelligentsia” (with or without quotation marks) is annoyingly 
ubiquitous, and requires close attention to the context in which it appears: 
“Obviously, by ‘intelligentsia,’ we do not mean attending balls at the Nobles’ 
Assembly. Nor do we even mean the ‘educated class’ … with its cultural 
function of spreading enlightenment. […] The intelligentsia is a totally 
unique factor in Russian political development, its historical significance 
stemming from its attitude to both the idea and the actuality of the state” 
(117–18).28 Petr Struve’s remarks, cited here, suggest that he was conscious 
of the need to position himself with respect to the original intelligentsia 
model, and he did so by historicizing it. Berdiaev also recognized the 
importance of distinguishing between a genuine intelligentsia and its 
epigones, as his inclusion of the pejorative “-shchina” suffix to create the 
neologism “intelligentshchina” suggests.29 In addition, he transposed this 
suffix to a partner noun to speak of “intelligentskaia kruzhkovshchina”— 
a rhetorical strategy that gave “intonational weight” to his condemnation 
of the intelligentsia’s failure to recognize the importance of individual 
responsibility.30 That said, Berdiaev only used the derogatory term 
“intelligentshchina” a handful of times, and the reader is, again, forced to rely 
on the context in order to gauge who or what is meant by “intelligentsia.” 
Other contributors were less rigorous; rather than distancing themselves, 
they muddied the waters with intermittent inclusions of a broad-based 
“we,” in guilty recognition of the part they had played in the failure of the 
1905 revolution. Bulgakov began his essay with a mea culpa account of the 
failure of the revolution, in which he, like all of the contributors, had been 
directly involved. Gershenzon openly positioned himself as an intelligent, 
and although he did not, of course, align himself with the “rank and file” 
(massovaia) intelligentsia, he persistently blurred the distinction between 
the two categories to produce in places an (unfortunate) all-inclusive “we.” 
His “we are cripples” is a clear instance of self-castigation; his exclamation 
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of shame—“our best people looked at us with disgust and refused to bless 
our cause” (51, 60)—was arguably, in view of the polemical intentions of 
the volume as a whole, not an admission of guilt other contributors would 
be prepared to make.
It goes without saying that, despite their disavowal of the intelligentsia, 
the Vekhi authors remained no less committed, through the written and 
spoken word, to encouraging awareness among the public of the need for 
social change. This explains why they were seemingly reluctant to equate 
their concept of the genuine intelligent, or enlightened man of letters, with 
the image of an “intellectual-scholar.” Again, in fictional depictions, the 
latter was associated with disinterestedness and uninspiring academia. If 
both the intelligent and the educated elite were portrayed as “westernized” 
in upbringing and formal education, narrative accounts of their sharply 
contrasting lifestyles worked to dramatic and comic effect. While the errant 
(when not exiled) intelligent, opponent of tsarist autocracy and participant 
in the underground, conspiratorial kruzhki where he plotted radical social 
change, made for an exciting storyline, the aloof, sedentary, and usually 
conformist scholar or man of letters, who enjoyed the refined rituals 
of salon culture and the country estate, did not. Likened to the German 
“cabinet professor,” the intellectual scholar was either the butt of sarcastic 
criticism (Pisarev) for his abstract theorizing and lack of social commitment 
or viewed as an exotic species (Chekhov’s “Skuchnaia istoriia” [“A Dreary 
Story,” 1892]) cultivating private interests and producing nothing.31
Struve furnished possibly the most comprehensive list of intelligenty 
and their opposites, which is worth quoting in full: 
We need only compare Novikov, Radishchev, and Chaadaev with 
Bakunin and Chernyshevskii to understand the ideological gulf that 
separated the luminaries of the educated class from the luminaries of 
the Russian intelligentsia. […] The great writers, Pushkin, Lermontov, 
Gogol’, Turgenev, Dostoevskii, and Chekhov, do not have the lineaments 
[lik] of intelligenty. Belinskii’s greatness is not as an intelligent, as 
Bakunin’s pupil, but chiefly as the interpreter of Pushkin and his national 
significance. Even Herzen, despite his socialism and atheism [i.e., 
attributes of the intelligent—FN], waged a constant inner struggle with 
his intelligent’s image. Or rather, he sometimes wore the uniform, as it 
were, of the Russian intelligent. […] Mikhailovskii is an example of a ty-
— 60 —
Frances Nethercot t
pical intelligent.… Vladimir Solov’ev is not an intelligent at all. Saltykov, 
who, as an individual, has little in common with Herzen, is very similar 
to him in one regard: although he was in no way an intelligent, he too 
wore the intelligentsia uniform, and quite submissively. Dostoevskii and 
Tolstoi, each in his own way, tore this uniform off and threw it far away. 
(120–21)32 
The suggestion here is that once branded intelligenty, these men of 
otherwise outstanding talent sacrificed their individuality and reverted 
to type. By contrast, the image of the ideal enlightener which the Vekhi 
authors endorsed is not sourced in the literary imagination: it primarily 
identifies individuals of intellectual and creative greatness who espoused 
theoretical, aesthetic, and religious values, and who were challenged or 
victimized for their independence of thought. Moreover, in opposition to 
the intelligent, defined as a product of Russia’s long tradition of repressive 
censorship, the “non-” or “anti”-intelligent had a resonance that potentially 
crossed national borders and time frames. Indeed, there are grounds for 
suggesting that the intellectual-cum-moral role model which is advanced 
in Vekhi anticipated the emergence of the “philosophe engagé” we associate 
with French leftist intellectuals in the twentieth century, just as, in some 
ways, it was reminiscent of the enlightened philosophe as defined by Voltaire. 
What distinguished the Vekhi role model was, of course, the pre-eminence 
of a religious dimension in the authors’ account of man and society, 
a component not found in the more secular worldviews of Enlightenment 
thought and twentieth-century west European existentialism. 
Bet ween History and Sociology 
“The word ‘intelligentsia,’” Struve remarked, “can of course be used in 
various senses. The history of this word in colloquial and literary Russian 
might be the subject of an interesting specialized study” (117). For the 
purposes of his argument, namely that the intelligentsia was a historically 
specific phenomenon, Struve identified the term as the expression of an 
attitude toward the regime (“atheistic dissociation from the state,” 121). But 
his observation also suggests that he was deeply aware of the difficulties 
presented to anyone endeavoring to offer a definition of the intelligentsia. 
It is worth noting that, initially, the dominant definitional criteria used 
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in historical surveys of the intelligentsia, which began to appear in 
this period, were moral and ideological. The authoritative Brokgaus-
Efron encyclopaedia, for example, highlighted the intelligentsia’s self-
ascribed mission to serve the people as a feature exclusive to the most 
“progressive sector of educated society,” thereby making its worldview 
integral to the definition.33 The critic and historian of populist persuasion 
Ivanov-Razumnik, who made explicit the link between the history of the 
intelligentsia and the history of social thought more generally, specified 
hostility to the “bourgeois [meshchanstvo]” as the hallmark of a genuine 
intelligentsia across the successive phases in its development. In view 
of its “classless nature [vneklassovost’],” the collective identity of the 
intelligentsia derived from a bond of consciousness and a shared moral 
passion.34 Increasingly, though, as Marxist literature prevailed, definitions 
of the intelligentsia acquired a more evident social referent building upon 
the original definition advanced by the popularizer, Boborykin, as “the 
most educated, cultured and progressive section of society in any given 
country.” 35
This double set of definitions—one a functionalist definition pitched 
in terms of a specific social referent (progressive, educated), the other 
more “culturalist,” emphasizing a professed outlook and self-image—has 
also fed competing views concerning the transferability of the concept to 
other cultures.36 If the Vekhi authors, subscribing to the second definition, 
regarded the intelligentsia as a unique, historically defined phenomenon, 
and continued to do so in their émigré publications, others, such as the 
historian and Kadet leader Pavel Miliukov, and the literary historian 
D. N. Ovsianiko-Kulikovskii, in addition to Boborykin, just mentioned, 
made a case for the existence of comparable sub-cultures across continen-
tal Europe.37 Doing so, however, was possibly at the cost of conflating terms. 
For example, Miliukov’s argument against a nationally specific definition of 
the intelligentsia derived from his view that the characteristics separating 
the intelligentsia and the educated class were not stable; depending on the 
context, differences between them could either dissolve or be exacerbated 
by the terms of hostile polemics.38 With no fixed distinction between the 
two, the task of identifying comparable phenomena elsewhere thus becomes 
far less problematic. Certainly, as Stefan Collini has argued in his study 
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of British intellectuals, the term “intelligentsia” was an influential foreign 
import, which in the early twentieth century was assumed to “identify 
a sociologically distinct group” who, by virtue of an education that set them 
apart from an almost wholly illiterate society, were committed to being 
critical of political and religious authority.39 He cites Karl Mannheim’s 
1929 study, Ideologie und Utopie (published in an English translation in 
1936) as an illustration of the facility with which the term was absorbed 
into sociological discourse: “In every society there are social groups whose 
special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society. 
We call these the ‘intelligentsia.’” But, as Collini notes, Mannheim was 
essentially using the term as the plural or categorical form of “intellectuals.”40 
Informed by a nascent social science and class analysis inspired by 
European Marxism, the intelligentsia acquired a collective identity as an 
epistemic authority. Should their interpretations of society and politics 
be received as criticism (in authoritarian regimes, for example), they may 
become marginalized, dissident, or oppositional, but these associations do 
not, according to Collini, form an intrinsic part of the concept as such.41 In 
sociological terms, then, the concept of intelligentsia qua intellectuals has 
a universal resonance: “Like the knowledge they produce, intellectuals are 
not bound by localized, communal traditions. They are, together with their 
knowledge, extra-territorial.”42
In her study of the attitudes non-Marxist Russians held toward 
Bolshevism, Jane Burbank noted that “without the Russian Revolution, the 
category ‘intelligentsia’ might not have entered the vocabulary of twentieth-
century social science and politics.”43 While her observation neatly 
dovetails with the foregoing comments, in view of the émigré sources she 
analyzes, her remark also implies that our understanding of the collapse of 
tsarism and revolution has to a large extent been shaped by the reflections 
of individuals—including former Vekhi contributors—who had witnessed 
these events firsthand and suffered the consequences in their personal lives 
thereafter. In memoirs and historical diagnoses of the deeper meaning of 
events culminating in October, leading émigré voices, such as Berdiaev 
and Georgii Fedotov, presented the intelligentsia to a western audience as 
a uniquely Russian phenomenon, the comprehension of which required 
examination of the specific context in which it emerged, together with 
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a reasoned account of the worldview it professed. Arguably, the majority of 
western-language studies of Russian intellectual and political culture have 
taken up Berdiaev’s and Fedotov’s cue: it has become customary among 
historians of Russia and the Soviet Union, especially since the latter part of 
the twentieth century, to argue for the distinctiveness of the intelligentsia 
as a socio-cultural category. Whether they opt for a socio-historical or 
a history of ideas approach (or some combination of the two), analyses 
generally seek to safeguard the historical and cultural distinctiveness of the 
Russian intelligentsia, even as they confront the evident splits and factions 
within it that surfaced over time. As I mentioned at the beginning of this 
essay, Richard Pipes addressed this issue by distinguishing between what 
he termed “cultured” and “ideological” intelligentsia. Scholars of the final 
years of Imperial rule have tried to accommodate the fragmentation within 
the ranks of the intelligentsia by employing a series of labels—radical, 
revolutionary, liberal, religious, artistic, even “academic”—in order to 
convey the growing complexity of the phenomenon—without, however, 
shattering the illusion of a shared identity as an oppositional force to the 
regime.44 Despite differences in background, skills, or profession, turn-of-
the-century intelligenty, which now included poets, philosophers, political 
thinkers, and university professors, continued to express a concern for the 
oppressed of Russia. These labels may be workable, short-hand solutions for 
research into, for example, the history of Russian liberal thought or Soviet 
dissidence, but they side-step the issue of the intelligentsia’s obsession with 
its own identity. Writing in the early 1970s, Michael Confino pointed out 
that “none of the definitions given during the past sixty years or so has 
been found entirely satisfactory, and recent research has clearly shown 
the vagueness of the term, its many ambiguities and the strains between 
the outlook and the self-image of those who used it and the social and 
intellectual reality it is supposed to represent.”45 The point, as Confino’s 
remarks imply, is that since its inception, the word “intelligentsia” operated 
as a sort of catchword in verbal slanging matches among rival groups, and 
was actually used to refer to different sets of people. Given an evident lack 
of formal or definitional consensus, attempts to affirm or demolish the 
social significance of peers and rivals involved qualifiers that tended to be 
“persuasive in nature” and actually targeted image/identity as much as, if 
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not more than, deeds.46 Adjectives such as “true,” “real,” “young,” evocative 
metaphors—“the beautiful class,” “crippled souls,” or “dung-hill”—and 
literary motifs—“repentant noblemen,” or “superfluous men”—which 
originally colored the intelligentsia question, suggest that the intelligenty 
were troubled by a quest to determine who or what they were, as much as 
by the need to establish their role in society as bearers of ideas and remedies 
for Russia’s socio-political problems. The Vekhi episode clearly testifies to 
this dilemma. 
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Perversions and Tr ansformaT ions:
A. S. Izgoev and the Intelligentsia Debates, 1904–22
St uar t  F ink e l
The authors of Vekhi strove toward one thing 
only: to the transformation and rebirth 
[pererozhdeniiu i vozrozhdeniiu] of the 
intelligentsia, in order to make it fully prepared 
for the tasks standing ahead of it. 
—A. S. Izgoev, “The Intelligentsia and ‘Vekhi,’” 
in Russian Society and the Revolution, 1910
A knightly Rus’—this is the new, reborn Russian 
intelligentsia.
—V. N. Murav’ev, “The Roar of the Tribe,”  
in Out of the Depths, 1918
Vekhi touched off a firestorm concerning the nature and mission of the 
intelligentsia that captivated educated Russians for several years after its 
initial publication in early 1909. Articles and lectures, volumes of rebuttal, 
and speaking tours featured supporters, and, far more often, opponents 
of the Vekhi contributors critiquing and condemning the pamphlet and 
denouncing its authors as anti-intellectual renegades. More subtly but 
lastingly, this acrimonious debate contributed to the reshaping of the 
ongoing self-conscious deliberation over the accursed question, “Chto takoe 
intelligentsiia?” (What is the intelligentsia?) which had already disturbed 
and puzzled Russia’s intellectuals for quite some time. Among the Vekhi 
contributors, the Kadet (Constitutional Democrat) publicist Aleksandr 
Izgoev was especially involved in this debate, in a series of articles and 
polemics stretching over two decades.
— 70 —
Stuar t Finkel
While Vekhi represented a thorough and scathing critique of the 
contemporary Russian intelligentsia for what the authors believed to be 
its dangerous, hollow dogmatism, Izgoev and the other Vekhi contributors 
were taken aback by the strong censure it received from most intelligenty—
which is to say, its targets—and they countered these rebukes with great 
vehemence. While the debate died down by late 1910, it resumed soon 
after the Revolution. With the events of 1917 having confirmed their direst 
warnings, five of the seven Vekhi contributors and six other authors penned 
their reproachful post mortem, Iz glubiny (Out of the Depths, 1918). The 
intelligentsia was charged with having paved the way for Bolshevism, and 
thus for having contributed to Russia’s complete annihilation. The pointed 
warnings of Vekhi were now rephrased as bitter recriminations; the answer 
to “Kto vinovat?” (Who is to blame?) was clearer than ever: it was the 
intelligentsia.
But it is important to qualify this assertion immediately: while disgusted 
with the dogmatism and shallow materialism of the Russian intelligentsia, 
most of the Vekhi and Out of the Depths authors hardly questioned the 
broader conceits informing the general shared understanding of the 
intelligentsia’s nature.1 In particular, they held firmly to the notion that it 
had a special and critical role to play in the development of the Russian 
nation. They continued to assume without question that there was, in 
fact, a single entity with a moral-ethical dimension that could be called 
an “intelligentsia.” Some of them even acknowledged the idea that the 
intelligentsia had a debt to pay before “the people,” although they rejected 
revolutionary maximalism as the solution to this obligation.
In the storm of controversy following the publication of Vekhi, its 
authors were intensely irritated by, among other things, the repeated 
charge of anti-intellectual obscurantism levied against them. Izgoev, in 
particular, fought off such allegations with a great deal of exasperation. 
The Vekhi contributors, he insisted, were hardly motivated by hatred of the 
intelligentsia, as some of their critics charged. Rather, he wrote, “[we] all 
too clearly see the enormous role that the Russian intelligentsia has before 
it and are aware of how much needs to be done so that it is prepared for 
this role, so that it is able to resolve a problem of colossal difficulty: the 
transformation of Russia into a law-based and democratic state. […] The 
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authors of Vekhi strove toward one thing only: to the transformation and 
rebirth [pererozhdeniiu i vozrozhdeniiu] of the intelligentsia, in order to 
make it fully prepared for the tasks standing ahead of it.” 2 Izgoev both shared 
the fundamental conviction that social forces needed to be mobilized in 
the transformation of Russia, and concurred that it was the intelligentsia, 
broadly conceived, that would spearhead this renaissance. Izgoev (and 
the other Vekhi contributors) therefore saw their task not as deposing the 
intelligentsia from its traditionally conceived leading role in guiding Russia’s 
development, but as sounding the alarm regarding its current unfitness to 
do so.3 This essay will analyze the contributions of Izgoev and other Vekhi 
and Out of the Depths authors to the extended intelligentsia debates of the 
early twentieth century, with a view to demonstrating that they aimed, in 
the end, not to displace the intelligentsia from its exalted role but rather 
to lament its current perversions, and to urge a root transformation that 
might enable it to lead Russia back from catastrophe.
Izgoev was no newcomer to debates over the definition, role, and 
function of the intelligentsia; his very first foray into polemical journalism 
had been an 1899 article entitled “Frantsuzskaia intelligentsiia” (“The French 
Intelligentsia”).4 But it was his article “Intelligentsiia kak sotsial’naia gruppa” 
(“The Intelligentsia as a Social Group”), which appeared in the journal 
Obrazovanie (Education) in 1904, that sparked an extended discussion 
over a period of several years.5 In this lengthy sociological investigation, 
Izgoev attempted to demythologize the intelligentsia and to critique both 
previous and contemporary romanticizations of its role and place in 
Russian society. N. K. Mikhailovskii’s well-known “subjective” declaration, 
that the intelligentsia proper consisted only of those thinkers whose “hearts 
and minds” were “with the people,” explicitly excluding Aksakov and other 
Slavophiles, Izgoev found profoundly simplistic and utterly unsatisfactory.6 
However, he reserved his harshest reproofs for his future Vekhi collaborator 
Nikolai Berdiaev’s idealistic conception that the true intelligent lived 
“above all for the interests of the mind, the intellect; spiritual hunger is his 
predominating passion.”7 Izgoev, still true to his pragmatic legal Marxist 
roots, found Berdiaev’s lofty formulation highly implausible and even 
distasteful: “I don’t know, perhaps this is very idealistic, elevated, eloquent, 
but for me it was extremely unpleasant to read this sentimental lie, striving 
— 72 —
Stuar t Finkel
to depict the intelligent as a person not of this world.…” While explicitly 
acknowledging the “lofty mission [vysshaia missiia]” of the intelligentsia, 
Izgoev insisted that they must be understood as ordinary human actors in 
society, with normal material needs.8
At the same time, Izgoev rejected a purely “objective” approach to 
defining the intelligentsia, maintaining that attempting to describe it in 
simple “class” terms was equally problematic: Marx himself had never 
satisfactorily explained how this might be done, and his followers had made 
even more of a muddle of it.9 Izgoev therefore eschewed purely material 
(economic) definitions of the intelligentsia as a class, and acknowledged 
that there could always be competing reasonable definitions.10 Still, 
although denying that simple Marxist categories could be applied, Izgoev 
at least began his exploration via an exposition of broader economic classes 
on the basis of which the category of “intellectual workers [intellektual’nye 
rabotniki]” could be discerned. His own ultimate proposition, however, 
owed at least as much to an idealist perspective on intellectual activity 
as to a materialist one: the most crucial factor in uniting all those who 
belonged to the “social group of the intelligentsia” was “the presence in the 
professional activities of these people of an element of pedagogy [uchitel’stva], 
in the broadest sense of the word, the transmission to people of information 
and accumulated knowledge with the goal of teaching.”11
While thus claiming to avoid the pitfalls of both an exclusively 
subjective and an impossibly objective understanding of intelligenty, in the 
end Izgoev still asserted that they had a pivotal role to play in Russian life. 
It was, among other things, their duty to press for those liberties, such as 
freedom of speech and religion, so needed by Russian society. “We might 
thus come to the general conclusion that the appearance in a society of the 
intelligentsia as a special social group leads to the establishment of spiritual 
freedom,” he concluded.12 Despite, then, his initial disdain toward Berdiaev, 
Izgoev too found a rather exalted goal for the intelligentsia: the promotion 
of freedom. “Only the intelligentsia social group strives toward full, 
multilateral, freedom, equal for everyone; only for this group is freedom 
both a means and an end in itself.” Because of this, then, in the absence 
of liberty, the intelligentsia “stood on the highest pedestal in the country,” 
was “the foremost element in society,” and could play an “outstanding role 
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in the life of the nation.”13 Herein, in these glowing hopes, we find a rather 
stark difference between Izgoev (and, later, his Vekhi collaborators) and 
more strident critics of the intelligentsia, such as Jan Wacław Machajski and 
his followers.14 Among the flurry of articles and books on the intelligentsia 
that followed Izgoev’s article, the Makhaevist Evgenii Lozinskii wryly 
complained in Chto zhe takoe, nakonets, intelligentsiia? (What, Then, Finally, 
is the Intelligentsia? 1907) that despite Izgoev’s attempts to provide a more 
nuanced depiction of intellectual workers, “he then proceeded ‘despite all 
logic’ to single out the intelligentsia as a special group and surround it with 
‘a halo of ideological holiness.’”15
As Izgoev would insist in 1910 in “Intelligentsiia i ‘Vekhi’” (“The 
Intelligentsia and ‘Vekhi’”), the desire of the Vekhi authors to reform and 
improve the intelligentsia for its important tasks was radically different 
from the thoroughgoing scorn toward intellectuals displayed by resolutely 
anti-intelligentsia reactionaries (to whom Vekhi’s many critics, Izgoev 
grumbled, all too often compared the Vekhi contributors).16 So, too, did 
their aims differ from those of the iconoclastic and revered Lev Tolstoi, 
who offered a significantly more holistic critique of the intelligentsia’s 
value to Russia. Tolstoi, although in agreement with the Vekhi contributors’ 
entreaties that the intelligentsia abandon abstract theorizing about external 
forms and concentrate instead on internal self-improvement and the details 
of real lived life, was in the end disappointed that Vekhi could not let go of 
the intelligentsia, which he felt could “never enlighten the Russian people, 
[it could] only corrupt it.”17 Indeed, the Vekhi contributors came not to bury 
the intelligentsia, but rather, as Izgoev insisted, to reform (or transform) it: 
to warn against the dangerous habits and pitfalls of the Russian intelligentsia 
tradition and its pernicious, mindless conformity, and redirect it instead 
toward internal spiritual development and humility.18
As Gary Saul Morson has argued, the Vekhi contributors were marked 
not so much by anti-intellectualism as by “anti-intelligentsialism”—a disgust 
for the dogmatic determinism of the intelligentsia as a caste.19 Berdiaev 
explicitly addressed this distinction in his Vekhi essay, “Filosofskaia istina 
i intelligentskaia pravda” (“Philosophical Verity and Intelligentsia Truth”), by 
contrasting the narrowness and utilitarianism of the contemporary Russian 
“intelligentshchina” with a true “intelligentsia” in the broader, historical 
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sense of the word.20 Berdiaev’s prescription—now quite like Izgoev’s, but 
very much unlike Tolstoi’s—is not to abandon hope in the intelligentsia, but 
to attempt to revitalize it. “The intelligentsia’s consciousness needs radical 
reform, and the purifying fire of philosophy will have no small role to play 
in this important task.” When it had finally abandoned its attachments 
to the external and focused on internal development, “the new soul of 
the intelligentsia will be born.”21 Berdiaev’s dramatic, strikingly poetic 
expression here, the essence of which would be reflected in Izgoev’s more 
prosaic essay, “The Intelligentsia and ‘Vekhi,’” also prefigures the mythos 
of destruction and rebirth that would find its full expression in its post-
Revolutionary apocalyptic sequel, Out of the Depths.
When Berdiaev asserted in Vekhi that “political absolutism” had 
“crippled the soul of the progressive intelligentsia,”22 he was echoing 
a concern that Izgoev had begun to elucidate several years before, in 
a series of articles in Petr Struve’s journal Russkaia mysl’ (Russian Thought), 
for which he was a recurring contributor. As Izgoev had already suggested 
in January 1907, not just the intelligentsia as narrowly defined, but all of 
Russia’s social and spiritual life (obshchestvennaia i dukhovnaia zhizn’), had 
been warped by the need to combat the repressive autocracy. Literature and 
art, science and philosophy, the political ideologies imported from Europe, 
had all been stunted in Russia by having been valued only as they related 
to the goal of overthrowing absolutism. “The autocracy has thoroughly 
distorted our life of public ideas [obshchestvenno-ideinuiu zhizn’].”23 In his 
Vekhi essay, Izgoev explored how this elemental corruption was inculcated 
in future Russian intelligenty by the distorted atmosphere and crippled 
morality of their student days.24 Throughout, the goal remained the same: 
to imply not (as the conservatives and Tolstoi did) that the intelligentsia 
had nothing to offer Russia, but to the contrary that it must be salvaged 
precisely because only it could rescue the country. As Izgoev wrote in Vekhi: 
“But now there are only two alternatives: either all of Russia is condemned 
to death and there is no way to save her, or else there must be a radical 
change, an all-encompassing transformation [vsestoronnii perevorot] in this 
fundamental and, to my mind, most deeply rooted feature of the Russian 
intelligentsia’s psychological structure. Instead of love of death, the basic 
motive force behind this activity must become love of life, life in common 
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with its millions of compatriots.”25 While Izgoev denied neither the heroic 
achievements of the Russian intelligentsia (at least up until the proclamation 
of the October Manifesto) nor the fact that its “distortions” had been caused 
by the need to struggle single-mindedly against absolutism, he now felt it 
imperative, as he stressed in the polemics after the publication of Vekhi, 
to sound a clarion warning regarding the need to create new intelligentsia 
ideas.
What’s more, even after they had effectively found the majority of the 
intelligentsia guilty of all charges after the Revolution, Izgoev and other 
Out of the Depths authors, in different ways and with different ends in 
mind, suggested a counter-image of a Russian intelligentsia that might have 
served (or might, perhaps, still serve) a far more effective and beneficent 
role in Russian society. Highlighting the critical nature of the intelligentsia, 
Izgoev began his Out of the Depths essay, “Sotsializm, kul’tura i bol’shevizm” 
(“Socialism, Culture and Bolshevism”), with the following questions: 
“Will the present events at least be a storm to clear the air and enlighten 
consciousness? Or will these days and months, so full of excruciating anxiety, 
pass, and those people who call themselves the Russian intelligentsia, those 
who teach the Russian masses by word and letter, return to their old ways? 
I believe that anyone who has not yet despaired of Russia, who still believes 
that ‘Russia will live,’ is troubled most of all by this question” (italics mine).26 
In this formulation, not only does the intelligentsia retain its central place 
in determining Russia’s fate, but whether it will reform itself and abandon 
its former predilections becomes the central question facing Russia. If, as 
Izgoev and the other authors of Out of the Depths felt, it was the errors of 
the intelligentsia that had led Russia to its current catastrophic state, then 
it would have to be the intelligentsia that rescued it, that led it back out of 
the wilderness.
Izgoev asserts that there is a very straightforward, logical reason for 
this conundrum: “Experience has proven to us that without or apart from 
the intelligentsia, it is impossible to create a viable government. But, from 
the same experience, we know that the intelligentsia, raised on false and 
impracticable ideas, serves as a powerful weapon, not for the creation, but 
for the destruction of the state” (125). Since in Russia the intelligentsia 
had indeed demolished the state, it was through the intelligentsia that it 
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must be restored—and although at present Izgoev had little faith that any 
lessons had been learned, it was nevertheless Russia’s only eventual hope. 
The faceless Russian people, the narod, or any group within it, was neither 
to blame for what had happened nor the likely source of any future national 
rebirth. “The main cause of the present, unprecedented devastation of our 
state lies in the fact that the intelligentsia completely misunderstood the 
nature of man and the force of the motives that direct him, the nature of 
society and of the state, and the conditions necessary for their strengthening 
and development.” The people, it seems, are simply the victims of these 
erroneous conceptions: the ideas of the intelligentsia “turned out to be false 
and fatal to the people” (125–26).
Similar assumptions grounded many of the other articles in Out 
of the Depths as well. It could even be said that the volume has as its 
shared foundational principle the sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit 
presupposition that Russia’s historical fate depended primarily on the inner 
state and actions of the intelligentsia. If the intelligentsia was, as the Out 
of the Depths authors declared, to blame for most of what had happened, 
then it stood to reason that if there were any hope for revival there must 
first be a fundamental reconstitution of its ethos. Such, for example, was 
the conclusion of S. A. Kotliarevskii’s essay, “Ozdrovlenie” (“Recovery”). 
Only a renewed, revitalized intelligentsia, Kotliarevskii suggested, the 
same group that had made so many mistakes and led to such destruction, 
could produce Russia’s revival: “The Russian intelligentsia must seek to 
restore its strengths, now so cruelly broken, at the inexhaustible sources 
of life. And then, recovered from its longstanding intellectual perversions 
and spiritual diseases, it will find in itself both a willingness and an ability 
to begin the task of the creative restoration of Russia, which now seems 
like a heap of ruins, and which gives witness to the great sin committed, 
and to the great retribution already borne” (155). Needless to say, this 
quotation makes clear that Kotliarevskii shares the core vekhovets principle 
that reformation of the intelligentsia will occur only after a collective soul-
searching, a turn from external causes to internal self-improvement. But 
after this has occurred, it is precisely the intelligentsia that will once again 
take the lead in restoring that which it is collectively to blame for having 
destroyed. 
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Pavel Novgorodtsev’s essay “O putiakh i zadachakh russkoi 
intelligentsii” (“On the Paths and Tasks of the Russian Intelligentsia”) 
contains the most explicit contemplation of the role of intellectuals in Out 
of the Depths. He noted, in sympathy with the original Vekhi volume, that 
its authors had not aimed in any way at
… deflecting the intelligentsia from its distinctive task of consciously 
organizing life. They called upon it neither to reject work of creative 
consciousness, nor to deny faith in its vital calling. They only wanted to 
show that the path along which the mainstream of the intelligentsia had 
previously travelled was an incorrect and ruinous path, and that there 
was another possible and necessary path for it, one to which it had long 
been summoned by its greatest representatives (175).
Alas, the intelligentsia had not heeded this well-intended caution and 
instead had responded with almost unanimous condemnation of Vekhi. 
After the October Revolution, however, “even the blind can see. Now 
everyone is beginning to say what the few affirmed ten years ago” (183). But 
the more widespread criticisms of the intelligentsia for its abstractions and 
isolation still, according to Novgorodtsev, usually missed the mark in failing 
to understand the deep spiritual nature of the crisis (183–84). Only on 
recognizing the need to retain continuity with the organic course of history, 
and the holiness inherent in the objective state of human affairs, could the 
intelligentsia guide Russia to the restoration of its national life (184–85).27 
Like Izgoev, Novgorodtsev saw a concrete task for the intelligentsia in state-
building, “for the intellectual principles of statehood are only worked out in 
the spiritual experience of the enlightened parts of society” (187).
This call to intellectual renewal can be seen even in the mystical, 
nationalist screed of V. N. Murav’ev (“Rev plemeni” [“The Roar of the 
Tribe”]), who, like Kireevskii and other nineteenth-century Slavophiles, 
lamented the disruption of the old Russian sobornost’ from the time of Peter 
forward, and who saw the intelligentsia as the bearer of abstract thought, cut 
off from Russian nationhood. Having infected the Russian people with these 
abstractions, the intelligentisa itself had been destroyed in the conflagration 
of revolution. And yet even here, even in the seeming irredeemability 
of Murav’ev’s intelligentsia, lies a call for its resurrection, and, moreover, 
a conviction that this renascence is a fundamental prerequisite for Russia’s 
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own recovery. “There cannot,” Murav’ev averred, “be a renewal of Russia 
without the repentance of both the people and the intelligentsia,… the 
adoption of a new truth, its elevation above the old” (168). Murav’ev seems 
to part from his co-authors in what this entails—after its resurrection, the 
repentant intelligenty will no longer be an intelligentsia as such. “The ruin 
of the intelligentsia,” he declares, “is the ruin of a world view constructed 
on thought alone” (169). In an almost Tolstoian manner, the wisdom of 
the intelligentsia is subordinated to the far greater (and more authentic) 
intuitive wisdom of the narod. For Murav’ev, even in its repentance the 
intelligentsia is not the primary force that will lead the way to renewal. 
“The Russia which thought, proved to be worthless. There remained only 
the whole, which acts. From its precious depths, it reconstructs the new 
cultural Russia” (171).
And yet, even here there is a place for the intelligentsia, a role for it to 
play, and quite an elevated role at that: “However much we would like to 
be mere observers and theorizing philosophers, we are forced, first of all, 
to be doers, apostles, and prophets.” Thus for Murav’ev, the intelligentsia 
must serve (still!) as seers, discerning what is superficial from what is 
essential in the narod by submerging itself in “the roar of the tribe.” “We 
are its messengers and heralds,” he suggests, but only insofar as “[w]e sense 
it from within. We exist in its flow” (172). Like Semen Frank and Berdiaev, 
among other Out of the Depths co-authors, Murav’ev retained faith that 
such a prodigal return, a rebirth from the ashes, might well occur: “[F]rom 
the passionate torments of recognized sin, the saving Aeon is born. 
Sophia [the intelligentsia] returns, repentant, to the fatherly bosom. In 
the depository of the Russian spirit, she acquires once again the rejected 
wisdom.” “A knightly Rus’—this is the reborn, new, Russian intelligentsia. 
Through it, the people’s corn field will begin to form ears after the spring 
storm” (173). Even Murav’ev could not divest himself of the conviction that 
a new, reformed, authentic intelligentsia would be instrumental in leading 
the Russian people to renewal, to Russia’s renascence.
As is often noted, Out of the Depths not only did not provoke the 
agonized public discussion that Vekhi had, it reached almost no immediate 
audience whatsoever. With its initial publication halted in late summer 
1918 with the initiation of the Red Terror and the Civil War, and with an 
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attempt to circulate it in Moscow at the time of the Kronstadt rebellion 
in March 1921 immediately forestalled, very few people in Russia or in 
the diaspora were able to read this volume at the time.28 But it is not quite 
correct to say that there was no dissemination of the key ideas in Out of 
the Depths. Berdiaev’s essay “Dukh russkoi revoliutsii” (“Specters of the 
Russian Revolution”) had been printed in the final issue of Russian Thought, 
and Bulgakov’s and Struve’s would appear in emigration.29 More broadly 
speaking, the authors of Out of the Depths managed to air their views not 
only in the burgeoning émigré press but also during the brief bab’e leto of 
intellectual activity in Moscow and Petrograd at the end of the Civil War.30 
Such views were vocalized both in the public lectures and discussions that 
occurred during 1920–22 and the briefly extant journals and almanacs 
of the time. In particular, Berdiaev and Frank in Moscow and Izgoev in 
Petrograd associated with the philosophical and literary organizations 
that flourished briefly and shared and traded views with both like-minded 
thinkers and opponents. To give just one prominent example, Berdiaev and 
Frank were key participants in the extended discussion of Oswald Spengler’s 
much-celebrated Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West, 
1918–22). A resulting volume of essays, Osval’d Shpengler i zakat Evropy 
(Oswald Spengler and The Decline of Europe, 1922), recapitulated several of 
the principal ideas in Out of the Depths, in particular the possibility (born 
of hoping against hope) that despite or even because of Russia’s national 
catastrophe it was potentially uniquely positioned for a Phoenix-like rise 
from the ashes.31
The debate over the so-called “Changing Signposts” movement 
(smenovekhovstvo) also involved several of the original Vekhi contributors, 
especially Izgoev, who adamantly denied any connection between Vekhi 
and Smena vekh (Change of Signposts, 1921) in a series of public disputes 
in Petrograd.32 Shortly thereafter, Izgoev and several other publicists issued 
a volume entitled O smene vekh (On the Change of Signposts, 1922), which 
denounced the attempt by the contributors to Change of Signposts to come 
to terms with the Soviet regime. “Beneath some external resemblances,” 
Izgoev wrote, “there is an enormous difference in principles between 
the old and new ‘Vekhi.’” Although the Vekhi contributors had advised 
intellectuals to rethink their categorical opposition to the old regime, “they 
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were far from deifying the state. Their God was commensurate neither 
with social institutions nor with human establishments.” The Change of 
Signposts authors, on the other hand, Izgoev claimed, effected precisely such 
a deification of the state, and they subordinated the “moral and spiritual 
character of the intelligentsia” to it. In so doing, they altered what for Izgoev 
remained the fundamental task of the intelligentsia. “The intelligentsia did 
not, does not, and will not have physical, material power.… The power of 
the intelligentsia is only moral, and spiritual. When a country does not 
sense the moral power of the intelligentsia, the harmony of life is drastically 
disturbed.” Thus Izgoev reaffirmed the critical, even exclusive importance of 
the intelligentsia, and ascribed the tragedy of the current moment precisely 
to the fact that the intelligentsia had lost its moral authority.33
Following the Change of Signposts debates, Izgoev reiterated in an article 
called “O zadachakh intelligentsii” (“On the Tasks of the Intelligentsia,” 
1922) in the almanac Parfenon (Parthenon) that the intelligentsia retained 
a vital, central role in transforming Russia, and that its tasks were far from 
exhausted. He explicitly refuted those who, following Tolstoi, wondered 
“Who needed it?” [A dlia kogo ona byla nuzhna?] and believed that the 
intelligentsia’s only real purpose was to demonstrate to Europe that Russia 
did indeed have a life of the mind.34 Izgoev dismissed these doubters, noting 
that even if one did not value in the slightest the fruits of Russian culture, 
Pushkin, Dostoevskii, and Turgenev (and Tolstoi himself!), even if one did 
not recognize that millions of ordinary Russians were now familiar with 
them due to the expansion in education and literacy, it was impossible to 
ignore the fact that during the storm of the Revolution, it was precisely the 
slogans of the intelligentsia (in its narrower sense) that were taken up by 
the people.35 The unmistakable importance of the intelligentsia had been 
confirmed, most unfortunately in Russia’s case, by the course of events.
This was proof to Izgoev of the degree of influence that the intelligentsia 
could have (for good or ill), and it reinforced his own conviction that its 
energies needed to be not diffused but redirected. For Izgoev, the heart 
of the intelligentsia mission lay, simply enough, in its role as a “teaching 
element in the broadest sense of the word,” just as he had articulated in 
his initial foray into intelligentsia studies, “The Intelligentsia as a Social 
Group,” back in 1904.36 Thus he once again did away with the narrower 
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understanding, in his view much more subjective, proffered most famously 
by Mikhailovskii, which defined the intelligentsia on political grounds. 
More specifically, as R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik put it, “the intelligentsia ends 
on the right at the boundaries of the Kadet party.”37 Izgoev discarded this 
definition (which, arguably, was the definition assumed in the original Vekhi 
critique of the intelligentsia) in favor of his notion of a broad pedagogical 
mission, bringing to the people learning and knowledge in all of their 
forms. At the same time, therefore, in attempting to retain this quite broad 
idea of uchitel’stvo, Izgoev’s reframed characterization was very much at 
odds with the simultaneous Bolshevik attempt to reframe “intelligentsia” 
sociologically as “umstvennyi trud,” “mental laborers” divorced from any 
sense of mission (either political or pedagogical) whatsoever.
The authors of Vekhi, and even of the post-apocalyptic Out of the 
Depths and other volumes that followed, thoroughly reproached the Russian 
intelligentsia, but they did so almost entirely within the existing framework 
of debate concerning its tasks and its importance. Theirs represented not 
a rejection of the leading moral role of the intelligentsia in Russian society, 
but rather a methodical indictment of how poorly the intelligentsia had 
performed in that role. The prescription, especially in Izgoev’s view, was 
not to banish intelligenty from a leading part in the construction of national 
life—this was neither possible nor desirable. Rather, it was to redirect them 
away from their former illusions and toward a more spiritual, holistic 
approach to larger questions, less obsessed with crude political solutions 
than with less tangible educative processes. Ironically, in the debate over 
On the Change of Signposts, it was now Bolshevik critics who accused 
Izgoev and the other Vekhi contributors of having attached too great an 
importance to the intelligentsia, even deifying it,38 and it was the Bolsheviks 
who were simultaneously attempting to reduce the intelligentsia’s role from 
that of moral arbiter to that of handmaiden of the state.
While Izgoev fiercely refuted the Bolshevik charge that he, for one, was 
looking to the intelligentsia for salvation—arguing that its role in his view 
was a modest, if important one, instructional rather than heroic39—we can 
see, in the poetic language of a number of the Out of the Depths essays, 
precisely the same heroicization that Sergei Bulgakov had criticized in Vekhi 
as characteristic of the delusions of the radical revolutionary intelligentsia.40 
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As Struve asserted in his passionate call for national revival, “Istoricheskii 
smysl russkoi revoliutsii i natsional’nye zadachi” (“The Historical Meaning 
of the Russian Revolution and National Tasks”), 
If there is a Russian “intelligentsia,” as an aggregate of educated people, 
able to create ideals for itself and to act upon them, and if there is within 
this “intelligentsia” any kind of obligation before the people, then that 
obligation consists in bringing to the broad masses, with passion and 
persistence, the national idea, as a healing and organizing force, without 
which neither the regeneration of the people, nor the recreation of the 
state, is possible. This is the whole program of the spiritual, cultural, and 
political rebirth of Russia, which depends on the ideological education 
and reeducation of educated people and the masses.41 
Thus this great collective sinner, the intelligentsia, which had brought 
Russia to apocalyptic ruin, might now, through a miraculous transformation, 
throwing off its atheist bravado for Christ-like humility, be reborn and help 
Russia rise up again from out of the depths.
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The inTell iGenTsia f iGhTs Back:
The Lef t-wing Response to Vekhi and its Signif icance
Chr is t opher  Re ad
Vekhi has enjoyed at least three lives. Its original one, of course, came 
in 1909 and 1910, when it was the intellectual sensation of the age. 
Some of its admirers revived part of its spirit in Iz glubiny (Out of the 
Depths), written but not circulated in 1918.1 The second life came in the 
1960s. This was no accident; both collections were re-published in Paris 
as student rebellions and revolutionary movements spread around the 
world. Vekhi in this revival became something of a symbol of opposition 
to the soixante-huitards and was a marginal tool in the cultural Cold War. 
Revolution was in the air, in a variety of forms, from Berkeley to West 
Berlin and from Prague to Saigon. In the forefront were students, and 
polemics around their activities were increasingly intense as campus after 
campus exploded. Among those not sharing the ethos of exuberance and 
radicalization were Richard Pipes and Leonard Schapiro. Pipes was working 
on his excellent biography of Petr Struve and editing his collected works. 
Schapiro had already written one of the few articles of the time devoted 
to Vekhi, calling it “Vekhi and the Mystique of Revolution.” In a limited 
way, Vekhi had become an “anti-sixties” manifesto. As the headiness of 
the sixties subsided, so too did the profile of Vekhi. For the best part of 
two more decades it sank deeper out of sight, into a half-life in which only 
a handful of people were working on or around it.2 However, it was still 
known about, not only in the west but also among Soviet historians and 
specialists. Ironically, memory of it in its homeland had been preserved 
through Lenin having devoted an article to refuting it. In fact, Vekhism 
(vekhovstvo) was a more favored theme in Soviet journals of the seventies 
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and early eighties than in western ones. It had become an intellectual 
peg on which Soviet ideologists could conveniently hang a whole array 
of their liberal critics. Interestingly, but not entirely accurately, by 1980 
I. I. Mints was linking interest in Vekhi with the rise of the new right in 
Britain and the United States. In a review of Pipes’s work on Struve, he 
claimed that Struve, in Pipes’s view, was a forerunner of Ronald Reagan. 
There was some truth in that: Pipes, of course, was Reagan’s National 
Security Advisor on the Soviet Union from 1981 to 1982. However, 
there is something here worth bringing to the fore: Vekhi had become 
a symbol, almost a brand name, a logo, for a certain kind of opposition to 
a loosely-defined leftism. 
Vekhi’s third, present, life was generated by its having been 
“rediscovered” in the land of its birth, a rediscovery foreshadowed by that 
of Aleksander Solzhenitsyn and a handful of 1970s and ‘80s dissidents.3 It 
gained a reputation for having, in some way, predicted the collapse of the 
revolutionary system, which eventually came about in 1991, a system that 
was deemed by many to embody the mechanistic, materialist, amoral, 
irreligious, unspiritual, anti-individualistic, and utilitarian principles that 
the Vekhi authors descried in the radical intelligentsia. 
The present volume contains studies of numerous aspects of all these 
“lives.” However, there is at least one intriguing difference between them: 
in its original life, Vekhi was largely reviled by the majority of its readers; 
in its second life it had admirers and critics; and in its third, post-Soviet, 
life it has largely been acclaimed, often uncritically. True, a volume of 
comments was entitled “Vekhi”: pro et contra (“Vekhi”: For and Against),4 
but that was something of an exception. The aim of the present study is 
to re-examine some of the original criticisms of Vekhi, which are often 
overlooked amid the contemporary adulation. The questions pursued 
in this essay are: how did the defenders of the intelligentsia tradition 
react to Vekhi, and what does their response tell us? To answer them, the 
focus will be on the responses of leading liberals and populists, with a 
brief glance at social democrats. Particular attention will be paid to the 
Constitutional Democrats’ (Kadet) sbornik entitled Intelligentsiia v Rossii 
(The Intelligentsia in Russia, 1910), the Socialist Revolutionaries’ (SR) 
“Vekhi” kak znamenie vremeni (“Vekhi” as a Sign of the Times, 1910), and 
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Lenin’s response, which, though short, did preserve memory of Vekhi in 
the way mentioned above. In the conclusion, a number of observations 
about these criticisms will be made. 
1909: Reaction and Context
The publication of Vekhi in February 1909 set off a chain reaction. The 
contributors, mocked later by Merezhkovskii for their “false” modesty,5 
claimed to be saying nothing new.6 However, the debate it set off was a 
defining event in early-twentieth-century intellectual history in Russia. 
Responses came from all parts of the intellectual spectrum. It was something 
like a spark falling in a box of fireworks: the ensuing explosion was colorful 
but chaotic. However, of all the comments one might make about the 
controversy around Vekhi, one of the few that is indisputable is that, as 
already mentioned, the overwhelming majority of reactions were hostile. 
This simple fact has not always been given its due. How do we account for 
the fierce reaction, and what did Vekhi’s opponents have to say? 
The unexpected scale of its initial impact depended, not entirely but to 
a significant degree, on it appearing at a moment of gloom and despondency 
among the intelligentsia. Its impact was multiplied by its apparent renegade 
attack on people already reeling from the defeat of 1905–07. Today it is easy 
to underestimate the widespread contempt felt by ordinary, decent people 
within Russia and beyond for the anachronistic, apparently unreformable, 
and, in the hands of Nicholas II, antisemitic, backward-looking, and cruel 
autocracy. It was not necessary to be a radical to dislike tsarism intensely. Its 
violent repression of unarmed protest in January 1905 and on many other 
occasions through 1905–07 not only sowed the seeds of counter-violence 
from below but also made autocracy an object of contempt across western 
Europe. Russia was a pariah state. True, the impact of this international 
contempt was mitigated by the geopolitics of the period, which led to the 
somewhat hypocritical but “necessary” spectacle of Europe’s two most 
democratic great powers, Britain and France, falling over themselves to 
ally with Russia, as a counterweight to their common enemy, a resurgent 
imperial Germany. Nonetheless, the depth of intellectual hostility remained 
great. Within Russia itself, though the worst of the armed repression had 
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faded by 1909, there was still sufficient state violence to enable Tolstoi, in 
a famous essay on the death penalty, to complain about the continuation 
of “executions, executions, executions.”7 The ferocity of people’s attitudes is 
shown by non-revolutionaries as well, like Leonid Andreev, who claimed 
that even moderates, including those who had a weak religious faith, hated 
government ministers so much that they would secretly pray for their deaths. 
Even so, when one of them—Lev Kasso, the Education Minister—did die of 
cancer, there was little satisfaction in it because, Andreev complained, his 
death had prevented him from being brought to justice.8 It was not only the 
left that was horrified by the political situation. For quite different reasons, 
many on the right were sceptical of tsarism’s ability to deliver stability. 
Its inefficiencies threatened to provoke revolution, which in turn would 
destroy the privileges of the landed and office-holding elite. Anachronistic 
elements, like antisemitism, were seen as particularly dangerous. In the 
most infamous antisemitic episode of the period, the 1911–13 investigation 
and trial of Mendel Beilis on a trumped-up charge of ritual murder of 
a Christian child in Kiev, Beilis’s defense was undertaken by a center-right 
Duma deputy, Vasilii Maklakov. Even the elites were tired of being excluded 
from power and increasingly feared for their positions as tsarism stumbled 
blindly from crisis to crisis, culminating in the Lena goldfields shootings 
in 1912.9 Perhaps one of the main reasons for the underestimation, decades 
later, of the atmosphere of the period is that, compared to an era like the 
1930s, the degree of repression is relatively small. However, to cite French 
level-crossings, “[u]n train peut-en cacher un autre” (one train can hide 
another). More appropriately, in this case, un mal peut-en cacher un autre—
one evil can hide another. Taking into account the fact that tsarism also 
has to bear a not-inconsiderable part of the blame for creating a culture in 
which extremism could not only survive but could break out into a mass 
movement, it is no defense of tsarism to say that Stalinism was worse. 
Obviously, no one knew in 1909 what lay in store for Russia. Setting aside 
the historian’s advantage of hindsight, it is incontrovertible that there was 
a widespread opposition to and even visceral hatred of tsarism among 
elites, intellectuals, workers, and peasants. Only by recognizing this is it 
possible to comprehend why Vekhi was met with a massive volley of abuse. 
While historical parallels can be misleading, Vekhi’s, or at least Struve’s, call 
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for reconciliation with the autocracy had an impact comparable to, say, 
a former South African radical calling for co-operation with the apartheid 
regime a year or two after the Sharpeville massacre, or for a supporter of 
Allende calling for reconciliation with Pinochet shortly after the latter came 
to power over a football stadium of executed victims. 
Does Vekhi deserve this reputation? It certainly did not see itself as 
crudely “right-wing” or conservative, and some of its contributors, notably 
Nikolai Berdiaev and Sergei Bulgakov, saw it as in its own way genuinely 
revolutionary, compared to what they saw as the false revolutionary 
commitment of those it criticized. That, too, opens up another question: 
which Vekhi? While Struve has, by and large, been the author most 
quoted by critics, his article was in no way “typical” of Vekhi as a whole. 
In truth, no article was. Berdiaev and Bulgakov were spiritual warriors; 
Mikhail Gershenzon, Bogdan Kistiakovskii, and Semen Frank were 
more stereotypical “liberal” intellectuals; and Struve, and to some extent 
Aleksandr Izgoev, were conservatives, at least in the making. 
The two intellectual/political schools of the period which have 
attracted the most attention have been the liberals (Kadets) and the social-
democratic Marxists (SDs). At one level this is completely absurd, because 
they were among the least influential and widespread schools at the time. 
Kadet liberalism only began to take on shape in 1905, and comprised only 
a small number of members, supporters, and natural voters (i.e., core 
supporters, not those who boosted its votes by using it as the only vehicle 
for supporters of banned or restricted parties). The Social Democrats, too, 
were highly aware of their vulnerable minority status at the time, which 
was an important consideration that caused many on both of its wings, in 
1905 and after, to attempt reconciliation rather than deepen and widen the 
split between them, thereby making it permanent. To split an already tiny 
minority group was rightly considered to be insane, even at times by one 
of its chief proponents, Lenin. On the other hand, important groups like 
the Octobrists and the populist-based Socialist Revolutionaries (who were 
by far the most influential and widespread group of the era), have not been 
studied in anything like the same detail, especially in terms of their ideas 
and principles in the period from 1905 to 1917. The Octobrists, by almost all 
criteria, stand outside the intelligentsia and observed the controversy more 
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or less from without, but I will look more closely at the rather neglected SR 
response to Vekhi. First, however, an examination of some key responses 
from Kadet liberals.
The Liberals and Vekhi
The official Kadet response to Vekhi came in the form of a sbornik 
entitled The Intelligentsia in Russia.10 In it, many leading party members 
were wheeled out to refute the volume. The longest, and possibly most 
tedious, contribution came from the party leader Pavel Miliukov. In 
a rather ponderous, professorial tone, Miliukov defined the core of 
Vekhi’s criticism to be a charge of “apostasy” (otshchepenstvo) against the 
intelligentsia. The apostasy had three components—the intelligentsia’s 
supposed irreligiousness; its hostility to the concept of the state; and its lack 
of national feeling, its cosmopolitanism (30). For Miliukov, it was in the 
nature of the intelligentsia to be cut off from the masses. The intelligentsia 
should, he said, be in the position of Socrates vis-à-vis the people (33). It 
should be proud to be separate from the people. As for the chief cause of 
its separation, religion, Miliukov said very little, not least, it seems, because 
he could scarcely believe the Vekhi authors were serious in bringing it back 
into intellectual debate. 
Regarding the accusation by Struve in particular that the intelligentsia was 
characterized by an attitude of hostility to the state (antigosudarstvennost’), 
Miliukov was a little more comfortable. Vekhi was wrong, in his view, 
for several reasons. First, only extremists, maximalists—that is, largely 
anarchists—actually opposed the state. Though he does not mention 
it, he might have supported his argument by pointing out that all of the 
democratic parties—liberal, SR, and SD—made the calling of a constituent 
assembly their first programmatic demand. Second, he defended the need 
for society, and related institutions such as law, as a base for the defense of 
individual freedom. In an area which blends a critique of Vekhi’s stances on 
religion and on the state, Miliukov linked Vekhi’s granting primacy to inner 
life over outer restraints to counter-revolutionary romanticism of the early 
nineteenth century in western Europe, neglecting to note that this very 
romanticism also had links to support for the French revolution and indeed 
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to early liberalism. In this sense, this particular accusation exploded, as 
it were, in Miliukov’s own hands. He was, however, in a safer place when 
he also linked this trait to Slavophilism, though he greatly overstated the 
extent to which Vekhi shared the religious obscurantism that he, as an 
anticlerical, atheist, enlightened, westernizing intellectual, discerned at the 
heart of Slavophile thinking.
Finally, and sometimes surprisingly to those who are not familiar with 
the immediate context of the post-1905 years, Miliukov stoutly defended the 
Russian intelligentsia tradition and its combative and revolutionary acts and 
ambitions. The intelligentsia, which he defined not as the educated class but 
as a concentric circle of creative thinkers and activists within the educated 
class (94), was the pride of Russia. He recalled its achievements, notably 
its opposition to serfdom and hostility to autocracy, and failures. He did 
not himself closely define the tradition, but one of the other contributors, 
Ivan Petrunkevich, did, naming the familiar quartet of Belinskii, Herzen, 
Chernyshevskii, and Mikhailovskii as its spiritual sources (39). The claim, 
which put liberalism firmly within the Russian revolutionary tradition, 
remains a stark reminder that using identical terminology for Russian 
and western phenomena, in this case the concept of liberalism, can cause 
significant differences to be concealed. By and large, western liberals put 
a greater distance between themselves and revolution, at least in their own 
countries.
Where The Intelligentsia in Russia was frequently rather petty and 
pedantic, two other liberal responses were rather more engaging. Writing 
separately in the liberal journal Russkaia mysl’ (Russian Thought), Aleksandr 
Kizevetter and Semen Lur’e gave a more imaginative set of reasons for liberal 
opposition to Vekhi’s project.11 Both writers took the position that, in many 
ways, Vekhi had highlighted the problems of the intelligentsia correctly but 
had identified completely wrong solutions. In Kizevetter’s opinion, as stated 
in his article focused on Bulgakov, Gershenzon, and Kistiakovskii, it was not 
necessary to withdraw into internal life; rather, one should do exactly the 
opposite. What was needed was “intensified and conscious participation in 
practical activity in society” (133). Gershenzon, he argued, was mistaken 
in seeing all intelligenty as leading superficial and neurotic lives. He was 
also very hostile to the religious aspect, stating that in Vekhi, “in place of 
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the rattle of the gendarme’s sabre I hear the clink of the censer” (129). Lur’e 
based his defense of the intelligentsia on the Latin proverb “primum vivere, 
deinde philosophare” (137). It was all very well for Vekhi to offer religious 
and philosophical nostrums, but there was practical work to be done 
first. Lur’e energetically defended the intelligentsia tradition for its focus 
on alleviating the suffering of the “humiliated and the injured,” quoting 
the title of Dostoevskii’s novel Unizhennye i oskorblennye (The Humiliated 
and the Injured). The intelligentsia should be praised, not blamed, for 
putting the interests of the people ahead of its own and for having chivalric 
qualities (143). The intelligentsia, Lur’e agreed, did have the people’s welfare 
as its absolute value, but it was right to do so—certainly it is superior to 
Vekhi’s (or at least Frank’s) placing of culture as its absolute value: one has 
to live first, only then can one engage in philosophy (146). Lur’e admitted 
that some groups of the intelligentsia were beyond defense—“to combat 
practical nihilism one does not need publicists but psychiatrists” (141)—
but that was no reason to attack its healthier components. Like Kizevetter, 
Lur’e found the religious revivalism of Vekhi to be incomprehensible among 
educated, civilized people.
All in all, the liberals presented a robust defense of their social action, 
perhaps surprisingly robust when it’s compared to that of their counterparts 
in the west, indicating, as we have already noted, how a term like “liberal” 
can be transformed in meaning when implanted in a new culture. True, they 
did stress the importance of institutions, a constitution, and law as necessary 
guarantors of individual freedom. However, they failed to exploit what 
could be seen as one of the greatest inconsistencies, even contradictions, 
within Vekhi. Berdiaev’s (and Gershenzon’s) insistence on the primacy of 
inner life over external forms could be seen as an excellent illustration of 
the truth of Kistiakovskii’s accusation regarding a lack of awareness of law’s 
importance among Russian intellectuals and also, perhaps, that of Struve’s 
accusation of alienation from state and nation.
In his classic account of Russian liberalism, George Fischer pointed out 
that in a backward society (in the terminology of the time) liberals are caught 
between the tactics of collaborating with the oppressive authorities in the 
hope of gaining concessions and out-and-out revolutionary opposition.12 
In this situation, the Kadets were theoretically defending the latter course 
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of action but were, in practice, getting closer and closer to adopting the 
former. In many ways, this moment of possible transition was central to 
the Vekhi debate, to the liberals themselves but also to their critics even 
further to the left. SR writers such as Viktor Chernov agreed: liberalism was 
doomed to be caught at the crossroads because of an “enormous disparity 
between its program and its tactics.” The Kadets retained radical aims—for 
a constituent assembly and land reform—alongside a desire to work within 
the system as a kind of loyal opposition to His Majesty.13 The remnants 
of the intelligentsia tradition interfered with this new posture, and Struve 
opened up a way of escape to enable them to reconcile with forces further 
to the right (20). Thus the intelligentsia was trapped. Any move to the right 
would discredit it with the left, but would risk being insufficient to earn the 
confidence of the right. Any step to the left would have the same impact in 
reverse, discrediting it with the right but not gaining credibility with the 
left (21). Fate had put the liberals in this position, which corresponded to 
Russian historical conditions. Russia lacked a strong, independent “liberal 
bourgeoisie prepared to fight courageously and decisively for political 
freedom” (20–21). The middle class, such as it was, was attempting to 
adapt the Kadet party to its own immediate interests and to throw out 
any superfluous remaining traces of “love of the people” and desires of the 
“third element” (22).
Social Democratic Responses 
Among Social Democrats, the embourgeoisement of the intelligentsia 
was the standard response, running through literary cultural criticism 
by Vladimir Friche, Vladimir Bazarov (Rudnev), and Nikolai Valentinov 
(Vol’skii) and more sociological analyses by Leon Trotskii and Aleksandr 
Bogdanov. These last were partially influenced by the theory of Jan Wacław 
Machajski, stating that socialism was the class ideology of the intelligentsia 
as a cover for its claim to be a ruling elite.14 However, the Social Democratic 
position on Vekhi was pithily summed up by Lenin: Vekhi was “an 
encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy.”15 There was not much more to the SD 
position beyond, first, the embourgeoisement theory, which was partly true 
in the broad sense; second, the assumption that this led to compromise 
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with the autocracy; and third, the more questionable assumption that 
Vekhi was simply supportive of the Kadets. The Kadet polemic against this 
was surely evidence of greater complexity, but Lenin did not acknowledge 
this. It could be instantly dismissed: “Vekhi is good because it discloses the 
whole spirit of the real policy of the Russian liberals and of the Russian 
Kadets included among them. That is why the Kadet polemic with Vekhi 
and the Kadet renunciation of Vekhi are nothing but hypocrisy, sheer idle 
talk, for, in reality the Kadets collectively, as a party, as a social force, have 
pursued and are pursuing the policy of Vekhi and no other.”16
The Socialist Revolutionaries Respond
One of the interesting features of the debate is how little influence the 
Social Democrats in general and Lenin in particular had on it. The great 
denunciations of Vekhi by liberals, populists, and others, not to mention 
Vekhi itself, paid little or no attention to the specifically SD school of 
thought. It was in fact the SRs who produced the most interesting, 
thoroughgoing, competent, and comprehensive reply to Vekhi, “Vekhi” as 
a Sign of the Times.17 The collection consists of eight contributions but, 
although his name does not appear at all, three of them are by Chernov 
under the pseudonyms Iu. Gardenin, B. Iur’ev, and Ia. Vechev. With some 
justification, the contributors believed that they themselves, the SRs, were 
the chief targetof Vekhi. “Yes! We stand at the centre of their attention and 
we should be proud” (10). “We are the sun in the planetary system of their 
opponents.” (11)
In a hard-hitting overview from which the above quotations were 
taken, Chernov/Gardenin led the attack on Vekhi on behalf of the SRs. In 
a phrase which became the title of the collection, he identified Vekhi as 
“a sign of the times [znamenie vremeni],” or even better, he went on, as 
“a sign of stagnating times [znamenie bezvremen’ia].” Its success on the 
book market and as an intellectual phenomenon was a “succès de scandale” 
(1), a phrase used much later by Frank in his memoirs.18 Nonetheless, he 
went on, it was “worth more serious attention than it had hitherto been 
given.” This was, in Gardenin’s view, nothing less than “the most reactionary 
book of the last decade. In this respect Vekhi defeated Pobedonostsev’s 
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Moskovskii sbornik (Memoirs of a Russian Statesman).… The naive and 
direct ‘old-style’ reaction pales into insignificance compared to the subtle 
[utonchennyi] and out-and-out [makhrovyi] reaction in the modern style” 
(1). These were very large claims. Gardenin himself used thirty-seven large 
format pages to back them up, and the collection as a whole ran to 352 
pages, nearly three times the length of Vekhi itself. What was it that the 
SRs found so despicable in Vekhi? For Gardenin, the first and fundamental 
point was that, as former members of the extreme left, the Vekhi 
contributors were, in the post-1905 atmosphere, the leading spokespeople 
of the turncoats and waverers. Quoting Jean Jaures’ lofty denunciation of 
Georges Clemenceau, Aristide Briand, René Viviani, and others drifting to 
the right in France, he describes these renegades as demanding a “return 
ticket” from revolutionary socialism. In Russia, Gardenin said, the Vekhi 
authors were “the ideologues, theoreticians and philosophers of the ‘return 
ticket’” (2). However, the real danger arose from the fact that they were 
not straightforward reactionaries. Quoting the witticism of the time that 
Struve was “the John the Baptist of all our rebirths,” Gardenin pointed 
out that Struve was not antisemitic, like the traditional reactionaries, but 
was “a-Semitic”: reactionaries wanted to restore the iron gauntlet, Struve 
wanted to strengthen the state system; reactionaries praised the idea of 
personal success, Struve supported the suitability (godnost’) of individuals; 
reactionaries roundly cursed the intelligentsia, Struve called on it to 
engage in self-denunciation and repentance (3). Chernov made much of 
the fact that the Vekhi authors themselves were, at heart, intelligenty, and 
had come through a typical intelligentsia formation, though they claimed 
to be outside it. Berdiaev, for instance, could be said to have once shared 
the primitive attitude to philosophy he denounced in others. They were, 
Chernov said, “inhabitants of Sodom but not Sodomites; intelligenty 
but alien to the intelligentsia; white, snow-white crows in a generally 
black flock” (10). The current period, Chernov continued, was one of 
revolutionary defeat and counter-revolutionary triumph. In an analysis 
many might see as having resonance today, Chernov pointed out that when 
the historical tide was ebbing, people ceased struggling for revolution 
and struggled off to wherever they could go. One turned to personal life, 
another into pure scholarship, a third into a caring profession, a fourth 
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into eroticism;19 a fifth, perhaps, may have entered into the auditorium of 
Struve and Gershenzon. But continued executions and exile meant that 
many would turn to renewed revolutionary activity (30). The Vekhi authors 
continually asked who was to blame for the failure of 1905, and constantly 
replied “the intelligentsia.” Chernov refused absolutely to accept this. In any 
case, he argued, the so-called Octobrists, the liberals and their allies, were 
not people of 17 October but actually of 3 June.20 Vekhi was a symbol of 
the general tragedy, or tragic comedy, of liberalism, of its illness, which 
he diagnosed as “complete impotence; senile degeneration of its substance, 
and its own distinctive kind of political arteriosclerosis” (35). Vekhi had 
no answer to the real needs of the time. It was not the intelligentsia which 
was doomed, it was the Vekhi authors. “They are doomed. They are cut off 
from the sharply greening stems of the liberation movement and there is no 
way back for them” (37). The other contributions to the collection were no 
less uncompromising. Under the name Iur’ev, Chernov defended “scientific 
philosophy” against “philosophising mysticism,” claiming that Vekhi did 
not even remain true to Solov’ev. Instead, it came close to the old world 
of official religion. For instance, Solov’ev celebrated the Russian people 
as “fools in Christ,” while Berdiaev and Frank simply denounced them as 
“Ivan-durak” (98–99). Their philosophizing was simply a cloak under which 
they smuggled socio-political contraband (101)—implicitly identified by 
Chernov as a restoration of the values of official Russia, namely Autocracy, 
Orthodoxy, and Nationality. Nikolai Avksent’ev energetically defended 
the record of socialism and the intelligentsia in terms of creating cultural 
values. Socialism, in particular, would establish the emancipation of the 
laboring classes, which was the only real base for the flourishing of human 
creativity (128). The Vekhi authors in general and Frank in particular did 
not understand that, for the intelligentsia, revolution was not a value but 
a condition. Socialism had various aims to establish new economic and 
other institutions in the real world, but “it does not see, does not know 
any concrete path to the realization of its demands other than through 
a revolutionary collision with the old order” (139). Nor did socialism 
assume that human nature was intrinsically good. Socialism, in its desire 
for the external transformation of institutions, also recognised the necessity 
of inner development of the personality (140). Frank and the others 
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concentrated on the negative aspects of revolution without recognizing its 
potential for growth and renewal: “They hear only the rumblings of the 
collapse of the old edifice,” but see nothing of its replacement and thereby 
“understand nothing” (141). Rather cheekily, Avksent’ev concluded by 
saying that Christ was the son of a poor carpenter who brought in a new 
teaching but died in ignominy, which is a proof for his pharisaic critics that 
his teachings were false, when in fact they were resurrected by numerous 
followers and became the basis for a universal religion. “Our” intelligentsia 
“now finds itself in the same position” (144). A final noteworthy response 
came from Leonid Shishko, in one of his last writings. Shishko attempted to 
refute the picture painted, especially by Struve, of the relationship between 
the intelligentsia and the inert, passive masses. Instead, Shishko argued, the 
previous half-century had seen the gradual rapprochement of two great 
historical forces—the social movement of the masses and the intelligentsia 
movement. From early naive encounters of the 1870s populism had learned 
that it would take longer than expected to achieve its aims, and it had 
been steadily attaining them, as time passed, though there had been many 
perturbations and problems. The events of 1905 certainly caused a serious 
setback, but it was not, as Vekhi assumed, “a complete and irremediable 
catastrophe” (278) which would destroy the process altogether. In fact, it 
was “the hopes which flared up in the light of October 17” which were 
proven to be fantasy “and … have been destroyed, leaving the remnants of 
deep disillusion in many hearts” (278). 
Palpable Hits?
The response to Vekhi shows many things. Specific criticisms pointed out 
inconsistencies, contradictions, and perceived errors. For instance, several 
critics as diverse as Miliukov, Kizevetter, Chernov, and Lenin believed that 
the intelligentsia should be some kind of vanguard, or part of a vanguard, 
which educated and led the masses. It was not a weakness but a strength 
that the intelligentsia should be cut off from the benighted masses and 
should promote the interests of ordinary people above its own. Differences 
of emphasis in Vekhi between Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Gershenzon, and Struve 
over the role of the individual and the social in both the diagnosis of 
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the supposed ills of the intelligentsia and over the suggested cures were 
noted. Many specific points of disagreement emerged. However, above and 
beyond the individual points, some significant broader features can also be 
detected.
While at one level it is not surprising that hardly any of the defenders 
would admit to any serious failings in the intelligentsia, or to its bearing 
even partial responsibility for the collapse of the 1905 revolution, on another 
level it is somewhat disturbing. In fact, one of the main features of the 
debate is the strength and energy which the whole spectrum of the radical 
intelligentsia, from liberals to social democrats, put into the defense not 
only of the current intelligentsia but also of its revolutionary tradition. This 
also highlights the fact that, although we may translate deeply meaningful 
words like “liberal,” “democratic,” “populist,” and so on from one language 
to another, the cultural framework around the terms, and their inner 
content, can engage in subtle and not-so-subtle shifts of meaning. All of 
them shared a more radical and even revolutionary meaning than is often 
associated with them in the United States or Western Europe. However, 
another key feature of the debate, about which the defenders of the 
intelligentsia were somewhat more divided, was the question of whether 
or not Vekhi was a sign of the growing transition of the intelligentsia from 
a radical, questioning group which challenged the autocracy into a more 
compliant and collaborative middle class hiding behind, as Gershenzon put 
it, the “bayonets and prisons” of the regime. Lenin was not the only one 
to be convinced that this was precisely what was happening. However, it 
is noteworthy that the portion of the intelligentsia most likely to be ripe 
for embourgoisement, the liberal professionals of the Kadet party, was 
among the stoutest critics of Vekhi, vigorously defending the social and the 
individual.
Not all of Vekhi’s critics were in agreement with one another—far from 
it, in fact. Two of the most effective responders, Kizevetter and Lur’e, were 
exceptions in that they did agree that Vekhi had diagnosed some serious 
weaknesses in the intelligentsia. Even so, they still did not think Vekhi had 
gotten all of its criticisms right. Vekhi, they felt, exaggerated the degree to 
which the intelligentsia was intellectually superficial and neurotic. It should 
praise rather than denigrate the intelligentsia’s devotion to the interests of 
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the narod, the people, the masses. Even more emphatically, however, they 
had no sympathy at all for Vekhi’s solutions. Kizevetter and Lur’e did not 
believe that the answer lay in mysticism, romanticism, inner development, 
and collaboration with the regime, as the Vekhi authors variously suggested, 
but in redoubling efforts to spread rationality and social engagement, not 
restrict them. They were also somewhat incredulous that Vekhi should be 
seriously suggesting a return to religion. For Lur’e particularly this was 
incomprehensible. It was not only the two of them who detected the “clink 
of the censer” in Vekhi. Almost all of Vekhi’s critics were of the same mind 
on this topic. Remarkably, perhaps, Miliukov was so contemptuous of the 
book’s religious dimension that he did not even deem it worth refuting.
Finally, and this may be a point shared with many intellectual traditions, 
the debate showed that Russian intellectual life since the mid-nineteenth 
century was not a set of different “generations” which “succeeded” one 
another, but was rather a kind of palimpsest, or better, “layer-cake,” with each 
segment adding to, rather than replacing, what had gone before. The debate 
showed not only a widespread devotion to a diverse set of revolutionary 
predecessors—Belinskii, Herzen, Chernyshevskii, Mikhailovskii, and 
others—but an important foundation of a kind of populism, in the sense 
of “serving the people,” shared by liberals and socialists. Indeed, this 
observation leads to a broader speculation. As we have seen, Shishko, who 
was coming to the end of a long and fruitful life lived in the light of radical 
principles, believed that the intelligentsia and the masses were coming 
ever closer together. The tone of the debate bore this out at least in part. 
However, it was to be one of the tragic ironies of the October revolution 
that it was precisely the “natural” populism and the “natural” collectivism, 
even socialism, that were to be obliterated from Russian culture.
A close examination of the responses to Vekhi shows that, in the 
words of Hamlet, the rapiers of its critics made numerous palpable hits. 
The uncritical admiration often shown by Vekhi’s modern admirers needs 
to take this into account; its opponents are not to be dismissed simply as 
a group of narrow-minded, philistine fanatics. Many of Vekhi’s admirers 
take it to be a lone voice criticizing an intelligentsia all too ready to succumb 
to the perceived evils of post-revolutionary communism—in the forefront 
of which they identify intellectual superficiality; a flawed view of human 
— 101 —
The Intelligentsia Fights Back: Lef t-wing Response to Vekhi and its Signif icance
nature; a contempt for the individual and a domineering view of the social; 
a crude utilitarianism; and a rejection of the rich cultural and artistic 
traditions of the past. The debate demonstrates the sophistication, complexity, 
and intellectual richness of the intelligentsia tradition. It shows that, while 
Vekhi did make many valid points and the intelligentsia was in some ways 
overly hostile, the final impression is one of passionate differences. The 
debate shows the traditional intelligentsia at its most developed, creative 
and diverse. The tragedy is not simply that it was destroyed by Bolshevik 
malevolence and fanaticism, but that the maelstrom of war and revolution 
made it almost impossible for it to have survived at all. In this sense, taking 
the range of the debate as a whole, the real significance is not in who “won” 
the argument. Rather, its significance lies in the fact that this debate is 
more or less the final exposition of the richness of late-nineteenth-century 
Russian intellectual life. It is the poignant swansong of a tragically doomed 
and much-missed group of talented, critical, and creative people.
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The rise of The PeoPle
and The Pol i T ical PhilosoPhy of The Vekhi auThors*
Ever t  van  der  Zwe er de
... Sem’ vrachei sem’iu lekarstvami lechat 
bol’nogo.
—Dmitrii S. Merezhkovskii, “Seven Humble 
Men,” 1909
Mais lorsqu’on lui pose la question: “Qui sont 
les aristoi qui doivent nous gouverner?”, le 
démocrate se tourne vers le peuple pour lui 
laisser la décision.
—Bernard Manin, Principes du gouvernement  
représentatif, 1996
Some argument is required to justify a discussion of the political philosophy 
of the Vekhi authors. This dimension received relatively little attention 
during the discussions immediately after the book’s publication in 1909, 
which focused more on the Vekhi authors’ perception of current affairs 
and, most of all, on the possible effects of their intervention.1 It has also 
remained under-researched in later scholarly literature, which tends to 
concentrate on the religious philosophy of the authors, their conceptions of 
* A Russian translation of a longer version of this essay, originally written in English, 
has appeared as “Narodnyi pod”em i politicheskaia filosofiia ‘vekhovtsev,’” in “Pravda.” 
Diskursy spravedlivosti v russkoi intellektual’noi istorii, ed. N. S. Plotnikov (Moscow: 
Institut “Spravedlivyi Mir,” 2011), 276–319. The same version has appeared in German 
translation as “Der Aufstieg des Volkes und die politische Philosophie in den Vechi,” in 
Pravda: Diskurse der Gerechtigkeit in der russischen Geistesgeschichte, ed. Holger Kuße 
and Nikolaj Plotnikov (Munich: Verlag Otto Sagner, 2011), 155–191.
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religion, philosophy, and the intelligentsia, and, not least, on the question 
of whether, in a Russian tradition of prophecy (prorochestvo), they “saw 
it right.” Finally, the Vekhi authors themselves suggested that “[I]n Vekhi, 
as is well known, politics occupies a relatively small place.”2 This may be 
true of politics in the immediate sense of parties, policies, and measures, 
although even there one may disagree: “Signposts claimed to stand above 
politics.… But the book’s moral and cultural critique did in fact mask 
a predominantly political motive. […] [T]he real political thrust of the book 
was an attempt to destroy the informal coalition of the liberals with the left 
which characterized Kadet [Constitutional Democrat] Party policy.”3
At the time of writing of Vekhi, Europe was on the threshold of the age 
of democracy, and Russia was no exception in this respect: there was strong 
pressure to change the politeia, and some short-lived changes indeed took 
place after the 1905 revolution. In this situation, the pressure on intellectuals 
to engage in politics was strong. With the exception of Mikhail Gershenzon, 
the initiator of the project but an outsider in many respects (notably in 
his admiration of Tolstoi), all of the Vekhi authors were politically active, 
moving from Leftist positions (legal Marxism, social democracy) to liberal 
ones, and in some cases, for example that of Aleksandr Izgoev (Lande), 
remaining close to a non-orthodox Marxism.4 With the exception of Izgoev, 
all had studied or lived in Germany. With the exception of Gershenzon, 
who later set up the Soviet Soiuz pisatelei and was its first president, all of 
them opposed the Soviet regime. Bogdan Kistiakovskii died in 1920 while 
a professor at Kiev University, but Petr Struve, after a brief membership 
in the “white” government of General Wrangel, left Russia after 1920, and 
Nikolai Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, Semen Frank, and Izgoev were forced 
to emigrate in 1922 on the “Philosophy Steamer.”5 The chart on the next 
page illustrates their political activism and the gradual shift to liberal and 
“kadet” positions.6
The main reason, I suggest, why the book had the impact that it did 
have is its attempted intervention in the very foundation of any “politics”: 
investigating the nature of the political, the relation between truth and 
power, and the role of the intelligentsia. This article, therefore, seeks to 
assess the political philosophy of the Vekhi authors, which is largely implicit 
in the seven articles that make up Vekhi. While Vekhi evidently neither is 
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Berdiaev yes yes yes yes member
Bulgakov yes yes yes — member 1905–07
Frank yes yes yes — close
Gershenzon no no no no no
Izgoev yes yes close local leader member
Kistiakovskii yes influenced close co-founder member
Struve yes yes ally co-founder leader 1905–07
nor contains a treatise in political philosophy, a particular political 
philosophy is, I argue, taking shape on the pages of this famous, polemical, 
and highly contested symposium, which saw five editions within a year and 
began a second life in the late 1980s, when republication of this previously 
forbidden book became possible.7
The chapter consists of two parts. The first part focuses on a key issue 
at stake in Vekhi, namely the relation between democratic conditions and 
the idea of an integral worldview, and I introduce this topic by way of 
a discussion of the social and political philosophy of a major predecessor of 
and inspiration for Silver Age thought, Vladimir Solov’ev (1853–1900). The 
second part offers a systematic analysis of the overall political philosophy 
of the Vekhi authors (without ignoring their differences). To avoid 
misunderstanding: the expression “political philosophy” denotes not the 
Vekhi authors’ political opinions or stances, but their overall conceptions of 
politics and the political.
A few preliminary remarks are appropriate. First of all, my objective 
is to understand, not to evaluate, let alone judge, the Vekhi authors. This 
is not without relevance, since Vekhi, whether in spite of or because of its 
“conciliatory” tendency, strongly invites the taking of a position even today, 
just as it is difficult to think about the first two decades of twentieth-century 
Russian history without developing strong opinions and emotions. Rather 
than concealing these behind the veil of scholarly objectivity, they should 
be pointed out. My overall intuition with respect to Vekhi is that the Vekhi 
authors were essentially fighting the already lost battle of an elite that had 
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not even begun to play a major role. More generally, there is a prevailing 
sense of tragedy around Vekhi. Nonetheless, this should not stand in the 
way of sober analysis.
Second, it is important to note that the statement that the Vekhi 
authors were fighting a lost battle can only be made by virtue of the 
advantage of hindsight. It is difficult to avoid reading Vekhi, in the 
light of later developments, as a prophetic warning against “principled 
revolutionism” (Frank, 143; cf. Bulgakov, 30), against a peculiar 
combination of moral absolutism and nihilism, and against the dangers 
of any “instrumentalization” in politics—that is, against the notorious 
Jacobin justification of means by ends that would become the hallmark 
of the later Bolshevik regime.8 In fact, however, we encounter here what 
I suggest one might call the disadvantage of hindsight, leading us to project 
later developments upon earlier events. A clear example of this is present in 
the review by Rüdiger Safranski of the German edition of Vekhi, published 
by Karl Schlögel in 1990: “Russian intellectuals of European reputation … 
used the calm before the great storm after the failed revolution of 1905 to 
urge a radical self-scrutiny of the intelligentsia” (italics mine).9 Obviously, 
to the Vekhi authors, the year 1909, in 1909 itself, was not an intermezzo: 
they were as ignorant of what would take place eight years from then as we 
are regarding what will take place eight years in our own future, even if they 
themselves, a decade later in Iz glubiny (Out of the Depths, 1918), recorded 
that “Russian educated society for the most part did not heed the warning 
addressed to it …,”10 thus contributing to the hindsight perspective.
Third, the use of words like democracy and aristocracy in this chapter 
calls for a terminological remark. Generally, I use the classical classification 
of six forms of politeia, three of them “virtuous” and three “corrupt.”11




mob democracy / 
 majority tyranny
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Other empirical forms, such as bureaucracy, gerontocracy, technocracy, 
expertocracy, hierocracy, and kleptocracy, are essentially variants of 
oligarchy. Corruption is possible in all three forms, but while the contrast 
between a good monarch and a tyrant is enormous, and an oligarchic elite 
can yield its place to a virtuous one which is truly oriented towards the 
common good, in the case of democracy the distance between “good” and 
“bad” democracy is relatively small. To the extent to which “the people” 
actually rules, it becomes difficult to find an alternative demos; corruption 
and amelioration can only come from the inside. The double meaning of 
demos, as denoting both the (political) people and the poor mob, is an 
indication of this. A polity with a virtuous demos could be qualified as 
“mass aristocracy,”12 pointing to a political community that rests upon 
widespread civic education (paideia), an Aristotelian ideal that is strongly 
present in Vekhi.13 Even Plato was not anti-democratic per se if demos 
meant a community of the virtuous.14
Conceptions of an ideal politeia contrast with the more realistic ideal 
of a mixed polity,15 used by Cicero and before him Polybius to describe the 
Roman republic, and seen by them as a means to compensate for the flaws 
of each of the pure forms, prefiguring the idea of representative democratic 
government that runs from James Madison to Bernard Manin.16 Empirically 
and historically, all regimes are compromises, and they are to a varying 
degree “corrupt”—they are somewhere on the scale of virtue, and engaged 
in the ongoing process of generation, corruption, and repair. This, however, 
is to be distinguished from the increase or decrease in political participation 
of members of the polity, in response to the actual development of society, 
as well as from the equalization of this participation, which historically led 
to universal suffrage on a one-(wo)man-one-vote basis. This increase and 
decrease of democratic participation is never smooth or uncontested—it 
tends to be rife with struggle and conflict.17 Vekhi is seen, in this article, 
against the backdrop of a “rise of the people” with a claim to political 
participation on the one hand, and a call for virtue and “political quality” 
on the other.
Finally, I perceive three meanings of the expression “political 
philosophy.” (i) In the most habitual meaning, political philosophy is 
a specialized branch of philosophy that focuses on “things political,” that 
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is, issues of government, justice, deliberation, political rights and liberties, 
party politics, and so forth. (ii) In a second, more properly philosophical 
meaning, it is a reflection on the question of why there are “political things” 
in the first place, and what makes them “political”—my position is that 
they are “political” insofar as they entail the possibility of “real conflict” 
(as opposed to mere disagreement or quarrel). This is, as Derrida has aptly 
labelled it, their politicité (politicity).18 Here we are in the field of ontology, 
and my position, following Chantal Mouffe’s interpretation of Carl Schmitt, 
is that everything social is always-already “political” in this precise sense. 
However, it is so to a varying degree, which can approach zero: some things 
are “politically neutral,” some have been neutralized. Such neutralization 
itself is not neutral, but political; at the same time, they are, for all practical 
purposes, neutral—that is, they have effectively been neutralized.19 That 
“everything is political” thus neither implies that anything is ever purely 
political nor that everything is politics—quite the contrary, it means that 
nothing is ever purely political and that nothing is ever purely a-political 
or un-political. Everything social has an inevitable political dimension: it 
is potentially conflictual and essentially contestable. (iii) If the previous is 
true, a reflexive notion of political philosophy is implied, which claims that 
political philosophy itself is always-already “political,” and hence it makes 
sense to approach a book like Vekhi as a politicum (Gk: politikon) in its own 
right.
The Big Issue: Democracy and Integral Worldview
John Rawls has argued that under conditions of political freedom, there 
is likely to exist a plurality of comprehensive doctrines—that is, religious 
and non-religious worldviews, each of which offers a more or less elaborate 
conception of society, politics, the meaning of life, salvation of the soul (or 
lack thereof), and so forth.20 Each of these “comprehensive doctrines” is 
a specimen in the category of what Berdiaev labelled “integral world-view” 
(tselostnoe mirosozertsanie), or “organic fusion of truth and goodness, 
knowledge and faith” (5, 13). One can connect the contrast that Aileen Kelly 
(thinking of Frank and Struve on the one hand, and Berdiaev and Bulgakov 
on the other) makes between doctrines that make a “clear distinction bet- 
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ween religious and political tasks” and others that do not with Rawls’s 
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doc-
trines.21 A reasonable comprehensive doctrine recognizes the existence 
of a plurality of competing comprehensive doctrines and is capable 
of distinguishing its own comprehensiveness from its participation in 
an overlapping consensus with other comprehensive doctrines. While 
disagreeing with Rawls on the notion of reasonableness and sharing 
the critique of those who argue that it already presupposes a “modern 
autonomous self,”22 I do agree with his idea of a plurality of comprehensive 
doctrines: under conditions of freedom, people will articulate their 
perceptions of the world in the form of contrasting worldviews which serve 
as each other’s “constitutive outside” (negierte Bestimmtheit, one might turn 
Hegel inside out), and of which there hence have to be at least two.23
Under conditions of liberty, the elements of this plurality enjoy prima 
facie legitimacy. Consequently, what singles out a democratic polity, given 
a degree of freedom that allows for their development, is a plurality of 
integral worldviews, none of which can be a priori disqualified without 
undermining the very polity in which they exist. In other words, there 
is a plurality of legitimate mutually exclusive integral worldviews, none 
of which can lay exclusive claim to truth or justice, and which together 
express and reflect both the richness of human intellectual creativity and 
the conflicts that exist in the society that they relate to, and which they 
sustain through their interaction. At the same time, they demonstrate the 
differentiation and partition of that same society, and deny its organic 
nature unless this diversity of worldviews is sublated (aufgehoben) into 
a higher unity. Some of these integral worldviews (forms of liberalism and/
or pluralism, for example) accommodate the very plurality just indicated, 
others do not; some appreciate it positively, others reject it or accept it as 
an inevitable evil.
The key point here is that there is a conflict between, on the one hand, 
this situation of “real existing plurality,” and, on the other hand, the ideal 
situation that is part of the vision of the good society of at least some of the 
Vekhi authors. Upon Kelly’s reading, Vekhi reflects precisely this conflict in its 
inner division and in its “two contradictory messages to the intelligentsia.”24 
According to Kelly, the four main authors, all “former leading ideologists of 
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Russian Marxism,” fall into two groups: the “maximalists” and “messianists” 
Berdiaev and Bulgakov, who stuck to an integral, Orthodox Christian 
worldview and hence viewed history in teleological terms, and political 
reality in apocalyptic ones, and the “pragmatics” or “humanists” Frank 
and Struve (joined by Izgoev and Kistiakovskii), who “were prepared to 
live with unpredictability as a consequence of openness to ideas (such as 
concepts of legal order and individual rights as preached and practiced in 
the West), which could extend the freedom of individuals in the present to 
determine their own destinies.”25
The way in which thinkers address issues that are part of the “current 
affairs” of their time is determined, among others, by their philosophical 
background. Part of the background of the Vekhi authors was the massive 
figure of Vladimir Solov’ev, who represented the kind of thinker that the 
Vekhi authors were trying to be, and who had in his work pointed out 
a number of basic problems and questions that the Vekhi authors were also 
struggling with. This struggle becomes manifest on the pages of Vekhi. 
Solov’ev had not, in any direct or indirect sense, been the philosophical 
teacher or mentor of the Vekhi authors. As he himself famously asserted, he 
had not founded a doctrine or school of his own,26 and even those who were 
philosophically closest to him—Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank—cannot be 
considered his pupils. At the same time, however, he is mentioned several 
times in Vekhi, by Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Kistiakovskii (the only contributor 
who is critical of Solov’ev, and who is more generally an exception among the 
Vekhi authors), Gershenzon, and Struve, though not by Izgoev and Frank 
(who might, however, have referred to him in his analysis of Nietzsche, 
and who refers to him frequently in other works).27 Apart from the well-
known passage in Berdiaev’s text in which he claims that “there seemed 
every reason to acknowledge Vladimir Solov’ev as our national philosopher 
and to create a national philosophical tradition around him,” and that “the 
philosophy of any European country could take pride in a Solov’ev” (12), 
the most striking statement on the topic can be found in Struve, who claims 
that, in contradistinction to Mikhailovskii and Chernyshevskii, “Vladimir 
Solov’ev is not an intelligent at all” (121). Solov’ev was, for most Vekhi 
authors, a “role model” at this point, in the sense that they all identified, 
explicitly, as intelligenty, yet wanted to supersede this identity. Finally, and 
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perhaps most importantly, it was Solov’ev who, in his philosophy of law 
and his attempts at a political philosophy, which was essentially an anti-
political philosophy,28 put key philosophical issues on the agenda. One such 
key issue concerns the relation between law and politics, and I will discuss 
this issue with the help of a recent analysis of Solov’ev’s legal and moral 
philosophy by Alexander Haardt. In his commentary, Haardt situates 
Solov’ev’s position in between those of Lev Tolstoi, who denied positive law 
in the name of Christian morality, and Boris Chicherin, who claimed the 
moral autonomy of the legal system. Solov’ev defends the position according 
to which positive law does have a moral dimension, which excludes out 
of hand any kind of legal positivism as well as its logical consequence, 
namely legal nihilism,29 but also justifies the legal relations, guaranteed by 
the state, between members of a given society.30 In his discussion of Kant, 
his main interlocutor in matters of moral and legal philosophy, Solov’ev 
concludes that the moral demand to treat each person always as an end in 
itself and never merely as a means founds the legal guarantee of personal 
rights and freedoms: “This right of the person [pravo litsa] is from its very 
nature unconditional, while the rights of the community with regard to the 
person are conditioned by the recognition of his individual rights [lichnoe 
pravo].”31 However, while these individual rights do include, for Solov’ev, 
property rights, freedom of religion, and other personal rights, they do not 
include political rights: “While Solov’ev emphasized time and time again 
the rights that protect citizens against state power, he distanced himself 
from the rights to participation in political power of the individual, rights 
which are just as essential for a liberal conception of the state.”32 So if, on 
the one hand, we have good reasons to call Solov’ev a liberal at the level of 
individual rights and freedoms, he is neither a liberal nor a democrat at the 
level of political rights, that is, the right to participation. The shortest way 
to summarize his position is to say that if those who hold power in society, 
namely tsar, church, and civil society, act fully in accordance with the 
principles of Christian universal morality, as they obviously ought to do, in 
Solov’ev’s view, the political participation of those who are ruled becomes 
superfluous. Given a just society with just rulers, democratic participation 
of substantial parts of the population can only lead to division and discord. 
Put differently, in a society fully determined by a Christian conception of 
— 113 —
The Rise of the People and the Polit ical Philosophy of the Vekhi Authors
justice, the difference between monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic 
politeia tends to become superfluous. To put it in Rousseauan terms: if the 
volonté générale is Christian in its essence, the volonté de tous becomes, if 
anything, a barrier to true justice.
As such, there is nothing particularly Solov’evian, Russian, Orthodox, 
or even Christian about this argument.33 This position was embedded, 
however, in Solov’ev’s case, in his conception of Christian politics, a position 
which, however liberal, rights-oriented and humanistic it may be, is not 
one that favors democracy.34 The reason for this is the following: Christian 
politics, like Solov’ev’s entire political project, relies on the idea of an integral 
worldview that not only comprises philosophy, religion, and science, but 
also answers all questions in the field of social and political philosophy.35 By 
contrast, the acceptance of individual political rights, that is, the acceptance 
of the principle of legitimate free individuality, not only at the personal and 
the religious level, as with the adherents of Christian politics, and not only 
at the economic level, as with the liberals and to an extent Solov’ev, but also 
at the political level, means that if a single integral worldview is the shared 
conviction of the members of a given society, this is an accidental fact in 
the sense that it happens to be the case that people share the same integral 
worldview or, in Rawlsian terms, comprehensive doctrine. If, by contrast, 
a modernized church and a Christian intellectual elite manage to establish 
such an integral worldview at the level of society as a whole, it will not be 
accidental, but organically related to the very “idea” of that society.
This excursion into the social and political philosophy of Solov’ev 
serves to show that the Vekhi authors were situated between two positions: 
one which preferred a Christian society on the basis of liberal principles, 
and another which preferred a free society based on Christian principles. 
Even if the “net effect” of these two models can, in principle, be the same, 
their foundation is fundamentally different. Among the Vekhi authors, 
Kistiakovskii came closest to the first position, while Frank was the thinker 
who most clearly adhered to the second. What they all feared, however, was 
not simply the power of a mob that hated them, the intelligenty—though 
that fear was reflected in Gershenzon’s much-loathed remark that “we 
must bless this government which alone, with its bayonets and prisons, still 
protects us from the people’s wrath” (64). What they feared more, and with 
— 114 —
Ever t van der Zweerde
equally good reason, was that a democratic polity would not automatically 
yield a good or just society, let alone one that would fit the integral world-
view that they, in different ways and to a varying extent, were endorsing. 
There is a general truth about democracy at play here: if a democratic 
polity is based on a liberal constitution that guarantees the citizens’ rights 
and liberties, political rights included, it can surely yield a society that is 
considered just by the vast majority of its members, but the unity of such 
a society will be the contingent a posteriori outcome of law-based practices 
and procedures, and not part of the a priori make-up of that society as an 
organic whole: a democratic society, by definition—by virtue of its being 
democratic—does not necessarily yield a society that is considered just by 
any its members, except by those who equate democracy and justice.
The big issue, then, for the Vekhi authors and their contemporaries, 
was identical to one of the big issues of political philosophy today, one 
that divides, for example, “liberals” from “communitarians”: how to 
accommodate the “democratic impulse,” while retaining the possibility of 
a “substantive” integral worldview. The position of the Vekhi authors at this 
point was not simply that of an intellectual elite that wanted to take part in 
political power before they had to give it away to “the people”—their vision 
was genuinely aristocratic. At the same time, their effort to argue for such 
a perspective on the political reality of Russia after the 1905 revolution and 
its subsequent failure is itself squarely situated in that political reality. It is 
from this angle that we must try to assess the political philosophy that is 
present in Vekhi.
Vekhi as Political Philosophy
If we start with the first, most habitual meaning of political philosophy 
(meaning [i], as indicated in the Introduction to this article), we ask how 
the Vekhi authors perceived polity and politics. For an assessment of the 
political philosophy that comes to the fore in Vekhi, it is appropriate, to 
begin with, to distinguish between preferred ends, acceptable means, 
and envisaged agents. Concerning ends, the Vekhi authors made their 
preferences clear. First of all, they wanted order in the sense of a society held 
together reliably and stably by a politeia. Secondly, they all desired freedom, 
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at least in the sense of religious and intellectual freedom, which implied 
a break with the autocratic regime that had existed until 1905. In the third 
place, I think, they all desired social justice: throughout Vekhi, one senses 
genuine protest against the many forms of injustice in Russian society, and 
against the violation of elementary ethical norms. A fourth candidate, rule 
of law (pravovoe gosudarstvo) or legality (zakonnost’, which is rule by rather 
than of law), seems to be of less primary relevance to most Vekhi authors—
at this point, Kistiakovskii comes across as a relative outsider,36 while the 
others seem to perceive it as a means rather than as an end in itself.
As far as means are concerned, apart from rule of/by law, the Vekhi 
authors are crystal-clear on one point: revolution is to be avoided. Even if, 
standing in the tradition of legal Marxism, they did not exclude a strictly 
political revolution, they did reject revolution in the sense of a major 
social transformation.37 Even if in some cases it might be inevitable, it 
is certainly not preferable, as its force is primarily destructive. Since the 
main alternative, reform, involving cooperation between the state and 
some form of representation of society, was not a serious possibility, as 
Bulgakov, Izgoev, and Kistiakovskii show with their critical assessment of 
the quality of political parties and Duma representatives, the question is 
what remains.38 Revolution being rejected, and reform proving unrealistic, 
the overall answer that emerges from Vekhi is (political) education, an echo 
of the aristocratic ideal of paideia that we find in Aristotle, as opposed to 
mobilization of popular instinct: “The Vekhi authors saw one of the most 
serious accusations directed at the Russian intelligentsia in the fact that, 
instead of engaging in a systematic political education of the people in 
a spirit of reasonable compromise, it not only pandered to, but even fully 
consciously stirred up, the ‘dark,’ ‘destructive’ instincts of the masses.”39
Coming, finally, to agency or political subjectivity, the implicit position 
of the Vekhi authors is that, once cured and revitalized, the intelligentsia still 
would have to be the main vehicle of social and political change. There is 
a certain modesty at play here, since the intelligentsia is also held responsi-
ble for much of Russia’s malady, but the basic position is that precisely 
because the intelligentsia has been profoundly wrong, it now really must do 
good. It is not difficult to see sincere intentions and genuine repentance here. 
However, at the same time, the “reborn intelligentsia” is again staged as the 
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leading, if not exclusive, agent. If it does its job properly, there is no real need 
for the political participation of the people: in Vekhi, we find a profound 
critique of what the intelligentsia had been telling the narod—not, however, 
a critique of the fact that it was the intelligentsia that had assumed this role. 
This is not so much an anti-democratic as an a-democratic attitude, fully 
congruent with the Christian politics of Solov’ev. In Kelly’s words—spoken 
of Berdiaev, but applicable more generally—the Vekhi authors showed 
“a reluctance to face the fact that in concrete situations choices frequently 
have to be made between equally desirable but conflicting values: democracy 
and aristocracy, equality and excellence, the demands of the flesh and the 
spirit.”40
The primary agent of change, the intelligentsia, remains particularly 
vague in Vekhi. The Vekhi authors were criticized by, for example, Evgenii 
Trubetskoi, for the “extreme lack of definition of that concept which 
constitutes the fundamental theme of the reflections of Vekhi—the concept 
of the intelligentsia.”41 Schlögel, who subscribes to this critique of a lack of 
definition (Ungenauigkeit), forgives the Vekhi authors by arguing that the 
intelligenty as a matter of fact were unclear as a group.42 This may be true, 
but there is something else at stake as well: the vagueness of this definition 
is productive in Vekhi’s key argument. The Vekhi authors were intelligenty 
themselves and they were identified as such by others.43 Therefore they had 
to be, as Lenin might have put it, “intelligenty drugogo tipa” (intelligenty of 
a different kind), namely a kind that would be capable of properly 
diagnosing the crisis of the intelligentsia to which they themselves belonged, 
and to point a way out of this crisis. They were able to put themselves in 
this position by associating themselves with a number of people, such as 
Dostoevskii and Pushkin, who often were considered intelligenty but who, 
according to most Vekhi authors, were only wearing, like Herzen, the mask 
or the “uniform” of an intelligent—or even, like Solov’ev, were “not an 
intelligent at all” (Struve, 121). The Vekhi authors were those intelligenty 
who were capable of receiving the cure for the intelligentsia’s ills as a whole 
from the outside, from non-intelligenty or from those who were merely 
apparent ones.
Proceeding to the second meaning of political philosophy (ii), namely 
a philosophy of the political understood as the possibility of conflict, we 
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can state that the general perception of it by the Vekhi authors is negative. 
Political parties, for example, are explicitly defined as a necessary evil by 
Bulgakov: “The division into parties, based upon differences of political 
opinion, social position, and property interest, is a habitual and widespread 
phenomenon in countries with popular representation and, in a certain 
sense, is a necessary evil” (46). The fact that they are a necessary evil 
provides them with a certain legitimacy, but the fact remains that they are 
an evil. The persistence of this negative evaluation—which is by no means 
specifically Orthodox or Russian!—is shown by its presence in one of 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s contributions to the 1974 tamizdat44 publication 
Iz-pod glyb (From Under the Rubble), a book that saw Vekhi as one of its 
forerunners: “‘Partiia’ means a part. Every party known to history has 
always defended the interests of this one part against … the rest of the 
people. And in the struggle with other parties it disregards justice for its 
own advantage. […] In the world today, we doubtfully advance toward 
a dimly glimpsed goal: can we not, we wonder, rise above the two-party 
or multi-party parliamentary system? Are there no extra-party or strictly 
non-party paths of national development?”45
This protest against the partition of society, reflected by a multi-
party system, is directly related to a predominantly organic conception 
of society as we find it in the thought of most of the Vekhi authors.46 It is 
part of a particular type of worldview, again neither typical of nor limited 
to Christianity or to Orthodoxy, but widespread among late nineteenth-
century and early twentieth-century thinkers (and not only in Russia). 
Struve later moved on to a nationalist position, which is indeed one of 
the possible vectors of development of the organic conception of society: 
“Contending that every state is an organism that needs to assert itself 
among its peers in order to maintain its health, he [Struve] argued that 
Russia could heal its internal wounds by pursuing an expansionist foreign 
policy based on a vigorous nationalism.”47
Directly related to the idea of society as an organism is the predominance 
in Vekhi of the medical metaphor: if a society is a living organism, it can 
be ill, wounded, cured, killed, operated on, infected, contaminated, 
and so forth. The intelligentsia is described, by Gershenzon, as “a crowd 
of sick men quarantined in their own country” (63). When emphasis is 
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on the spiritual dimension of Russian society, “psychotherapeutic” 
metaphors pop up with a vocabulary of crisis, healing (ozdorovlenie), 
self-searching, and similar notions. The Vekhi authors thus engage in 
anamnesis and diagnosis before suggesting a cure: “What follows from 
this diagnosis of the illness? First of all … it means that the ailment 
is deep-seated” (Struve, 127). A close reading of Vekhi shows that the 
metaphors of illness, diagnosis, and healing are present in all seven 
contributions except Kistiakovskii’s.48 As Dmitrii Merezhkovskii aptly, 
and sarcastically, put it: “Seven physicians are treating the patient 
with seven drugs.”49 Treating a patient with seven different medicines 
obviously has a strong risk of overkill, and this possibility catches 
the disagreement among the Vekhi authors, correctly highlighted by 
Merezhkovskii. More significant, however, is the political metaphysics 
at play here: if society is an organism, and one of its main limbs or 
organs, the intelligentsia, is ill, then it must receive proper treatment 
from that part of itself that is capable of providing it, namely, its spiritual 
part. This part can receive the remedy from the outside, because it is 
the privileged part of the social body.50 Such metaphysics fits badly into 
a democratic society with matching polity: whatever unity or harmony 
there is under conditions of democracy is the contingent outcome of 
complex processes, not the manifestation of an underlying substance. 
This is not to say that the Vekhi authors were anti-democratic per se, 
in the sense of being opposed to elections (as Kadet party and Duma 
members, they would be performatively contradicting themselves if 
they were), but to argue that their perception of society, and of their 
own position in it, was essentially pre-modern and aristocratic.
Closely connected to the organic conception of society is the idea 
that the “body” of society consists of more or less clearly delineated 
“organs” and “members” (rather than of citizens or individuals). The 
two of these on which the Vekhi authors focus are, of course, the 
intelligentsia and the people (narod), the latter of which in Russian 
always has the connotation of “ordinary people,” i.e., demos in the 
sense of the mob or hoi polloi. The relation between these two entities 
is stated and evaluated differently, but the pair itself is constant and 
goes unquestioned. Arguably, a belief in the central role of this pair 
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is what the Vekhi authors have in common more than anything else, 
and it appears in all seven contributions (again, less prominently in 
Kistiakovskii’s).51
Arriving, finally, at the third meaning of “political philosophy” (iii), we 
should address the politicity of Vekhi, that is, the fact that the book’s very 
appearance and existence are political. First of all, the book itself, not so 
much as a physical object but as an event, as something that was there, is 
a “thing political.” It was a politicum in 1909, when it saw five editions within 
a year and became the object of heated debate. It was a politicum during the 
Soviet period, when it “survived as a negative” in the polemical works of 
Lenin, in Stalin’s Kratkii kurs istorii KPSS (Short Course on the History of 
the Soviet Union Communist Party), one of the key ideological texts of the 
Stalin era, and in the official Soviet renderings of the history of philosophy 
in Russia, for example in the History of Philosophy that appeared in six hefty 
volumes between 1957 and 1965 (in a chapter entitled “Critique of the 
Bourgeois-Landowner Idealistic Philosophy and Sociology in Russia in the 
Epoch of Imperialism” Vekhi is discussed as “maliciously attacking [zlobno 
napadaia na]” Marxism, materialism, and natural science while invoking 
“the Slavophiles, Iurkevich, Solov’ev and other mystics,” and Lenin’s “O 
‘Vekhakh’” is repeatedly quoted to disqualify Vekhi as “an encyclopaedia of 
liberal renegacy.”)52 And it was a politicum, once again, around the end of 
the Soviet regime, when it was republished in large numbers (the edition 
used for this article appeared in 75,000 copies),53 and played a key role in 
the reassessment of the intelligentsia and of the role it claimed it could or 
should play.54
In terms of what it did, secondly, Vekhi’s nature as a politicum comes 
to the fore in the decisions it takes at the level of theory.55 The sustained 
juxtaposition of intelligentsia and narod as not only historical or sociological 
categories but also as political agents and non-agents respectively is a first 
case in point. The nascent nationalism of the Vekhi authors, in opposition 
to both proletarian internationalism and the “Christian cosmopolitanism” 
of Tolstoi, is a second example. It appears in several places, for example 
at the end of Izgoev’s contribution, where he ascribes the political success 
of the Young Turks to their emphasis on the nation-state and contrasts 
it with the failure of the Russian intelligentsia (90).56 A third example is 
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the renouncement of revolution as a viable strategy for political change, 
and the choice for a combination of reform and conciliation, highlighted 
by Merezhkovskii, among others.57 All three examples point to political 
decisions at the level of theoretical discourse, and they are part of the 
polemics that Vekhi engages in.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, Vekhi is political in its formal 
aspects, that is, in how it develops its positions and polemics and thus in 
how it “engages in politics” itself. To avoid misunderstanding, it should 
be clarified that this is not a matter of doubting the sincerity of the Vekhi 
authors (as if they were “politicians cloaked as philosophers”), but a matter 
of highlighting the inevitable political nature of their endeavor, and of laying 
bare the logic of things (a logic which implies that philosophers always 
are “politicians” in the precise sense that they, too, have to deal with “the 
political” that is present in their text). To start with, the polemics of Vekhi 
are anti-polemical, with their emphasis on “reconciliation” (smirenie), 
a feature noted by many commentators, including Merezhkovskii, whose 
critical commentary bore the title of “Sem’ smirennykh” (“Seven Reconciled 
Men”).58 To be anti-polemical, however, is to be polemical in a different 
way: the original opponents are those who continue the struggle, who 
refuse to reconcile, and a plea for conciliation is a form of self-concealing 
polemics. In this sense, no position or perspective can ever escape the logic 
of polemics.
Crucially important is the use of one key word of political philosophy, 
“we”:59 a conciliatory word par excellence, it is also, as Frank emphasized 
elsewhere, oppositional: “… ‘we’ is fundamentally limitless. It is true that, 
empirically, ‘we’ is always limited: every ‘we’ … is opposed by … some ‘you’ 
and ‘they.’ But, along with this, ‘we’ in another, projected unity can embrace 
and include all ‘you’ and ‘they’ …”60 This is the case with the “we” formed by 
the Vekhi authors too. Apart from the differences within this “we,” it is also 
always constitutive of its “other.” A close analysis of the use of “we” (my) and 
its derivatives such as “our” (nash) serves to show that while its meaning 
(in the Fregean sense of Sinn) remains constant, namely, “this group of 
which I as locutor am part and in the name of which I speak,” its reference 
(Fregean Bedeutung) shifts between three positions: sometimes “we” stands 
for the Russian nation, sometimes “we” stands for the intelligentsia as 
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a whole, and sometimes, finally, it stands for those intelligenty who, unlike 
the vast majority but including the Vekhi authors themselves, perceive the 
real causes of the crisis and have the proper remedy.
In the three cases mentioned, “we” stands in opposition to, respectively, 
people other than Russian nationals, non-intelligenty, and, most importantly, 
the “you” that is addressed directly and has the choice between becoming 
part of a reborn “we” or remaining stubbornly “ill,” thus risking becoming 
part of “they.” This shifting use of “we” is what enables the Vekhi authors to 
turn their criticism of the intelligentsia into a samokritika (self-critique) by 
the intelligentsia as a whole, in which case they themselves are the agents 
of this samokritika.61 A cured intelligentsia will be capable of becoming the 
agent of change of the “big we” of the Russian nation. The shifting reference 
of “we” thus is the precondition for the Vekhi authors to distance themselves 
from the intelligentsia while remaining part of it, and thus both to “remove 
themselves from the ranks of the accused,”62 and to turn the intelligentsia 
into, to put it in present-day terms, a self-help group.
In sum, Vekhi is political with respect to its very existence—its that; 
with respect to its content—its what; and with respect to its form—its how.
From this analysis of Vekhi as a specimen of political philosophy, three 
conclusions can be drawn. First of all, it has been demonstrated that the 
largely implicit political philosophy (distinct from their political stances) of 
the Vekhi authors was aristocratic, not so much in terms of their own social 
background (which was rather mixed in this respect),63 but in terms of their 
perception of political agency. This conception is clearly at odds with the 
first model of democracy that I have distinguished, that is the Jacobin model 
of direct or pure democracy in the tradition of thinkers from Rousseau 
to Lenin and Schmitt. But it could be made compatible with the second 
model, or representative democracy as a mixed polity with aristocratic 
elements, if the Vekhi authors could have accepted the idea of a plurality 
of radically different, yet all a priori legitimate, “comprehensive doctrines” 
and, perhaps more importantly, the intrinsically political nature of things 
political, including their own endeavor. Their organicist social ontology, 
however, precluded this: it held no place for conflict, division, and plurality 
other than as an ailment to be cured or, at best, as a necessary evil.
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Connected to this is a second conclusion: the Vekhi authors have been 
qualified as reactionaries and mocked as renegaty and nazadniki (literally, 
“backwarders”),64 and they have objected to this misqualification.65 
They were partly right: they did not support autocracy, they did favor 
constitutional and democratic reform, they were “liberals” in such issues 
as freedom of religion, opinion, and movement, and they were certainly 
progressive. Still, their qualification as reactionaries does make sense: their 
position was not only and explicitly a reaction to the failed revolution of 
1905 and to the ensuing crisis of the intelligentsia; it was also, and more 
profoundly, a reaction against the actual democratization of Russian 
society. This reaction comes to the fore most clearly in their persistent use 
of the opposition: intelligentsia-narod. One can link this to a conservative 
position, aiming at the preservation of the worldview monopoly of the 
intelligentsia, but it is, in fact, reactionary, because this monopoly already 
belonged to the past. Shelokhaev rightly states that, while the Vekhi authors 
accepted the idea of a political revolution (and thus could approve of the 
February revolution of 1917), they were opposed to the idea of a social 
revolution.66 They ignored, however, the social revolution that was already 
taking place, and to which the February and October revolutions were 
the alternative reactions. In Vekhi, we see a partial recognition of this 
new situation when, for example, Kistiakovskii points to the legitimate 
existence of a plurality of political parties (99),67 or when Gershenzon, in 
the last section of his contribution, displays an almost visionary awareness 
of the coming-to-be of a society of individuals who decide for themselves 
(66–69). Such insights, however, remain relatively rare on the pages of Vekhi.
Finally, when Shatz and Zimmerman, in the Introduction to the 
English edition, state that “contemporary Western political thought and 
practice can also be illuminated by Signposts,” they claim that Vekhi shows 
that “the need for political and social justice” should be placed “within 
the larger perspective of the need for a creative and productive culture” 
(xxiv–xxv). Safranski, in reviewing the German edition, adds that Vekhi 
shows “how from the struggle against a political tyranny emerges the 
tyranny of the political.”68 Shelokhaev, finally, in the preface to a 1991 post-
Soviet edition, states that when the Vekhi authors demonstrated the poverty 
of political culture in Russia, they were overstating their case.69 All three 
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may have a point. The main conclusion from the Vekhi case, however, is 
that it shows that a democratic politeia, whatever its details, that matches 
a democratizing, individualizing, and differentiating society, does not rely 
on, and no longer can rely on, an integral worldview that is monopolized 
by intellectuals or intelligenty. Instead, it relies on the contingent and 
hence unpredictable dynamic interplay between a plurality of worldviews 
and a society as it actually exists and develops. The Vekhi authors saw this 
situation approaching and rejected it, and in doing so they demonstrated 
the conflict between a Platonic-Christian ideal politeia on the one hand and 
the unpredictable plurality of a democratic society under mixed polity on 
the other. This is not an exclusively Russian problem. On the contrary, it was 
and is also a European and global problem. Karl Schlögel, in the concluding 
remark of his Introduction, points to an open question rather than to an 
achieved answer: “To be able to live without Vekhi, leaving them behind as 
signs on a road which at last leads Russia out of the time of catastrophe—
that would be ‘New Vekhi.’”70 This, again, is not an exclusively Russian issue. 
At this point, Vekhi and the Vekhi authors continue to be highly instructive 
indeed. We see seven intellectuals playing doctor, struggling to keep up the 
idea of an organic society-cum-polity that has a single integral worldview 
as its “spiritual foundation,”71 while the world, Russia included, had already 
developed beyond that point.72
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indi v idual freedom and social JusT ice:
Bogdan Kist iakovskii’s Defense of the Law
Vane s sa  Rampt on
In his introduction to the Vekhi symposium, Mikhail Gershenzon describes 
the contributors’ “common platform” as their “recognition of the theoretical 
and practical primacy of spiritual life over the external forms of community. 
They mean by this that the individual’s inner life is the sole creative force 
in human existence, and that this inner life … constitutes the only solid 
basis on which a society can be built.”1 Bogdan Kistiakovskii’s article 
“V zashchitu prava (Intelligentsiia i pravosoznanie)” (“In Defense of Law 
[The Intelligentsia and Legal Consciousness]”) constitutes an obvious 
exception to this “common platform.” Instead of exploring how society 
could be regenerated via internal moral renewal, Kistiakovskii focused 
precisely on the significance of the rule of law, an external means of shaping 
new cultural values. His article stressed that there was no opposition 
between external freedom guaranteed by law and internal spiritual 
development: “Inner, more absolute spiritual freedom is possible only when 
external freedom is present,” he wrote, “and the latter is the best school for 
the former” (91). Consciously or unconsciously, Kistiakovskii’s piece was 
devoted to proving that the opposition Gershenzon set up between law and 
individual self-realization was false. 
Kistiakovskii’s decision to focus on the normative value of law was 
prompted by his concern at how thoroughly disregard for the idea of the 
rule of law had permeated Russian society. He deplored the arbitrary nature 
of tsarist legal practices, but also the intelligentsia’s legal nihilism and 
refusal to acknowledge the links between a legal order and both individual 
and collective morality. Rather than approaching law as a living process 
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embodied in social convictions and ideals, the intelligentsia saw it as “faith 
in the omnipotence of statutes and the force of binding rules” (107). And 
it was not only the intelligentsia that presented a false ethics on which to 
rebuild Russian society: Kistiakovskii was also wary of attempts, some of 
which were offered by Vekhi collaborators, to refashion society based on 
idealist personalism, which neglected what he saw as the unique advantages 
offered by the idea of law. 
The extent to which different strands within Vekhi figure in its 
opposition to the revolutionary intelligentsia has attracted much scholarly 
interest over the years. The problem of Vekhi’s place within the philosophical 
tradition of Russian liberalism has been examined particularly by Aileen 
Kelly, Leonard Schapiro, and Andrzej Walicki in separate though related 
arguments.2 The present essay seeks to address the issue from a slightly 
different point of view, namely that of how Kistiakovskii’s convictions 
concerning the rule of law were grounded in an ethical theory and politics 
that differed substantially from those of his co-contributors.3 The difference 
between Kistiakovskii and his fellow contributors was noticed long ago, but 
rarely pursued further. The leader of the Kadet Party Pavel Miliukov, for 
example, devoted a lecture tour to criticizing Vekhi, yet found “one essay 
[Kistiakovskii’s] in Vekhi with which one could fully agree, except for its 
terminology and a few sentences at the beginning and end, by which it 
is stitched on, rather artificially, to the rest of the book.”4 Viktor Chernov 
of the Socialist Revolutionary party (writing under the pseudonym of Ia. 
Vechev) went even further, arguing that “Kistiakovskii’s essay, ‘In Defense 
of Law,’ differs favorably from the reactionary noise of Vekhi by its pithiness, 
correctness of style, and serious tone.”5
The contradiction implicit in Kistiakovskii’s affinity with Vekhi and 
the cautiously positive reception of his article among the book’s opponents 
raises questions about the points of intersection between his theory and 
that of his fellow contributors. My aim is therefore to explore to what 
extent Kistiakovskii’s philosophy and politics differed from the theories of 
freedom and selfhood commonly associated with the Vekhi symposium. 
Kistiakovskii was a neo-idealist, but by retaining a resolutely neo-Kantian, 
“scientific” approach to ethics, he distanced himself from the metaphysical 
assumptions of the predominant strain in Russian neo-idealism. His 
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resistance to the idea that idealism necessarily implies a transcendent 
metaphysical reality, and the corresponding focus on inner, personal aspects 
of freedom, led him to emphasize the concept of justice, a moral principle 
that is social by its very nature. In turn, his ethics fed into a progressive 
politics that focused on embodying the absolute ideal of justice in the more 
prosaic value of law.
Scientific-Philosophical Idealism and Social Ethics 
The neo-Kantian ethics underpinning Kistiakovskii’s Vekhi article were the 
product of a philosophical outlook he had devoted much of the previous 
decade to refining. Kistiakovskii’s intellectual path developed in the broader 
context of the emergence of neo-idealism in Russia, and shares many 
characteristics of the better-known transition “from Marxism to idealism” 
of his fellow Vekhi authors Nikolai Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, Semen 
Frank, and Petr Struve. Kistiakovskii (1868–1920) was from a prominent 
Ukrainian family in Kyiv, and was exposed from a young age to the study of 
law (his father was a renowned criminal lawyer) as well as to the Ukrainian 
national movement.6 Interested in Marxism at university, Kistiakovskii 
gradually was drawn to the description of individual freedom and dignity 
in neo-Kantian thought. His five years of graduate work in Germany, where 
he studied first in Berlin under the neo-Kantian Georg Simmel and then in 
Strasbourg under the supervision of Wilhelm Windelband, consolidated 
his sense that idealism provided a firmer basis for the scientific study of 
society than Marxism. 
Like other neo-idealists, Kistiakovskii drew on Kant’s thought 
to articulate a response to pervasive positivist claims that everything 
intellectual can be reduced to the natural, and that moral consciousness 
is simply a derivative of the sensible or psychological.7 In 1907 he 
described the following propositions as irrefutable: since ethical problems 
exist independently of tangible reality and cannot be subordinated to it, 
individuals benefit from the “incontrovertible ability to evaluate reality 
independently and autonomously,” which presupposes their freedom.8 
Individual freedom has important implications: on the one hand, it indicates 
the “principle of the intrinsic value of the individual person and the equal 
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value of persons among themselves”; on the other, freedom constitutes the 
basis of moral behavior: “an individual [is free to] create ideals for him/
herself and demand their fulfillment in reality.”9
Yet what led Kistiakovskii to reject Marxism in favour of neo-
Kantianism was also what distinguished him from Berdiaev, Bulgakov, 
Frank, and Struve. Kistiakovskii found in idealism a rigorous method for 
the scientific study of society as well as a defense of the autonomous value 
of the personality and individuals’ moral equality. But he also repudiated 
the reduction of all processes and structures to a single governing principle, 
a reductionism that led many neo-idealists to formulate metaphysical 
postulates about a moral world order and religious belief. “All monisms,” he 
wrote in the preface to his dissertation, Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen: Eine 
methodologische Studie (Society and the Individual: A Methodological Study, 
1899), “both materialist and idealist must necessarily be metaphysical. They 
construct a final objective for scientific development instead of beginning 
with their starting point.”10 Kistiakovskii prided himself on a more inductive 
approach, concerned not so much with the origins (metaphysical or not) 
of a moral world order, but rather with what the scientific study of moral 
behavior can reveal about social processes.
In his own work, Kistiakovskii sought to make Kantian principles 
relevant for social life while maintaining Kant’s methodological rigor. 
He argued that the study of society should be approached as a science 
(Naturwissenschaft) with a correspondingly stringent methodology, and 
in light of the Kantian categories of understanding. As in the natural 
sciences, social phenomena should be broken down into isolated instances; 
only then can one determine the causal relations between them and the 
general laws that govern social relations.11 In ethics, Kistiakovskii took as 
his starting point the idealist notion that the form of “ought” is permanent 
but its content changes with progress, and that moral principles represent 
common reference points for all individuals without exception.12 Yet he 
was particularly interested in linking Kantian practical reason and broader 
social processes. In various publications of the period, he explored the 
ramifications of individual freedom and morality for social well-being. 
Kistiakovskii sought to bridge the social and personal implications of 
Kantian thought by designating the category of justice (spravedlivost’), an 
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objective and universally valid category for understanding social processes, 
even if it only applies to the social world and not the natural one.13 In his 
reading, justice, a moral yet inherently social principle, is one of the innate 
and incontrovertible attributes of the human condition. In particular, 
individuals’ equal moral worth validates universal aspirations for respect 
and recognition. Kistiakovskii claims that the moral commitment to 
improving the life of the individual within society has traditionally been 
expressed in the creation of legal norms.14 Law, therefore, takes on the 
historically and scientifically necessary task of expressing social justice: the 
generalized social feelings and aspirations that encourage us to form legal 
norms (pravovye normy) are also characterized by categorical necessity 
(bezuslovnaia neobkhodimost’).15 
Kistiakovskii’s views of the tasks of neo-idealism were further fleshed 
out in his contribution to the collection Problemy idealizma (Problems 
of Idealism, 1902). His article “‘Russkaia sotsiologicheskaia shkola’ i ka-
tegoriia vozmozhnosti pri reshenii eticheskikh problem” (“The ‘Russian 
Sociological School’ and the Category of Possibility in the Solution of 
Social-Ethical Problems”) criticizes the ethical theories of the Russian 
subjective sociologists (associated with the thought of N. K. Mikhailovskii 
and P. L. Lavrov) for denying both the objectivity and necessity of values. 
Rather than attempting to clarify universal moral principles that stem from 
human conscience, the “subjective sociologists” emphasized the socially 
determined aspects of human knowledge. Kistiakovskii denounces this 
ethical relativism, in which phenomena are approached not in light of the 
Kantian category of “causal necessity” but rather in terms of “possibility.”16 
The false assumptions of the subjective sociologists result in a misleading 
account of the relationship between what is socially desirable and what 
is historically possible, allowing them to identify the “possible” with the 
“potentially desirable”—in short, allowing them to justify “anything at 
all.”17 Kistiakovskii concludes his article with the remark, “We strive for 
the realization of our ideals not because they are possible, but because 
our conscious duty imperatively demands it of us and everyone around 
us.”18 Eventually, he came to associate this “consciousness of duty,” which 
has its own type of objectivity or necessity, with a realm he defined as 
transcendental-normative.19 Yet in 1902, Kistiakovskii was already adamant 
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that ethics must remain within the realm of pure science and that ethical 
problems could be approached (and solved) scientifically, without reliance 
on metaphysics.
At the time of Problems of Idealism’s publication, this position 
contrasted with those of other neo-idealists, including Berdiaev, Bulgakov, 
Pavel Novgorodtsev, and Struve. In his contribution, Struve frames the 
transition from positivism to idealism in terms of a “metaphysical need.”20 
The problem of uniting “what is” and “what ought to be,” Struve declares, 
“belongs by its essence to metaphysics.”21 He describes his personal transition 
from Marxism to idealism as follows: once we acknowledge “the objective 
nature of ethics as a problem, [we] arrive at a metaphysical postulate of 
a moral world-order, independent of subjective consciousness.”22 Echoing 
Struve, Novgorodtsev, the editor of Problems of Idealism, confirmed that the 
objectivity of ethics demonstrates the existence of a trans-empirical level 
of reality in which the self and morals are grounded: “affirmation of the 
relative nature of empirical knowledge means for me also the admission of 
free, creative, uncaused being.”23 Bulgakov as well associates the solutions 
of the most primordial questions—“questions about our world as a whole, 
about its substance, about whether it has some meaning or rational end, 
about whether our life and deeds have any value, about the nature of 
good and evil, and so on and so forth”—with “the sphere of metaphysical 
thought.”24
In 1904, Berdiaev distinguished between two neo-idealist approaches 
in Russia, based on the above-mentioned distinction regarding 
metaphysics: “One is decisively metaphysical, and attracted to a religion 
of the transcendent, the other is ethical-epistemological, drifting in the 
channel of Kantian transcendental idealism.”25 In 1907, Kistiakovskii 
further clarified his aspiration to be associated with a separate branch of 
“ethical-epistemological” idealism in his article “V zashchitu nauchno-
filosofskogo idealizma” (“In Defense of Scientific-Philosophical Idealism”). 
A strict scientific development of the implications of the autonomy of the 
personality and individuals’ equal moral capacities would lead to a proper 
understanding of the role and significance of moral problems in all their 
forms and manifestations. The fact that the ethical world is independent 
from reality and cannot be subordinated to it, Kistiakovskii wrote, need 
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not lead to metaphysics: only a “scientific-philosophical” solution to the 
problem of ethics can be thoroughly convincing.26 
Kistiakovskii’s reluctance to ground the self and ideals in a higher, 
ontological reality is, I think, linked with his desire to expand the Kantian 
idealist project beyond the private, individual sphere.27 Rather than focusing 
on the origins of Kant’s description of individual autonomy (speculations 
that led many other neo-idealists in the direction of metaphysics and 
religion), Kistiakovskii concentrated on the implications of individual 
moral consciousness for life in society. The affinity he suggests between 
individual autonomy and individuals’ moral worth led him to consider 
social justice a universal moral imperative. In turn, this dovetails with his 
interest in the idea (elaborated in more detail in his political writings) that 
we necessarily pursue self-perfection in a social context, and that therefore 
our individual goals are inextricably bound up with how we relate to others. 
Because he refrained from adopting an exclusively personalist approach to 
freedom and morality, Kistiakovskii was naturally drawn to a conceptual 
apparatus in which justice, law, and civic consciousness each played 
a fundamental part. 
From Social Ethics to Socialism
Much recent work has been devoted to the power of idealist philosophy to 
promote and reinforce liberal values in tsarist Russia.28 Notwithstanding 
the concern of turn-of-the-century Russian neo-idealists with regard to 
separating the tasks of philosophy and politics, idealist claims concerning 
the autonomy of moral consciousness, individual dignity, and the 
perfectibility of individuals meshed well with liberal approaches to freedom 
and selfhood.29 It is no coincidence, then, that the majority of Vekhi 
contributors were also actively engaged in the reform movement and the 
emergence of liberalism as a social philosophy.30 Kistiakovskii was in this 
case no exception: his early acquaintance with Struve during his student 
years in Germany spurred his participation in the Liberation Movement, 
in which Struve played a key organizational role.31 Together with many 
other neo-idealist thinkers, Kistiakovskii took part in the meeting in 
Schaffhausen, Switzerland, in July 1903 that laid the groundwork for the 
— 135 —
Indiv idual Freedom and Soc ial Just ice: B. Kist iakovskii’s Defense of the Law
Russian constitutional movement.32 Later on, he became a member of the 
Kadet party and was actively involved in its activities.33 
Like his neo-idealist colleagues, Kistiakovskii defined the ideal state as 
a constitutional democracy with legal guarantees of rights. He emphasized 
that a rule-of-law state is founded on the recognition of a sphere of negative 
liberty, that is the inviolable, indestructible rights of individuals, and his 
insistence on this point is what aligns his political theory most obviously 
with classical liberalism.34 Moreover, his conviction that the possession of 
rights and the ability to enjoy them is crucial for another aspect of freedom, 
namely the striving toward moral self-perfection, fits into a recognizable 
liberal tradition. The possibilities of self-development in a sphere of freedom 
can be traced back to John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, with its description of 
“man as a progressive being,” and its romantic notion of the “absolute and 
essential importance of human development in its richest diversity.”35 Thus 
conceived, the limits law places on state power and the power of one person 
over another ensure that each person retains the ability to develop and work 
out his or her individuality to its full potential. “Legal norms [are] rules 
that regulate people’s external conduct,” Kistiakovskii wrote, while “their 
internal conduct [is] governed by ethics,” and the former is a condition of 
the development of the latter (104).
Much of Kistiakovskii’s discussion of law and personhood is informed 
by his Kantian premises. He identified his view of “internal” and “external” 
freedom (what we might call moral and political freedom, respectively) with 
Kant’s, and, like the German philosopher, developed an account of law as the 
basis of civil society.36 Yet Kistiakovskii went further than Kant in assigning 
law a crucial role in fostering social discipline.37 In particular, he argued that 
the external discipline provided by law helps further individual awareness 
of moral duty: “Legal convictions [provide] internal discipline,” and thereby 
facilitate the development of a civil society founded on respect for the rights 
of all (107).38 Thus law, and political institutions generally, play a crucial role 
in the process whereby individual awareness of duty translates into active 
citizenship.39 As we have seen, the gradual expression of value judgments in 
legal norms slowly engenders a freer, more equal society. In essence, legal 
and political institutions have the power to instantiate the neo-idealist ideal 
of community, in which individual desires work toward the realization of 
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the collective good. In this reading, state institutions play a crucial didactic 
role, one that involves making their citizens aware of their rights and shared 
interests, as well as allowing them to develop their full potential: the state 
“ennobles and elevates the individual. It gives [her/him] the opportunity to 
develop the best part of [her/his] nature and implement ideal goals.”40 
Despite his emphasis on law and “negative freedoms” as the 
foundations of a viable state, Kistiakovskii went further than most Russian 
liberals in arguing that a socialist political order was best able to both 
protect individual rights and promote self-realization.41 In particular, he 
stressed that individual and political liberties lose their value unless their 
affinity with economic and social aims is acknowledged. Negative liberties 
cannot be authentically realized if one class has a dominant position in 
relation to another, and similarly cannot be realized unless certain positive 
measures designed to attenuate social inequality are introduced.42 These 
positive measures necessary for individual self-development (the rights 
Kistiakovskii referred to as socialist [sotsialisticheskie prava]) include the 
right to work, the right to receive care in the event of illness, old age, and 
inability to work, the right to develop one’s capacities fully, the right to 
a proper education, and the right to a dignified human existence.43 The 
willingness of a socialist state to enshrine this last right in law was what led 
Kistiakovskii to consider this political order superior to a rule-of-law state.44 
“A legal order,” he wrote in Vekhi, “is a system of relationships whereby all 
members of a given society possess the greatest freedom of action and self-
determination. But a legal order defined in this way cannot be contrasted 
to a socialist order. Quite the contrary, a more profound understanding 
of both leads to the conclusion that they are closely related, and that from 
the juridical point of view a socialist order is simply a more rigorously 
implemented legal order” (99). 
Kistiakovskii perceived the main threat to his Kantian-inspired 
socialism as stemming from the lack of conviction—particularly widespread 
in turn-of-the-century Russia—that law has the ability to guarantee 
personal autonomy and to effect social and political change. Historically, 
Slavophile thinkers popularized the idea that there was something positive 
in the absence of legal forms in Russian life, feeling that the dictates of 
inner consciousness and ethics were sufficient guides for individual self-
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development (95). Following the revolution of 1905, a number of thinkers 
in their tradition argued that constitutionalism and the rule of law were 
foreign Western imports and emphasized the superiority of spiritual forces 
over law as the potential foundation of social life.45 While Kistiakovskii 
singled out the intelligentsia’s attitude toward the law in his Vekhi article for 
particular scorn, a significant number of Russian intellectuals—including 
several Vekhi contributors—resisted assigning the rule of law primary 
significance in the constitution of personhood. 
As a rule, the other Vekhi contributors drew different conclusions 
than Kistiakovskii from the Kantian postulates concerning individual 
autonomy and moral equality. We have seen how, for Kistiakovskii, the 
notion of individuals as ends in themselves remained meaningless unless 
it was translated into social and economic spheres and guaranteed by 
law. For many of his colleagues, however, the existence of a metaphysical 
world order in which absolute values are grounded informed their view 
of the method for drawing nearer to eternal, spiritual ideals such as truth, 
holiness, and goodness at the individual level. Thus conceived, spiritual 
freedom is to be found within individuals, and exists in potential tension 
with systemic changes at the level of society designed to further political, 
economic, and social reform. Notwithstanding the different political 
agendas represented in Vekhi, the authors’ focus on inner, spiritual free-
dom made them wary of political doctrines such as socialism, doctrines 
that they felt placed excessive emphasis on the idea of society. In the words 
of Leonard Schapiro, the Vekhi authors “emphasise again and again the 
need for moral self-perfection, for repentance, and the incompatibility of 
materialistic socialism and egalitarianism with the Christian way of life.”46
Of the Vekhi authors, Gershenzon presents perhaps the most extreme 
example of the rejection of politics.47 Berdiaev as well repudiated the 
“bourgeois” qualities of his previous liberalism in favor of a libertarian 
philosophy which considered relative values such as law and politics 
oppressive for the human spirit.48 Yet even among those authors who 
did believe in the rule of law, Kistiakovskii’s presentation of the mutual 
reinforcement of individual freedom and social justice stands out.49 
Struve’s article in Vekhi, “Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia” (“The Intelligentsia 
and Revolution”), makes explicit his view of the tension between individual 
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freedom and egalitarian aims: “Our concept of education has nothing to do 
with the ‘organization’ of the social environment and its pedagogical effect 
on the personality. This is the ‘socialist’ idea of education, and it has nothing 
in common with the idea of education in the religious sense. The latter 
is completely alien to socialist optimism. It believes not in organization 
but only in creation, in a person’s positive labor on himself, in his inner 
struggle for the sake of creative tasks” (127).50 For Struve and others, the 
idea of humanity had undeniably religious implications and, in their 
holistic account of reality, personal self-fulfillment took on a metaphysical 
significance.51 While law could serve to guarantee the freedom necessary for 
personal development, the more didactic aspects of socialism, concerned 
with the value of egalitarianism and the socialization of individuals, posed 
a risk for individual freedom. Novgorodtsev, a legal scholar close to 
the Vekhi authors, remarked that by believing that socialism was fully 
compatible with a rule-of-law-state, Kistiakovskii was “confused as to the 
real goals of socialism.”52 
Kistiakovskii defended his view of a potential harmony between 
negative liberties and the achievement of social and economic equality by 
pointing to European history, where he found evidence of the progressive 
expansion of citizens’ rights and freedoms as well as the widening of the 
spheres of activity of the state and increase of its sovereign rights.53 In the 
Russian case, Kistiakovskii advocated the construction of a new society 
informed by both political and philosophical theory as well as Russia’s 
own resources and traditions. Professing cautious optimism regarding 
what he refers to as the “intuitive” consciousness of right and non-right 
in Russian society, he pointed to the forms of redistributive justice in 
Russia’s communal social structures (the agrarian commune and artel’, for 
example) as examples of the externalization of moral rules (104). Russians’ 
legal consciousness could be developed both by formalizing the elements 
of customary morality and by performing inner soul searching: in order 
to reconnect with the legal convictions that were part of its spiritual 
make-up, the intelligentsia “must withdraw into itself and plunge deeply 
into its own inner world in order to bring fresh air and health to it” (112). 
Both respect for the law and personal self-development would help promote 
a legal order and a socialist state. 
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Freedom and Justice
Kistiakovskii’s “In Defense of Law” is frequently cited as the “classic” 
article in the Russian tradition on the need to enlist law in the preservation 
of liberal values.54 To be sure, his understanding of the development 
of personhood within a sphere of negative liberty guaranteed by law 
taps into one of the most established strands of liberal thinking. Yet 
Kistiakovskii kept his distance from the individualistic, abstract, rights-
centred approach to law often associated with mainstream liberalism. 
For him, law was the means by which the imperatives of Kantian 
moral philosophy were embodied in reality, thereby guaranteeing 
individuals their innate autonomy and moral equality. Because law 
represents a formal expression of the moral duty of individuals to 
promote certain common ends, it has both an individual and a so-
cial significance: law enables the self-realization of all. In this way, 
a viable legal order is also the foundation of a progressive social 
politics, in which the state assumes a broad range of tasks, including the 
guarantee of the right to a dignified existence.
By placing the values of justice and law at the centre of his political 
and philosophical concerns, Kistiakovskii both overlaps with and stands 
out from the Christian and humanist traditions to which his Vekhi co-
authors belonged. The distinctiveness of his legal and social theory is 
firmly located in his resistance to giving it any religious or metaphysical 
foundations, and to approaching human nature as part of a holistic 
explanation of reality. It seems plausible that, because Kistiakovskii 
rejected a metaphysical approach to freedom as the point of connection 
between the individual and the absolute, he was especially concerned 
with linking individual rights to social duties, and to attribute to them 
their own type of objectivity or validity. In his account, justice is a ca-
tegory as universally valid as freedom; rather than turning inward to 
find authentic liberation, individuals should embrace their common 
humanity and externalize shared values in the rule of law. 
This conception of positive liberty is what makes Kistiakovskii able 
to bridge the gap between liberalism and socialism without denying 
his liberal heritage. And perhaps his blurring of these two political 
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traditions works towards the liberal label after all: as Waldron notes, 
liberals are liberals because they acknowledge a tension between 
order and justice, between negative and positive freedom.55 Of all 
the Vekhi authors, Kistiakovskii was the most concerned with the 
question of what valid limits could be placed on individuals in order 
to enable the self-realization of all. His argument in favor of law 
thus presents an attempt to reconcile principles that are at the heart 
of both liberalism and socialism, while acknowledging that because 
they exist in constant interaction there can never be a final balance 
between them.
        notE s                                                                                                                                              
1 Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman, eds. and trans., Vekhi/Landmarks: 
A Collection of Articles about the Russian Intelligentsia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
1994), xxxvii. Henceforth references to this edition are in parentheses in the text.
2 See Aileen Kelly, “Which Signposts?,” in Toward Another Shore: Russian Thinkers 
between Necessity and Chance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Leonard 
Schapiro, “The ‘Vekhi’ Group and the Mystique of Revolution,” in Russian Studies, 
ed. Ellen Dahrendorf (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987); Andrzej Walicki, “Bogdan 
Kistiakovskii and the Debate about the Intelligentsia,” in Legal Philosophies of Russian 
Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1992). 
3 For a study of Kistiakovskii’s thought in the context of the Vekhi debate, see Anita 
Schlüchter, “Zashchita prava B. A. Kistiakovskogo v kontekste filosofskikh diskussii 
nachala XX v. v Rossii,” in Sbornik “Vekhi” v kontekste russkoi kul’tury, ed. A. A. Takho-
Godi and E. A. Takho-Godi (Moscow: Nauka, 2007), 125–32. 
4 P. Miliukov, “Intelligentsiia i istoricheskaia traditsiia” (1910), in Vekhi. Intelligentsiia 
v Rossii: Sborniki statei. 1909–1910gg. (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1991), 134–35. 
5 Ia. Vechev, “Pravovye idei v russkoi literature,” in “Vekhi” kak znamenie vremeni 
(Moscow: Zveno, 1910), 174. 
6 For example, his uncle, Volodymyr Antonovich, collaborated with one of the leaders 
of the Ukrainian intellectual movement, Mykhailo Drahomanov, on an important text 
on Ukrainian ethnography. M. Drahomanov and V. Antonovich, eds., Istoricheskie 
pesni malorusskogo naroda (Kyiv: Tipografiia M. P. Fritsa, 1874–75).
— 141 —
Indiv idual Freedom and Soc ial Just ice: B. Kist iakovskii’s Defense of the Law
7 With the exception of Izgoev, all Vekhi contributors were interested in idealist thought. 
8 B. A. Kistiakovskii, “V zashchitu nauchno-filosofskogo idealizma,” Voprosy filosofii 
i psikhologii 86 (1907): 57–109, reprinted in slightly modified version in B. A. Kis- 
tiakovskii, Filosofiia i sotsiologiia prava, ed. Iu. N. Davydov and V. V. Sapov (St. Pe-
tersburg: Izdatel’stvo Russkogo Khristianskogo gumanitarnogo instituta, 1998), 116–
53 (118).
9 Ibid.
10 B. A. Kistiakovskii, “Vorwort,” Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen: Eine methodologische 
Studie (Berlin: O. Liebmann, 1899). Beginning with this insight, Kistiakovskii 
criticized both organicist and Marxist models of society for considering that one basic 
substance or principle is the basis of reality and for conflating ethical questions and 
those of positive science into one comprehensive worldview. 
11 See, for example, Kistiakovskii, Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen, 42: “Gleich den anderen 
Wissenschaften aus dieser Kategorie [Kosmologie, Geologie, Biologie] untersucht 
die Soziologie einen zeitlich ununterbrochenen Entwickelungsprozess in einem 
abgeschlossenen Kreise von Erscheinungen.”
12 Ibid., 155. 
13 B. A. Kistiakovskii, “Kategorii neobkhodimosti i spravedlivosti pri issledovanii 
sotsial’nykh iavlenii,” reprinted in B. A. Kistiakovskii, Sotsial’nye nauki i pravo (Moscow: 
M. and S. Sabashnikov, 1916), 176, 186. Justice benefits from “inalienability and 
universal validity, Allgemeingültigkeit.” It is important to note that, for Kistiakovskii, 
assigning social justice an a priori value did not compromise in any way the attempt to 
study society in a scientific fashion.
14 Ibid., 187: “The ultimate link in any social process generally and in the social-
psychological process in particular is the clarification of some or other moral demand 
or the definition of some or other legal norm.” 
15 Ibid., 167. Elsewhere, Kistiakovskii argued that the state can be considered a Kantian 
subject that makes sense of the world by matching its categories of understanding with 
those of nature. As Kant taught, “die Synthese nicht in den Dingen selbst oder in den 
Beziehungen und Verhältnissen zwischen ihnen enthalten, sondern im menschlichen 
Bewusstsein als deren spontane Funktion begründet ist. Es giebt jedoch noch ein 
Subjekt, dem die Synthese als von ihm erzeugt und nur ihm angehörig zukommt, und 
das ist der Staat,” Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen, 199–200.
16 See Randall A. Poole, ed. and trans., Problems of Idealism (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 330.
17 Ibid., 337.
18 Ibid., 352.
19 Kistiakovskii’s position is associated with the axiological approach of the Southwest 
German school of neo-Kantianism. Wilhelm Windelband, the school’s initiator and 
Kistiakovskii’s doctoral supervisor, suggested that the problem of the objectivity of 
values can be solved transcendentally, without resorting to metaphysics. For an 
— 142 —
Vanessa Rampton
overview, see Hans-Ludwig Ollig, “Neo-Kantianism,” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. E. Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), 776–92. 
20 P. B. Struve, “Toward Characterization of our Philosophical Development,” in Poole, 
Problems of Idealism, 154.
21 Ibid., 151.
22 P. B. Struve, “Predislovie,” in N. A. Berdiaev, Sub”ektivizm i individualizm v obshche-
stvennoi filosofii: Kriticheskii etiud o N. K. Mikhailovskom (Moscow: Kanon, 1999 
[1900]), 51. 
23 P. I. Novgorodtsev, “K voprosu o sovremennykh filosofskikh iskaniiakh. (Otvet 
L. I. Petrazhitskomu),” Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii 66 (1903): 138. Berdiaev’s intel-
lectual development represents yet another example of the attempt to solve ethical 
problems using metaphysics. He concluded that the substantiality of the spirit 
(spiritualism) was the answer to the problem that absolute moral perfection cannot be 
realized in experience. 
24 S. N. Bulgakov, “Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress,” in Poole, Problems of 
Idealism, 87. 
25 N. A. Berdiaev, “O novom russkom idealizme,” Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii 75 (1904): 
684.
26 B. A. Kistiakovskii, “V zashchitu nauchno-filosofskogo idealizma,” Filosofiia i so-
tsiologiia prava, 117. Kistiakovskii maintained that metaphysical idealists had negated 
Kant’s distinction in The Critique of Pure Reason between the transcendental forms 
and the content of knowledge, and thereby broken the link between philosophy and 
universal truths. The desire of thinkers such as Struve for “wholeness, finality, and 
completeness” had led them in the direction of metaphysics, and resulted in their 
mistaken refusal to maintain a separation between the absolute and the relative, 
between “ought” (dolzhenstvovanie) and “is” (bytie).
27 One could also note Kistiakovskii’s religious differences with other neo-idealists: while 
most were believers, Kistiakovskii’s religion is not known. 
28 See, in particular, the masterly work of Randall A. Poole in this regard. See also Patrick 
Lally Michelson’s doctoral dissertation, “‘The First and Most Sacred Right:’ Religious 
Freedom and the Liberation of the Russian Nation, 1825–1905” (PhD diss., UW-
Madison, 2007), particularly Chapter 5; and Laurent Cauderay’s doctoral dissertation, 
Die Partei der konstitutionellen Demokraten und das liberale Weltbild von Pavel Ivanovic 
Novgorodcev (St. Gallen: D-Druck-Spescha, 2004).
29 Consider, for example, Novgorodtsev’s introduction to Problems of Idealism, in which 
he writes: “New forms of [social and political] life now no longer represent the simple 
demand of expediency, but the categorical imperative of morality, which gives primary 
importance to the principle of the absolute significance of personhood [lichnost’].” 
“Foreword, Russian Edition,” in Poole, Problems of Idealism, 83.
30 See Judith Zimmerman, “The Political Views of the Vekhi Authors,” Canadian-
American Slavic Studies 10 (1976): 306–27, for an overview of their political 
activities. 
— 143 —
Indiv idual Freedom and Soc ial Just ice: B. Kist iakovskii’s Defense of the Law
31 The movement was supported by the launch of the émigré journal Osvobozhdenie 
(Liberation) in 1902 with Struve as editor and the establishment of Druz’ia 
osvobozhdeniia circles, around which the radical-constitutional movement 
crystallized. For details, see Shmuel Galai, The Liberation Movement in Russia 1900–
1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), and Kornelii Shatsillo, Russkii 
liberalizm nakanune revoliutsii, 1905–1907gg: Organizatsiia, programmy, taktika 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1985).
32 The conference planned both the establishment of the Union of Liberation and the 
Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists. 
33 For details, see Susan Heuman, Kistiakovsky: The Struggle for National and 
Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1998).
34 See, for example, B. A. Kistiakovskii, “Gosudarstvo pravovoe i sotsialisticheskoe,” 
Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii 85 (1906): 469–507, reprinted in Voprosy filosofii 6 
(1990): 141–59 (144).
35 J. S. Mill, Epigraph to On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974); for clarification of 
the epigraph, see ibid., 120–22.
36 Kant’s notion of Right is based on his concept of external freedom. See his The 
Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991); Paul Guyer, “Kantian Foundations for Liberalism,” in his Kant on Freedom, Law, 
and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Peter Benson, 
“External Freedom According to Kant,” Columbia Law Review 87 (1987): 559–79. 
37 Kant was also extremely interested in the idea of discipline (see, for example, his 
Vorlesung über Pädagogik [1803] in Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie 
[Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983], 699, where he writes that “Der 
Mensch kann nur Mensch werden durch Erziehung. Er ist nichts, als was Erziehung 
aus ihm macht”). Kistiakovskii, however, made the link between discipline and law 
more explicit, claiming that law “disciplines a person much more than does logic or 
scientific method or any systematic exercise of the will.” Shatz and Zimmerman, Vekhi/
Landmarks, 91. 
38 In her chapter “Combined Underdevelopment: Discipline and Law in Imperial and 
Soviet Russia,” Laura Engelstein contrasts Kistiakovskii’s understanding of the role of 
discipline in a legal order with that of Foucault. See her Slavophile Empire: Imperial 
Russia’s Illiberal Path (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 13–32.
39 B. A. Kistiakovskii, “Prava cheloveka i grazhdanina,” Voprosy zhizni 1 (1905): 142.
40 Kistiakovskii, “Gosudarstvo pravovoe i sotsialisticheskoe,” 142.
41 Ibid., 155. The numerous points of connection between Kistiakovskii’s concept of an 
ethical socialism and that of German neo-Kantians—particularly Herman Cohen and 
the Marburg school—are evident but have yet to be fully explored. For an overview 
of neo-Kantian socialism in Germany see Timothy Keck, “The Marburg School and 
Ethical Socialism,” The Social Science Journal 14 (1977): 105–19; Thomas Willey, 
Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 
— 144 —
Vanessa Rampton
1860–1914 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978); and Harry Van der Linden, 
Kantian Ethics and Socialism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988).
42 Kistiakovskii, “Prava cheloveka i grazhdanina,” 121.
43 Ibid., 125. The “right to a dignified existence” was formulated by the Russian philosopher 
Vladimir Solov’ev as follows: “Everybody should have the means of existence and 
sufficient physical rest secured to him, and he should also be able to enjoy leisure for 
the sake of his spiritual development.” Cited in Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian 
Liberalism, 195. Solov’ev’s ideas exerted considerable influence on Kistiakovskii, 
even though the latter distanced himself from the former’s philosophical views as 
a whole.
44 Kistiakovskii, “Gosudarstvo pravovoe i sotsialisticheskoe,” 157: “In a socialist society 
the right to a dignified human existence will not be merely the realization of social 
justice, something analogous to charity for the poor, but the fully valid personal right 
of each citizen and person.” For a contemporary account of the legal significance of 
the right to a dignified existence in a rule-of-law state, see P. I. Novgorodtsev, “Pravo 
na dostoinoe chelovecheskoe sushchestvovanie” (1905), reprinted in Obshchestvennye 
nauki i sovremennost’ 5 (1993): 127–32. 
45 The resurgence of religious thought in this period is associated with the work of Nikolai 
Berdiaev (1874–1948), Aleksandr Bogdanov (1873–1928), Anatolii Lunacharskii 
(1875–1933), and Dmitrii Merezhkovskii (1865–1941), among others. See G. M. 
Hamburg and Randall A. Poole, eds., A History of Russian Philosophy 1830–1930 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), particularly chapters 11 and 13. 
46 Schapiro, “The Vekhi Group and the Mystique of Revolution,” 83.
47 Gershenzon warned, for example, against “the tyranny of civic activism.” Shatz and 
Zimmerman, Vekhi/Landmarks, 68. See also Zimmerman, “Political Views of the 
Vekhi Authors,” 308.
48 Berdiaev called for “not only political liberation but also liberation from the oppressive 
power of politics,” Shatz and Zimmerman, Vekhi/Landmarks, 15. On Berdiaev’s 
political views see Poole, Problems of Idealism, 77, n. 230.
49 Bulgakov advocated a “Christian socialism,” but approached socialism as a means of 
realizing the metaphysical principle of Christian love for one’s fellows. On his political 
views, see Catherine Evtuhov, The Cross and the Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the Fate of 
Russian Religious Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
50 Cited in Frances Nethercott, “Russian Liberalism and the Philosophy of Law,” in 
Hamburg and Poole, History of Russian Philosophy, 260–61. 
51 Struve’s position in Vekhi retains a certain affinity with Kistiakovskii’s, due to his 
liberalism and assertion that an effective state authority is necessary to safeguard 
liberty. Eventually his theory took the form of a conservatism that emphasized 
national unity, a strong state, and Russian cultural imperialism. See, for example, 
“Velikaia Rossiia. Iz razmyshlenii o russkoi revoliutsii,” Russkaia mysl’ 1 (1908): 143–
57. Struve and Kistiakovskii also disagreed profoundly on the question of national 
self-determination, with Kistiakovskii advocating a moderate Ukrainian nationalism. 
Indiv idual Freedom and Soc ial Just ice: B. Kist iakovskii’s Defense of the Law
See B. A. Kistiakovskii, “K voprosu o samostoiatel’noi ukrainskoi kul’ture. Pis’mo v 
redaktsiiu,” Russkaia mysl’ 32 (1911): 133, 142.
52 Pavel Novgorodtsev, “Ob obshchestvennom ideale,” Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii 
(1911-1916), n. 376 in Filosofskii portal <http://www.philosophy.ru/library/vehi/ideal.
html> [accessed 4 November 2010].
53 In various instances, the reduction of the sphere of individual liberties was compensated 
for by a marked increase in the participatory rights of individuals. See Kistiakovskii, 
“Prava cheloveka i grazhdanina” and “Gosudarstvo pravovoe i sotsialisticheskoe.” 
Kistiakovskii strongly criticized both socialists and liberals who held that individual 
liberties and constitutional governments are necessarily bourgeois or liberal. As 
support for his theory, he pointed to the behavior of socialist parties in contemporary 
constitutional states in which state laws are a compromise worked out by different 
parties, including socialists.
54 See, for example, Poole, “Editor’s Introduction,” Problems of Idealism, 52, and Walicki, 
Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, 13.
55 Jeremy Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” Philosophical Quarterly 37 
(1987): 131. 
— 146 —
6                                                                                                                              
russian Pol i T ical TheoloGy in an aGe of revoluT ion
Randal l  A .  Po ole
I
One of the most important directions in religion today is political theology.1 
It is not a new concept, but it has taken on a new meaning within the past 
fifty years, so much so that scholars now distinguish between the old and 
the new political theology.2 The old goes back to the ancient empires of the 
Near East, and refers to the use of religion to sanction or legitimate a given 
political order. Augustine of Hippo, in the City of God, criticized the old 
Roman political theologies and opposed the sacralization of any earthly 
political order, but his pessimistic conception of human nature, with its 
emphasis on human depravity and original sin, formed the basis for its own 
type of old political theology: for him, salvation largely meant salvation 
from ourselves, by the external action of grace and the church acting as its 
earthly instrument. Accordingly, Augustine condoned the use of state power 
against heretics who challenged church dogma and threatened salvation. In 
general, the old political theology was premised on an external approach 
to salvation, with external (i.e., political) power being seen as a necessary 
means to salvation—the salvation of those subject to such power. After 
Augustine, political theology fell into long disuse as a theoretical concept, 
though certainly not as a political practice. It was reintroduced into modern 
discourse by Carl Schmitt in his 1922 essay Politische Theologie (Political 
Theology). (Schmitt later served as “crown jurist” of the Third Reich.) 
Despite some new theoretical content, Schmitt basically perpetuated the 
old meaning of the term, that is, the subordination or instrumentalization 
of religion for political purposes, which purposes were, for Schmitt, the 
only absolute ones.
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The new form of political theology was founded in the 1960s and 
1970s by a very different German thinker, the Catholic theologian Johann 
Baptist Metz. It refers not to the ideological legitimization of political 
power but to the theological analysis, criticism, and justification of 
politics, society, and history. In Metz’s conception, political theology 
is a “practical fundamental theology” that seeks to ground politics in 
a theological anthropology and to elaborate a theological or normative 
framework for political and social praxis.3 The old political theology 
was more about politics than theology, and tended to reduce theology 
to political purposes. The new political theology, by contrast, is first and 
foremost about theology. It conceives politics in relation to the absolute 
values and ends of theology, which means re-conceiving politics as the 
ways human beings work and struggle together in history and society 
to realize ever more fully their personhood (or, as Metz often puts it, 
“to become subjects before God”4), to build a just society befitting them 
as persons or subjects, and to take responsibility—as autonomous, self-
determining moral subjects or agents—for their salvation. The very idea 
of God, according to Metz, is an “ineluctably political one,” because 
it expresses an option: “opting for a state of affairs in which all people 
are able to be subjects and ought to become subjects” (76). In this way 
Metz directly relates the idea of God to the human capacity for self-
determination, self-realization, and subjecthood. Here is the profound 
humanism of the new political theology, in stark contrast to the old.
II
In 1999 Rowan Williams published a fine edition of the writings of 
twentieth-century Russia’s most important theologian, Sergei Bulgakov.5 
Williams chose as the subtitle for his book, “Towards a Russian Political 
Theology,” clearly referring to the new political theology.6 He writes 
that Bulgakov’s thought “could well be read as a systematic attempt to 
work out the basis on which political action and policy could be seen as 
philosophically—and, eventually, theologically—legitimate” (7). In this 
article I shall argue, following Williams’s lead, that the Russian religious-
philosophical tradition, as represented by Bulgakov and other members 
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of the Vekhi group, is both a remarkable anticipation of the new political 
theology and a trenchant critique of the old.
The Williams collection includes one of Bulgakov’s lesser-known 
texts, “Dusha sotsializma” (“The Soul of Socialism,” 1932–33). This 
essay offers perhaps the best succinct justification of Williams’s subtitle. 
Bulgakov’s main themes here are human personhood, human work, and 
human history. Socialism, in his account, misunderstands all of them. Its 
anthropology or conception of human nature is based on two doctrines, 
“sociologism” and “economism,” which together make up the impoverished 
soul of socialism. Sociologism dissolves the individual human person in 
the social whole and denies its independent reality, freedom, and creativity. 
Economism debases human work and economic activity. In Marxism it is 
materialistic and even “zoological” (240). Bulgakov commends instead the 
sophiological approach to economy that he developed in his 1912 treatise 
Filosofiia khoziaistva (Philosophy of Economy),7 which understands that 
through free, creative work man humanizes the world and transforms it 
in his own image. This sophianic work takes place in history, and with this 
Bulgakov turns to his conception of human history, his most important 
theme. He advances an activist, humanist understanding of eschatology, 
one that is strikingly similar to Metz’s new political theology some forty 
years later. 
Bulgakov’s main burden is to reconcile eschatology, the transcendent 
fulfillment and end of history, with human responsibility for it within 
history. History and eschatology have, according to him, been too long 
separated and set in opposition to each other, the link between them denied. 
He calls this separation “eschatological transcendentalism,” whereby 
“all earthly illumination is quenched and all earthly values destroyed: all 
that remains is personal merit and personal sin, with their equivalents of 
reward or punishment, which each individual receives for himself alone, 
without any regard to the collective work of humanity in history” (244). 
Such eschatological transcendentalism leads to historical nihilism: in order 
for history to have meaning and value, people must believe that they are 
responsible for it and are working toward its culmination. In this sense, 
“history has its own inner apocalypse, which makes history itself already 
eschatology fulfilling itself in time”—though the fulfillment remains 
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ultimately transcendent (244). Thus Bulgakov tries to preserve the idea of 
a transcendent eschaton with an immanent goal of human aspiration.
He links his philosophy of history with a critical “sense of an orientation 
towards the future, with consciousness of obligatory tasks to be performed 
and of continuing historical labour” (253). This “orientation towards the 
future” is a type of utopianism, in the positive sense of the human capacity 
to imagine the future and to work toward it as an ideal. Bulgakov describes 
utopia—“an object of social faith, hope and love”—in terms of the biblical 
definition of faith, “the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of 
things not seen” (Heb. 11:1). Utopia, he writes, is “an ideal with a changing 
content,” depending on the specific historical circumstances.8 In his 
conception, utopian ideals are the driving force behind historical progress; 
they take us ever beyond present historical reality and constantly into the 
future. But such ideals must remain rooted in religious consciousness; 
otherwise they collapse into the “tired positivism” that is inimical to the 
very concept of the ideal (248–49).
The supreme ideal is the Kingdom of God. It cannot remain a “purely 
passively understood prophecy” but must become “an active utopian ideal, 
a hope”—in short, a human task. “Naturally this symbol in itself is abstract,” 
Bulgakov writes, “but it is constantly being filled out with concrete content, 
in terms of actual advances or achievements in history, of the summons 
directed by the future towards the present” (257–58). He contrasts this 
activist and progressive philosophy of history to “pseudo-eschatologism,” 
which resigns before the eschaton and shuns historical responsibility. He 
extols the Hebrew (Old Testament) prophetic tradition, with its sweeping 
utopian vision (“in the positive sense of ‘utopian,’ of course”) and demand 
for social justice. The New Testament brought a definite shift, as expectations 
of the imminent end of the world brought about a certain indifference to 
history, social quietism, and “a peculiar kind of apolitical vision” (254). 
From this come Bulgakov’s efforts to historicize the Apocalypse. He calls 
hopefully for a Christian reformism, inspired by the active utopian ideal of 
the Kingdom of God.
“The Soul of Socialism” is a landmark essay. In Williams’s estimation, it 
“draws together a remarkable range of Bulgakov’s ideas, and displays some 
of the deepest continuities in his thought” (235). A year later, in his “Social 
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Teaching in Modern Russian Orthodox Theology,” which was delivered 
as a lecture at the Seabury-Western Theological Seminary in Evanston, 
Illinois, Bulgakov used a simple but apt term to describe the main direction 
of his theology and of modern Russian theology as a whole: “Christian 
humanism.” Its distinctiveness, again simply and aptly put, is that “it 
includes the creativity of man in the means of his salvation” (283). This 
type of religious humanism, with its faith in the efficacy of human work and 
progress toward salvation, is also the distinctive feature of the new political 
theology and of its antecedents and correlates, such as nineteenth-century 
Kantian liberal theology, the social gospel movement, and liberation 
theology.
III
“The Soul of Socialism” was published in German translation in 1977,9 
the same year that Johann Baptist Metz’s most important work, Glaube 
in Geschichte und Gesellschaft (Faith in History and Society: Toward 
a Practical Fundamental Theology), appeared.10 Metz describes his theology 
as “the struggle for the subject—or, practical fundamental theology as the 
political theology of the subject” (70). This is a meaningful formulation. 
First, the term “practical” signals not only Kant’s moral philosophy but 
also the humanist dimension of Marxism, both of which have decisively 
shaped Metz’s thought.11 Second, Metz’s term “subject” indicates his 
focus on human personhood. He prefers “subject” to emphasize human 
autonomy, agency, and responsibility, but those qualities can, of course, 
be emphasized in the term “person” as well, as they were by Bulgakov 
and other Russian neo-idealist philosophers. Metz has had an abiding 
preoccupation with theological anthropology; his first major work was 
Christliche Anthropozentrik (Christian Anthropocentrism, 1962).12
The thesis of Faith in History and Society is that people are called to 
become subjects in the presence of, and through their relationship to, God. 
This idea has a dual meaning: first, God wants us to be subjects; second, 
God wants us to be subjects even in his presence, that is, he wants us to 
preserve our autonomy and responsibility in his presence rather than to 
be overwhelmed by it. As Metz writes, “the relationship to God does not 
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become the expression of a slavish subjection and enervated devotion; it 
does not humiliate persons as subjects” (71).13 Human beings can become 
subjects before God only in history and society. This is necessarily a strug-
gle—Metz refers to the “historical struggle for humanity”—and human 
beings are subjects most when they struggle to help others become subjects. 
The implication, Metz stresses, is that people struggle to become subjects in 
solidarity with each other. The historical struggles for all human beings to 
be subjects, and by which they become subjects, is the main theme of Metz’s 
political theology.
This theme is an eschatological one. In his 1968 book Zur Theologie 
der Welt (Theology of the World),14 Metz wrote, “The universal existential-
anthropological viewpoint in Christian theology depends on the 
eschatological viewpoint. This is true, because only in the eschatological 
horizon of hope does the world appear as a reality coming into being, whose 
development and process is handed over to the free action of man.”15 The 
“eschatological horizon of hope” is a telling expression. It makes clear the 
humanism of Metz’s understanding of eschatology. For him, as for Bulgakov 
earlier, eschatology stands for human freedom in history. History is the 
sphere of human freedom, because unlike the natural world, its future is 
open and undetermined. In his conception of history, especially the notion 
that history is the coming into being of that which has not yet existed, the 
Noch-nicht-gewesene, Metz drew on the Marxist thinker Ernst Bloch, who 
for a Marxist was uncharacteristically interested in religion. In the words 
of one Metz scholar, “the uniquely human capacity, which is the ground of 
genuinely free activity, is the capacity to envision this Noch-nicht-gewesene 
and orient one’s activity by it. For Bloch this is the sensorium for Utopia. 
The power of utopia is what pulls history forward.”16 Metz himself, in 
a famous passage, writes of utopia: “The name ‘God’ stands for the fact that 
the utopia of all human beings being liberated to become subjects possessed 
of human dignity is not a pure projection—which is certainly what it would 
be if there were only utopia and no God” (76).
The “struggle for the subject” is a theme that, given human nature 
and history, is full of suffering. Suffering in history, the theodicy problem, 
redemptive eschatology, and the meaning of progress in light of past 
suffering are all among the main concerns of Metz’s new political theology. 
— 152 —
Randall A. Poole
They are perennial Russian themes. Metz prefers to call them by the name 
“Auschwitz,”17 but Dostoevskii’s treatment of them also helped to shape his 
thought. They are powerfully dealt with in Bulgakov’s 1902 essay “Osnovnye 
problemy teorii progressa” (“Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress”).18 
Earlier that year Bulgakov published his famous Dostoevskii essay “Ivan 
Karamazov kak filosofskii tip” (“Ivan Karamazov as a Philosophical 
Type”).19 Both Bulgakov and Metz level the same critique against the secular 
idea of progress, namely that it makes the suffering of past generations the 
“manure” (in Dostoevsky’s expression) for the harmony of future ones.20 
Contrary to its secular conception, they believe that progress needs to be 
reconceived as eschatology.21
IV
Metz insists on separating his new political theology from the old, Carl 
Schmitt’s in particular, for good reason. In the preface to Faith in History and 
Society, he writes that unlike “the classical ‘political theology,’ … the new 
political theology was never guided by the intention of exalting a politics 
that was already in force or on the increase anyway, and of simply copying 
theologically the way it operates” (xi). Other scholars agree. According to 
the authors of a recent short history of the concept, “The current positive 
theological use of political theology has to be understood as a reinvention 
of the term.”22
Schmitt’s use of the term was political rather than properly theological. 
In 1933 Erik Peterson formulated an influential critique of Schmitt, the 
so-called “Peterson thesis”: “Political theology,” he wrote, “is not really an 
element of theology but rather of political thought,” and is in truth a political 
theory of a “particularly heretical nature.”23 Peterson thought it particularly 
heretical because the political was the only absolute for Schmitt. In 1934, 
in his preface to the second edition of Political Theology, Schmitt wrote that 
“the political is the total.”24 In that banal sense, Schmitt’s idea of politics is 
“theological” (or “metaphysical”). Banal but dangerous: Schmitt recognized 
no limits on state power and endorsed the idea of the “total state.” For him, 
“the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can 
be reduced is that between friend and enemy,” as he put it in his 1927 essay 
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Der Begriff des Politischen (The Concept of the Political).25 The sovereign 
makes the distinction on the basis of nothing but arbitrary, raw power. 
There is no higher framework of morality or natural law.26
The title chapter of Political Theology opens with the following well-
known lines: “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state 
are secularized theological concepts” (36). After Schmitt, a number of 
remarkable central European thinkers developed this insight into the 
powerful concept of “political religions,” another variant of political 
theology. Among these scholars were Schmitt’s disillusioned protégé 
Waldemar Gurian as well as Karl Löwith and Eric Voegelin.27 They saw 
contemporary totalitarian ideologies as secular forms of millenarianism 
and eschatology, which purported to offer collective terrestrial salvation 
by external political means. The link between political religions and the 
old political theology was their common illiberal, pessimistic view of 
human nature with their corresponding emphasis on external salvation 
(whether by church or party-state); this is also what separates them from 
the basic humanism of the new political theology, with its “faith in history 
and society”—its faith that human beings can work toward, and must 
take responsibility for, their salvation. (In contrast to the new political 
theology, conservative political philosophers such as Voegelin, on the basis 
of their analysis of political religions, reemphasized the radical distinction 
between the transcendent divine realm and the immanent realm of human 
existence in history. Their theological and anthropological presuppositions 
were rather different than those of thinkers such as Bulgakov and Metz. 
Bulgakov would have criticized Voegelin for “eschatological trans- 
cendentalism.”)
V
Here as well, with the idea of political religions, Bulgakov and other 
Russian idealist philosophers were prescient. Even before the Russian 
Revolution, they interpreted positivism and socialism as secular religions, 
whose promise of salvation was based on a claim to knowledge of the 
laws and teleology of history, unfolding independently of human will but 
leading inexorably to the promised age.28 As early as 1878 Vladimir Solov’ev 
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wrote, in his Chteniia o bogochelovechestve (Lectures on Godmanhood), that 
socialism and positivism were substitutes for “rejected gods.”29 Bulgakov, as 
we shall see further, developed this approach in a number of his writings, 
including his essays “Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress” (1902), 
“Karl Marks kak religioznyi tip” (“Karl Marx as a Religious Type,” 1906), 
and “Geroizm i podvizhnichestvo (Iz razmyshlenii o religioznoi prirode 
russkoi intelligentsii)” (“Heroism and Asceticism [Reflections on the 
Religious Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia],” 1909).30 Pavel Novgorodtsev 
also took up the theme. His 1917 book Ob obshchestvennom ideale (On 
the Social Ideal) includes a long, seminal analysis of Marxism as a pseudo-
religion of coerced collective salvation in history.31
Perhaps the most influential Russian proponent of the “socialism as 
religion” theme was Nikolai Berdiaev. 32 He addressed it in several of his pre-
revolutionary writings and in his widely read book Istoki i smysl russkogo 
kommunizma (The Origin of Russian Communism, 1937), where he depicts 
the Soviet state as an “inverted theocracy” in which everything assumes the 
character of orthodoxy or heresy. “The Soviet communist realm,” he wrote, 
“has in its spiritual structure a great likeness to the Muscovite Orthodox 
Tsardom”—that is, to the old political theology of tsarist Russia.33 In his 
account, both the tsarist and communist autocracies were premised on 
the denial of freedom of conscience, because for them salvation was not 
a matter of inner self-determination and individual striving but of collective, 
external determination. The political religions approach remains influential 
among historians of totalitarianism today.34
What made the Russian neo-idealists such early and perceptive critics of 
twentieth-century political religions, and of the old political theology more 
generally, was their essential humanism, their belief, as Bulgakov put it, in the 
idea that human creativity is included in the means of salvation. For them, 
salvation was not something purely external (again, whether through grace, 
church, or party-state); rather, it depended on human self-determination 
and human self-realization, both individually and collectively. This is how 
the founder of modern Russian theology, Vladimir Solov’ev, understood 
salvation: the self-realization of humanity’s intrinsic divine potential, or of 
Godmanhood (bogochelovechestvo), ultimately culminating in deification 
(theosis).35 The type of humanism expounded by Solov’ev and his followers 
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is what distinguishes the new political theology from the old, then and 
now.36 Solov’ev even coined the term “Christian politics” to champion the 
consistent application of Christian moral principles to all spheres of human 
life (public as well as private) in the project of building of the Kingdom of 
God on earth.37
VI
This is the tradition, broadly, of Vekhi and of its predecessor volume, 
Problemy idealizma (Problems of Idealism, 1902). These two landmarks of 
the Russian Silver Age can be read, first, as powerful implicit critiques of 
the old political theology of the Russian autocracy; second, as critiques 
of the political religions of the Russian intelligentsia; and third, as classic 
texts of the new Russian political theology. Problems of Idealism is probably 
the most significant text in the first and third respects, while Vekhi focuses 
more on the salvific ethos of the intelligentsia and its belief in revolution as 
salvation.
Problems of Idealism was conceived at the beginning of the Russian 
Liberation Movement as a defense of freedom of conscience and its 
importance in liberalism.38 The volume’s architects, Petr Struve and 
Novgorodtsev, understood freedom of conscience in two interrelated 
senses. First, it meant the inalienable right of the individual to determine 
his or her religious beliefs, a right not recognized by the tsarist government 
until the October Manifesto of 1905. Second, they understood freedom 
of conscience in the even more fundamental, Kantian sense as inner 
autonomy or self-determination according to freely recognized absolute 
ideals, which capacity Kant held to be the essence of morality, human 
dignity, and personhood itself. In their understanding of the dual 
meaning of the concept, Struve and Novgorodtsev followed the two 
greatest philosophers of nineteenth-century Russia, Boris Chicherin and 
Solov’ev.39 
In its Kantian, liberal defense of self-determination and freedom of 
conscience, Problems of Idealism was a powerful critique of the old political 
theology in autocratic Russia. Almost fifty years ago Michael Cherniavsky 
described this political theology in his book Tsar and People, basing his 
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comparative historical framework in part on Ernst Kantorowicz’s classic 
work The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. “The 
myth of the pious ruler drew its strength from the eschatology of Russian 
political theory,” Cherniavsky wrote. “From its beginning around 1500, the 
Third Rome, Moscow, was the chief fact in the economy of salvation. Upon 
the orthodoxy and personal piety of the tsar depended the salvation of Russia 
as a state and thereby the salvation of the whole world.”40 Beginning with 
Peter the Great, the ideology of Russian autocracy was partly Westernized 
and secularized, but after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 there 
was a return to a religious image of monarchy. Richard Wortman has shown 
that Alexander III and Nicholas II both projected “scenarios of power,” 
showing themselves as pious Muscovite rulers who believed themselves 
responsible for their people’s salvation.41
Against the old political theology of autocracy, Problems of Idealism 
advanced a new political theology of personhood (cf. Metz’s “political 
theology of the subject”). Following Kant, Russian neo-idealists defined 
the essence of personhood as the human capacity for morality or for self-
determination—which capacity was the anthropological basis, in turn, 
for freedom of conscience as a natural right. Recognition of the absolute 
value of personhood and of its natural rights was incompatible in principle 
with autocracy, and stipulated, for nearly all the volume’s contributors, 
the constitutional limitation of political power and the rule of law. At the 
beginning of Russia’s long age of revolution, the new political theology of 
personhood thus took the practical form of liberalism. This was a type of 
liberalism that, in contrast to prevailing positivist conceptions (e.g., in Pavel 
Miliukov), was self-consciously idealist and, for most of its proponents, 
ultimately theological. While the old Russian political theology made 
religion an instrument of state power, the new political theology made it 
a limit of such power.
VII
The clearest formulations of the new Russian political theology of 
personhood can be found in what are surely the two best essays in Problems 
of Idealism: Bulgakov’s “Basic Problems of the Theory of Progress” 
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and Novgorodtsev’s “Nravstvennyi idealizm v filosofii prava” (“Ethical 
Idealism in the Philosophy of Law”).42 Bulgakov’s essay, which opens the 
volume, is one of his finest. He begins with a straightforward refutation 
of positivism: the idea or category of the absolute (whether in the form 
of morality, religion, or metaphysics) cannot be derived from the positive 
data of sense experience (the positivist criterion of reality), and yet it is 
intrinsic to human consciousness and cannot be eradicated.43 Positivist 
attempts to deny the presence of the absolute lead only to unconscious 
metaphysics, since it then enters into thought as “contraband”—it is 
smuggled in under the guise of scientific, historical, social or other 
concepts, rather than being openly recognized and justified before reason 
(96, 107). The result is that the relative and absolute are distorted and 
conflated with each other.
Bulgakov’s brilliant case study of this type of conflation is the 
positivist theory of progress (under which he includes both Comte’s and 
Marx’s version). “For humanity today,” he writes, “the significance of the 
theory of progress is that it is called upon to replace lost metaphysics and 
religion, or, more precisely, it takes the form of both” (91). In Bulgakov’s 
analysis, the theory of progress turns out to be a pseudo-scientific, 
secular “religion of progress” because it posits a perfect human future— 
a future like nothing that could be positively extrapolated from the human 
past, but rather one that has overcome worldly contingency as such and 
achieved absolute perfection (97). Here the theory of progress betrays 
its debt to traditional religious faith in salvation, which obviously is not 
“positively given” but reflects human longing for the absolute. At the same 
time, “it wants to inspire confidence in the certain advent of this future 
kingdom through science,” with its alleged ability to identify the laws of 
history and predict their necessary course (92–93). Thus the theory of 
progress not only promises a perfect (though utterly unverifiable) future, 
but also promises that it will come about “externally” through historical 
necessity, not through human self-determination and striving toward 
a transcendent, absolute ideal.
Bulgakov holds that ultimately the theory of progress fails because 
positivism cannot contend with the problem of personhood, which 
must rest on idealist and theistic foundations. The very concept of the 
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person contradicts positivism’s premises: it is a moral and metaphysical 
concept derived from the will’s self-determination by the law or ideal 
of “ought”—which is of “supra-empirical origin” (105–06). “Ought,” as 
a moral demand directed toward the will, is an ideal of action; it can 
autonomously motivate us, despite the claims of historical determinism 
to the contrary.
With this Bulgakov turns directly to the theme that would still occupy 
him thirty years later in “The Soul of Socialism”—the philosophy of history, 
or, as he prefers to call it here, the metaphysics of history, defined as “the 
discovery of the absolute in the relative” (108). “And if the absolute is 
a synonym for freedom,” he writes, “then the metaphysics of history 
is the revelation of the principle of freedom in history, its victory over 
mechanical causation” (109). The metaphysics of history is not some 
abstract, impersonal schema: the absolute is recognized by persons in 
conscience as the moral law or categorical imperative, and persons are 
responsible for progressively realizing the absolute in history. 
The moral law, according to Bulgakov, commands us “to want progress. 
From this point of view, progress is not a law of historical development,” 
as it is in positivism, “but a moral task.” In this idealist conception of it, 
progress requires inner strength. By contrast, “the positivist theory of 
progress flatters our weakness; it … promises the external support of the 
natural course of things to that which does not find adequate support 
internally. In this, the positivist theory of progress represents its own 
type of eschatology, invoked to inspire warriors and sustain religious 
faith in the final triumph of the good. But another type of eschatology 
is needed before man can find in it real support for his moral activity” 
(111). This second type of eschatology is the one that Bulgakov will later 
call “Christian humanist.” It respects human autonomy and dignity and 
recognizes that salvation or the Kingdom of God can be achieved only 
through what Kant called the kingdom of ends, which Bulgakov mentions 
in this context (112).44 “This is the true theory of progress—is any other 
needed!” Remarkably, Bulgakov has shown that this theory of progress 
(idealist and theistic) is consistently humanist, while the purported 
humanism of positivism (materialist and atheistic) actually shares the 
external, misanthropic approach to salvation of the old political theology.
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VIII
Novgorodtsev, in his chapter of Problems of Idealism, is less explicitly 
theological than Bulgakov and more political. His topic is the revival 
of natural law, and he is more specifically interested than Bulgakov in 
developing neo-idealism as a theory of liberalism. Nonetheless, there 
is broad and impressive philosophical agreement between them. Their 
common themes are personhood, progress, the critique of positivism, and 
the philosophy of history. Both philosophers are centrally concerned with 
rescuing history from positivist determinism and restoring it as the sphere 
of human freedom.
For Novgorodtsev, the openness of history defines the very task and 
importance of natural law. According to him, natural law reveals a constant 
human need: “This is the need consciously to go forward to meet the future, 
as yet undetermined and still within our power, as it were, and to realize in 
it our ideal strivings and hopes” (283). In another formulation, he writes: 
“Human thought has this quality of living not only in the present, but also 
in the future, of bringing to the future its ideals and aspirations, and in 
this sense natural-law constructions are an integral property of our spirit 
and testimony to its higher calling” (284). Decades later, Bulgakov would 
write of the “sense of an orientation toward the future,” and Metz, in terms 
even more strikingly similar than those of Novgorodtsev, of the Noch-nicht-
gewesene. Like them, Novgorodtsev relates the openness of history to the 
power of utopian ideals to shape the future (292).
The task of natural law, as he understands it, is to order ideal paths 
of progressive development. Natural law is about the future of law, and 
in this its guide is the moral ideal of “what ought to be” (286). The ideal 
nature of natural law (in contrast to positive law) makes it “a norm and 
principle of personhood” (303). This is an intricate connection: the moral 
ideals that take juridical form in natural law are the same ideals that make 
self-determination and therefore personhood itself possible. The idea of 
personhood was the center of Novgorodtsev’s philosophical liberalism, 
from its treatment of ethics to its treatments of law and public policy. His 
ultimate social ideal was the “kingdom of ends.” “The self-determining 
person,” he writes, “is the ground on which is raised the supreme good of 
the moral world, ‘the kingdom of persons as ends,’ in Kant’s expression” 
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(305). This “supreme good” is not only a moral one but also a broadly 
theological one; it fits squarely within the humanist tradition of the new 
political theology.
Novgorodtsev stressed the core liberal implication of his theory of 
natural law and of personhood: the inalienable rights of the person solidly 
mark the limits of state power. In the modern conception, he writes, 
“natural law is the expression of the autonomous, absolute significance of 
the person, a significance that must belong to it in any political system. 
In this respect natural law is more than a demand for better legislation: 
it represents the protest of the person against state absolutism, reminding 
us of the unconditional moral basis that is the only proper foundation 
of society and the state” (313). Novgorodtsev thought that the absolute 
value of the person held theistic implications—though in his Problems of 
Idealism essay he points only rather obliquely to a “higher metaphysical 
synthesis” (314)—so that his idealist liberal theory incorporates, indeed 
rests on, a political theology of personhood. In tsarist Russia, where in 
1902 Konstantin Pobedonostsev had starkly symbolized the old political 
theology of autocracy for over twenty years, his ideas must have resonated.
IX
The great divide between Problems of Idealism and Vekhi was, of course, the 
1905 revolution. The Vekhi authors blamed the radical intelligentsia and 
its positivist ideology for the failure of Russian liberalism in the aftermath 
of the revolution. Vekhi’s criticisms of the intelligentsia drew heavily on 
Problems of Idealism, in particular on its critique of positivism, its defense 
of neo-idealism, and its political theology of personhood. Five of the seven 
Vekhi authors had contributed to Problems of Idealism. The initiative for the 
earlier volume came from Struve, who was also an important inspiration 
behind Vekhi. 
Struve’s Vekhi essay, “Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia” (“The Intelligentsia 
and Revolution”), highlights a central philosophical continuity between 
the two volumes, namely their religious-philosophical humanism. In 1905 
Struve wrote an essay with Semen Frank on the philosophy of culture. In it 
they offer a defense of humanism, “by which we mean idealism, a faith in 
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absolute values which is linked with faith in humanity and its creative tasks 
on earth.”45 Pipes suggests that their philosophy of culture drew directly 
on Kant’s idea of human self-determination.46 “Culture is creativity,” they 
wrote, “the conscious and deliberate transformation of reality in accord 
with ideals.”47 In Vekhi, Struve applies this same idealistic humanism to 
religion, writing that any true religion must rest on “faith in the redemptive 
power and decisive importance of personal creation, or, more truly, of 
personal achievement [podvig] in conformity with the will of God.”48 Like 
Lev Tolstoi, whom he greatly admired, Struve believed that “the Kingdom 
of God is within you,” and that “for the religious mind, therefore, nothing 
can be more important than a person’s individual self-perfection” (120). The 
atheistic intelligentsia, in denying the existence of ideals (as its positivism 
stipulated), also denied itself the possibility of self-determination and self-
perfection, of personal achievement and responsibility.
Despite his impressive formulation of important tenets of Russian 
religious humanism, Struve seems to reject the “political religions” 
approach to understanding the intelligentsia’s psychology, as advanced 
by Solov’ev, Bulgakov, and others. His argument refuting this approach is 
that the alleged religiosity of the intelligentsia’s outlook and ideologies was 
purely a matter of form, not content (119, 124)—but this is precisely what 
proponents of the “political religions” approach claim. He also rejected the 
idea of “Christian politics.”49
X
In his famous Vekhi essay, “Heroism and Asceticism: Reflections on the 
Religious Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia,” Bulgakov applies his 
1902 critique of the theory of progress more specifically to the Russian 
intelligentsia. The essay is a classic analysis of the intelligentsia’s political 
religions. According to Bulgakov, an eschatological “striving for the 
salvation of mankind” was the intelligentsia’s distinctive trait (21). In this 
external sense of the concept, eschatology captures the “heroism” that was 
central to the intelligentsia’s “entire spiritual economy” (27). “The very 
essence of heroism,” he writes, “presupposes a passive object of activity, 
the nation or humanity that is being saved” (29). The intelligentsia’s heroic 
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mission was the “external salvation of mankind”; it rested on “an arrogant 
view of the people as an object of salvation” (39, 43). The intelligentsia’s 
salvific heroism can be traced, Bulgakov argues, to the circumstances under 
which the radical intelligentsia emerged—to persecution, suffering, and 
a type of martyrdom under the tsarist police regime. He leaves unstated an 
interesting paradox: the Russian autocracy’s political theology thus gave 
rise to the intelligentsia’s political religions, both premised on the idea that 
they were responsible for the people’s salvation.
The external means by which the intelligentsia hoped to bring about 
the salvation of Russia and humanity was the positivist theory of progress 
that Bulgakov analyzed in Problems of Idealism. The intelligentsia took the 
atheism of this theory as an article of faith. In Vekhi, Bulgakov is highly critical 
of “humanism,” here associating the term (despite the real humanism of his 
own religious philosophy) with atheism and with the intelligentsia’s faith 
in humanity’s natural goodness, corrupted only by irrational or defective 
external circumstances (such as religion). In the “humanistic intelligentsia 
church” (22), salvation is understood as something that will take place 
automatically through rational, necessary historical development toward 
socialism. With this belief, “the intelligentsia lives in an atmosphere of 
expectation, awaiting the social miracle, the universal cataclysm—it lives 
in an eschatological frame of mind” (30).
Bulgakov draws a crucial implication from this “heroic” type of 
eschatology: it cannot provide a real basis for personhood because (to put 
it somewhat more philosophically than he does) it cannot sustain an ideal, 
which is a necessary condition for self-determination and self-development. 
Self-determination (which capacity defines personhood) requires an ideal 
by which the will can be self-determining. “Heroic” eschatology collapses 
the ideal to an immanent process of automatic historical development. 
Salvation happens through historical necessity, not through the self-
determination of persons acting in history according to higher, ultimately 
transcendent ideals. These considerations explain why “the absence of 
a correct doctrine of personhood is the intelligentsia’s chief weakness” (34).
Bulgakov commends not heroism but asceticism (podvizhnichestvo) 
or humility, which he considers to be self-discipline, self-mastery, and 
self-perfection—in short, as the religious cultivation of personhood. In 
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its recognition of “absolute norms and values,” asceticism can serve “as 
an inner structuring of personhood” (36, 38). It is oriented not toward 
external salvation, the salvation of others, but toward inner salvation, 
the salvation of oneself. In opposition to Enlightenment notions of the 
natural goodness and (mechanical) perfection of human nature, asceticism 
requires recognition of sin and a willingness to struggle against it, first of 
all within oneself. Despite the inward emphasis of asceticism, Bulgakov 
argues that the same ideals that make self-determination (and personhood) 
possible are also culturally and economically creative. Ascetic obedience to 
one’s duty can be applied to any field of “external” activity: the discipline 
of obedience or “worldly asceticism” cultivates the self through work in 
the world (39). Though some of Bulgakov’s language sounds archaic and 
though he opposes the term “humanism,” his overall case for asceticism 
directly anticipates his later “Christian humanism.” Asceticism is already 
the new political theology, while heroism is the old.
XI
In his Vekhi essay, “Etika nigilizma: k kharakteristike nravstvennogo miro-
vozzreniia russkoi intelligentsii” (“The Ethic of Nihilism: A Characterization 
of the Russian Intelligentsia’s Moral Outlook”), Frank does use the term 
“humanism” to describe his philosophical worldview, one which bears 
striking similarities not only to Struve’s but also to Bulgakov’s. All three 
thinkers were concerned perhaps above all with the role of objective ideals 
and of absolute values in the constitution of personhood and in cultural 
creativity. The concepts of “heroism” and “nihilism” are different ways of 
describing the loss of the ideal and the consequences of that loss. Bulgakov 
emphasizes the consequences for personhood, while Frank emphasizes 
those for culture. Frank defines nihilism as “the denial or non-recognition 
of absolute (objective) values” (136). The inevitable result is the creation 
of false absolutes or idols, the ascribing of absolute significance to one or 
another relative value or interest (fanaticism). A good example, according 
to Frank, is the intelligentsia’s “moralism,” by which everything is judged 
according to the utilitarian criterion (and false absolute) of the people’s 
happiness. The intelligentsia’s faith in the inevitability of universal human 
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happiness drove its “theory of progress,” its “religion of socialism,” and its 
belief that it held the key to “the universal salvation of mankind” (142–43). 
On this point Frank’s analysis is very similar to Bulgakov’s.
In Vekhi Frank devotes relatively more attention than Bulgakov to 
outlining an idealist theory of culture. Clearly drawing on his 1905 essay 
written with Struve, he defines culture as “the aggregate of objective values 
which have been actualized by the historical development of social life” (139, 
italics removed). In this conception, culture is the ever-richer embodiment 
and ever-greater realization of ideals and values in life through human self-
determination and aspiration. This is the real dynamic of progress. It also 
underlies what Frank calls the “metaphysical concept of wealth” and the 
intelligentsia’s aversion to it: “The Russian intelligentsia does not love wealth. 
In the first place, it does not value spiritual wealth, or culture—the ideal 
force and creative activity of the human spirit that impels it to master and 
humanize the world and to enrich its life with the values of science, art, 
religion and ethics. What is more remarkable, it even extends this dislike to 
material wealth, instinctively recognizing its symbolic connection with the 
general idea of culture” (148). It is clear that the nihilist (and more broadly 
positivist) denial of the ideal—without which there is no object for the 
will’s self-determination and nothing to be embodied in life—cannot but 
impoverish personhood, culture, and economy. By contrast, recognition 
of the ideal—which ultimately meant metaphysical theism for Bulgakov, 
Frank, Novgorodtsev, and Struve—enriches them. This is why Frank 
concludes his article (and Vekhi) with the following call: “We must pass 
from unproductive, anti-cultural nihilistic moralism to creative, culturally 
constructive religious humanism” (155).
XII
Within ten years and in the midst of another Russian revolution, Iz 
glubiny (Out of the Depths, 1918) appeared as a type of sequel to Problems 
of Idealism and Vekhi.50 Some of its essays also pursue the critique of the old 
political theology, whether in the form of the old regime’s appropriation of 
religion for its own ideological purposes or in the form of the intelligentsia’s 
political religions. By 1918, however, the Great War had radically 
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undermined the premises of liberal theology all over Europe. In 1919 Karl 
Barth published his Der Römerbrief (Epistle to the Romans), one of the most 
important theological works of the twentieth century. “The book’s adversary 
was every form of liberal theological humanism,” in Mark Lilla’s recent 
estimation.51 The point of all its rich metaphors and images “is to show that 
there can never be a fusion of the human and divine, either in morality or 
in history,” Lilla writes. “The God of Romans could not be further from … 
Kant’s moral lawgiver.”52 Barth and other Weimar-era theologians cast Kant 
aside and returned to Augustine, with his emphasis on original sin—the 
depravity of human nature—and our need for total redemption. Their new 
theology was the old one of the need for salvation from ourselves.
The theological currents of Weimar Germany may seem worlds apart 
from the Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet Union during this era. In fact, 
they shared certain presuppositions about human nature. Lenin created 
Leninism when he pronounced the proletariat incapable of developing its 
own true class consciousness—which was the precondition of communism. 
As a result, such consciousness would have to be brought to the proletariat 
from without, by a vanguard party of professional revolutionaries. In other 
words, the workers had to be saved from themselves, and the external agent 
of salvation was the party. Lenin’s contempt for humanity had much in 
common with Carl Schmitt’s. It is for good reason that one recent scholar 
writes that Schmitt’s thought suggests “a kind of right-wing Leninism.”53
Europe’s theological despair, in its various forms, began to lift with the 
post-1945 appearance of the new political theology, representing as it does 
a revival of earlier traditions of liberal theological humanism. Its further 
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Anyone choosing the original landmark critique of the state of intellectual 
affairs in Russia in the nineteenth century would most likely identify it as 
Petr Chaadaev’s Lettres philosophiques/Filosoficheskie pis’ma (Philosophical 
Letters, 1828–30), and in particular the “First Letter,” written some 80 years 
before Vekhi.1 In the “First Letter” Chaadaev describes Russia as a lacuna 
in the “intellectual order” (330); Russia lacks historical consciousness 
and does not participate in the “wondrous connection of human ideas in 
the succession of generations” (323). This leads Chaadaev to the direst of 
conclusions: “We belong to those [peoples] which do not as it were form 
a component part of the human race and exist only to teach a great lesson to 
the world” (326). The contemporary reception of both Vekhi and Chaadaev’s 
“First Letter,” when it was eventually published due to a censor’s error in 
1836, has marked them as “scandals.”2 In both cases the intemperate nature 
of contemporary responses was not without a certain provocation, and in 
this respect, while none of the Vekhi authors pull their punches, Mikhail 
Gershenzon—the original instigator and compiler of the Vekhi collection, 
as well as the publisher of Chaadaev’s Philosophical Letters at the same 
time—may in particular be thought to have taken on the mantle of what 
Chaadaev called his “exaggeration” and Viazemskii called his “splendid and 
masterly satire.”3 
The publication history of Chaadaev’s work was marked by severe 
disruption, at the time and subsequently (disruption in the case of Vekhi 
took place only subsequently). Yet Vekhi and Chaadaev come together in 
the period 1904–09, through the republication of Chaadaev’s work made 
possible at long last in 1905 (though the Philosophical Letters in its entirety 
still remained unpublished), and especially, of course, through Gershenzon, 
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who was at the center of this republication, as he was of Vekhi. He began 
work on Chaadaev in 1904, publishing him in Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii 
(Questions of Philosophy and Psychology) in 1906 and again as an appendix 
to his own 1908 study P. Ia. Chaadaev. Zhizn’ i myshlenie (P. Ia. Chaadaev: 
Life and Thought).4 The supposition that Chaadaev has a presence which 
informs the Vekhi project, first of all in Gershenzon but to a greater or 
lesser extent throughout, can be taken, I would suggest, as granted.5 There 
may be archival material of interest here, although there is no mention of 
Chaadaev in the “Commentary” to the 1991 edition of Vekhi, which traces 
in some detail the background formation of the project, or in the letters 
from the participants to Gershenzon published in Minuvshee (The Past), 
also in 1991.6 He is, however, prominently there in Gershenzon’s “Preface,” 
in the final paragraph: “Our warnings are not new: all of our most profound 
thinkers, from Chaadaev to Solov’ev and Tolstoi, said the same things again 
and again.”7 
Indeed, the connection in Gershenzon’s thinking between Chaadaev 
and Vekhi is clearly apparent from the opening sentences of the “Preface” 
to his 1908 book, in which he exposes the widespread “misconception” of 
what Chaadaev stands for: 
A lot has been written about Chaadaev and his name is familiar to 
almost every educated Russian; but it is only now that we are learning 
how to go about understanding his thought. For various reasons, in part 
of a general kind, in part personal, his name has become the preserve of 
legend: despite being someone who was an unambiguous critic of all that 
our vanguard intelligentsia held most dear about itself—its exclusively 
positivist orientation and its revolutionary politics—he was enlisted 
in the synod of Russian liberalism as one of the glorious figures of our 
liberation movement. This misconception began already in his own 
lifetime…8 
In the second paragraph, Gershenzon goes on to speak of the “eternal truth” 
to be found in Chaadaev concerning “that internal freedom, for which 
external and hence political freedom is only the footstool,” and of Chaadaev’s 
focus on the “highest tasks of the spirit.”9 Consider the following sentence 
from the “Preface” to Vekhi: “Their [the authors’] common platform is a 
recognition of the theoretical and practical primacy of spiritual life over 
the external forms of community. They mean by this that the individual’s 
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inner life is the sole creative force of human existence, and that this inner 
life, not the self-sufficient principles of the political realm, constitutes the 
only solid basis on which a society can be built” (xxxvii). The fourth and 
final paragraph of Gershenzon’s “Preface” to his book on Chaadaev begins 
with the question, “Is now the time to remind Russian society of Chaadaev? 
I think it is—indeed more so than ever.” The reason for this is not so 
much Chaadaev’s particular opinions, such as his “negative attitude to 
revolutions,” but the “general spirit of his teaching”: “Through the entirety 
of his thought he tells us that the political life of peoples, directed towards 
temporary and material aims, in reality is only realizing in part an eternal 
moral idea, i.e., that any social cause is in essence no less religious than 
the ardent prayer of the believer. He tells us the following about the life of 
society: enter in, and God is here: but he adds: and remember that God is 
here and that you serve Him.”10 
All in all, then, this “Preface” of 1908 reads like something of a blueprint 
for Vekhi, and it is apparent that Chaadaev, through Gershenzon, has 
served as a catalyst in its conception. It is a curious turn of events that this 
is a reprise of his role in stimulating philosophical enquiry and intellectual 
debate in his own time, which was memorably described by Herzen as 
having the awakening effect of a “shot ringing out in the dark of night.”11 
At the same time it is one of the paradoxes of Chaadaev that, despite this 
role, his philosophical project itself is in a way a “failure” in its immediate 
context. Or, to put it another way, its impact lay less in its content, which 
was not taken up, than in its meta-content, its formulation of key questions 
and problematics, including the very problem of philosophy; and in longer 
perspective, as in Vekhi, Chaadaev’s project has an enduring resonance 
through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with reverberations 
thereafter.12
Thus, in exploring the presence of Chaadaev in Vekhi, I do not mean 
only to assert a direct influence, although in the case of Gershenzon there 
clearly is one. The aim of my study is to trace continuities and tropes, as well 
as genealogies, in Russian intellectual history. In this respect, parallels—
whether they are typological similarities, common themes, or direct 
affinities—between Chaadaev and Vekhi provide an interesting perspective 
on some of the overarching problematics in the tradition of Russian 
— 174 —
Robin Aizlewood
philosophical thought, as well as on the individual thinkers concerned. In 
addition, approaching Vekhi through the prism of Chaadaev, and vice versa, 
can pose questions for how we conceptualize that tradition. In what follows 
I will concentrate on two main lines of enquiry: first, an analysis of how we 
may juxtapose or transpose the framework of the Chaadaevan critique to 
Vekhi; and second, an exploration of the conception of the person in both 
Chaadaev and Vekhi that illuminates tensions and divergences as well as 
continuities in Russian thought. A key aspect of Chaadaev’s resonance in 
Russian culture, which comes to the fore in the second part of my study 
and its conclusion, lies precisely in the Chaadaevan image, championed by 
Gershenzon, of the person of moral intellect. 
I
Typically, the transposition of Chaadaev’s framework to Vekhi involves 
a shift in the object/address of the critique from Russia/Russians as a whole 
in Chaadaev to the intelligentsia in particular in Vekhi. However, such 
a shift immediately begs the question—pertinently asked in contemporary 
responses to Vekhi—of whether and how the contributors to Vekhi may 
themselves display at least some of the characteristics they criticize in the 
intelligentsia. In the same way, the response to Chaadaev of the Slavophiles 
and others—including Dostoevskii—was to shift the address of his critique 
from Russia/Russians in general to the small part of society that was the 
alienated, westernized elite (which on a rather partial, limited understanding 
could include Chaadaev himself and which, with appropriate qualification, 
may offer a closer parallel to the object of the Vekhi critique).13 In this 
connection, by way of a prelude, it is worth briefly noting a couple of 
distinctive tropes in Russian culture which receive a protean formulation 
in Chaadaev and have lost none of their currency in the Vekhi critique. 
Two such tropes are the alienation of Russians/the intelligentsia, and the 
juvenility of Russians/the intelligentsia. In Chaadaev, these two features are 
in effect aspects of the lack of historical consciousness and lack of continuity 
of ideas among Russians, which will be considered in greater detail below. 
This is why Russia has never progressed beyond its youth (324–25) and why 
“we are as it were alien to ourselves” (326). The juvenility of Russia and/
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or of the intelligentsia had acquired considerable cultural baggage by the 
time of Vekhi, where it concentrated around the image of the “student” (in 
Sergei Bulgakov, Semen Frank, and Aleksandr Izgoev’s contributions, for 
example). The same applies even more, of course, to alienation—from the 
incorporation of Hegelian (and later Marxian) ideas, on the one hand, to 
the Dostoevskian notion of the educated elite’s alienation from the Russian 
“soil,” on the other. A variation on Hegelian/Marxian alienation may be 
found in Petr Struve’s central diagnosis of the intelligentsia’s “alienation” 
or “dissociation” (otschchepenstvo) from state and religion (118), while 
a reiteration of Dostoevskii’s motif is found in Bulgakov’s and Gershenzon’s 
essays (27, 52), identically worded in the original as being “torn from the 
soil” (an echo of this may conceivably be seen in Struve as well).14 
The central question in the transposition of Chaadaev’s critique 
to Vekhi concerns not these tropes, important as they are, but the 
intelligentsia’s “attitude to philosophy,” as highlighted by Nikolai Berdiaev 
in the opening sentence of the collection’s opening essay (1). At the outset, 
it is worth reiterating the fundamental ground that Chaadaev and Vekhi 
have in common: the insistence throughout Vekhi by all the contributors 
on absolute values, on consciousness, and on the link between the absolute 
and consciousness is in essence fully shared—and equally emphasized—
by Chaadaev. That said, for the most part the Chaadaev-Vekhi intertext 
can be traced more especially through Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Frank, and 
Gershenzon, with the latter—as has already been demonstrated—taken as 
something of a special case. Gershenzon, as we shall see throughout, may 
indeed be interpreted in certain respects (though not wholly and solely) as 
not only reproducing but even ventriloquizing the Chaadaevan critique. 
Nor is it surprising that the main connections are otherwise to be explored 
through Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank, since it is these three thinkers who 
primarily occupy the same religious-philosophical disciplinary territory as 
Chaadaev.
There are three main, closely related Chaadaevan themes that can 
be traced in the critique of the intelligentsia’s “attitude to philosophy” 
in Vekhi: these are the truth, philosophical culture, and the borrowing 
of ideas. At the centre of Chaadaev’s philosophy lies the idea that the 
truth resides in the unity and historical continuity of thought in human, 
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Christian consciousness, that “wondrous connection of human ideas in the 
succession of generations” (323), as he calls it. Russia, however, lies “as it 
were outside time” (323) and has not contributed “a single thought to the 
mass of human ideas” (330). In rhetorical affirmation, the “First Letter” 
plays out continuous variations on the theme, such as, for example, in the 
following passage: 
As we move forwards in time, our past experience disappears without 
return. This is the natural consequence of a culture which is entirely 
borrowed and imitative. We have absolutely no internal development, 
no natural progress; former ideas are swept away by new ones because 
the latter do not arise out of the former, they just appear from nowhere. 
We only take in ideas that are completely ready-made, therefore those 
ineradicable traces which are laid down in the mind through the 
consecutive development of thought, and which create intellectual 
strength, do not leave furrows in our consciousness. (326)
Alongside the lack of continuity of ideas, therefore, comes a weak 
philosophical culture, the absence of rigorous method or “consecutive 
[logical] development” (posledovatel’noe razvitie) in the process of thinking. 
The same point, lamenting both the “blind, superficial, very often senseless 
borrowing” of ideas and the corresponding lack of “some kind of stability and 
rigor [posledovatel’nost’] in the mind, some kind of logic” is reiterated a page 
later (327–28). Throughout the Philosophical Letters, Chaadaev’s essential 
point of reference is the higher, absolute truth—istina—of Providence. 
Indeed, while he changes to a more optimistic assessment of Russia’s future 
in the “Apology of a Madman” (a shift already apparent in letters written in 
1833–35), he still proceeds from an assertion of the primacy of “love for the 
truth” over “love for one’s country,” “fine thing” though that may be (523): 
“The way to heaven is via the truth [istina], not via one’s country,” he states, 
and then adds: “It’s true [pravda] that we Russians have always been little 
interested in what’s true [istinno] and what’s false” (523–24).
So let us now move on to the critique of the intelligentsia’s “attitude 
to philosophy” in Vekhi, concentrated as it is—just as it is in Chaadaev—
around the priority of truth as an absolute value, the need for a strong 
philosophical culture and rigor in the exposition of thought, and the 
borrowing and continuity of ideas. The affinities with Chaadaev will 
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become readily apparent, and indeed it may be assumed that the essays 
of Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank (as well as Gershenzon) are at least 
to some extent directly or indirectly informed by Chaadaev’s thought. 
A reasonable supposition would be that the affinity is more direct in the 
case of Berdiaev than in those of Bulgakov and Frank: in the paragraph 
in which Berdiaev introduces his account of “original Russian philosophy” 
and the “philosophical content” of Russian literature, the first person he 
mentions is Chaadaev, followed by Solov’ev, Dostoevskii, and Tolstoi (12). 
Neither Bulgakov nor Frank foregrounds Chaadaev in this way.
The title of Berdiaev’s essay, “Filosofskaia istina i intelligentskaia 
pravda” (“Philosophical Verity and Intelligentsia Truth”), draws on the 
distinction in Russian between higher truth (istina) and truth as justice 
(pravda) and so, as one might expect, the priority of truth—istina—is 
a major theme of his essay. In a formulation that echoes Chaadaev’s as 
noted above, he notes that “the intelligentsia does not care whether Mach’s 
theory of knowledge, to take one example, is true or false,” and laments 
a “feeble awareness of the unconditional value of the truth” (4–5). He 
goes on to emphasize, again echoing Chaadaev—this time, I would say, 
explicitly—that “love for egalitarian justice, for social good, for the people’s 
welfare, paralyzed love for the truth and almost destroyed any interest in 
truth” (6). Chaadaev’s love for one’s country has here mutated into a populist 
love for the people. The theme of truth—“love for the truth” as an “absolute 
value” (6), “love of objective, ecumenical truth” (7), the intelligentsia as 
“unreceptive to objective truth” (12), “humility before the truth” (15) and 
so on—continues through the rest of his essay. As a corollary, there is the 
related theme of philosophical thinking. At the outset, Berdiaev laments 
a “very low level of philosophical culture” and a “temperament” and 
“values” antipathetic to philosophy (1); he comments that “our intelligentsia 
was always interested in questions of a philosophical nature, though not 
in their philosophical formulation” (3). He notes a “weak appreciation of 
intellectual life as an autonomous value” (7), indifference to a scientific, 
scholarly approach (20), “hostility to philosophical endeavor” (14; in the 
original, “hostility to the philosophical work of thought”).15 He finds this 
weakness in the new mysticism (which Berdiaev identifies with Ivanov, 
Merezhkovskii, and Rozanov) as much as in the thought of the radical 
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intelligentsia, and calls for such mysticism, with its “dionysian principle,” 
to combine with the “apollonian principle of philosophy” (14–15). Bearing 
in mind Berdiaev’s later self-confessed or even self-proclaimed antipathy 
to systematic exposition,16 it is interesting to find such a strand in his 
critique, but also to note that it is couched in the rather general terms of 
“philosophical culture” and “apollonian principle.” Indeed, compared with 
the attention to methodological rigor in some subsequent contributions, 
particularly those of Bogdan Kistiakovskii and Frank, Berdiaev’s essay is 
easier on itself in this respect.
While Gershenzon, Bulgakov, and Frank all take up the themes of the 
intelligentsia’s indifference to the truth and lack of philosophical culture, 
there are some interesting differences of emphasis. In Gershenzon, for 
example, the theme of the truth is presented in terms very close to those of 
Chaadaev: it is described as the “one and indivisible Divine truth” which 
“out of the millennia of its life experience mankind is slowly assembling” 
(53); he talks of “mankind’s universal consciousness” (53) and of “supra-
personal ideas” (55), and of the “content of thought-truth” directing the 
will (58). It is this understanding of the truth that can redirect the crippled 
consciousness of the individual intelligent; the corollary need for rigorous 
philosophical thinking is nowhere stated, although it may perhaps be 
inferred. Bulgakov’s main theme is the intelligentsia’s attitude to religion, 
but to this he adds their “suspicious attitude toward philosophy” (22). It is 
interesting that Bulgakov, whose thought at this time was turning more to 
the theme of history, is the one author to stress the breaking of “intellectual” 
and “historical” “continuity” in Russia (25, 26)—echoing Chaadaev—
which manifests itself in the intelligentsia’s “historical impatience” instead 
of the proper “feeling of connection with and gratitude to the past” (39). 
Frank, whose topic is the intelligentsia’s nihilistic moralism, adopts an 
approach that seeks to clarify the “foundations of the prevailing ideas in 
morality and religious philosophy” of this outlook (154). He notes that 
the intelligentsia’s mind-set has no place for “ideals of truth, beauty and 
Divinity,” “theoretical, aesthetic and religious values,” and “theoretical, 
scientific truth, rigorous and pure knowledge for its own sake” (133). When 
he states that “perhaps the most remarkable trait of the recent Russian social 
movement … is its lack of philosophical reflection and understanding” (154; 
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in the original, perhaps more precisely, “how poorly thought through and 
articulated it is in philosophical terms [ego filosofskaia neprodumannost’ 
i nedogovorennost’]”),17 Frank shows himself to be the author who most 
keenly feels the need for rigorous philosophical thinking, some 80 years 
after Chaadaev.
The third “Chaadaevan” theme covered by all four authors is the 
problem of the superficial borrowing of European ideas, and on this they 
all write in similarly eloquent and pained terms. Gershenzon is dismayed 
that the periodization of Russian thought is not defined by its own “internal 
development” but by the dominance of “one or another foreign doctrine.” 
He decries the fact that “our collective consciousness failed to work out its 
own life values,” that it did not have its “own national evolution of thought,” 
but “simply seized on what Western thought had created for itself ” until 
a “gift” that was “new and better” came along; on the other hand, “we 
did not value the truth that our best minds—Chaadaev, the Slavophiles, 
Dostoevskii—had attained” (59). Compared with Chaadaev, there is more 
emphasis on the distortion that marks such borrowing. Berdiaev spends 
several pages on the topic (7–12), covering, for example, positivism, 
Marxism, and empiriocriticism before ending on the “especially sad fate” 
of Nietzsche (11), which leads him to exclaim: “Poor Nietzsche, and poor 
Russian thought!” (12) Neo-Kantianism, on the other hand, suffered less 
distortion, and he commends the way that an interest in Kant and Fichte, 
for example, has “raised our philosophical level” (10). Bearing in mind the 
broadly or more narrowly Kantian framework to which the Vekhi authors 
have subscribed or do subscribe, there is a touch of self-approbation here—
Berdiaev is never shy in this respect. In similar terms, Bulgakov writes that 
the intelligentsia “did not go beyond external appropriation” of Western 
ideas, and Frank’s penultimate paragraph (already quoted from above) 
offers an extended critique linking the absence of “independent intellectual 
activity” to the “philosophical mindlessness” that comes from superficial 
borrowing (154). It is notable too that all four writers, like Chaadaev before 
them, present European thought and culture, for all its competing trends, 
as, in Bulgakov’s words, an “organic whole” (25). 
The continuities with Chaadaev that we have seen are, I would suggest, 
striking in both range and depth; and they are important—whether as 
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influence, affinity or typological similarity—for our understanding of the 
larger narrative of Russian intellectual history as well as the particular places 
of Chaadaev and Vekhi in that narrative. It is significant for a reading of 
Vekhi that Chaadaev is not located in the distant intellectual background—
as is more or less the case for other Russian thinkers from before the 
1860s—but, through the publication of his work in the few years leading 
up to Vekhi, is present in the synchronic foreground, less prominently 
than Dostoevskii and Solov’ev, for sure, but there all the same. To this must 
be added his role, via Gershenzon, as a catalyst in the very conception of 
the collection, and his highlighted presence in the text. One might even 
interpret the state of affairs 80 years on as worse than that described by 
Chaadaev. Certainly it seems more than likely that, with Chaadaev’s work 
newly republished, a recognition by the Vekhi authors that they were 
repeating his words about the borrowing of ideas—and about attitudes to 
truth and to philosophy—can only have heightened the sense of dismay in 
their critique of the intelligentsia. 
II
Having explored the convergence of Vekhi and Chaadaev, I would now like 
to turn to the conception of the person, a thematic field in which the picture 
that emerges is more complex (and where, as noted earlier, the image of the 
Chaadaevan persona has a striking—and contested—resonance). Russian 
thought has often been characterized as being especially concerned with the 
person, for example in Zen’kovskii’s formulation that it is “anthropocentric,”18 
and recent scholarly attention and analysis have continued to advance the 
investigation of this aspect of Russian philosophy.19 
I will begin by bringing another of the iconic texts of nineteenth-
century Russian culture into the frame, namely Dostoevskii’s 1880 
“Pushkin Speech” (delivered on the occasion of the unveiling of the 
monument to Pushkin in Moscow). Dostoevskii has an overtly influential 
presence in Vekhi, especially in the first three essays, those of Berdiaev, 
Bulgakov, and Gershenzon. Dostoevskii’s exploration of mangodhood 
and Godmanhood, his portrayal of intelligentsia types in Raskol’nikov, 
Verkhovenskii, Stavrogin, Ivan Karamazov, et al., his call for personal 
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moral responsibility and repentance—all this has a weight informing Vekhi 
which for Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Gershenzon, at any rate, would be hard 
to exaggerate. Dostoevskii clearly informs Frank’s searching analysis of the 
intelligentsia’s atheism and moral nihilism too (and, covering a whole range 
of themes from the intelligentsia’s mores to the Russian state, one might 
also construct a dialogue between Dostoevskii and Izgoev, Kistiakovskii 
and Struve). 
Dostoevskii’s “Pushkin Speech” distills a portrait of the intellectual 
type—proud, rootless, destructive but truth-seeking—from the 
presentations of Pushkin’s characters Aleko and Onegin as initial archetypes 
of the “superfluous man.” Bulgakov in fact twice draws on the “Speech” 
in support of his critique of the intelligentsia, first to quote Dostoevskii’s 
rewording of Pushkin on the need for the proud intellectual to “humble” 
himself (35) and then to refer to the rootless “wanderer” type identified 
by Dostoevskii in Pushkin’s heroes (43). However, while Chaadaev, as we 
have seen, has been lined up by Gershenzon and Berdiaev on the side of 
the Vekhi critique (and so far we can say the same, at least implicitly, for 
the other authors), the Dostoevskian perspective places him on the other 
side. This is because the figure of Chaadaev is for Dostoevskii none other 
than the epitome of the “European Russian,” the proud intellectual “torn 
from his native soil,”20 which is exactly how Bulgakov and Gershenzon, 
following Dostoevskii, describe the intelligentsia, as we have seen. 
Chaadaev is indeed one of the sources of the “superfluous man,” in the 
particular case of Pushkin’s Onegin (referred to in the novel as “a second 
Chaadaev”) and more generally, though this does not of course mean that 
Dostoevskii’s interpretation of Chaadaev is the only valid one. That said, 
while the interpretation may be contested or qualified, it is not a wholesale 
mis-representation. Certainly, in respect to pride and humility as integral 
to such conceptions of the person, Chaadaev is a key figure, both in his own 
construction of his persona based on aristocratic pride of the intellect and 
in the image of him that is projected in Russian culture.21
The presence of Chaadaev in Vekhi is thus a problematic one, 
notwithstanding Gershenzon’s wished-for triumvirate of “our best minds—
Chaadaev, the Slavophiles, Dostoevskii” (59). It serves as a prism through 
which to illuminate not only complexities and competing lines in the 
— 182 —
Robin Aizlewood
intellectual origins or genealogy of Vekhi, but also underlying tensions and 
differences in the Vekhi authors’ conception of the person. This may be 
gathered around the notion of the primacy of the “inner life of the person,” 
but, as has been apparent from the moment of the collection’s appearance, if 
one looks past the (more or less) converged application of this notion when 
directed against a common object of critique, divergences emerge, whether 
fully-fledged, implied, or nascent. At a more general level, this has to do with 
what happens when an attempt to elaborate and embed in Russian culture 
a liberal, Kantian conception of the autonomous value of the person—one 
of the primary goals of Vekhi’s predecessor volume, Problemy idealizma 
(Problems of Idealism, 1902)22—interacts with the rich and diverse thinking 
on the person that had developed in Russian thought over the nineteenth 
century and continues into the twentieth century. The Russian scholar 
Nikolai Plotnikov has recently observed that Russian thought concentrates 
on the conception of a person’s distinctive individuality, much more so 
than on the Kantian autonomous person or the Lockean conception of 
the person as locus of an identity formed over time.23 Such an overarching 
framework nevertheless has to accommodate radical conceptual differences 
between, say, an Orthodox-oriented conception of the integral person 
in Slavophilism, on the one hand, and Herzen’s free individual, with an 
admixture of the autonomous person, on the other. Similarly, any account 
of the person in Russian thought will focus, for example, on the concept of 
Godmanhood as elaborated upon by Solov’ev and a pleiad of subsequent 
thinkers; it will dwell on the interpersonal, dialogic conceptualization of 
the person in Bakhtin; and it will engage with Dostoevskii’s extraordinary 
exploration of consciousness and the subject, intuitively informed by 
philosophy from Descartes onwards, in texts such as Zapiski iz podpol’ia 
(Notes from Underground, 1863) and “Son smeshnogo cheloveka” (“Dream 
of a Ridiculous Man,” 1876).24 
Within this large area of thought, the image or conception of the 
person that can be associated with Chaadaev—the aristocratic person of the 
intellect, of religious/moral intellect—has a specific interest, in the contexts 
of Vekhi, Chaadaev’s own thought, and Russian philosophy and culture 
more generally.25 There are two related but distinct phenomena here: the 
image of Chaadaev as a person or persona, in—as already noted—his own 
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construction and its construction in Russian culture; and the conception 
of the person in Chaadaev’s thought. The emphasis in Chaadaev’s thought 
is on the supra-personal and the role of special thinkers or prophets 
as being the media between Providence and people; he also stresses the 
subordination of the individual person to the higher principle. His concern 
for continuity of ideas and memory, at the supra-personal level and also in 
terms of the individual, has implications for a conception of the person in 
Lockean terms of identity. It is interesting to consider how one aspect of the 
“failure” of Chaadaev’s philosophical project may be the marginalization 
of this conception in the Russian tradition. 
While Chaadaev’s persona may have aspired to the role of special 
thinker, it is important to recognize that this vision is grounded in a con-
ception of the individual life of the person, down to the level of daily 
routine. In this connection, the concentration in Vekhi on the individual 
life of the person also draws us retrospectively to consider the generally 
ignored passages in the Philosophical Letters in which Chaadaev talks to 
his female addressee about just this. The passages concerned are found in 
the first three Letters: in the opening of the “First Letter” (320–23), at some 
length in the “Second Letter” (339–46) and, very briefly, at the start of the 
“Third Letter” (355–56) (of these only the first was known and published at 
the time of Vekhi). Moreover, these passages, though more or less discrete, 
contain sentences that articulate key aspects of his overall philosophy, and 
the passages as a whole reinforce—and are reinforced by—that overall 
philosophy. They constitute a particular, but not extraneous, strand in the 
work. 
In comparing the conception of the person in Chaadaev and Vekhi, 
the reader finds generic Christian elements as well as more specific points 
of similarity and contrast. Among the former we could note, for example, 
Chaadaev’s assertion of the need for the “regeneration of our being” 
following Christ at the start of the “Third Letter” (356) and his prescription 
in the “Sixth Letter” for both peoples and individuals to “know and evaluate 
themselves” and to “repent of their mistakes” as a condition for moving 
forward on the path of perfection (398). Regeneration and repentance 
are much more insistent themes in Vekhi, perhaps because of the sheer 
urgency of the national predicament and/or because of the intelligentsia’s 
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nihilistic and destructive atheism, whereas atheism is not a concern in 
Chaadaev’s work, and the trauma of the Decembrist uprising is deep but 
not threatening in the same way as the revolution of 1905 and its aftermath 
were. More specific parallels—though they are still at a level of generality of 
idea—could include, for example, Struve’s statement that “human goodness 
depends entirely on a person’s free submission to a higher principle” (120), 
where the emphasis on “free submission” echoes Chaadaev, or Gershenzon’s 
closely Chaadaevan formulation of the personality’s active transformation 
in accordance with “supra-personal ideas” (55). 
A more revealing and multi-faceted comparison can be explored 
through the question of the inner and the external life of the person (which 
was invoked at the outset when juxtaposing Gershenzon’s “Prefaces” to his 
book on Chaadaev and to Vekhi). Chaadaev, in keeping with his overall 
philosophy, does not see the individual person as isolated from society and 
the outside world. Indeed, his ultimate aim is the transformation of society. 
However, in a formulation that accords with Vekhi, the first obligation 
placed on the individual is to live a “concentrated life dedicated in the 
main to a religious mind-set and exercises,” although, as this “First Letter” 
notes with a gendered interpretation, “what could be more natural for 
a woman?” (322). In a further parallel with Vekhi, the dire state of Russian 
society makes attention to this bedrock of the individual life even more 
crucial. Chaadaev elaborates on this at some length in the “Second Letter” 
(which was not known to the Vekhi authors). Here he moves from the 
need to redirect ourselves at the level of ideas to the arrangement of the 
individual’s personal life, including attention to the aesthetic aspect of 
oneself, one’s home and one’s surroundings (339–41); indeed, Chaadaev 
was legendary in his attention to dress. Overall he calls for a “methodical 
way of life” since, in words that directly echo what he has to say about 
intellectual life, “we all lack the spirit of order and method” (341). Such 
a way of life—implicitly aristocratic, as far as Chaadaev was concerned—
extends to the organization of the day, in which it is important to set aside 
hours for oneself to allow for “concentrated thought”; all this will train 
one in resisting the allure of superficial “novelties” (345), a strain familiar 
from his general critique that appears in Vekhi as well. It is interesting 
to compare this with what Gershenzon and Bulgakov have to say about 
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the intelligentsia’s life-style, which they link to an overall inadequacy in 
attention to the person. Bulgakov notes the absence of “disciplined work 
habits and a measured pace of life” and a “lack of principle in everyday 
life” (20, 33). Gershenzon, twice using a notion favored, as we have seen, 
in Chaadaev—(ne)posledovatel’nost’: “logic/order/consistency” or the lack 
thereof (52, 58)26—decries this lifestyle as “horrible,” and comments that 
for the intelligentsia “a day passes, and who knows why; today things are 
one way, and tomorrow a sudden fancy will turn everything upside down” 
(58). Izgoev’s whole article carries a critique of the intelligentsia’s woeful 
lifestyle, in the family, sexual, educational, and professional arenas. In this 
context, it is striking to return to Chaadaev’s conclusion that “the closer 
you tie the external with the internal, the visible with the invisible, the 
more pleasant will the path ahead of you be,” which is followed in the same 
paragraph by a familiar rhetorical lament, culminating: “Has anyone here 
dedicated themselves to the cult of the truth?” (345–46). As for Chaadaev 
himself, not only does this conception of the life of the individual fit directly 
into his overall philosophy, as already noted, but the biographical evidence 
also suggests that he practised what he preached in the performance of his 
persona.27 Moreover, his model is grounded in both religious practice and 
everyday reality in a way that demonstrates its superiority to the fragile 
basis of calls in Vekhi for a spiritual reorientation of lifestyle. On the other 
hand, his aristocratic nature undoubtedly relates to a similar undercurrent 
in Vekhi (especially, but not only, in Berdiaev). 
It has long been argued that the differences among the Vekhi 
authors concerning the “common platform” of “primacy of the inner life 
of the person” may be construed not just as a matter of emphasis but as 
differences of a fundamental order. Such arguments relate, for example, to 
Kistiakovskii’s notion that the external reality of a law-governed society will 
serve to cultivate the inner life, not the other way round, and they may also 
relate—perhaps as a matter of emphasis, but significantly nevertheless—to 
Struve’s call for political education and Frank’s concern for cultural creativity 
and positive evaluation of wealth-creation, in the broadest sense. Here, one 
has to say that Chaadaev’s unequivocal concern for the external forms of 
life, from the individual to society, could draw him toward Kistiakovskii 
and Struve, as well as Frank. That is, in addition to the specific parallels 
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to Gershenzon and Bulgakov that have been noted, there are grounds for 
a qualified linking of Chaadaev with the Vekhi authors whom we have had 
less reason to consider so far, while the one author who does not figure 
in this comparison (except in terms of his aristocratic nature) is the one 
who, apart from Gershenzon, has otherwise shown the closest affinity to 
Chaadaev: Berdiaev. 
In summary, then, starting from the problematic juxtaposition of 
Chaadaev and Dostoevskii in the genealogy of Vekhi and continuing to 
a detailed comparison of conceptions of the person, the Chaadaevan 
perspective casts an interesting and revealing light across the complex 
strands that constitute Vekhi, both synchronically and diachronically. In 
addition, it highlights important aspects for study—Lockean identity, 
aristocratism, the external as well as the inner, and the intellect, among 
others—in the conceptualization and representation of the person across 
the Russian philosophical tradition and Russian culture.
In conclusion, I would like to return to the particular, definitive image 
of Chaadaev as a person of the intellect. Indeed, the person of the intellect 
is one of the underlying themes of Vekhi. As such, it constitutes an aspect 
of the ongoing consideration—by Russian thinkers and scholars of Russian 
thought alike—of the pursuit of reason in the Russian philosophical 
tradition, which ranges from the advocacy of a reductionist scientific 
reason in Chernyshevskii through the apogee of attempted integration of 
reason and faith in Solov’ev to Shestov’s life-long assault on the pretensions 
of rationalist philosophy. As we have seen, the call to acquire a proper 
philosophical culture and rigorous intellectual method is a call to become 
a person of the intellect, to reorient the intelligentsia toward the root notion 
of the “intellect.” As we have also seen, the Chaadaevan presence in Vekhi has 
revolved around his conception of thought and idea in the life of mankind 
and the individual person. Gershenzon’s description of the kind of person 
that Russia has needed, which none of the Vekhi authors would disown even 
if they might phrase it differently, comes close to a portrait of Chaadaev as 
an aristocratic person of the intellect—of religious/moral intellect: “Had 
there been a handful of whole, fully conscious people in Russia, people 
whose high intellectual level [vysokii stroi myslei] was organically rooted in 
their personality, despotism would have been inconceivable” (57). This is 
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remarkably close to the portrait put forward by Osip Mandel’shtam in his 
1913 essay “Petr Chaadaev.” Mandel’shtam writes:
The trace left by Chaadaev in the consciousness of Russian society is so 
deep and ineradicable that the question involuntarily arises: is this not 
the trace left by a diamond passing over glass? […]
All those qualities, of which Russian life was deprived, about which 
it did not even have a suspicion, came together as if deliberately in the 
personality of Chaadaev: huge inner discipline, lofty intellectualism, 
moral architectonics. […]
What is the famed “mind” of Chaadaev, that “proud” mind, 
respectfully sung by Pushkin, denigrated by the tiresome Iazykov, other 
than a fusion of the moral and intellectual principles—a fusion which 
is so characteristic for Chaadaev and which directed the growth of his 
personality towards perfection?28
Mandel’shtam’s words provide an eloquent statement as to how the image 
of Chaadaev, as constructed by both himself and Russian culture, has 
a resonance in the Russian Silver Age and beyond, and Vekhi—as I hope to 
have shown—is one of the texts that conveys and refracts that resonance.
       notE s                                                                                                                                                
1 All references to Chaadaev are taken from P. Ia. Chaadaev, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii 
i izbrannye pis’ma, ed. Z. A. Kamenskii et al. (Moscow: Pravda, 1991), 2 vols, and 
are given in the text, citing page number (all quotations are from the first volume). 
Translations of Chaadaev and other Russian texts are my own, except where the 
reference is to a translated source; translations of Chaadaev are from the Russian 
version of the Philosophical Letters in this edition, with consultation of the original 
French. 
2 Sapov, in the opening paragraph of his Introduction to the collection Vekhi: pro et 
contra, makes just this comparison: “Neither before nor after Vekhi did a book 
in Russia provoke such a storm of reaction in society and in such a short space of 
time…. Perhaps only Chaadaev’s “Philosophical Letter,” which appeared more than 
70 years before Vekhi, had stirred up such a ‘heated discussion’ in Russian society.” 
See V. V. Sapov, “Vokrug ‘Vekh.’ (Polemika 1909–1910 godov),” in Vekhi: pro et contra. 
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Antologiia, ed. V. V. Sapov (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Russkogo Khristianskogo 
gumanitarnogo instituta, 1998), 7–22 (7). 
3 In “Apologie d’un fou”/“Apologiia sumasshedshego” (“Apology of a Madman,” 
1837), Chaadaev admits somewhat archly, in an extended rhetorical sentence, that 
there was “exaggeration” (four times repeated) in his “idiosyncratic accusatory act” 
(536–37). The clever characterization of the “First Letter” as “satire” comes in a letter 
from Viazemskii to A. I. Turgenev (28 October 1836), quoted in V. A. Mil’china and 
A. L. Ospovat, “O Chaadaeve i ego filosofii istorii,” introductory article in P. Ia. Cha-
adaev, Sochineniia, ed. V. Iu. Proskurina (Moscow: Pravda, 1989), 3–12 (9).
4 M. Gershenzon, P. Ia. Chaadaev. Zhizn’ i myshlenie (1908; reprint: The Hague, 
Paris: Mouton, 1968). Concerning the publication history of Chaadaev, including 
Gershenzon’s role in it, see Z. A. Kamenskii and M. I. Lepekhin, “Sud’ba literaturnogo 
nasledstva,” in Chaadaev, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 678–81. 
5 The juxtaposition of Chaadaev and Vekhi is found as a passing mention in the 
scholarship, with a rare headlining by Sapov (see Note 2 above), but, as far as I am 
aware, the closer connection between them has not been explored in detail before. 
6 Concerning the pre-history and publication history of Vekhi, see M. A. Kolerov and N. 
S. Plotnikov, “Primechaniia,” in Vekhi. Iz glubiny, ed. A. A. Iakovlev (Moscow: Pravda, 
1991), 500–48 (500–08). See also V. Proskurina and V. Alloi, “K istorii sozdaniia 
‘Vekh’,” Minuvshee. Istoricheskii al’manakh 11 (1991): 249–91. 
7 Mikhail Gershenzon, “Preface to the First Edition,” in Vekhi/Landmarks: A Collection 
of Articles about the Russian Intelligentsia, trans. and ed. Marshall S. Shatz and Judith E. 
Zimmerman (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), xxxvii–xxxviii (xxxviii). Subsequent 
references are given in parentheses in the main text. References to the Russian text 
are taken from Vekhi. Iz glubiny (see Note 6 above). Gershenzon originally listed just 
Chaadaev and Solov’ev, Tolstoi was added at the suggestion of Struve. See Kolerov and 
Plotnikov, “Primechaniia,” 508.
8 Gershenzon, Chaadaev, iii.
9 Ibid., iii–iv.
10 Ibid., iv.
11 A. I. Gertsen, Byloe i dumy (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1967), parts 4–5, 
103. Sapov continues his comparison of Vekhi and Chaadaev (see Note 2 above) by 
suggesting the appropriateness of Herzen’s words to Vekhi (“Vokrug ‘Vekh’,” 7). In 
connection to Herzen’s words, it is worth noting that Chaadaev and Vekhi share an 
analogous historical context, namely writing in the shadow of a national political 
trauma—the Decembrist uprising of 1825 and the 1905 revolution, respectively. Sergei 
Bulgakov’s description at the start of his essay in Vekhi—“Russian society … is in 
a state of torpor, apathy, spiritual malaise, and despondency” (17)—could equally well 
apply to the mood in Russia after 1825, as evoked inter alia by Chaadaev’s designation 
of his place of writing as “Necropolis” (339). While both the Philosophical Letters 
and Vekhi are revisited some 10 years later in, respectively, Chaadaev’s “Apology of 
a Madman” (1837) and Iz glubiny (Out of the Depths, 1918), in this case we see more 
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divergence than parallel, or perhaps an inverted parallel: Chaadaev’s “Apology” carries 
a changed, more optimistic prognosis for Russia, while Out of the Depths contemplates 
in horror the worst outcome possible from the malaise analyzed in Vekhi.
12 It is interesting to note that Chaadaev’s ouevre and Vekhi are interwoven, whether 
explicitly or not, in the context that informs later ponderings on the intelligentsia 
and Russia, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, and again in the heady days of mass 
republication of Russian thinkers at the end of the Soviet period. Concerning the 
reading and interpretation of Chaadaev’s thought in the later Soviet period, see Julia 
Brun-Zejmis, “Messianic Consciousness as an Expression of National Inferiority: 
Chaadaev and Some Samizdat Writings of the 1970s,” Slavic Review 50 (1991): 646–58. 
For a narrative of the wider phenomenon, see Stanislav Bemovich Dzhimbinov, “The 
Return of Russian Philosophy,” in Russian Thought after Communism: The Recovery of 
a Philosophical Heritage, ed. James Scanlan (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 11–22; 
for an analytical commentary on trends in the philosophical scene over the Soviet 
period, see Galin Tihanov, “Continuities in the Soviet period,” in A History of Russian 
Thought, ed. William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 311–39.
13 In this connection, it is worth commenting that both the writings of Chaadaev and 
Vekhi reveal an ambiguity in respect of reflexivity or auto-reflexivity in the rhetoric of 
critique: this relates to the scope and rhetorical use of the first person plural pronoun 
and possessive, “we” and “our.” Chaadaev uses these throughout the “First Letter,” 
taking in the whole of Russian society and history in the broad sweep of his critique. 
While, on the one hand, he no doubt has himself in mind in ready answer to his 
rhetorical question “where are our wise men, where are our thinkers? Who of us has 
ever thought, who thinks for us today?” (329) and so implicitly distinguishes himself 
from the object of his critique, he does not, on the other hand, differentiate himself in 
his discourse from the “we” that is Russia. While one might conclude that Chaadaev 
dissembles in his use of “we,” there are no other indications to this effect; there is 
thus a tension in his rhetoric that intimates a consciously ambivalent self-awareness. 
In Vekhi, meanwhile, there is no common discursive strategy in this respect and, one 
is inclined to think, less self-awareness. Gershenzon, whether at times imitating Cha-
adaev, or out of a peculiar sense of belonging to the intelligentsia, or out of uncertainty, 
is variable in his use of the first person “we.” Having introduced the pronoun as it were 
from a perspective outside the intelligentsia (“The one thing we can and must tell the 
Russian intelligent is: try to become a human being”), he then carries on to say, “We are 
not people, but cripples” (51). But Gershenzon is not subsequently consistent: at times 
he uses the neutral phrasing “our intelligentsia,” as do other authors; at times he refers 
to the intelligentsia in the third person; at times “we” returns. Curiously, the other 
author who may have a closer affinity to Chaadaev, Berdiaev, occasionally also adopts 
a more inclusive and ambiguous first person plural reference, as in his very opening 
sentence, when he refers to “our attitude to philosophy,” or in the rhetorical flourish 
of his finale: “We will be freed from external oppression only when we are freed from 
internal bondage” (1, 16). The remaining authors, however, avoid any first person 
plural alignment with the object of their critique. When considering both Chaadaev’s 
writings and Vekhi, therefore, it transpires—as one might expect—that auto-reflexivity 
of critique, its acceptance or denial, is a complicated affair. 
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14 Iakovlev, Vekhi, 44, 74. 
15 Ibid., 28.
16 For an extended disquisition on his philosophical “creativity” and aversion to 
system and logic, see Nikolai Berdiaev, Sobranie sochinenii, ed. N. A. Struve, vol. 1, 
Samopoznanie (opyt filosofskoi avtobiografii) (Paris: YMCA Press, 1989), 253–59. 
For a fascinating encounter between Berdiaev and a highly trained logical mind, see 
Frederick C. Copleston, Philosophy in Russia: From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev 
(Tunbridge Wells: Search Press and University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 371–89.
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When did Tolstoi first read Vekhi, and how did he react to the anthology? 
According to the great literary critic Boris Eikhenbaum, Tolstoi read the 
volume in late April 1909—a month after the book’s publication—and 
immediately began to write a response to it. This response, the draft article 
“On Vekhi,” was never published in Tolstoi’s lifetime: it appeared in print 
only in 1936, in volume 38 of his collected works.1
The draft article, “O Vekhakh” (“On Vekhi”), consisted of four parts: 
a pair of epigrams on the role of teaching and scholarship in society; 
criticisms of Vekhi; a long excerpt from a letter written to Tolstoi by the 
“illiterate” peasant Ivan Vasil’evich Kolesnikov; and a final commentary on 
the role of educated Russians in contemporary life. The argument of “On 
Vekhi” was straightforward: the authors of the Vekhi anthology had proven 
themselves unable to teach the Russian people how to live. Tolstoi suggested 
that the Vekhi anthology was badly written, its style being an awkward 
mixture of un-Russian neologisms and fashionable political jargon. 
This bad writing, he argued, was proof of the Vekhi authors’ intellectual 
obtuseness and of their incompetence as teachers. Furthermore, according 
to Tolstoi, the authors had shown themselves to be unforgivably arrogant in 
assuming that the fate of Russia lay in the intelligentsia’s hands, yet nowhere 
in the anthology had they explained the “one necessary thing”: namely, of 
what the “inner” or “spiritual work” of individuals should consist. True, 
Nikolai Berdiaev had demanded that educated Russians show humility 
before the truth, but he had not explained the precise nature of this truth. 
Sergei Bulgakov had called upon the intelligentsia to return to the Church, 
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but Tolstoi considered Bulgakov’s “solution” to Russia’s problems “strange” 
and unrealistic. According to Tolstoi, there was more wisdom in the 
peasant Kolesnikov’s call for Christian love than in the entirety of Vekhi. 
Tolstoi concluded his draft article by describing Vekhi as a symptom of the 
intelligentsia’s “increasing confusion and perversion.”2
According to Eikhenbaum, Tolstoi probably finished writing “On 
Vekhi” on 8 May 1909. Although Tolstoi was very unhappy about the 
content of Vekhi, he decided not to publish his response to the anthology: 
he told his secretary Nikolai Gusev that he did not want to offend the 
“young intelligentsia” and did not want to contribute to the public debate 
which Vekhi had stirred up.3 Nevertheless, on 20 May 1909, Tolstoi gave an 
interview to Sergei Spiro, correspondent for the newspaper Russkoe slovo 
(Russian Word), in which he summarized his unpublished draft article, 
telling Spiro that the intelligentsia had lost its way and had lost the capacity 
to formulate the main questions of life.4
Unfortunately, Eikhenbaum’s “canonical” account of Tolstoi’s reaction 
to Vekhi is both inaccurate and seriously oversimplified, for three reasons. 
First, Eikhenbaum’s commentary underestimates the importance of 
Tolstoi’s contacts with the Vekhi authors before the anthology’s publication. 
Both Mikhail Gershenzon and Bulgakov had met Tolstoi personally on 
more than one occasion: Gershenzon at Iasnaia Poliana in July 1904 and 
again in January 1909; Bulgakov at Iasnaia Poliana in January 1897 and 
at Gaspra in May and June 1902. Tolstoi had read Petr Struve’s journal 
Osvobozhdenie (Liberation) since its initial publication in 1902,5 and he was 
familiar with Struve’s Great Russian nationalism. It goes without saying that 
the Vekhi authors had read Tolstoi’s great novels and his religious writings. 
Berdiaev had studied Tolstoi from childhood and had internalized the 
master’s literary characters as intellectual reference points.6 Bulgakov 
had written about Tolstoi’s religious conversion in his 1901 lecture “Ivan 
Karamazov kak filosofskii tip,” (“Ivan Karamazov as a Philosophical 
Type”),7 in his 1903 article on Vladimir Solov’ev’s philosophy,8 in his 1903 
inaugural lecture at Kiev University on political economy,9 in his article “O 
sotsial’nom ideale” (“On the Social Ideal”) for the journal Voprosy filosofii 
i psikhologii (Questions of Philosophy and Psychology),10 and in his essay 
on Thomas Carlyle in the anthology Dva grada (Two Cities).11 The young 
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Semen Frank was keenly interested in Tolstoi’s moral teaching, especially 
Tolstoi’s idea that moral authority and political power are independent 
phenomena—which he criticized in a 1905 essay, “Problema vlasti” (“The 
Problem of Power”).12 Frank analyzed Tolstoi’s ethical teachings in two 
1908 articles which also explored the intelligentsia’s attitude to Tolstoi.13 
Tolstoi’s familiarity with the intellectual position staked out by the Vekhi 
authors before 1909, and their knowledge of his works, suggests that his 
reaction to Vekhi was to some degree already determined before he actually 
read the anthology.
Second, Eikhenbaum’s account of Tolstoi’s reaction to Vekhi was based 
in part on an error in dating. In fact, Tolstoi had acquired Vekhi not in mid-
April 1909, but on 18 March 1909—a month earlier. We know this from 
the diaries of Tolstoi’s physician Dushan Makovitskii, who summarized 
Tolstoi’s initial response to the anthology.14 After beginning to read Vekhi 
in mid-March, Tolstoi planned an essay or manifesto in which he would 
reformulate his philosophy of non-resistance to evil. This essay/manifesto 
took shape in Tolstoi’s long draft article, “Neizbezhnyi perevorot” (“The 
Inevitable Revolution”), which was written between March and 2 June 
1909. This essay/manifesto was published in abridged form in Russkie 
vedomosti (Russian News) in September 1909, and in unabridged form in 
Tolstoi’s collected works in 1936.15
Tolstoi’s “The Inevitable Revolution” summoned readers to follow the 
“law of love” instead of the “law of violence.” If they did so, he predicted 
a “universal, sweeping revolution [vsemirnyi velikii perevorot],” a new joyous 
life for humanity.16 In Tolstoi’s opinion, the chief obstacles to the coming 
of the new era were governments and their revolutionary opponents, 
who engaged in absurd violence in the pursuit of mistaken objectives. In 
addition, however, two groups of intellectuals also constituted obstacles to 
the new order: the “so-called scholars” who studied “sciences” that excluded 
ethical questions bearing on how people should live, and members of 
educated society who did address ethical questions but nevertheless lived in 
a conformist fashion that actually supported the “superstition” of violence. 
In this latter group Tolstoi placed nationalist patriots and supporters of the 
institutional Russian Orthodox Church. In chapter eight of “The Inevitable 
Revolution,” Tolstoi argued that most intellectuals translated the question 
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“What is to be done?” as “How shall I arrange the lives of others?” rather 
than as “What must I do to change myself?” This erroneous translation 
bespoke arrogance, for it placed intellectuals above others and imputed 
to these intellectuals the right to transform the supposedly benighted 
common people. In effect, Tolstoi contended, the “superstition” that one 
group of people can and must organize the lives of others was nothing but 
a summons to violence. Tolstoi claimed that the alternative to participation 
in such coercion could be found in a simple set of rules: 1. Do no violence; 
2. Take no part in the violence being done by others; 3. Do not approve of 
violence in any form. Tolstoi regarded these rules for non-violent living as 
manifestations of self-restraint, a virtue that could be practiced by anyone 
who wished to escape “slavery” to church and state. His criticism of the 
Russian intelligentsia, including the Vekhi authors, was clear: the “old” and 
“young” intelligenty imagined themselves to be opponents of the existing 
order, but they were actually defenders of violence, secretly attached to the 
worst abuses of the existing system. To escape the way of violence, they 
would have to recognize the law of love. 
Third, Eikhenbaum’s account of Tolstoi’s response to Vekhi neglected 
the most interesting episode in that response: Tolstoi’s conversation with 
Struve at Iasnaia Poliana on 12 August 1909. In the remainder of this essay 
I intend to examine in detail that conversation and its aftermath. The essay 
will be divided into four parts: a description of the primary sources from 
which we can reconstruct Tolstoi’s conversation with Struve on 12 August 
1909; a reconstruction of the conversation; an analysis of one of Struve’s late 
1909 articles criticizing Tolstoi; and a reflection on the significance of the 
Tolstoi-Struve conversation as an indicator of the “afterlife” of Vekhi.
I
On 4 July 1909, the same day that Tolstoi gave the manuscript of “The 
Inevitable Revolution” to his editor Nikolaev, Makovitskii reports that he 
discussed with his family the fact that “everyone is reading Vekhi, because 
the intelligentsia has [just] discovered that God exists.” During this 
discussion Tolstoi agreed to meet the following month with Struve and the 
politician Aleksandr Stakhovich. His comment, “It would be better to allow 
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Struve [and Stakhovich] to visit,” indicates that his family was of divided 
opinion about the wisdom of such a visit, for one result would surely be 
a dispute between Tolstoi and Struve over Vekhi.17 For his part, Struve was 
anxious to meet Tolstoi. Stakhovich had solicited his company on a trip to 
Iasnaia Poliana in a curious letter, which stated that, “I want very much to 
visit Tolstoi, although I’m anxious about it. This [Tolstoi] is a grand and 
terrible being who has lived not one, but several human lives of the sort 
that for a single human being to endure would be strange and terrible.” 
Struve, who had never seen Tolstoi before 1909, claimed to have “sensed 
that I must meet him. I understood that soon it would be too late to do 
so.”18 Struve accepted Stakhovich’s invitation to accompany him to Iasnaia 
Poliana.
From the two principals we have terse written reactions to the meeting, 
which occurred at Iasnaia Poliana on 12 August 1909. In an article written 
after Tolstoi’s death the next year, Struve reported his “strongest impression 
[of the meeting]” as being that “Tolstoi lives by the thought of God alone, 
by the idea of his proximity to God.” According to Struve, Tolstoi was 
physically present in August 1909, but “psychologically and spiritually he 
had already gone to that place across the grave where the majority of human 
beings go, unseen and unknown to the living. But he had already gone there 
and I saw this.” Struve’s sole allusion to the conversation’s content came 
when he recalled Tolstoi’s statement, “It is not surprising that we disagree, 
since I am more than twice your age.” At this, Struve had nodded assent, 
“for I felt that into these words Tolstoi himself packed not just a reference to 
his age, but to the very feeling of having lived several lives.”19 
Perhaps, in retrospect, the meeting was more significant to Struve than 
it had been to Tolstoi, who recorded his reaction in his diary on 13 August. 
“Stakh[ovich] A[leksan]dr and Struve visited [yesterday]. They were little 
interesting and were ponderous, especially Struve. I read them ‘On Science’ 
to no effect and spoke to them to no effect.”20 Tolstoi’s muted response to 
the conversation in his diary was perhaps not entirely faithful to his mood, 
as perceived by others, immediately after the meeting. Makovitskii, who 
had listened to the conversation, reported: “On parting, Lev Nikolaevich 
told Struve he would always be happy to be in communication with him. 
It seems he [Tolstoi] even kissed him [Struve]. Struve was somewhat 
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confused; he listened, did not argue and sought explanation [from Tolstoi] 
and [he sought] the truth rather than [to justify] his own correctness. Lev 
Nikolaevich obviously liked him.”21
Besides the short reactions from the principals, we have two eyewit-
ness accounts of the conversation between Tolstoi and Struve—one from 
Tolstoi’s physician Makovitskii and the other from his friend, the musician 
Aleksandr Gol’denveizer. Of the two, Makovitskii’s account was the fuller, 
since he was present from the conversation’s beginning, at 1:30 p.m. on the 
terrace, to its end late at night in the manor house. Gol’denveizer heard 
the latter portions of the conversation; however, his account was perhaps 
more astute, because he had a clearer grasp of the issues at stake.22 Both 
Makovitskii and Gol’denveizer understood that the conversation was an 
important intellectual event, and so both allotted considerable space in 
their diaries to its recording. By comparing these two accounts, we can 
reconstitute the flow of the conversation, and at moments we can even 
“hear” the two participants.
II
According to Makovitskii, Tolstoi asked Struve from which direction he 
had traveled to Iasnaia Poliana. Struve’s answer—that he had come from the 
White Lake district in Iaroslavl’ province where there were many famous 
monasteries—provoked Tolstoi to observe that a monastery is a “useful 
and essential haven [from the world].” Struve then noted that, in Kazan’, 
he had once seen Vasilii Polenov’s “wonderful” series of paintings on the 
life of Christ. Tolstoi apparently let this remark drop without comment; at 
least Makovitskii did not record a response on this point.23 Unbeknownst 
to Struve, however, Polenov’s paintings had been the subject of extended 
conversations in Tolstoi’s household. On 17 March 1909, Makovitskii 
reports, Tolstoi recalled seeing the paintings at an exhibit in St. Petersburg: 
he had not been impressed.24 But the next day, he had expressed interest in 
seeing them again.25 In late April, Sofiia Andreevna and Tolstoi’s son Sergei 
had seen Polenov’s exhibit, and they had praised the paintings for their 
naturalism and “avoidance of the mystical.”26 Tolstoi himself had studied 
the album of the exhibition, pronouncing the reproductions of Mysterious 
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Evening and Crucifixion “good,” and the entire series “in general, good.”27 In 
November 1909, nearly three months after the conversations with Struve, 
Sofiia Tolstaia and Sofiia Stakhovich again discussed Polenov’s paintings 
in Tolstoi’s presence, prompting him to say, “[The life of Christ] is so dear 
to us, that it is better not to touch on it [etogo ne trogat’].”28 Thus, the first 
exchanges between Struve and Tolstoi dealt with the phenomenon of 
religion: Struve established his credentials as a “new” intelligent interested 
in the subject; Tolstoi acknowledged that interest but without opening up 
his own emotions on the subject.
Tolstoi then turned to the theme of the intelligentsia and Vekhi, 
asserting that of the vast number of books now being published, “not a single 
one is useful.” He told Struve that he agreed with the chief point made in 
Vekhi. “On your main idea [“inner work” in preference to political action], 
I am plus royaliste que le roi,” but, he added, “I find Vekhi too superficial.” 
He told Struve, “There are more profound reasons for this” that he would 
discuss later, after a walk. Struve also lamented that journals had “lost 
their former significance and now played to the common denominator.” 
Tolstoi complained that he had said many times that one should write for 
the people, but “everyone persists in writing for the intelligentsia.”29 By this 
second stage of the conversation, Tolstoi had indirectly reproached Struve 
twice—once for his superficiality and again for his failure to write “for the 
people.” Struve read these reproaches as opening gambits in Tolstoi’s attack 
on Vekhi and awaited further developments. Tolstoi promised to speak 
himself out: “The word is an important thing, so one must say everything, 
not just half of it.”30 For Struve, the prospect of hearing Tolstoi “speak 
himself out” must have been thrilling but also daunting.
Tolstoi excused himself to ride in the forest with his daughter 
Aleksandra. After returning from the forest, he rejoined Struve for a late 
afternoon/early evening meal. The group, now including Gol’denveizer, 
adjourned to the balcony for continued conversation. Makovitskii recorded 
an observation of Tolstoi: “When I ride in the forest, the feeling is very 
Christian. I want others to exalt in nature, and I regret that we alone do so.”31 
Tolstoi’s “very Christian feeling” was probably the result of two impulses: 
his belief that God is in everyone and everything, and his Christian desire 
to share with the less fortunate (in this case, city dwellers) his sense of 
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religious unity with creation. The effect of this observation was to reconnect 
the collocutors to the subject of religion.
Makovitskii and Gol’denveizer agreed that the conversation then 
turned quickly to the religious views and intellectual significance of the 
“old” intelligentsia, specifically to Aleksandr Herzen, Nikolai Ogarev, and 
Mikhail Bakunin. Tolstoi compared Herzen to the German philosopher 
Arthur Schopenhauer. According to Tolstoi, “[Herzen,] in spite of his 
philosophical-political beliefs, enunciated religious truths of universal 
human significance,” whereas in the thought of Schopenhauer, an atheist, 
“one can find more propositions about the unavoidability of religion than 
in [the catechism of Metropolitan] Filaret.”32 In praising Herzen’s religiosity, 
Tolstoi probably had in mind two epigrams he had quoted in “The Inevitable 
Revolution,” in chapters seven and nine. In the latter, Tolstoi quoted Herzen 
as writing, “If only people wanted, instead of saving the world, to save 
themselves; instead of liberating humanity, to liberate themselves—how 
much they could do to save the world and to liberate humanity.”33 Under 
questioning by Struve, Tolstoi pronounced Ogarev “an insignificant man.” 
He described Bakunin as “some sort of crazy man [kakoi-to shal’noi],” but 
conceded that “much in him [Bakunin] was attractive.”34 At this moment 
in the conversation, Struve was trying to draw Tolstoi out on one of Vekhi’s 
subjects, the irreligion of the “old” intelligentsia, but Tolstoi was refusing to 
play along: rather than indict Bakunin and company for their shallowness 
and militant atheism, Tolstoi pointed toward Herzen’s spiritual sensibility 
and Bakunin’s charisma. He hinted that the difference between the “old” and 
“new” intelligentsia was perhaps not so dramatic as Struve and the other 
Vekhi authors had imagined. Tolstoi’s allusion to Filaret’s catechism also 
alerted Struve to Tolstoi’s hostility toward the institutional church and to 
Tolstoi’s assessment of the costs of churchliness [tserkovnost’]. Behind this 
barb was Tolstoi’s criticism of two Vekhi authors, Berdiaev and Bulgakov, 
whose essays in Vekhi had espoused a return to the Orthodox Church.
From 8:30 to 10:00 p.m., Tolstoi read to Struve and eight others his 
draft article “O nauke” (“On Science.”)35 We know from Gol’denveizer’s 
diary entry of 10 August that Tolstoi had contemplated this step in advance. 
He had told Gol’denveizer that the conclusions of “On Science” needed to 
be widely known, and he admitted his pride over having written the essay: 
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“It suddenly struck me how deeply I feel this … If you assign grades [to 
articles], you sometimes see a ‘two’ or a ‘three,’ but then you run across 
a ‘five plus.’ That is what I think about the article ‘On Science.’”36 Tolstoi 
apparently believed that reading the article to Struve would demonstrate 
why the educational mission of the “new” intelligentsia was suspect.
“On Science” made the point that science as usually defined by 
intellectuals is “the knowledge of everything in the world except the one 
thing necessary to each individual to live a good life.”37 In contrast, Tolstoi 
believed that genuine science “is knowledge of what every individual 
must do to live better in this world during the short time allotted him 
by God, by fate or by the laws of nature—whatever you wish to call it.”38 
The experimental sciences are flawed, according to Tolstoi, because the 
meaning of experiments depends on subjective interpretation of the 
data by observers. Even if one were to eliminate subjectivity in reporting 
experimental results, Tolstoi thought, scientists would remain unable to 
interpret the meaning of experiments for human life properly, because 
each experiment yields only a discrete result, a description of a certain 
causal sequence that, in principle, is only a finite portion of an infinitely 
long sequence of causes that constitute the natural world.39 He regarded 
applied sciences like physics and medicine as instruments whereby “the 
rich increase their power over enslaved workers and intensify the horrors 
of warfare.”40 Tolstoi emphasized the harm done to the people not only by 
theological and “quasi-philosophical” deceptions, but also by “military-
patriotic lies.”41 He compared “what is now called science” to a handbook 
for vandals and thieves, aimed at defining “the best scientific way to assault 
and rob the people.”42 Tolstoi saw the false sciences as profoundly anti-
human: they were based neither on love nor on respect for others, and thus 
“nothing good can come from them, only harm.”43 Those who embraced 
the false sciences would only survive “as long as the falsity of their science 
remains hidden.” Tolstoi called on common people to “place no trust in 
science introduced by coercion [from above] and by government grants.”44
Tolstoi sought to put Struve on the defensive with the force of this 
article, and to damn the entire mission of the Russian intelligentsia, whose 
self-selected mission was “to serve our unhappy Russian people” through 
scientific education.45 
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Struve offered two objections to Tolstoi’s article. First, he argued that the 
division of society into two “castes”—the educated and the uneducated—
“exists only in Russia”; in the West, this division did not obtain. According 
to Struve, “in America the labor of a teacher and of a factory worker ... are 
identically compensated.”46 In Germany, he said, “A train conductor earns 
more money than a Privatdozent.” Second, Struve argued, medicine does 
not aim to harm or to enslave people: “The preservation of human life might 
be posited as its goal.”47 Struve insisted on the utility of crutches in helping 
the lame and of chemical remedies for curing the ill. He pointedly asked 
Tolstoi: “Don’t you value science aiming at the prolongation of human 
life?”48 Struve’s intention was to vindicate science by denying any necessary 
link between scientific research and violence or social exploitation, and by 
showing its value to common laborers. In the process, he sought to blunt 
Tolstoi’s insinuation that the intelligentsia’s “arrogant” kul’turtregerstvo, 
bringing of culture to the masses, is harmful.
The two collocutors had now arrived at the heart of their disagreement 
over Vekhi. In Tolstoi’s opinion, the disagreement over science was 
a manifestation of a deeper dispute about action in the world. According to 
Gol’denveizer, Tolstoi told Struve: “Of course, ‘thou shalt not kill’ is the first 
moral law in relationship to others. But if I set myself the goal of preserving 
human life, then I must kill a person who wants to throw a bomb, so as 
to prevent the death of a hundred others, and from this [postulate] one 
can derive all the sophisms on which the current violent order is based.”49 
According to Makovitskii’s account, Tolstoi said the following: 
So by your reckoning, if one wants to save a hundred people, it is 
permissible to kill one of them. [But] the sense of moral law cannot be 
made contingent on the presumed utility of actions, but [must derive] 
only from the imperative of conscience. The goal of actions undertaken 
by a religious person is the observance of the moral law. [On the other 
hand,] the scientific superstition holds that, in the future, in a better-
ordered society, the people’s welfare can be secured, just as the Church 
superstition holds that one will receive one’s reward in the next life. Your 
mission is action; you seek to transform the lives of people by external 
means, but by what methods? By socialistic methods? By anarchistic 
methods? I think that change occurs entirely in the realm of ideas, that 
an individual obeys an inner law, conscience, God.50 
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Tolstoi maintained that in the “simple non-violent life of the future,” there 
would be no science of the currently existing type. “What sort of science 
will exist I don’t know, but the current kind will not exist.”51
After a (very late) tea, Tolstoi returned to the subject of Vekhi. He told 
Struve apropos of Berdiaev’s and Bulgakov’s articles: “I will never succeed 
in understanding the Orthodoxy of people such as [Vladimir] Solov’ev and 
those like him.”52 According to Makovitskii’s account, Tolstoi said, “One has 
to choose between two possibilities: either to believe in the [institutional] 
Church’s teaching, or to accept as Christian what is taught in common by 
all religions.”53 In Tolstoi’s opinion, the modernist Orthodoxy espoused by 
Solov’ev, Berdiaev, and Bulgakov was a false third option—ne ryba, ne miaso. 
According to Makovitskii, Tolstoi told Struve: “I understand the Orthodoxy 
of my sister [Mariia Nikolaevna] … She has a relationship to God who is 
the foundation of everything—that is, [she renders] loyalty and obedience 
to him.”54 According to Gol’denveizer, Tolstoi sympathized with his sister’s 
brand of Orthodoxy because “here is a person whose highest need is the 
religious posture toward life, but who does not have the capacity to regard 
critically the existing religious creeds, who simply takes them on faith, and 
thus satisfies her religious requirements. But when a person who has once 
succumbed to doubt then resorts to sophisms to justify the Church faith in 
which he was raised—that I cannot understand. As Kant said, having once 
assimilated certain views, a man then becomes a sophistic apologist for his 
mistaken ideas.”55
Struve attempted to parry this attack on Vekhi by saying that only 
Berdiaev and Bulgakov deserved the reproach of Orthodox tserkovnost’: 
“Of the other contributors, two for example are Jews [Gershenzon and 
Frank], who are completely innocent of ascribing themselves to any sort of 
Orthodoxy.”56 Significantly, Struve was silent about his own belief. Frank, in 
his biography of Struve, described Struve’s faith circa 1909 as a generalized, 
non-dogmatic belief in God. According to Frank, Struve acknowledged the 
mystical side of religion without subjecting it to searching analysis. Indeed, 
although Struve considered religious faith a natural impulse, “he never 
studied religious questions nor did he discuss the problems and concepts 
of religion.” In Frank’s opinion, Struve’s belief system corresponded to “the 
spirit of liberal Protestant theology.”57
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In May 1909, Struve had published an article in Russkaia mysl’ (Russian 
Thought) attacking religious dogmatism. In it he wrote that “[d]ogmatism 
is the pretension of a finite consciousness to complete possession of an 
infinite or final truth. And as paradoxical as it may sound, I claim that for 
contemporary consciousness the only way to strengthen genuine religiosity 
is the gradual overcoming of dogmatism.”58 Struve took as an example 
of religious anti-dogmatism none other than Tolstoi, in whose teaching 
Struve could find “not a single dogma.” However, in the same article, 
Struve classified Tolstoi as “genuinely dogmatic in the sphere of morals.” He 
accused Tolstoi of issuing absolute prescriptions for new ways of living based 
on religion, yet of refusing responsibility for the implementation of those 
prescriptions.59 At the same time, Struve criticized Tolstoi for inconsistently 
taking a gradualist approach to social change and for pretending that this 
social change could occur suddenly, “in the blink of an eye.”60 By these 
obscure formulas Struve apparently sought to indict Tolstoi for absolutely 
rejecting violence, for laying on individuals the responsibility of refraining 
from violence, and for assuming that the non-violent movement might 
change Russia virtually overnight. 
Struve himself embraced a faith based on personal responsibility 
and gradual change. In his March 1909 lecture on “Religiia i sotsializm” 
(“Religion and Socialism”), he endorsed a “genuinely religious worldview 
in which old religious motives growing out of Christianity, and out of 
liberalism, would combine with the idea of personal religious mission 
[podvig] and personal responsibility, compounded of a new motive—the 
motive of the freedom of the individual understood as creative autonomy.”61 
This vague formula amounted to an endorsement of the intelligentsia’s 
mission of gradual cultural enlightenment of the masses, and also to the 
privileging of intellectual freedom as a prerequisite for cultural progress.
Given this personal religious perspective, which was alien both to 
traditional Orthodoxy and to Tolstoi’s brand of Christianity, Struve’s choice 
in August 1909 to keep quiet about his own religious beliefs made sense. 
However, Tolstoi had not yet said all that was on his mind concerning the 
Vekhi authors’ religiosity. According to Gol’denveizer, Tolstoi said to Struve: 
“Yes, but I don’t see [in Vekhi] any well-defined religious foundation of any 
kind. Your reproaches to the intelligentsia for irreligion are justified, and 
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I would add that they [the intelligenty] should also be reproached for their 
appalling arrogance [v uzhasaiushchei samouverennosti]. But, in any case, 
I don’t see the religious foundation in the name of which all this [in Vekhi] 
is being said, and that is the main thing.”62 In Makovitskii’s diary, Tolstoi’s 
account was more pointed: “I see here [in Vekhi] a kind of superficial 
attitude [toward religion]. [You] don’t want to say everything [about your 
faith]. But this is not religiosity: it is appalling arrogance. ‘We don’t need 
this Christianity.’ But you should have a more precise position [nado bolee 
tochnuiu tochku] from which to attack the intelligentsia.”63
According to Makovitskii, Struve then began to speak about social 
progress, about how in the future a well-ordered society would appear. 
He may have hinted at his doubt about whether Tolstoi’s own variety of 
Christianity would produce positive results: Makovitskii’s diary is opaque 
on this matter, and Gol’denveizer did not mention Struve’s commentary on 
social progress. However, if we believe Makovitskii, Tolstoi cut off Struve’s 
train of thought by asserting that “I am not talking about the consequences 
[of belief], but rather about genuine knowledge of how I can obey the will 
of Him who sent me [into the world].”64
Gol’denveizer and Makovitskii agreed that the conversation ended 
with a discussion by Tolstoi of a critical letter he had just received from Petr 
Velikanov. According to Makovitskii, Tolstoi informed Struve that “there 
are people who know how to write belligerently and poisonously, and who 
take advantage of that ability. When they criticize me, I rejoice because I see 
that I do not live in God when I catch myself becoming angry.”65 According 
to Gol’denveizer, Tolstoi observed that Velikanov “was always writing me 
nasty letters [rugatel’nye pis’ma].” “I wanted to tell him not to write again 
so as not to stir up negative emotion in himself.… He writes caustically 
apropos [Nikolai] Gusev’s exile that I hide behind the backs of my friends 
and that, just as behind [Prime Minister Petr] Stolypin there is Nicholas II, 
so behind my friends there is Lev I, and so on. My prayer is: ‘Rejoice when 
they slander you. When you are alone and in a good mood that suffices,… 
but when you are in a bad frame of mind, it becomes depressing.”66
At first glance, this closing episode in the Tolstoi-Struve conversations 
seems unrelated to the matter at hand. At the end of a very long day, the 
old man could not help complaining about an unpleasant letter, perhaps 
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because he sought Struve’s sympathy, perhaps because he wanted to remind 
Struve that his religious dissent carried heavy personal costs (such as 
Gusev’s exile and his own exposure to “poisonous” correspondence). But 
we might contemplate at least one other explanation for Tolstoi’s comment 
at the end of the conversation. Tolstoi was disappointed with Vekhi and 
exasperated with Struve, whom he found a “ponderous” or “heavy” 
passenger. Of course, Tolstoi, ever the barin, hid that exasperation beneath 
a polite visage. He told Struve he would be “always glad” to see him and to 
hear from him.67 As we noted above, he even kissed Struve on the latter’s 
departure from Iasnaia Poliana. 
However, for Tolstoi the conversation had indeed been futile. Recall his 
diary entry of 13 August: “I read them ‘On Science’ to no effect and spoke 
to them to no effect.”68 Perhaps this futile conversation reminded Tolstoi 
of the pointlessness of corresponding with the “poisonous” Velikanov. We 
have on record three unsent letters from Tolstoi to Velikanov, drafted on 
12 August 1909. In the third variant, Tolstoi wrote: “Each person has his own 
convictions, and therefore I think it completely useless to write poisonous 
letters to people holding opposed views. Besides being a waste of time, it 
only produces negative emotions, one of the most harmful things in life.”69 
The conversation with Struve had not been exactly poisonous—Struve had 
conducted himself tactfully enough—but it had obviously stirred in Tolstoi 
“negative emotion.”
In general, the conversation with Struve on 12 August 1909 followed 
the intellectual line on Vekhi set down by Tolstoi in the draft article “On 
Vekhi” and in the unpublished “The Inevitable Revolution.” In Struve’s 
presence Tolstoi attacked the “terrible arrogance” of the Vekhi authors, the 
“strangeness” of Berdiaev’s and Bulgakov’s modernist Orthodoxy, and the 
absence of a well-defined religious perspective in Vekhi. Tolstoi strongly 
implied that Struve’s failure to accept non-violent Christianity indicated 
acceptance of “all the sophisms on which the current violent order is 
based.” Tolstoi pressed Struve not to calculate the external consequences 
of genuine Christian belief in advance of adopting it, and warned Struve 
that the Vekhi authors had actually assumed the same posture as the “old” 
intelligentsia: “Your mission is action; you seek to transform the lives of 
the people by external means.” Tolstoi tried to persuade Struve that Vekhi, 
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which had ostensibly justified “inner” work over political activism, actually 
showed its authors to be enemies of the “inner law, of conscience, of God,” 
as Tolstoi understood those things. In sum, Tolstoi accused Struve and 
the other Vekhi authors of contributing to the “illusion” of the necessity of 
violence rather than to the dissipation of that illusion. They had said “half 
a word” about religion in criticizing the intelligentsia’s godlessness. Tolstoi 
wanted them to “say everything.”
III
An excerpt from Tolstoi’s “The Inevitable Revolution” appeared in Russian 
News on 10 September 1909, less than a month after Tolstoi’s meeting 
with Struve at Iasnaia Poliana. Struve responded to the excerpt with 
a short analysis in Russian Thought under the title “Rokovye voprosy” 
(“Fateful Questions”).70 Although Struve characterized his response “not 
as a ‘polemic’ in the usual sense of the term,” his commentary on Tolstoi’s 
thinking was a continuation of the conversation at Iasnaia Poliana, this 
time in a forum Struve could control.
Struve credited Tolstoi for raising fundamental questions, questions of 
a “fateful character,” that deserved the intelligentsia’s attention. At the same 
time, he underlined what he took to be the “illogic” and “contradictoriness” 
of Tolstoi’s thinking. On the one hand, Struve observed, Tolstoi insisted 
on personal responsibility for one’s actions and on the primacy of “inner 
work” over external action. On the other hand, Struve contended, Tolstoi 
argued that “the cause of the evil from which we all suffer [i.e. violence] 
is not within people, but in a false order of life based on violence, which 
people consider necessary.”71 Struve considered these two propositions 
contradictory. He saw Tolstoi’s emphasis on personal responsibility for 
actions as incompatible with the notion that people bear no responsibility 
for structural violence stemming from social arrangements into which they 
are born.
Struve suggested that there are two possible explanations for the 
corrupt social order in which people live. Either they live badly because 
they themselves are bad or corrupt, or they live badly because they do 
not know how to organize their lives properly. Struve asserted that, from 
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a religious perspective, only the first possibility makes sense. Tolstoi had 
written repeatedly that the “kingdom of God is within you”; Struve wrote 
that the “kingdom of the devil or of evil is also within us in an organic 
sense.”72 In other words, Struve argued, “If human beings are not ‘evil’ or 
‘guilty [of vice],’ they are certainly [morally] weak.”73
For Struve, the implication of the fact that human nature is neither wholly 
good nor innocent was that “the perfection of life and the improvement 
of human character cannot be accomplished through mere ‘education,’” 
or by “a simple sermon” of the sort Tolstoi routinely delivered. Human 
perfectibility, the overcoming of evil, required instead “a complicated, 
multi-front effort encompassing all of life and the strengthening of an 
individual’s entire character.” According to Struve, the problem with 
tolstovstvo lay not in Tolstoi’s ultimate goal of avoiding violence, but rather 
in a “more difficult, and damnably puzzling problem: how to make human 
beings strong enough for ‘love excluding violence’?”74
Struve’s contention—that Tolstoi had failed to understand evil or to 
fathom the weakness inherent in human nature—had been levelled at 
Tolstoi by Solov’ev in Tri razgovora (Three Conversations, 1899), as Struve 
surely knew. Here, in “Fateful Questions,” Struve alluded both to Solov’ev’s 
critique of Tolstoi and to what Struve regarded as a universally accepted 
religious proposition—that evil is part of human nature. The idea was to 
rebut Tolstoi’s assertion of 12 August that there was “no religious founda-
tion whatsoever” behind Vekhi, while simultaneously defending Berdiaev, 
Bulgakov, and himself against the charge of modernist superficiality 
in matters of faith. The charge that Tolstoi’s concept of personal moral 
responsibility contradicted his critique of violence enabled Struve to pose 
as a “realist” sympathizing with Tolstoi’s long-term objective of a violence-
free society while wondering whether “weak” human beings could ever be 
“strong enough for ‘love excluding violence.’” Although Struve did not say 
so, his doubts about the “strength” of human nature implied the need for 
coercive measures against criminals of every sort, at least until humanity 
showed itself morally worthy of a non-violent society. This was Struve’s 
answer to Tolstoi’s accusation that licensing the killing of one person “to 
save a hundred others” was a “sophism” on which the entire violent social 
order rests. Struve was telling Tolstoi that, in view of the evil within human 
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beings, it was a “sophism” to pretend that a non-violent social order could 
easily be established.
Struve did not realize that Tolstoi had repeatedly pointed in “The 
Inevitable Revolution” to those people—workers, government officials, 
intelligenty—whose beliefs and actions sustained the “illusion” that violence 
is a necessary component of the social order. Surely this proposition 
indicated Tolstoi’s awareness that the evil of violence is a product of human 
volition, and that this evil “illusion” and its manifold justifications come 
from within human beings. Tolstoi’s profoundest idea was perhaps that, 
since this element of the external social order sprang from within human 
beings, those same individuals might, by exerting spiritual self-discipline, 
extricate it from their characters by refusing to do violence and by refusing 
to approve of its being done. Tolstoi knew from personal experience that 
exercising spiritual discipline is not easy, but he also knew that it is possible 
to exercise such discipline. His far-flung network of correspondents told 
him that even common people could manage such discipline.
In Struve’s “Fateful Questions” there was an unbecoming arrogance 
that manifested itself in condescension toward Tolstoi as a thinker and 
toward human nature itself. In Struve’s pleas to take cognizance of human 
weakness, one hears the echoes of Dostoevskii’s Grand Inquisitor, for whom 
pity toward human weakness served as a justification of coercion. The article 
“Fateful Questions,” like Tolstoi’s early reactions to Vekhi, showed why no 
full meeting of minds between Tolstoi and the Vekhi authors was possible. 
Tolstoi was a resolute opponent of not only the “old” intelligentsia but also 
the “new” one. Being “plus royaliste que le roi” in advocating inner work did 
not make Tolstoi amenable to Struve’s political “realism.” Struve was right to 
acknowledge that, alongside the Russian public’s “idol-worship” of Tolstoi, 
there was on the educated public’s part a “lamentable absence of interest 
in his thinking.”75 Struve should have admitted that, even among the Vekhi 
authors, there was little real sympathy for Tolstoi’s spiritual worldview.
IV
One might have predicted that Struve’s 1909 visit to Iasnaia Poliana would 
come to naught, or worse, that it would set off an unpleasant polemic 
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between himself and Tolstoi. After all, the two men were very different 
creatures: Tolstoi was an autodidact, a literary artist turned religious 
radical, the most distinguished survivor of Russia’s “golden age,” and Struve 
was a radical political economist turned conservative, a religious naïf, 
a figure embodying the contradictoriness of Russia’s on-going “silver age.” 
Aside from these stark personal differences, Struve appeared at Tolstoi’s 
estate as representative of a cohort of intellectuals with whom Tolstoi had 
uneasy relations. Tolstoi had met Bulgakov in 1897, but had offended him 
mortally in 1902; he had helped Gershenzon by providing materials for 
the latter’s books on the intelligentsia, but had quarrelled with him in early 
1909, before the publication of Vekhi. Tolstoi had never met Berdiaev, but, 
as we have seen, he found his brand of modernist Orthodoxy preposterous. 
Thus, Struve was not only personally disagreeable to Tolstoi, he was guilty 
by association.
Intellectually, the differences between Tolstoi and Struve could not have 
been greater. Because Struve was a true believer, perhaps the last and most 
eloquent one, in the manifest destiny of the Russian empire, he believed in 
the kind of strong government that Tolstoi felt to be a practical disaster and 
a moral abomination. Struve’s nationalism, which combined reverence for 
the “creative process of national life” with an elitist condescension toward 
the uncultured narod, struck Tolstoi as not only a false posture typical of 
the “old” intelligentsia but as an attitude likely to perpetuate the structural 
violence then afflicting Russia and the world. Struve’s deeply held faith in 
science seemed to Tolstoi both naive and unexamined; it was also repellent 
to him because, in the thought of Struve and other Vekhi authors, it was 
linked to a contradictory philosophy of life that justified killing under 
the banner of avoiding killing. On the other hand, in Tolstoi Struve saw 
a creative artist of the first rank and a religious thinker who had upheld 
the spirit’s banner in trying times; however, by 1909, Tolstoi was also, in 
Struve’s view, an old man with one foot in the grave, an intellectual curiosity 
because, while physically alive, he had nonetheless already passed into the 
afterlife. Moreover, Tolstoi’s spiritual outlook, as Struve understood it, was 
flawed by dogmatic moralism and hyper-rationalism. Tolstoi’s political 
views seemed to Struve pitifully naive about the realities of human evil 
and the imperatives of power, which Struve and his liberal friends fancied 
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that they understood. In Struve’s eyes, Tolstoi’s opinions about science 
and about the uses of technology seemed obscurantist, even hopelessly 
anti-modern. In Struve’s view, Tolstoi wanted to lead the Russian people 
backward, rather than forward toward a more civilized and radiant future. 
Therefore, Struve’s August 1909 polemics with Tolstoi only demonstrated 
why, despite the Vekhi authors’ support for “inner work” over political 
action, no agreement between his group and Tolstoi concerning the means 
of transforming Russia was in principle possible.
By attacking the intelligentsia’s obsession with external political change, 
the Vekhi anthology recalled to Russians’ attention the very different ethical 
assumptions held by the intelligentsia and by its nineteenth-century critics. 
On the one hand, as the outpouring of newspaper and journal articles on 
Vekhi after its publication in March 1909 had shown, the Vekhi authors’ 
condemnation of the intelligentsia elicited strong defensive reactions from 
those committed to political change through violence. Yet, as the Struve-
Tolstoi polemics demonstrated, Vekhi also evoked from Tolstoi, Russia’s 
leading proponent of non-violence, an attempt to restate his own criticisms 
of the intelligentsia and to apply these same criticisms to its authors. The 
history of the debate over Vekhi, of which the Struve-Tolstoi debate was 
an important part, therefore suggests that the “afterlife” of Vekhi was 
a recapitulation, in a shorter time frame, of the nineteenth-century Russian 
debate about the ends of life and about the means of achieving a just society. 
It was as if all the fury of the preceding century were suddenly concentrated 
within a few months and focused on a single document.
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aleksei losev and Vekhi:
Strategic Tradit ions in Social Philosophy
Elena Tak ho - G o di 1
Aleksei Fedorovich Losev, one of the last representatives of nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century Russian religious philosophy, did not take part in 
the Vekhi project: when Vekhi was published he was still at school. We might 
then ask whether it is legitimate to speak of Losev’s connection to Vekhi. In 
my view it is indeed both legitimate and interesting to do so, first because 
Losev became personally acquainted with several of the Vekhi contributors 
not long after it was published, and second (and more importantly) because 
he inherited the social-philosophical strategy of Vekhi, which may be defined 
as opposition to the cause of revolution by means of the word or creative 
activity (the word—slovo—is here placed in opposition to the deed—
delo). This position is most explicitly formulated in Mikhail Gershenzon’s 
essay “Tvorcheskoe samosoznanie” (“Creative Self-Consciousness”) and 
Semen Frank’s essay “Etika nigilizma” (“The Ethics of Nihilism”), both of 
which explain the difference between what Frank calls creative “cultural 
production” and “principled revolutionism” (184), with its emphasis on 
social struggle and the destruction of existing social forms.2 This leitmotif 
can also be discerned in the works of other Vekhi contributors. Thus Petr 
Struve, in his essay “Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia” (“The Intelligentsia and 
Revolution”), stresses that the liberal intelligentsia which led the revolution 
has never been able to comprehend the field of Russian literature, that is, 
precisely the sphere of the word (156). In this context, the accentuation 
of the merits of the literary and artistic spheres that is typical for Russian 
philosophy acquires a special meaning. The Vekhi authors wanted to 
transform the inner nature of the Russian intelligentsia through the word, 
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through their social-philosophical public discourse, to arouse its creative 
self-consciousness. It was the “creative struggle of ideas” (166), as Struve 
put it, spiritual opposition, and the ascetic struggle (podvizhnichestvo) that 
were important to them, not the “heroism” or titanism of the social struggle 
of the revolutionary superman who had taken upon himself the task of 
destroying those with differing views in order to create a new social order.
Aleksei Losev (1893–1988): Life and Works
Aleksei Losev was born in Novocherkassk, in southern Russia.3 In 1911, 
after finishing his secondary education at a classical gymnasium and 
graduating from the Italian F. Stadzhi’s music school, he matriculated 
at Moscow University in both the department of philosophy and the 
department of classical philology. An interest in psychology led him to the 
Psychological Institute founded by Professor Georgii Chelpanov. Thanks 
to Chelpanov’s support, in the 1910s Losev became a participant in the 
famous Religious-Philosophical Society, which was established in memory 
of Vladimir Solov’ev in 1905. In 1915 Viacheslav Ivanov, the symbolist 
poet and classical philologist, read Losev’s graduation thesis on Aeschylus. 
Losev was retained at the University to train for the academic profession, 
and his first publications appeared in 1916: articles on eros in Plato and the 
operas of Verdi and Rimskii-Korsakov. In the revolutionary year of 1919 
he was a professor at the University of Nizhegorod. In the 1920s he was 
a full member of the State Academy of Artistic Sciences and a professor 
at the Moscow Conservatory and the State Institute of Musical Science. 
During this time Losev wrote and published no fewer than eight books, 
which were received by his contemporaries as “a new Russian philosophical 
system”:4 Antichnyi kosmos i sovremennaia nauka (The Ancient Cosmos and 
Modern Science), Filosofiia imeni (The Philosophy of the Name), Dialektika 
khudozhestvennoi formy (The Dialectics of Artistic Form), and Musyka kak 
predmet logiki (Music as an Object of Logic), all in 1927; and Dialektika chisla 
u Plotina (The Dialectics of Number in Plotinus, 1928); Kritika platonizma u 
Aristotelia (Aristotle’s Critique of Platonism, 1929); and Ocherki antichnogo 
simvolizma i mifologii (Essays on Classical Symbolism and Mythology) and 
Dialektika mifa (The Dialectics of Myth), both in 1930.
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The poet Andrei Belyi recorded in his diary his first impressions of 
Essays on Classical Symbolism and Mythology on 12 February 1930:
An enormous volume, more than 800 pages, it leaves a splendid 
impression. One can be proud that such a book has appeared in Russia at 
such a time. It is principally devoted to Plato. On a cursory reading (I’ll 
give it proper attention later) you can see that this is not Frank, Berdiaev, 
or the like: genuine, original thought, extremely valuable material, and 
simple and modest in tone. I consider that at another time Losev’s book 
would have created the same reaction in Russia as Spengler’s did in 
Germany, but Losev’s thought, so it seems to me, is more monumental. 
Losev is a genuine philosopher in the good sense of the word, and as 
a living philosopher he doesn’t “philosophize” or “terminologize,” but 
thinks. For now I write this in anticipation, because I’ve just sniffed at 
the book: I’ll read it properly, but I have a good sense of smell.5
Although Essays on Classical Symbolism and Mythology, which had 
so impressed Belyi, went generally unnoticed, The Dialectics of Myth 
created quite a stir.6 Here Losev set himself an impossible task in the 
Soviet context: namely that of writing a philosophical-theological treatise 
on absolute mythology—on the Holy Trinity, the concept of the angel, 
the symbolism of immaterial powers, and so forth.7 Moreover, Losev’s 
understanding of myth itself, as “the essential ontological identity of being 
and consciousness, whereby all being is fundamentally one or another 
manifestation of consciousness (not according to its arbitrary appearance, 
but in its ultimate substance) and whereby all consciousness is being (in 
the same way),” became the particular key to Losev’s analysis of the socio-
political system and mass psychology of the time.8 Losev demonstrated 
how socialism, that new relativist mythology with its cult of the material, its 
idea of the intensification of class struggle, and so forth, distorts personal 
and social consciousness. It is unsurprising that after the appearance of 
The Dialectics of Myth Losev was not only subjected to persecution in the 
press (a campaign in which Maksim Gor’kii participated) and condemned 
at the 16th Party Congress as an enemy of the people, but was also arrested 
on 18 April 1930, and subsequently sent to a concentration camp for the 
construction of the White Sea-Baltic canal. In 1931, Nathalie Duddington, 
in a review of Russian philosophy for the English Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, informed the European public of the “bad news” concerning the 
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philosopher Losev, “of whom Russia could be proud” and whose profound 
works of metaphysics had been declared counter-revolutionary.9 Losev 
himself, however, pondering on what had happened, wrote to his wife from 
the camp on 11 March 1932 that, suffocating “from the impossibility of 
expressing myself and speaking my mind,” he had no longer felt able “to 
confine myself within the iron bands of Soviet censorship”: “I knew that 
it was dangerous, but for a philosopher and writer the desire to express 
oneself, to let’s one’s individuality speak out, surmounts all consideration 
of danger.”10
In 1933, following the completion of the canal, Losev’s sentence was 
lifted, along with those of hundreds of other prisoners involved in the 
construction. He returned to Moscow, but was forbidden from engaging 
in philosophy: access to publication was completely blocked for him 
until 1953 and the death of Stalin. Under the conditions of the spiritual 
underground, in this quarter-century of enforced silence, Losev continued 
to write. Drawing on the doctrine of the Divine Energies formulated in the 
fourteenth century by Gregory Palamas (the knowledge of God through His 
energy) and on the religious-philosophical name-worshipping movement 
(onomatodoxia) of the early twentieth century (among the adherents of 
which was Pavel Florenskii), Losev developed a doctrine of the name that 
he had first begun in his book The Philosophy of the Name, in the essays 
“Veshch’ i imia” (“The Thing and the Name”) and “Samoe Samo” (“Self 
Itself ”). Losev’s basic concepts come to the fore in these works: thing, 
being, meaning, the depths of the eidos, “selfness” (samost’), and “self 
itself ” (samoe samo), which should be understood as “the essence of the 
very essence of being,”11 “the most genuine, most insuperable, most terrible 
and potent reality that can possibly exist,”12 which engenders “innumerable 
interpretations.”13 During the same period Losev wrote works on the 
philosophy of mathematics (he had received a professional mathematical 
education in the 1920s from the prominent professor of mathematics 
Dmitrii Fedorovich Egorov, and through his correspondence with Nikolai 
Luzin, another outstanding mathematician). Among the themes most 
important to him were the analysis of the infinitesimal, the theory of 
multiples, and the theory of the complex variable.14 He translated Plato, 
Plotinus, Sextus Empiricus, Proclus, and Nicholas of Cusa, and studied 
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Classical mythology. He created an original philosophical literary prose, 
displayed in his novel Zhenshchina-myslitel’ (The Woman-Philosopher), in 
which the ideas of Solov’ev and the traditions of Dostoevskii are refracted 
in a distinctive way,15 and earned a living teaching Classical literature in 
provincial universities. Only during the war years (1942–44) was he allowed 
to read lectures in Moscow University’s faculty of philosophy, and he was 
soon forced out after being denounced as an idealist. From this time until 
his death Losev worked in the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute in the 
departments of Russian language and general linguistics.
In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s Losev turned once more to the 
philosophy of symbol and myth, in Problema simvola i realisticheskoe 
iskusstvo (The Problem of the Symbol and Realistic Art, 1976), and Znak. 
Simvol. Mif (Sign. Symbol. Myth, 1982), and to language, in Vvedenie v 
obshchuiu teoriiu iazykovykh modelei (Introduction to the General Theory 
of Linguistic Models, 1968), and Iazykovaia struktura (Linguistic Structure, 
1983). His works on language raised the question of the possibility of a 
strict axiomatics in linguistics, and foregrounded communicative and 
interpretative acts. The author of The Philosophy of the Name, having 
traced the ladder of “naming” (imenitsvo) from the Divine Name down to 
the sound that is not yet illuminated by meaning, was convinced that two 
spheres of thought exist. The first was that of pure thought, the realm of 
“ideas,” or “thought in general,” while the second was its earthly realization 
in language, or in “the unmediated actuality of thought.”16 Reality as it 
is developed mentally, according to Losev, always has “communicative 
directionality,” because “language does not repeat the pure and abstract 
element [stikhiia] of thought, but gives it concrete substance, realizes it and 
interprets it anew, in order to become closer to reality in its original and, for 
thought, primary existence.”17 The American linguist Sebastian Shaumyan 
has commented that “Losev’s law of polysemy is the most important 
discovery since the 1930s, when the basic concepts and principles of the 
classical semiotic paradigm were formulated.”18
Nevertheless, Losev’s main work of these decades was the writing of 
the monumental eight-volume Istoriia antichnoi estetiki (History of Classical 
Aesthetics, 1963–94), in which a thousand years of Classical thought is 
analyzed, from the birth of aesthetics and the aesthetic terminology of 
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the Homeric era to early Christian neo-Platonism and the Gnostics. The 
books Estetika Vozrozhdeniia (The Aesthetics of the Renaissance, 1978) and 
Ellinisticheski-rimskaia estetika I–II vv. n.e. (Hellenic-Roman Aesthetics of 
the First and Second Centuries, 1979) are thematically related to this work. 
If we take into account his unfinished work of the 1960s, “Srednevekovaia 
filosofiia” (“Medieval Philosophy”), Losev’s design for the recreation of 
an historical panorama of European aesthetics and philosophy, in all its 
fullness, becomes obvious. 
The symbolic conclusion of Losev’s life’s work was his book on Solov’ev, 
the first on this philosopher to be written in the entire Soviet period. 
Losev considered Solov’ev to be his spiritual teacher: his extraordinary 
encyclopaedic interests are rooted in Solov’ev’s concept of pan-unity. 
The book had a complicated fate: a shorter version, printed in 1983, was 
published but subject to a confiscation order, and the entire print run was 
exiled to remote regions of the north, central Asia, and the far east,19 while 
the full version, Vl. Solov’ev i ego vremia (V. Solov’ev and his Time) only 
came out after the author’s death.
In 2004 the State Library of the History of Russian Philosophy and 
Culture was opened in Losev’s house, in which he had lived for the last fifty 
of his ninety-five years, on the Old Arbat in Moscow. The “House of A. F. 
Losev” is a memorial not only to the philosopher himself, but to the whole 
of Russian philosophy, including the thought of those who took part in 
the Vekhi symposium. It is fitting that an international conference entitled 
“The Vekhi Symposium in the Context of Russian Culture” was held in the 
“House of A. F. Losev” to mark the centenary of Vekhi’s publication.20
Losev and the Vekhi Authors: Biographical Connections
Losev is often referred to as the last representative of the Silver Age of 
Russian culture. However, there have still been no studies made of 
the personal connections between Losev and his older colleagues in 
philosophy. It is difficult to fill this gap in our knowledge, because Losev’s 
entire personal archive, and his correspondence from the middle of the 
1910s until the end of the 1920s, were lost upon his arrest in 1930. The 
main venue for meetings between Losev and the philosophers of the early 
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twentieth century, including the Vekhi contributors, was the Vladimir 
Solov’ev Religious-Philosophical Society in Moscow. There Losev was 
able to exchange views with Nikolai Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, S. N. Du- 
rylin, Ivanov, I. A. Il’in, G. A. Rachinskii, E. N. Trubetskoi, Frank, 
and Florenskii (Father Pavel was the priest who married Losev and 
V. M. Sokolova in 1922).21 Losev related how he was often present at 
meetings of the Religious-Philosophical Society, and how he used to receive 
notifications of and invitations to meetings.22 He states that he went to 
a meeting of the Society for the first time at the house of Margarita Kirillovna 
Morozova to hear Ivanov give a paper entitled “On the Margins of Art,” 
on 14 November 1913.23 “Grigorii Alekseevich Rachinskii presided at the 
meeting. … The speaker, Ivanov, sat next to him, then Evgenii Trubetskoi, 
and Berdiaev was there too.”24 It appears that the young Losev, who was in 
raptures over Ivanov’s speech, was not as swayed by Berdiaev’s contribution 
to the discussion: “Berdiaev endorsed Viacheslav Ivanov’s aesthetics, but he 
said that one should make art accessible to a wide audience and to do that 
one had to write simply, although it is absurd to say such things to Ivanov: 
clearly he can’t write like Pushkin.”25 Nonetheless other contributions by 
Berdiaev had a lasting and “enormous impact” on him: “A brilliant orator. 
He had one flaw that he suffered from all his life, a facial tic … a terrible 
tic: his face would regularly distort into a grimace and he would stick 
his tongue out. But this did not prevent him from speaking. He spoke 
beautifully”26 and “loved to speak. It was a basic need for him, such that on 
one occasion he remarked: I haven’t spoken today yet! How can this be? He 
usually spoke with restraint, in a considered way. Not passionately, as he 
does in The Meaning of the Creative Act [Smysl tvorchestva, 1916]. Berdiaev 
is a writer-orator. He writes absolutely brilliantly. But his speech was calm, 
unprovocative, and accessible.”27
Losev first encountered another Vekhi contributor, Bulgakov, a year 
earlier, on 21 September 1912, at the latter’s defense of his doctoral 
dissertation Filosofiia khoziaistva (The Philosophy of Economy) at Moscow 
University. For Losev, Bulgakov was “a genuine scholar,” “a theologian who 
is equally a philosopher.”28 In the five intervening years before the closure 
of the Religious-Philosophical Society in the summer of 1918, Losev may 
have been present at papers given by Bulgakov on “Russian Tragedy,” 
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about Dostoevskii’s novel Besy (The Devils, 1872) (2 February 1914), “The 
Sophianicity of the World” (17 January 1916), “The Conquered Conqueror 
(the fate of Leont’ev)” (13 November 1916), his contributions on the 
subjects of the new Russia (15 April 1917) and Vladimir Ern (19 May 
1917, at an evening commemorating Ern at which Berdiaev also spoke), 
and the paper “At the Feast of the Gods (Contemporary Dialogues)” 
(3 June 1918).29 In 1918 Losev, Bulgakov, and Ivanov attempted to publish 
a religious-philosophical series called Dukhovnaia Rus’ (Spiritual Rus’, see 
the next section, below). Neither Bulgakov nor Losev could have predicted 
that in 1930 Bulgakov’s son Fedor would be arrested in connection with 
the Losev affair, and that in the 1960s Fedor would invite Losev to pose for 
a sculpture.30
Losev did not restrict himself to the role of silent listener in the 
Religious-Philosophical Society. He presented a paper on “The Question 
of the Fundamental Unity of Plato’s Dialogues Parmenides and Timaeus,” 
which elicited responses from Rachinskii and Florenskii.31 When the Society 
ceased to exist, Losev began to attend meetings in Berdiaev’s apartment and 
at his Free Academy of Spiritual Culture.
Of all the contributors to Vekhi, Losev enjoyed the closest relationship 
with Frank. Since his youth Losev had been a dedicated reader of the 
journal Russkaia mysl’ (Russian Thought), where Frank was chief editor 
of the philosophy and literature sections, and of the journal Logos, in 
which Frank regularly published.32 He would recall his special relationship 
with Frank all his life, and in the mid-1970s noted that “Frank valued me 
highly.”33 And in 1930, in the notes to Essays on Classical Symbolism and 
Mythology, he relates how his research into Plato’s use of the terms “eidos” 
and “idea” was discussed in various Moscow academic societies: in the 
Lopatin Philosophical Society in June 1921, in Berdiaev’s Free Academy 
in April 1922, in the Moscow Psychological Society in June 1922, and 
also in the Institute of Scientific Philosophy; in this connection he recalls 
that Frank “fully took on board my work on ‘eidos’ and ‘idea’ and told me 
personally that ‘[a] new understanding of Platonism has been in the air in 
Europe for a long time now. You have discerned and articulated it.’”34
As Losev recollected in 1975, Frank was the reason he ended up 
attending the sessions held at Berdiaev’s home: “Frank and Il’in told me 
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about them. So I went.”35 On 5 April 1922 the Free Academy, where Frank 
delivered a course of lectures entitled “Introduction to Philosophy,”36 
reported on Losev’s presentation of the paper “Greek Linguistic Ontology 
in Plato.” Among the respondents were B. A. Griftsov, Rachinskii, P. S. Po-
pov, B. P. Vysheslavtsev, and Frank.37
Frank participated in the discussion of Losev’s work not only at the 
Free Academy and the Institute of Scientific Philosophy: we know that 
in the Lopatin Philosophical Society, too, when Losev gave a paper on 
Aristotle, Frank took part in the debate along with Griftsov, Rachinskii, 
and Vysheslavtsev.38 According to the notes to Music as an Object of Logic, 
Frank was also present at Losev’s talk at the State Institute of Musical 
Science on 24 December 1921.39 In Music as an Object of Logic, Losev 
mentions exchanging views with Frank not only on the subject of his own 
definition of the number (in his view Frank’s thinking about the number 
in Predmet znaniia [The Object of Knowledge, 1915] “sets out the meaning 
of my definition of the number in a more precise form”),40 but also on the 
coincidence of Frank’s ideas with those of Plotinus.41
A common interest in Platonism and neo-Platonism informed their 
mutual attention to the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa. Frank considered 
Cusa to be one of his greatest teachers (not for nothing did one of the 
outstanding philosophers of the Russian emigration, V. N. Il’in, devote an 
article to the relationship between Nicholas of Cusa and Frank). For his 
part, Losev wrote a book about Cusa in the 1920s, which was lost after his 
arrest, and in the 1930s he translated three of Cusa’s treatises: “On the Not-
other,” “On the Mind,” and “On the Possible-actual.”42 It appears he held 
conversations of some kind with Bulgakov about Cusa as well, or else how 
could he have known that Bulgakov possessed a sixteenth-century “copy of 
Nicholas of Cusa published in Lyons”?43 
We can form an opinion about Frank’s attitude to Losev from a review 
of his The Philosophy of the Name and The Ancient Cosmos and Modern 
Science which was published in the journal Put’ (The Way) in 1928. When 
he was preparing his review, Frank well understood the consequences that 
praise for Losev in the press of the White emigration would have for the 
Soviet philosopher. In an unpublished letter from Frank to the journal’s 
editor, Berdiaev, dated 8 November 1927 and accompanying his review of 
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Losev’s books, we find the following lines: “Dear Nikolai Aleksandrovich … 
I have been cautious and have not said everything that should have been 
said, but have confined myself to allusions in order not to cause Losev 
trouble.”44 Aware of the obligatory concessions to the Soviet censorship in 
Losev’s books, Frank writes that “the isolated irritating passages in which 
the author pays tribute, as it were, to the ruling ‘spirit of the age’ … are orga-
nically quite unrelated to the rest of the content of his ideas,” and that “there 
is no need to dwell on these; the ‘tribute’ is clearly an unwilling one.”45 For 
Frank what is important is that “with his books the author has undoubtedly 
joined the ranks of the foremost Russian philosophers and … has borne 
witness to the fact that even inside Russia the spirit of true philosophical 
creativity is alive, the pathos of pure thought, directed towards the absolute: 
a pathos which itself is, in its turn, a witness to spiritual life and spiritual 
fire.”46
According to Frank, The Ancient Cosmos and Modern Science, which 
is devoted to the dialectics of being, represents a detailed analysis of just 
one of the aspects of The Philosophy of the Name, in which “the author’s 
own philosophical system is set out.” “Briefly and in popular language” 
summarising Losev’s “infinitely complex and abstract construction,” Frank 
conveys the essence of Losev’s philosophical conception as follows:
For the author, the name, as the place where the “meaning” of human 
thought and the immanent “meaning” of the object world itself meet, 
is in its ultimate completion the expression of the essence of being 
itself. Everything in the world, including dead nature, is “meaning,” and 
therefore the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit unite 
in the philosophy of the “name” as the self-disclosure of meaning. The 
name in its completion is the “idea,” capturing and expressing the “eidos,” 
the essence of the object. The name acquires ultimate fullness and depth 
when it also embraces the precious “apophatic” layer of being: it then 
reveals itself as “myth,” which is not an invention but, on the contrary, 
the ultimate plenitude, self-revelation, and self-understanding of reality. 
The philosophy of the name thus coincides with the dialectic of the self-
understanding of being and by the same token with philosophy itself, for 
the “name,” understood ontologically, is the highest pinnacle of being, 
reached through its immanent self-revelation.47
At the same time, Frank considers it essential to draw attention to 
the traditions whose development, continuation, or re-conceptualization 
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are most apparent in The Philosophy of the Name. The first of these is 
Classical dialectics—Plato’s Parmenides and the further development of its 
constructions in Plotinus and Proclus. The second is the phenomenology 
of Edmund Husserl, transformed by Losev, drawing on Plato and the neo-
Platonists, “into a universal ‘dialectics,’ which for him is identical with 
philosophy as such.” The third comprises “the obvious points of contact 
with the ideas of Florenskii and his ‘magic of the word.’” Fourth, “the many 
pages of The Philosophy of the Name in which categories dialectically give 
rise to one another are extraordinarily reminiscent of Hegel, and indeed in 
terms of difficulty, complexity, but at the same time subtlety in the working 
of abstract thought, there can hardly be many examples since Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit of philosophical systems on a par with that of 
Losev.”48
It is curious that Losev knew about this review by Frank, which had 
been published in Paris: the Foreword to his Dialectical Foundations of 
Mathematics, dated 29 April 1936, makes reference to it.49 It is likely that in 
the 1920s Losev was still able to maintain links with émigrés and to access 
émigré publications, something that was harshly punished by the Soviet 
authorities.50 We know that in 1923 he read Berdiaev’s Filosofiia neravenstva 
(Philosophy of Inequality), which contained sharp criticism of the Soviet 
regime, and that Berdiaev’s “inspired words” made a huge impression on 
him—such that in the 1970s he could quote from this work from memory: 
“What have you done to my country!”51 Thus it was no accident that in 
1930, in the course of Losev’s interrogation, he was reminded of his 
acquaintance with Berdiaev. It is not impossible that the link between Paris 
and Losev was the well-known botanist Professor V. V. Markovich (arrested 
in 1932 in connection with the affair of Leningrad’s Aleksandr Nevskii 
Brotherhood),52 or the Dane M. M. Brensted, who appears in the memoirs 
of Lidiia Berdiaeva and who lived in Russia in the 1920s, but left for Paris in 
the year of Losev’s arrest, subsequently collaborating on Berdiaev’s journal 
The Way.53
Even in his old age Losev preserved a special piety in regard to the 
older philosophers with whom he had had the good fortune to engage. 
“I have retained not just a bright, but a dazzling impression of them all,”54 he 
confessed, not attempting to count himself their equal. “As people, they were 
— 225 —
Aleksei Losev and Vekhi: Strategic Tradit ions in Soc ial Philosophy
real giants of their kind, so that I would hardly dare to shake their hand, just 
say ‘how do you do.’ At most I had some insignificant conversations with 
just one or two of them.”55 In a documentary film made at the end of his life, 
Losev speaks in the same spirit:
I was a student just starting out, but these were very important people. 
All those Bulgakovs, Berdiaevs, and Trubetskois, they were already 
giant figures, so to speak. I even used to greet them formally and they 
would shake me by the hand, but I didn’t really manage to get close to 
any of them. … And anyway, the revolution was on its way: I graduated 
from university in 1915, and in 1917—revolution! So just when I was 
rather more grown-up and could make my presence felt more strongly 
and get properly close to them, it was all broken off by events, mechani- 
cally … only Frank, perhaps, he was somehow enthused by my research 
on Platonism and understood me more sensitively and deeply. But the 
rest were too far above me, at too far a remove from this young lad who 
had just shown up in Moscow and didn’t know anything or anyone, and 
anyway what contribution could he bring and what could he say.56
However, the story of Losev’s intellectual and spiritual opposition (in 
particular his collaboration on the Spiritual Rus’ series, described below) is 
testament to the fact that in his oral reminiscences, whether on purpose or 
not, he downplayed the degree of his real and actual proximity to the Vekhi 
authors.
Losev’s Opposition to the Revolutionary “Cause” (“Delo”)
Several key stages in the history of Losev’s opposition to the revolutionary 
“cause” by means of the “word” can be distinguished, and they serve to 
illuminate his relationship to the Vekhi tradition. 
The first stage that we know about was a project to publish a series of 
books devoted to Russian national identity under the general title Spiritual 
Rus’.57 The plan for the project was conceived by Ivanov, Bulgakov (by now 
Father Sergii Bulgakov), and Losev in the spring of 1918: Losev was to be 
general editor. Losev informed the publisher, M. Sabashnikov, that the series 
“exclude[d] the remotest possibility of any party viewpoint,” but he made 
no secret of the fact that the authors’ views were anti-Marxist, although 
“the approach [was always to be] that of a free, non-confessional religious 
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consciousness.”58 The series was to include works by Berdiaev, Bulgakov, the 
poet Georgii Chulkov, Sergei Durylin, secretary of the Vladimir Solov’ev 
Religious-Philosophical Society, the critic and publicist A. S. Glinka-
Volzhskii, Ivanov, Evgenii Trubetskoi, and Losev himself. The project was 
never realized, but analysis of the proposal indicates that Berdiaev’s essay 
“Ghosts of the Russian Revolution (Gogol’, Dostoevskii, Tolstoi),” along 
with the articles by Bulgakov and Ivanov that were similarly included in 
Struve’s symposium Iz glubiny (Out of the Depths), were originally intended 
for Losev’s Spiritual Rus’ also. The chronology of the preparation of 
both publications is the same, running from March to August 1918; the 
parallelism of their ideas is quite evident as well. Spiritual Rus’, like Out of 
the Depths, was intended as a sui generis continuation of Vekhi.
In the first half of 1918, Losev published his work in the newspaper 
Zhizn’ (Life),59 which was opposed to the Soviet authorities from an anarchist 
standpoint, that is, from a standpoint exactly opposite to that of Vekhi and 
Out of the Depths—hence the polemical attacks on the newspaper by the 
weekly Nakanune (On the Eve), which published the work of the Vekhi 
authors Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Struve. The appearance of Losev in such 
a publication may seem strange, but in the context of a rapidly contracting 
space for free discourse uncontrolled by the Bolshevik censorship, the 
newspaper attracted people of various political persuasions, including 
well-known writers like Anna Akhmatova, Belyi, Aleksandr Blok, and Osip 
Mandel’shtam.
Of the three articles published by Losev in Life, “The Crisis of the 
Private Secondary School” and the review article “Russian Philosophical 
Literature in 1917–18” are of the most interest to us.60 In the first the author 
describes, with emotional restraint and relying only on facts and figures, the 
catastrophic situation in private schools, the last “islets” not to be exposed 
to the pernicious influence of the new ideology. The article on Russian 
philosophy, for its part, only at first sight appears removed from social 
problems and the debate about the Russian intelligentsia and revolution 
that was conducted in Vekhi in 1909. It seems that the twenty-four-year-old 
Losev deemed the position of his older colleagues from Spiritual Rus’ to 
be too passive. Losev was convinced that “from of old Russian philosophy, 
which is in essence social and frequently mystical at base, has always 
— 227 —
Aleksei Losev and Vekhi: Strategic Tradit ions in Soc ial Philosophy
reacted strongly to social and political phenomena, describing them from 
the point of view of its more profound conception of the world.”61 As he 
himself put it, Losev was looking to philosophy for a spiritual “weapon 
for the fight,”62 and he was unhappy that “despite the horrifying course 
of events Russian philosophy is silent, and we do not know what it has 
to say about everything that is happening.”63 This is why he writes with 
a certain reticence about the works of the “Slavophiles,” Bulgakov’s Svet 
nevechernii (The Unfading Light, 1917) and Tikhie dumy (Quiet Thoughts, 
1918), Ivanov’s Rodnoe i vselenskoe (The Native and the Universal, 1917), 
and Evgenii Trubetskoi’s Metafizicheskie predpolozheniia poznaniia. Opyt 
preodoleniia Kanta i kantianstva (The Metaphysical Presuppositions of 
Knowledge. An Essay in Overcoming Kant and Kantianism, 1917). Thus, after 
paying tribute to Bulgakov’s “sincere, profoundly Orthodox mysticism,” 
“the religion of the Russian Christ that is the final and longed-for end of 
Bulgakov’s entire work,” he concludes that there is “little that is new and 
fiery” in The Unfading Light.64
Losev’s intellectual affinities made him closer to the “western” wing 
of Russian thinkers at the time, among whom Losev classed Gershenzon 
(Mudrost’ Pushkina [The Wisdom of Pushkin, 1917], Troistvennyi obraz 
sovershenstva [The Trinitarian Image of Perfection, 1918]), Frank (Dusha 
cheloveka. Opyt vvedeniia v filosofskuiu psikhologiiu [The Soul of Man: 
Introduction to Philosophical Psychology, 1917]), Il’in (Filosofiia Gegelia 
kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka [The Philosophy of Hegel as 
a Doctrine on the Concreteness of God and Man, 1918]), and P. I. Novgorodtsev 
(Ob obshchestvennom ideale [On the Social Ideal, 1917]). Losev welcomed 
Il’in’s “ardent affirmation of eternal truths” and Novgorodtsev’s “objective 
critique of Marxism.” He warmly recommended Frank’s book as “a superb 
weapon in the fight against the outmoded and crude conventions of 
sensualism and materialism,”65 while in Gershenzon’s Trinitarian Image of 
Perfection he valued a “precise and clear … sense of the vital antinomies of 
which everything consists,” “a feeling for the contradictions and lamentable 
chaos of life,” which “are also an essential stage on the way to ultimate 
affirmations.”66
The second landmark in Losev’s opposition to the revolutionary 
“cause” is his participation in the Swiss collection Russland (Russia), in 
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which his article “Russian Philosophy” was published.67 According to the 
table of contents, the first part of Russia was to include a second article 
by Losev, “Die Ideologie der orthodox-russischen Religion” (“The Ideology 
of Russian Orthodoxy”). This article was listed as appearing in Russia but 
for unknown reasons it never did so. Losev apparently intended to submit 
it, since an essay in German, “Die Onomatodoxie” (“Onomatodoxy”), 
survives, devoted to “one of the oldest and most typical trends in the 
Orthodox east,” the name-worship that attracted numerous apologists 
among Russian religious thinkers of the early twentieth century.68
Russia was edited by Vera Erismann-Stepanova, Theodor Erismann, 
and Jean Matthieu, and was published in Zürich in 1919.69 Matthieu was 
an active Swiss social democrat, while Erismann-Stepanova was a graduate 
in philosophy from the University of Zürich who was married to the 
psychologist Theodor Erismann.70 Family tradition has it that the initiative 
for Russia came from the Erismanns,71 but be that as it may, it seems that the 
ideological platform was the idea of Erismann-Stepanova’s brother-in-law, 
the well-known historian Sergei Mel’gunov, who was exiled from Russia 
in 1922 on the famous “philosophical steamship.” Mel’gunov’s atheistic, 
liberal-populist position, which informed his attacks on Vekhi in 1909,72 
changed to a certain extent when the Bolsheviks came to power. Mel’gunov 
started to look for allies in various political circles, and this brought him to 
the Soiuz vozrozhdeniia Rossii (Union for the Revival of Russia, established 
in 1918), which aimed to restore Russian statehood. It was probably only 
for tactical reasons that Mel’gunov’s name was not included in the list 
of editors of Russia. The collection contains an article by him on church 
and state in Russia, and another by his wife, Erismann-Stepanova’s sister, 
Praskov’ia, and the majority of Russia’s other contributors (the publicist Ivan 
Belokonskii, the pedagogue Nikolai Rumiantsev, the historian Konstantin 
Sivkov, and the folklorist Boris Sokolov) had actively published their works 
in Mel’gunov’s co-operative publishing house, Zadruga. It is likely that the 
project aimed to provide the western reader with detailed information 
about Russia and its culture, and that aim was in conformity with the ideas 
of Mel’gunov as a member of the Union for the Revival of Russia.
In this context one thing remains unclear, and that is how Losev’s article 
“Russian Philosophy” came to be included in this publication.73 There is 
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no evidence that Losev and Mel’gunov were acquainted, but we know that 
Losev became a member of Zadruga at some point between 1918 and 
15 May 1919:74 his name appears in the membership list until 15 May 1919,75 
and in 1919 he considered publishing his Genesis of Greek Tragedy with 
Zadruga. Several hypotheses can be advanced. The most persuasive is that 
Losev’s friend from university days, Pavel Popov, acted as an intermediary 
between Losev and Mel’gunov between 1917 and 1919. Popov had become 
acquainted with Mel’gunov in the late 1910s, and was an active member of 
Zadruga.
Like the review of philosophical literature in Life, Losev’s article for 
Russia is only superficially unrelated to the problems debated in Vekhi. For 
a start, albeit unsurprisingly, Losev includes Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and Frank 
in his list of the representatives of contemporary Russian philosophy. He 
offers a brief description of Berdiaev’s The Meaning of the Creative Act and 
Bulgakov’s The Unfading Light. He also quotes copiously from Berdiaev’s 
book on Khomiakov because, as he himself explains, Berdiaev “is one of 
the most significant representatives of contemporary Russian philosophy,” 
and it is evident from his book that “in our time Russian philosophy has 
become aware of its own essence, and that, as a rule, it is true to this essence 
in only setting itself the tasks that have always been associated with genuine 
Russian philosophy.”76 Losev believes that, beginning with Solov’ev, “a new 
Russian apocalyptic conception of the world”77 had come into being; it 
is therefore unsurprising that Berdiaev and Bulgakov seem to him to be 
“Slavophiles with the addition of apocalyptic mysticism.”78 Additionally 
(and in the context of Vekhi this is particularly noteworthy), Losev 
underlines the publicistic principle present in Russian philosophy. He 
states that Russian philosophy, with its characteristic “mystical-ontological 
realism,”79 has always been “intricately connected with real life, and for this 
reason often appears in polemical and publicistic guise, drawing its vitality 
from the general spirit of the age, with all its positive and negative aspects, 
with all its joys and sufferings, with all its order and chaos.”80
Losev did not choose to write about the history of Russian thought only 
out of a desire to inform his western readership about a world with which 
it was unfamiliar. He highlights the philosophical character of Russian 
literature, the philosophy of the Slavophiles, and above all the philosophy of 
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Solov’ev, that is, the creative endeavors of precisely those Russian thinkers 
“the Russian intelligentsia does not want to know,” according to Berdiaev’s 
essay for Vekhi, “Filosofskaia istina i intelligentskaia pravda” (“Philosophical 
Verity and Intelligentsia Truth”). Losev develops Berdiaev’s thinking on the 
“concrete idealism” or “ontological realism” of Russian philosophy, and 
on its religious foundations as reflected in the striving for a “synthesis of 
knowledge and faith.” At the same time, Losev’s assertion that “Russian 
philosophy has never dealt with anything other than the soul, the person, 
and inner asceticism”81 also invites comparison with Bulgakov’s essay for 
Vekhi, “Geroizm i podvizhnichestvo” (“Heroism and Asceticism”), in which 
the spiritual act and Christian asceticism are opposed to the intelligentsia’s 
heroism and anthropotheism. In his texts from 1918, Losev agrees with 
Bulgakov on the need to form a “national self-consciousness” on “religious-
cultural foundations.”
Although Vekhi is neither directly quoted nor mentioned in Losev’s 
article, one can nevertheless see here a continuation of the conversation 
begun in Vekhi by Berdiaev, who thought that “the purifying fire of 
philosophy” was to play a significant role in the radical reformation of the 
intelligentsia’s consciousness. Subsequently, Losev would make further 
discreet reference to Berdiaev’s Vekhi essay. For example, in the late 1930s 
allusions to this essay appear in Losev’s novel Vstrecha (The Meeting), 
which is the closest of his works to the set of problems discussed in Vekhi. 
Meanwhile, Berdiaev’s reference to a special “proletarian class mysticism” 
is recalled in The Philosophy of the Name and The Dialectics of Myth, in 
which Losev writes about the mysticism of materialists, the communist and 
proletarian mythology. A telling example is the grotesquely ironic apology 
for “a world without end or limit, without form or bounds,” a blind and 
dead material world that true materialists fanatically believe in: “We have 
our own mythology, and we love it, cherish it, we have spilled and will again 
spill our living and warm blood for it.”82
Whatever the interest—considerable as it is—of Losev’s attempts in 
the years 1917–19 to express his social-philosophical position, it was The 
Dialectics of Myth (1930), the last anti-Marxist book to be published in the 
Soviet Union, that marked the culmination of his intellectual and spiritual 
opposition to the Soviet order.83 This work is not about ancient myths. 
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It is about a different kind of mythology: the ideas of the public sphere 
that possess individuals as well as entire social groups. The Dialectics of 
Myth is at once a religious-philosophical treatise exploring the dialectics 
of the mythology of the Absolute and a sui generis sociological study of 
the psychology of mass thinking, an attempt to define the basic ideological 
units that pre-determine the behavior of specific social groups or whole 
nations.
The polemical, almost publicistic, tone that, unusually for a work 
of philosophy, permeates Losev’s text, is confirmation that this work 
continues the tradition of social-philosophical (typically journal) writing 
of the Vekhi authors, and indeed of Vekhi itself, and, in a broader sense, of 
a classical Russian philosophy that (as Losev himself declared in “Russian 
Philosophy”) is notable for its vitality, its involvement in real social life, 
and its interest in pre-logical, mythological thinking. It is not without 
reason that The Dialectics of Myth developed many of the themes of Vekhi: 
atheism as a peculiar religious faith, the idolization of science and progress 
by the intelligentsia, and the rejection of positivism and rationalism in 
philosophy. Echoing/repeating Frank’s article “The Ethics of Nihilism,”84 
Losev stresses the real spiritual and religious foundations of social and 
political events by demonstrating how spiritual nihilism—the negation 
of both the Absolute and the mythology of the Absolute—transform man 
into nothing and plunge him into a spiritual and social hell where various 
relative mythologies, including Marxism, reign:
From the point of view of Communist mythology, not only [is it the 
case that] “a specter wanders in Europe, the specter of Communism” ([as 
stated at] the beginning of the Communist Manifesto), but also [that]“the 
vermin of counterrevolution are swarming,” “the jackals of imperialism 
are howling,” “the hydra of the bourgeoisie is baring its teeth,” and “the 
jaws of financial sharks are gaping.” Here we also find scurrying about 
such figures as “bandits in tail-coats,” “monocled brigands,” “crowned 
blood-letters,” “cannibals in mitres,” and “cassocked jaw-shatterers.” In 
addition, everywhere there are “dark forces,” “gloomy reaction,” “the 
black army of obscurantists”; and in this darkness there is “the red dawn” 
of “global fire,” “the red flag” of rebellion. What a picture! And they say 
there is no mythology here.85
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The opposition Losev constructs between proponents of the mythology 
of the Absolute and adherents of relativist mythologies such as socialism 
in many aspects mirrors the opposition in Vekhi between two social-
philosophical types: the opponents and the advocates of revolution. 
Contemporary readers may share the view of some that Losev’s 
attacks on socialism and communism get lost in the theoretical analysis 
of the nature of myth and mythological thinking, but even these sporadic 
passages were enough to have their author sent to one of the forced labor 
camps organized for the construction of the White Sea-Baltic canal, and 
to have him condemned as a class enemy at the 16th Party Congress. 
After his release his works were not published until after Stalin’s death, 
but his intellectual and spiritual opposition to the regime did not cease. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, Losev’s opposition to Soviet reality is expressed 
in his literary works, in which one can also find allusions to Vekhi and 
the problems addressed therein. In Meeting, mentioned above, the 
problem treated is that of the intelligentsia and revolution. In the story 
“Iz razgovorov na Belomoro-Baltiiskom kanale” (“From Talks at the 
White Sea-Baltic Canal”), Losev addresses the question of production 
under socialism that so greatly troubled the Vekhi authors, above all 
Frank. The main subject of debate for the interlocutors in the story is 
the question of the correct attitude to technology. For the author, this 
question is closely related to the problem of civilization as the last stage 
of human history, when the human spirit is subjugated to the spirit of 
the thing, the machine. Such a “neo-Luddite” orientation was typical for 
the turn of the twentieth century, when “it was as if literature became 
the site of a pitched battle between the ‘mechanizers’ and the ‘anti-
mechanizers,’” as reflected in the novels of H. G. Wells and the dystopias 
of E. M. Forster or Aldous Huxley. In their “brave new world,” power has 
also been usurped by a new and humanly improved “Lord our Ford, or 
Freud” (Huxley). Man himself prays to the machine because the Bible 
has long since been replaced by the “Book of the Machine” (Forster).86 
At the same time this idea of Losev’s is in complete agreement with the 
general outlook of Russian religious philosophical thought. Thus, for 
Berdiaev, socialism is “civilization, but not culture” because “culture is 
organic” while “civilization is mechanical.”87
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In a world in which animated being has been replaced by the inanimate, 
God and the idea of the Absolute are squeezed out by matter, and the logic of 
the absurd comes into play such that, as the central protagonist of Meeting, 
Nikolai Vershinin, says, “they want to base morality and self-sacrifice for 
the sake of society on the natural sciences, on biology,” or when a person 
who has been deprived of his personhood and soul has it explained to him 
that “they say you are descended from the apes. Therefore you should love 
one another.”88 Vershinin’s words are a veiled quotation from Berdiaev’s 
Vekhi article: “Vladimir Solov’ev very wittily observed that the Russian 
intelligentsia always reasons from the same syllogism: man is descended 
from the apes, therefore we ought to love one another. The intelligentsia 
perceived scientific positivism wholly in terms of this syllogism; positivism 
was merely an instrument for affirming the reign of social justice and 
for utterly destroying those metaphysical and religious ideas which, the 
intelligentsia dogmatically assumed, support the reign of evil” (21). Only in 
this context can the direction of Losev’s thinking be properly understood. 
Losev is persuaded that the triumph of materialism and the extirpation of 
metaphysical and religious ideas distort morality and transform man into 
an ape and the world into a prison. As he says through his mouthpiece 
Vershinin, all his abstract talk about philosophy or music is but “an analysis 
of the Russian revolution.”89
Beginning in the mid-1950s, Losev worked on his History of Classical 
Aesthetics in eight volumes. His withdrawal to the history of philosophy 
was a forced step, but it gave him the opportunity to realize at least 
partially his plan of the 1920s to create a general typology of cultures that 
presupposed their present condition. By plunging into antiquity, Losev 
seemed to abandon the burning social problems of Vekhi, but his mood 
was quite different. Allegorically, in Aesopian language, he continued to 
develop ideas similar to those of the Vekhi authors. For example, in 1985 
the Party newspaper Pravda published a conversation with Losev entitled 
“Derzanie dukha” (“The Daring of the Spirit”).90 Is it an accident that the 
title reminds us of Berdiaev’s words in Vekhi about “the love of truth and 
the daring of thought [derznovenie mysli]” that are being extinguished 
by the reigning demagogy? It is unlikely. This is confirmed by Losev’s 
argument, expressed during the interview, that as a counterweight to an 
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irrational technologism aimed at the destruction of the human person and 
humanity there should be a correct worldview, “a secret or open striving for 
freedom,”91 and that there was a need to educate young people in “love for 
the profundity and beauty of thought for its own sake.”92 It is not without 
reason that Losev makes the reservation that he may be considered “a bad 
idealist for preaching a quiet, conciliatory and sober way of thinking,”93 
given that his words are a paraphrase of Gershenzon’s argumentation about 
“creative self-consciousness.”
Conclusion
Of all the participants in Vekhi, three figures—Berdiaev, Bulgakov, and 
Frank—attracted Losev’s attention throughout his life. In Gershenzon he 
saw “a profound critic” with a “beautiful style,” but toward the end of his 
life he was rather critical of his philosophy in general.94 Losev’s special 
relationship with Frank has already been discussed in detail. As far as 
Berdiaev and Bulgakov are concerned, there are many positive references 
to them in Losev’s work. In the 1970s Losev had in his field of vision 
Bulgakov’s books The Unfading Light (1917), Lestvitsa Iakovlia (Jacob’s 
Ladder, 1929), and Nevesta Agntsa (Bride of the Lamb, 1945), and Berdiaev’s 
The Meaning of the Creative Act, Opyt opravdaniia cheloveka (Essay in 
Religious Anthropology, 1916), O naznachenii cheloveka (On the Destiny of 
Man, 1931),95 Samopoznanie (Self-Knowledge, 1949)96 and Ekzistentsial’naia 
dialektika chelovecheskogo i bozhestvennogo (The Dialectic of the Human 
and the Divine in Existentialism, 1952). If Bulgakov’s books delighted him 
with their marvelous titles,97 Berdiaev’s did so by their style: “Sometimes 
in Berdiaev every phrase is an aphorism. ‘The personality is the sacrament 
of one, marriage is the sacrament of two, the church is the sacrament of 
three.’ Or, ‘Two types of Satanism, fascism and communism.’ But this is 
not politics, it is a meticulously worked out philosophy.”98 To Losev, it is 
important that Bulgakov, and Berdiaev too, are “Solov’evians,” although 
“touched by the twentieth century.”99 Not for nothing does he devote 
a special paragraph to describing Bulgakov’s relationship to Solov’ev’s 
philosophy in his book on the latter.100 In the documentary film “Losev” 
he speaks with no less enthusiasm about Berdiaev’s philosophy, and calls 
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him “an apostle of freedom.” According to Losev, Berdiaev “senses the 
divinity of his freedom like Angelus Silesius, who said: ‘Without me God 
could not make the tiniest movement.’”101 It is interesting that in one private 
conversation Losev aligned himself precisely with Berdiaev: “Like Berdiaev 
I call myself a child of freedom.”102 All the more, then, did he suffer from 
not being able to work openly in conditions of unfreedom, not being able to 
study his favourite thinkers and own their books: “Once I saw that someone 
was selling six or seven of Berdiaev’s works for fifty rubles. But I was afraid 
of political provocation. Moscow would find out immediately who that man 
sold his books to.”103 He recommends reading Berdiaev: “Even if you don’t 
share all his views, it is always useful to commune with a genius,” but at the 
same time acknowledges that this is dangerous since “it’s dangerous not 
even to read, but simply to keep the books. You get persecuted for that […] 
They lock you up, there’s been the trial of Daniel’, Siniavskii, Ginzburg.”104 
It seemed demeaning to him to study his favorite philosophers in secret: 
“No, I don’t like it when you have to hide. I say what I think; I’d repeat it in 
front of an audience of two hundred. Let everyone see what Losev thinks. 
I like to do things openly. But to study Berdiaev by reading him in snatches 
at night—that’s not interesting. You have to study seriously so as to think 
things through, you have to become absorbed.”105
Of course, seventy years of the Soviet system trained Losev to write 
in Aesopian style. But as soon as perestroika began in the Soviet Union, 
the philosopher began to speak openly about Vekhi. This is evident in 
the documentary filmed in 1987, toward the end of Losev’s life, by V. 
Kosakovskii. “Today Vekhi is deemed to be a dreadful book, you can’t 
read or own or discuss it,” he declares, and admits at the same time that 
“[w]hen I read it I was excited by its profound thought. Very profound 
thought! They saw that the revolution suppressed the person too much. 
That’s why the cry went up, ‘Where is man?’ Well, production—production 
is good. Progress, the public. … But where is man? He isn’t there.”106
The philosopher had to spend the major part of his life in a deperso- 
nalized, dehumanized society, suffer many catastrophes, and make various 
sacrifices, but inwardly he remained faithful to the social-philosophical 
strategy of resisting evil with the word and with creative activity in the field 
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of culture. In the days of his youth this strategy had also guided his older 
colleagues, the Vekhi authors, in their philosophical endeavor.
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inside ouT:
Good, Evil, and the Question of Inspiration
O l iver  Smit h
Russian atheism is by no means a conscious 
rejection, the fruit of a complex, agonizing and 
prolonged effort of the mind, the heart and the 
will, the product of personal experience. No, 
most often it is taken on faith, and preserves the 
characteristics of a naive religious belief, only 
inside out. 
—Sergei Bulgakov
Sir, didst not thou sow good seed in thy field? 
From whence then hath it tares?
—Matthew 13:27
Perhaps the most fundamental theme running through the Vekhi collection 
is the division between inner and outer, internal and external. The 
“common platform” of all the authors, Mikhail Gershenzon tells the reader 
in his “Preface,” is “the recognition of the theoretical and practical primacy 
of spiritual life over the external forms of community,” with an emphasis 
on the “individual’s inner life” (xxxvii).1 This division between internal 
and external appears in one form or another in all of the essays. It can be 
observed in the critique of the Russian intelligentsia’s alleged propensity 
for disregarding the internal work of personal development in favor of 
external social engineering; its inability to digest ideas or beliefs rather than 
simply gathering, herd-like, under the latest flag; and its dependence on 
external might over inner, spiritual reserve.2 The tendency of the Russian 
intelligent to, in Gershenzon’s words, live “outside himself [vne sebia]” (51),3 
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is clearly one of the principal targets of the Vekhi critique. Not centered 
in himself and thus enjoying only minimal interaction with his inner life, 
the intelligent reads the reality around him in a similar vein. He admits of 
no causality but that of the material order, a causality that does not arise 
from a place of interiority but, so to speak, slips off the shapes of things, 
building its future from the mechanical flux of events. Change the flux 
of events—through ordering, or through the mechanical construction of 
society and nature, for example—and you are able to control the influx 
of good and evil into the world or, more precisely, radically to diminish 
the latter in favor of the former. “The basic philosopheme of socialism,” 
writes Petr Struve, “its ideological axis as a world-view, is the principle that 
human good and evil ultimately depend on external conditions” (119).
This is all well-worn ground on which many subsequent critiques of 
the Soviet system, indeed of totalitarianism in general, have been founded.4 
This essay concentrates on a somewhat different aspect of this inner-outer 
division, namely Sergei Bulgakov’s at first puzzling categorization of the 
unconscious religiosity of the intelligentsia—a religiosity much debated 
in Vekhi, as indeed it was before and after—as one that shares all the 
features of naive faith, even Christian faith, excepting the fact that it is 
“inside out [naiznanku]” (22). This phrase will be explored in the context 
of the tradition on which the Vekhi essays self-consciously draw yet 
rarely articulate openly, namely that of the apocalyptic strand in Russian 
religious thinkers such as Fedor Bukharev, Fedor Dostoevskii, and 
Vladimir Solov’ev. While I seek to illuminate this problematic from the 
perspective of Vekhi as a whole, I concentrate in particular on Bulgakov, 
whose life trajectory was inextricably bound up with the Solov’evian 
legacy and whose oeuvre demonstrates (with the possible exception of 
Nikolai Berdiaev) the strongest development of eschatological themes, 
the culmination of which we see in his last complete work, Apokalipsis 
Ioanna (The Apocalypse of John, 1948). Through the prism of Bulgakov, 
I therefore seek to uncover a consistent hermeneutic that weaves through 
the pre- and post-revolutionary periods and encapsulates both Bulgakov’s 
own evolving conception of the workings of good and evil in Russian 
society and the wider framework of apocalyptic interpretation in which it 
was set. 
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It should be stated at the outset that a religiosity “turned inside out” 
does not for Bulgakov equate merely to a transposition of the object of faith 
from God to nothing, atheism replacing theism by an inversion of its object. 
Conventional wisdom has of course long taught that atheism requires just 
as much a leap of “faith” as belief in God does, yet this is the focus of neither 
Bulgakov nor the Vekhi authors as a whole. It is fair to say that they are only 
tangentially interested in the ideological structures underlying Russian 
atheism and in the patterns of belief that fuel atheistic currents of thought, 
which, as the authors point out, feed on many of the same tendencies as 
contemporary atheism in the west. 
In a recent book on Dostoevskii, Rowan Williams writes against the 
grain of many commentators, arguing that the novelist was not concerned 
in solving the so-called “cursed questions,” this being especially the case as 
regards the question of the existence or non-existence of God. Rather, he 
attempted to portray what a world without God might look like, and what 
it might mean for human beings to inhabit such a world.5 Atheism is not 
debunked as a matter of course; rather, its various, often ambiguous effects 
are traced through the actions of his protagonists. While the approach of the 
Vekhi authors is clearly less creative and more explicitly philosophical, they 
nevertheless proceed in a similar manner: their goal is not to provide an 
alternative worldview to the atheistic nihilism, the “heroism,” or whichever 
term we choose to use, of the revolutionaries, but to portray the effects of 
such a worldview on the “soul” of the intelligentsia. It is only insofar as they 
depict the effects of atheism on human life severed from absolute values 
that they can be seen to propose the means for the overcoming of atheism. 
Yet, whereas in his novel Besy (The Devils, 1872) Dostoevskii tends to read 
contemporary events as ciphers for a larger reality, drawing the shapes of 
the future from the still-uncertain present, the Vekhi essays work in the 
opposite direction. They move from the all-too-real to the murky source 
of inspiration in which the real had its birth. Where Dostoevskii may be 
described as constitutive and prophetic, Vekhi is primarily diagnostic: it 
attempts not to lay bare the partially concealed content of the soul of the 
Russian intelligentsia but to interpret the development of the same from its 




Nevertheless, Vekhi occupies a kind of liminal zone: its concrete time 
is a Russia poised between two revolutions. Its authors’ reading of history, 
which is described by Bulgakov as “not mere chronology, relating the 
sequence of events,” but “life experience, the experience of good and evil” 
(17), has therefore both a diagnostic and a prophetic aspect. On the one 
hand, that such experience had come to a head, and that, as a consequence, 
a kind of veil had dropped from the face of the Russian intelligentsia during 
the revolution of 1905, was axiomatic for the Vekhi authors. No longer was 
it a question of intuiting the darkness within; the darkness was there for all 
to see. For Bulgakov, the days of the revolution had revealed the “full-blown 
image of the intelligent” (21), while Struve speaks in almost identical terms: 
“the intelligentsia … became fully manifest in the revolution of 1905–
07” (118). Yet, on the other hand, the precise contours of this definitive 
revelation, for all its demonstrative power, appear to many readers of Vekhi 
to be particularly difficult to chart. This is in large part due to the fact that 
Vekhi is not primarily concerned, unlike its predecessor Problemy idealizma 
(Problems of Idealism, 1902), with the critique of philosophical and political 
systems; nor, unlike its successor Iz glubiny (Out of the Depths, 1918), is it 
focused on the study of a single historical event and its underlying causes. 
Read a hundred years after its publication, this series of essays “about the 
Russian intelligentsia” appears to its reader to be a bridge spanning its two 
sister volumes: it has neither the emotional detachment of the earlier nor 
the apocalyptic catastrophism of the later essays, yet it draws on the same 
wellspring that gave life to both. 
While Out of the Depths appropriates the full force of biblical 
apocalypticism (its title being merely the most explicit self-representation 
of authors who, in the words of Struve, were all “undergoing a common 
torment”),6 the apocalyptic context of Vekhi exists mostly in veiled form.7 
Struve, the editor of the later essays, spoke of Vekhi in the post-1917 landscape 
as “merely a timid diagnosis of the vices of Russia and a weak premonition 
of that moral and political catastrophe”8 which was to befall Russia. While 
Vekhi may not have quite the tragic purpose and feeling aroused by later 
events, Struve surely understates the import of the 1909 volume. Indeed, 
if one were to pick a biblical parallel for the continuity between the two 
volumes, one could do worse than comparing them to pre- and post-exilic 
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Jeremiah. Vekhi, taken as a whole, is a particular form of jeremiad, a lament 
that singles out not only the sins of the present but also the fruit that may 
be reaped through the perpetuation of such sin.9 It is this adumbration 
of a still uncertain future—far from timid in its discourse—that moves 
through Vekhi as a shadow-context on which the authors both consciously 
and unconsciously draw.10 In particular, the very liminality of the historical 
space in which it resides—the instability of the present moment—lends 
a portentous air to the essays’ urgent appeal to turn inward. In this threshold 
time, the emergence and propagation of evil is predicated not on historical 
events or movements but on the quality of the inner life of individuals, and 
the personal relations between them that constitute society. Good and evil 
are borne not somewhere in the ether but within concrete persons, and it 
is the contention of Vekhi that the Russian intelligentsia, as a social body, 
has become a dangerous incubator of a virulent spiritual malaise whose 
maturing fruit is envisaged in apocalyptic terms. 
A comment made by Semen Frank gives us the most concise expression 
of the Vekhi perspective on what had happened in their recent historical 
past: the “most tragic,” he writes, “and, on a superficial level, surprising 
development [s vneshnei storony neozhidannyi fakt] of our recent cultural 
history” is that “subjectively pure, disinterested, self-sacrificing devotees 
of the social faith turned out to be not only the political allies but the 
spiritual kin of robbers, murderers, hoodlums and debauchees” (153).11 
The words “on a superficial level, surprising development” (alternatively, 
“unexpected fact from an external perspective”), arrest our attention here. 
How could it be that the conscious and unconscious religious aspects of the 
intelligentsia to which each author points—Berdiaev’s “thirst for justice on 
earth that is rooted in the soul of the Russian intelligentsia” (7), Bulgakov’s 
“eschatological dream of the City of God and the future reign of justice” (21), 
Frank’s “spontaneous sense of vital love for people” (141), those defining 
characteristics that draw the Russian intelligentsia so close to authentic, 
religious maximalism (podvizhnichestvo)—could not only be corrupted but 
corrupted so definitively and so absolutely? In Bulgakov’s words from the 
dialogues that were included in the collection Out of the Depths of 1918: 
“There occurred some kind of black transfiguration: the people of God 
became a herd of Gerasene swine.”12 Apparent good somehow mutated into 
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manifest evil in the blink of an eye, and it is the nature, foundation, and 
consequences of this transformation that the Vekhi authors are at such pains 
to disclose. 
For the Vekhi authors, the answer to the dark riddle of Russian 
revolutionary experience does not lie in the prevalence of certain world-
views—atheism, nihilism, materialism, and the rest. Such trends existed in 
the west, as Bulgakov, Struve, and others point out, often in just as emphatic 
a form. Nor does the answer lie in the historical fruit of these worldviews, in 
this case revolution. “Revolution, meaning certain political actions,” writes 
Bulgakov, “does not in itself predetermine the specific spirit and ideals that 
inspire it” (38). Political uprisings, even revolutions, are not in themselves 
evil. The Vekhi contributors are very far from the political reactionaries 
they were sometimes painted to be. The source of evil, according to them, 
should rather be sought in the nature of the human possession of these 
ideals, the enervating spirit of the revolution, the inspiration that lurks 
behind the flag-waving of countless “-isms” and political maneuverings. 
But for Bulgakov and others, it is the character of this inspiration which is 
so hard to pin down. Even when they read back from its manifestations in 
Russian reality—criminality, violence, hatred—it is still hard to locate the 
point of departure from where the rot began. 
This may explain one of the indicative rhetorical devices of Vekhi: 
metaphors of clothing and dress, Bulgakov’s “inside out” being no exception. 
The effect of veiling or distorting the appearance of something is to mislead 
and confuse. Comparing German and Russian students, Aleksandr Izgoev 
writes that though the former “gets drunk, cracks stupid jokes, and behaves 
outrageously,” he does not “array his drunken cavorting in the elegant garb 
of Weltschmerz” (79). In a similar vein, Berdiaev talks about the intelligentsia 
dressing in “the European garb of Marxism” (4). Struve suggests that Herzen 
“sometimes wore the uniform, as it were, of the Russian intelligent” (121), 
and Frank uses the same word “uniform [mundir]” as Struve to talk about 
living people who have “garbed their soul in the intelligent’s moral uniform” 
(137). These metaphors relate, in part, to the superficial absorption of 
western ideas by Russian intellectuals, whereby ideals and philosophical 
trends were “signed up to” unreflectively without any inner movement on 
the part of their holders—pure “fanaticism,” as Berdiaev puts it (14). 
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Were these sartorial metaphors no more than a commentary on the 
superficiality of the Russian reception of ideas, however, their role in 
engendering the kind of urgency the Vekhi contributors wished to inculcate 
in their readers would not be nearly so great. A good deal of that urgency, 
so clearly felt even from a century’s distance, derives from the fact that 
these metaphors of veiling and unveiling, of disguise and impostorship, 
draw, whether self-consciously or otherwise, on the apocalyptic tradition 
of past Russian thought. Here the question of the quality of the political 
and philosophical culture of Russia is supplemented by wider questions 
governing the nature of good and evil, their interaction within the human 
heart, and their final resolution in a suprahistorical landscape. This 
overlaying of a larger and more comprehensive narrative atop of the Vekhi 
critique of contemporary societal ills comes into greater focus when set 
against the background of the apocalyptic imaginings of two particular 
thinkers, Bukharev and Solov’ev, whose own, peculiar interpretations 
of the two apocalyptic books of the Bible—Daniel and Revelation—are 
particularly instructive to consider in this regard. 
In 1860, Bukharev published a work entitled O pravoslavii v otnoshenii 
k sovremennosti (On Orthodoxy in Relation to the Contemporary World), 
which sought to practice a kind of biblical exegesis that could be applied 
not only to questions of doctrine or historical context but also to the 
most pressing problems of modernity. In the fourth and final chapter, he 
offers an interpretation of the prophet Daniel’s vision of the Four Beasts 
(Daniel 7:2–8).13 The vision is complex, but what Bukharev plays on is the 
element in it that endows the beasts with human characteristics. The lion 
is, according to the biblical passage, “lifted up from the ground and made 
to stand on two feet like a human being; and a human mind is given to it,” 
and on the small horn that emerges from the final beast there appear “eyes 
like human eyes.” The repetition of the word “like,” with an emphasis on 
semblance and appearance, occurs in the vision as a matter of course. The 
fact that the beast does not have human eyes but “eyes like human eyes” 
resonates with Gershenzon’s description of the intelligentsia in Vekhi as 
“man-like monsters” (61).14 Bukharev employs these human characteristics 
of the beasts to construct a new series of human and humane concerns 
that broadly correspond with many of the Russian intelligentsia’s most 
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cherished ideals, transferring the vision from the remote environment of 
Babylonian mythology to a context rich in contemporary resonance: 
Even though [a person] concern himself with the maintenance of human 
rights, even though he spend his time reasoning as to how to elevate 
human dignity, reason and the human heart, yet does not do so in the 
manner of Christ, the Son of God, his principle will still be the beast, 
even though it has “eyes like the eyes of man.” […] Even though this 
person, who does not value conformity to the Son of God himself, be 
distinguished by a multi-faceted education, even if he be in our time 
as a Hellene had been before a barbarian in the ancient world—alas, in 
his motivations we still do not see a human being but only the image of 
a lynx or a leopard, attractive to the eye and no more.15 
Bukharev is indicating that the presence of the most laudable, perhaps even 
ethically unavoidable, ideals without an inner conformity to the principle 
of authentic humanity—Christ, the Son of God—may not only mask the 
hypocrisy of the actor but itself represent the sign of the beast. The principle 
of humanity—the carrier of the image of God in the world—does not arise 
from within but is conferred from without. “A human mind is given” to 
the beast, according to the Book of Daniel. This does not render the ideals 
that emerge evil or misguided: the criterion for their judgment lies not 
here but in the source of their birth, in the heart of the intelligentsia itself. 
However strong the moral imperative of each stated ideal from an objective 
perspective, therefore, they tell us nothing about the spirit of its adoption. 
Indeed, the Russian tradition holds that the most perfect expression of the 
religious ideal in word and action may mask the purest embodiment of evil. 
“The most profound meaning of world history,” as Solov’ev said in February 
1900, “is the fact that in the final historical appearance of the evil principle 
there shall be such a great deal of good.”16
Solov’ev, in whom the apocalyptic strand of Russian thought found 
its most compelling articulation, went on, in the introductory words to 
his public reading of Kratkaia povest’ ob Antikhriste (A Short Story of the 
Antichrist, 1900), to give a kind of manifesto for the future incursion of 
evil in the world, leaning heavily, like the Vekhi authors who succeeded 
him, on the imagery of clothing. “It is required,” he said, “that the prince of 
this world be allowed to show himself toward the end from the best angle, 
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to become freely adorned in every semblance of good.”17 In the context of 
the Vekhi debate regarding the religiosity of the intelligentsia, the question 
that emerges from Bukharev and Solov’ev’s eschatology is this: does the 
semblance of authentic religious inspiration, the proximity of the soul of 
the intelligentsia to absolute good, act as a redeeming factor? Or is it, to 
the contrary, a sign of what Bulgakov terms a profound and irreconcilable 
“internal difference” in the face of “apparent, external, similarity” (24)? It 
was this point that divided the Vekhi authors: not the apparent religiosity of 
the intelligentsia, on which there was broad agreement, but the redemptive 
power of the same.
Solov’ev ended his reading of the short story that was to bewitch 
and puzzle many future Russian thinkers (in almost equal measure) with 
a short afterword, the first few sentences of which contain a summary of the 
intuition he wished to convey to his listeners: “Such is the impending and 
inevitable dénouement of world history. We shall not see it, but events of the 
not-too-distant future throw their prophetic shadow, and in our lifetimes 
more clearly and undeniably than ever do counterfeit good, fraudulent 
truth and fake beauty rise before our eyes. All the elements of the great 
deception are already before us, and our immediate descendants will see 
how all these things shall interweave and come together in one living and 
individual phenomenon, in Christ turned inside out [Khristos naiznanku], 
the Antichrist.”18 The antichrist in Solov’ev’s handling is not the archetypal 
villain but the great pretender, the agent provocateur who not only infiltrates 
the camp of the good but champions its cause: from cessation of wars to 
greater cooperation between the countries of the world to human and even 
animal rights. This is not the antipode to Christ but his mirror image—his 
projection in externality, endowed with the grand mannerisms of religiosity 
yet, to use Struve’s words, “without the content” (125). Solov’ev’s Antichrist 
is a Christ who has slipped into his opposite without even noticing it, as 
if this were a perfectly natural thing to do. He has adorned himself in the 
inner principle of human being, the Word-Logos, but he wears it inside 
out: instead of the turning to God through repentance and conversion of 
heart, there is a turning to the material world, to the surface of things. The 
ideals that animate him rise not from the intimate places of the soul but are 
entirely self-posited: they do not penetrate the surface of things since they 
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themselves derive from the surface. The interior content is spent wholly 
in externality, without remainder: in moralizing, in social construction, in 
the search for worldly over spiritual power, and in an excess of gesture and 
posturing. 
If we concentrate on the character of Solov’ev’s Antichrist alone, 
however, we miss the full picture. The Antichrist does not appear out 
of nowhere—his advent is heralded by the spread of what Solov’ev calls 
“counterfeit good, fraudulent truth and fake beauty.” He is very much 
a product of his time. And what is striking about the Vekhi critique of 
the consciousness of the intelligentsia is the prevalence of the theme 
of perverted ideals and norms in their historical appraisal of the ills of 
modernity. In each human activity the authors choose to dwell on, they 
intuit a perversion of its ideal purpose and character. In the search for 
truth, instead of the use of reason to integrate and make sense of the 
things of the world, Gershenzon sees an empty moralizing (rezonerstvo), 
a “morbid self-analysis, a ceaseless and senseless digging in the soul” that 
“deforms the natural features of things, and deprives them of their essential 
nature.” Instead of a living “legal conviction,” Bogdan Kistiakovskii sees 
a slavish bowing to law as to a coercive force. Instead of the consciousness 
of the Christian ascetic (podvizhnik), Bulgakov sees the revolutionary hero, 
mangodhood rather than Godmanhood.
Faced with this mass of perverted ideals, the Vekhi authors look 
for a measure of authenticity: a conscious or unconscious trait in the 
Russian intelligentsia that holds out a promise of redemption. Frank 
finds such a trait in the “spontaneous sense of vital love for people” that 
at any given moment of its historical existence saves the intelligentsia 
from diving into the abyss, the “one thing” that “atoned” for everything 
else (141). Many of the Vekhi authors stress this commitment to self-
sacrifice, the kenotic strain in the psychology of the Russian intelligentsia 
of active self-giving in love, which constitutes a central part of their reli- 
giosity.19 
But what if even love itself can be corrupted? What if there is a form of 
self-giving that, far from affirming the other, weighs it down and deprives it 
of its essential nature? It is this possibility that Bulgakov explores five years 
after the publication of Vekhi in a 1914 article on Dostoevskii’s The Devils, 
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which adds the final component to his reflections on the adaptability of evil 
in taking on the form of the good. 
Describing the love that exists between Stavrogin and Lise, he writes: 
These are not the wings with which the soul soars into the eternal blue 
of the heavens. These are fetters, demonic charms. This is love turned 
inside out [liubov’ naiznanku], love-hate, which also possesses a certain 
clarity of vision, only not of good but of evil, seeing in the beloved and, 
at the same time, hated person not a creation of divine love but the spoils 
of hell.20 
Here is a love that does not free but imprisons, a love that in its practice has 
dissolved in its opposite. Bulgakov’s description of such satanic love enables 
us to complete the three potential stages of the great deceit. We have, first, 
the general mind-set of the intelligentsia: religiosity turned inside out, 
mangodhood rather than Godmanhood; second, the activity that results 
from this mind-set on society and the world around it: love turned inside 
out, love-hate; and third, the final, individual embodiment of both: Christ 
turned inside out, the mangod, Antichrist. In each stage, the perversion 
of the ideal does not present us, at least not until the final unmasking, 
with a transformation of good into evil, accompanied by the gradual, or 
even sudden, extinguishing of the former. Rather, it is the undifferentiated 
presence of the two poles at a single point, or in a continuum where their 
differentiation loses all its meaning. As Williams has written in the context 
of The Devils: “The recording of events as a single continuum without value 
and continuation leaves us with a mangled idea of freedom and even of 
truthfulness. If all we have before us is a continuum which includes equally 
horror and beauty, the horror is worse than it would otherwise be because 
there is no way of putting it into a context where it can be healed or modified. 
It just happens.”21 It is the reality of such a continuum that Dostoevskii 
portrays in the character of Stavrogin, whose very name expresses the 
presence of the two poles in one individual—the cross (Greek: stavros) 
and the apocalyptic horn (Russian: rog) of Daniel—and whose ascent to 
his death in a loft-attic encapsulates the fates of both Christ and Judas.22 
Stavrogin leads people to their dooms through advocating any number of 
ideals classifiable under various -isms; yet these ideals come from a place of 
absolute indifference: they belong not to him but to the grey matrix of this 
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indifference. “How I wish you were hot or cold,” quotes Tikhon to him from 
Revelation, “but as you are lukewarm, I will spit you out of my mouth.”23
Recalling Dostoevskii’s famous epigraph to Brat’ia Karamazovy (The 
Brothers Karamazov, 1880), “Here God battles with the devil, and the 
battleground is the human heart,” the problem of Stavrogin takes on an 
additional dimension. What he represents is not the epitome of evil but 
the absence of any kind of battle between the warring principles, which in 
its own way is more terrifying. The battle that takes place within his soul 
continues, as it does in every living soul, but Stavrogin does not actualize 
it, since his will does not, cannot, give assent to the choice of either good or 
evil, instead resting in absolute indiscrimination. And without that battle, 
the human person, argues Bulgakov, itself not being evil since it is made 
in the image of God, becomes a channel for evil: it literally ceases to exist, 
or slips into non-being. Bulgakov here talks of the “absence of the living 
Stavrogin, his existence as mask [lichinnost’].”24 The outer form persists as 
a hollow shell, and it is the inspiration of this mask that gives birth to the 
pseudo-religious transformation of the characters that surround him: to 
the mangodhood of Kirillov, the God-bearing nationalism of Shatov, and 
the murderous nihilism of Verkhovenskii. The triune arc of deification 
according to the Christian model—God, humanity, world, where the 
energies of God are channelled through humanity onto society and the 
world around it—is here fundamentally transformed. Humanity and God 
shift places: Godmanhood is replaced by mangodhood. The human form, 
divested of its belonging to God at its innermost core, wears its God-bearing 
interiority on the outside, and seeks to use its own external words, actions, 
and thoughts to deify its environment. Yet what is deified in the process is 
sheer emptiness, a form with no content, the absent humanity of Stavrogin. 
This absence begets not a form of Prometheanism—a rebellion against God 
and the ways of God—but rather the loss of religious consciousness per se, 
the elimination of any residual significance that the terms “good” and “evil” 
might once have had. 
It is the fear of such an outcome that is expressed by Bulgakov in Out 
of the Depths through the mouth of the social activist: “If only our people 
were theomachists, mutineers against all that is sacred; this at least would 
constitute a negative self-testament of their religious spirit. More often than 
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not, though, they simply behave as louts and cattle who have nothing to 
do with faith whatsoever. As if there were no demons in them at all, for 
what would demons do with them? From demonic possession one can 
be healed, but not from bestiality.”25 Such bestial indifference eats away at 
core human attributes such as belonging, loyalty, and responsibility. Here 
the goal becomes not internal participation in events but the provoking of 
certain external effects in those around you, for no other purpose than the 
simple possibility of so doing. 
In his essay on The Devils, Bulgakov states that Dostoevski had “treated 
in artistic terms the question of political provocation, understood not only 
in a political sense but in a more profound, experiential-religious sense.”26 
From Stavrogin, whom Bulgakov terms a “spiritual provocateur,” there 
emerges “the provocateur-betrayer, the ‘colleague’ who gives away the 
secrets of the party for money. [He is] a degeneration of this type, its reverse 
side, or its elaboration and pollution, though most probably inevitable.”27 
The degeneration of the more complex figure of Stavrogin into a political 
chameleon brings to mind a figure whose shadow is cast across the Vekhi 
essays: Evno Azef, whom Izgoev describes as the “foremost hero of the day” 
(83), and who indeed conforms like no other to all that Bulgakov has to say 
on the nature of revolutionary heroism. 
A double-agent and provocateur, Azef was involved in terrorist acts 
for the Social Revolutionaries while at the same time informing on his 
colleagues in his role as spy for the Okhrana, the Imperial secret police. 
Although much doubt has recently been cast on his actual character and 
activities,28 what is clear is that by the time of the writing of Vekhi, barely 
a month after his unmasking in February 1909, he had become a sort of 
cipher, a receptacle into whom Russian idealist philosophers poured the 
eschatological forebodings of the thinkers of the past century. “Is Azef-
Verkhovenskii,” asked Bulgakov, putting together his name with one of 
Stavrogin’s spiritual children, “and azefshchina as a whole merely a chance 
phenomenon in the history of the Revolution, an abnormal growth that 
may never have been? Or can we see in it, to the contrary, its core spiritual 
disease?”29 In his essay for Vekhi, Bulgakov highlights the moment of 
personal discernment in the case of Azef, when you can “no longer tell 
where the revolutionary ends and the police agent or provocateur begins” 
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(32). Azef can be seen, and was certainly so interpreted, as the historical 
fulfillment of the apocalyptic incarnation of evil as interpreted by Russian 
thinkers. A resident of two worlds, with strong links to neither yet ready 
to give himself in service to either one, Azef exists on the same continuum 
as Bukharev’s beast, Solov’ev’s Antichrist, and Dostoevskii’s Stavrogin. He 
is both betrayed and betrayer, yet exists in this contradiction in absolute 
indifference. In the evocative words of Vasilii Rozanov, “it was decided to 
crush the Christ of the Revolution by the Judas of that selfsame Revolution: 
to open wide the garment of Christ and under it reveal Judas.”30 
Yet the question here is not only about the mark of the beast—the 
character of evil’s appearance in the world—but about the kind of society 
that facilitates such an appearance. “Azef was some kind of unique monster, 
and the names ‘satan’ and ‘satanic’ were often pronounced alongside his 
name,” wrote Rozanov.31 For the latter, however, the most incredible thing 
was not that this monster existed, but that he could have been believed for 
so long. “The whole matter rests in the inability to perceive,” he wrote in 
a response to Vekhi. The revolutionaries “knew his uniform but did not 
know his soul.”32 Great deception can only work on those who are spiritually 
unequipped for its possibility. The uniform fooled them precisely because 
they had physical eyes, but not spiritual ones.
It was to the nature of spiritual discernment in the apocalyptic context 
of post-revolutionary Russia that Bulgakov would dedicate much of his 
later writing. In 1931, he returned to the theme of betrayal and redemption 
in an essay on Judas Iscariot. His major concern in this piece is not to 
condemn the sin of the archetypal betrayer, nor is it to offer a moralistic 
teaching on the corruptibility of good intention. Rather, he attempts to 
disclose the “mystery of Christ and Judas” as a certain “hieroglyph of fate,” 
and the reader is left in no doubt that the fate he has in mind is that of 
the Russian nation.33 “The tragedy of the apostle-betrayer, his terrible fate, 
stands before us with imploring eyes. It has become now our own fate, 
not personal, but national.”34 Each one of the characteristics with which 
he, alongside other intellectuals of the Russian diaspora, had characterized 
the Russian intelligentsia are here ascribed to Judas, who is described as 
a “monomaniac [odnodum],” a person “blinded by utopia” who above all 
“needed a task” to which to dedicate himself.35 
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Bulgakov is no longer trying to warn of the adaptability of evil to all 
semblances of good, as did Solov’ev and Bukharev in the century before 
him, but instead to reveal the apostle in the betrayer, and the betrayer in the 
apostle, in such a way that neither dissolves in the other, both remaining as 
aspects of an antinomy that is never subsumed in identity. It is an attempt, 
it may be suggested, to understand the Christ-Judas mystery—the ultimate 
crux theologiae according to Bulgakov—sacramentally, as the very economy 
of the Gospel, the inner spring on which all else rests. The atheistic movement 
in Soviet Russia is here interpreted as neither anti-religious nor pseudo-
religious at first, but as a moment in the soul of a nation which can only be 
fully comprehended when taken in the fullness of its linkages with historical 
time. One needs, wrote Bulgakov, “to understand the contradictions in the 
Russian soul in their connection, as the disclosure of one whole, linking the 
past with the present and the future.”36 For Bulgakov, only in so doing could 
one intuit that this “diseased love for Christ, this struggle against Christ in 
the name of the truth of Christ” is actually “titanic, that is, simultaneously 
heroic and demonic.”37 Just as God sends Judas on his path of misery “in 
order to lead him to redemption,”38 “in the Christ-murdering hearts and 
souls of Russia there is concealed Christ’s Resurrection.”39 This may be 
wishful thinking, born of desperation; there may even be something to 
Ivan Il’in’s accusation that Bulgakov had spoken “in defense of Judas the 
Betrayer in an attempt to proclaim him the patron saint of the Russian 
people (for ‘we too have betrayed Christ’).”40 Bulgakov, however, is not 
trying to force a silver lining onto the most inappropriate of rainclouds. His 
is not the facile mission of the theodicists against whom Vissarion Belinskii 
spoke so forcibly at the beginning of the Russian intelligentsia’s path to self-
discovery.41 Suffering and evil are not justified through their involvement in 
a narrative or sophistic dialectic which will supposedly result in the triumph 
of the good. Nor is Bulgakov’s view wholly aligned to that of his fellow 
Vekhi contributor Berdiaev, who in his 1923 work Novoe srednevekov’e (The 
New Middle Ages) depicted European civilization as having removed itself 
altogether from the battle between good and evil through a kind of inner 
banality, arguing that “Russia would rather give birth to the antichrist than 
to a humanistic democracy and neutral humanistic culture.”42 The anti-
Christian values of a Soviet-style regime are not, in Bulgakov’s view, by 
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some mystical proximity in distance closer to authentic Christianity than 
are the values of a secular society which has lost a sense of both divine and 
demonic. Indeed, as we have seen, it was the absoluteness of such a loss—
the lukewarmness of Stavrogin, the abolition of any distinction between 
good and evil—that he regarded as the essence of the Russian condition. 
Instead, he saw the revolution in Russia as an unprecedented call to an 
entire nation to turn away from outward planning toward the only place 
that remained: the interior space of authentic humanity. This call was not 
closer to its desired destination by virtue of its residence at the opposite 
pole. But it was more pressing because of the radical nature of the choice 
facing Russia and the Russian intelligentsia. 
In his contribution to Out of the Depths, Sergei Askol’dov draws on the 
Parable of the Tares from the Gospel of Matthew (Matthew 13:24–30) to 
paint a picture of the contemporary state of the Russian nation: 
In all this great fortitude, in the non-acceptance of evil inside one’s 
soul, in the practical resistance to it, alongside the crafts of evil—indeed 
already in some ways differentiating themselves from these—are there 
not maturing in the people’s soul yet other holy crafts for that battle 
which will take place in the final days, in those days when to take part in 
the antichristic state will be an unforgivable sin, a definitive alignment 
under the banner of the enemy of Christ? So alongside the choking tares 
there grows good wheat, the number of the righteous is continually 
being renewed, and the spiritual qualities needed for the creation of the 
new organism of the Kingdom of God are coalescing.43
Askol’dov’s choice of biblical allusion is not accidental, and it illuminates the 
particular constellation of Christian eschatology and Russian experience 
that lurks behind so many of the earlier arguments of the Vekhi authors. The 
word translated into English as “tares” (in modern translations, “weeds”) 
refers to the plant commonly known as darnel (Lolium temulentum), 
whose seeds are sown amongst the good (wheat) seeds by an enemy “while 
everybody was asleep” (13:25). Darnel is so like wheat in appearance that in 
the early stages of its growth it is all but indistinguishable from the genuine 
article.44 There is no external criterion fully capable of telling them apart, 
just as is the case for the good and ill of the Russian revolution. Through 
its description of the growth of the wheat alongside the darnel, the parable 
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introduces, in the words of the contemporary theologian Robert Capon, 
a parallel insistence on the cosmic reach of God’s kingdom and what he 
calls the “catholicity of evil […] the radical intermixture of goodness and 
badness in the world.”45 Moreover, unlike other Gospel parables of judgment, 
the ground is not nurtured for the production of evil, which appears as 
if from nowhere: “There is no openness here, none of the simplicity that 
characterizes the straightforward hostility of the birds or the rocky ground 
or the thorns. Rather, there is the full-blown paradox of the appearance 
of evil in a situation where there is absolutely no reason to expect it.”46 
These words bring to mind once more Frank’s bewilderment at the peculiar 
convergence of selfless revolutionary and callous murderer in the events of 
1905, which were “on a superficial level [s vneshnei storony]” a “surprising 
development” (153). How could this occur? Who is to blame? According 
to the parable, the bad seed is sown by an enemy who works while the 
laborers are sleeping, and it is this sleep, not the conscious intentions or 
even unconscious urges of the sowers, that facilitates the incursion of evil 
onto the land. In the interpretation of Filaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, 
sleep in this context means “carelessness and a lack of vigilant attention 
both to oneself and one’s actions.”47 It is this “sleep” from which the Vekhi 
authors wish to awaken their readers, in order to direct them once more 
toward the imperatives of constant self-judgment, self-questioning, and 
self-doubt.
Vekhi was a call to regain a sense of human involvement in the history 
of a nation, and a world, that avoided the extremes of absolute control and 
absolute helplessness. Its demand for a return to fostering inner life—in 
Bulgakov’s words, for the intelligentsia to “be corrected not from without 
but from within” (34), should be seen not only in the context of a return to 
traditional values, to the prerogatives of personal spirituality over external 
organization, but also in the sense of a re-equipping for the spiritual struggle 
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Dmitrii Sergeevich Merezhkovskii (1865–1941) was a seminal thinker. In 
the 1890s, he popularized Nietzsche’s thought and reawakened Russians’ 
interest in antiquity and in the classics of world literature, and his lecture 
“O prichinakh upadka i o novykh techeniiakh v sovremennoi russkoi 
literature” (“On the Causes of the Decline and on the New Trends in 
Russian Literature,” 1892, published 1893) became the manifesto of Russian 
symbolism.1 In the early twentieth century, he pioneered the study of Fedor 
Dostoevskii, Nikolai Gogol’, and Lev Tolstoi as religious writers and co-
founded the Religious-Philosophical Society of St. Petersburg (1901–03, 
1906–17), which helped inspire a religious revival. The members were called 
“God-seekers” even though most of them were already believers, because 
they were seeking a new interpretation of Christianity. During and after 
the revolution of 1905, he advocated a religious revolution. Throughout, 
he opposed materialism, rationalism, utilitarianism, and positivism. He 
promoted his ideas in articles, book-length essays, and historical novels, 
and at meetings of the Religious-Philosophical Society. Newspapers 
reported on Merezhkovskii’s attack on Vekhi and on his polemics with 
Petr Struve, a prominent Constitutional Democrat and a contributor to 
Vekhi.2 Merezhkovskii’s attack on Vekhi was part of a larger polemic with 
Struve and certain other Vekhi authors on such issues as the state, economic 
development, and rule by law. 
A radical by temperament and by conviction, Merezhkovskii 
perpetuated the anarchistic, utopian strain of Russian cultural history, 
without the atheism. His apocalypticism mingled with other apocalyptic 
scenarios circulating in Russia since 1900. 
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This article will describe Merezhkovskii’s attack on Vekhi, as well as 
responses to his attack, and analyze the larger polemics of which it was part. 
His attack merits detailed attention because it was one of the “landmark” 
responses to Vekhi, prompting in itself further responses. It also provides 
a particularly rich picture of the complex and contested cultural, religious, 
and political landscape in which Vekhi—and the polemics around it—were 
created. Moreover, Merezhkovskii’s starting point and certain aspects of 
his intellectual genealogy share much with those of most, if not all, of the 
Vekhi contributors, to which can be added their common participation in 
initiatives such as the Religious-Philosophical Society. So, first, a few words 
on Merezhkovskii’s views before 1908, the year his polemics with Struve 
began.
Merezhkovskii’s Views Before 1908
In the 1892 lecture mentioned above, Merezhkovskii decried the 
intelligentsia’s emphasis on political and social issues to the exclusion of 
metaphysical questions, aesthetic criteria, and the “inner man” (the soul or 
the psyche). Here, therefore, and as noted above, he starts from a position 
not at all dissimilar to that of Vekhi. He accused the intelligentsia of 
curbing self-expression and stifling imagination and creativity, insisted that 
religious faith is a basic human need, and predicted that symbolism would 
lead to new religious truths and, eventually, to a new culture characterized 
by beauty, creativity, and freedom.
Merezkhovskii’s version of symbolism was a surrogate religion, a re-
ligion of art, but it did not assuage his fear of death. So around 1896, he 
concluded that there are two eternal truths, paganism (enjoyment of life) 
and Christianity (personal immortality), that must be reconciled. In 1899, 
he “turned to Christ.” In 1900, he declared that “historical Christianity” (the 
Christianity preached in the churches) was obsolete because the Second 
Coming was imminent. Jesus Christ Himself would grant humankind 
a Third Revelation (a Third Testament) that would solve all problems and 
reconcile all polarities, including paganism and Christianity, flesh and 
spirit, and East and West. From then on, Merezhkovskii cast all problems 
in terms of an eschatological dualism that only divine intervention 
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could resolve. Very few intellectuals believed in a forthcoming Third 
Revelation, but his idea that Christianity had to be reinterpreted was widely 
accepted.
In November 1901, Merezhkovskii, Zinaida Gippius (his wife), and 
Dmitrii Filosofov (also known together as “the Merezhkovskiis”), obtained 
the government’s permission to organize the Religious-Philosophical 
Meetings of St. Petersburg as a “mission to the intelligentsia.” The meetings 
featured reports by clergymen or lay intellectuals, followed by discussion, 
on such issues as the Orthodox Church’s excommunication of Tolstoi, 
Christian attitudes to sex, and whether new Christian dogma is needed 
and if so, who has the power to create it. The lay intellectuals were mostly 
symbolist poets and anti-positivist philosophers. The minutes of the 
meetings were published in Novyi put’ (The New Way, 1903–04), a review 
founded by the Merezhkovskiis for that purpose.
The government closed down the Religious-Philosophical Meetings in 
April 1903, charging that they provided a “forum for heresy.” Merezhkovskii 
was so outraged that he declared that autocracy is from the anti-Christ. Up 
to that point, he had eschewed political and social questions. The meetings 
resumed as the Religious-Philosophical Society after the Revolution of 1905 
and continued until 1917. The Moscow Religious-Philosophical Society 
(1906–1917) was modeled on the St. Petersburg one. Several Vekhi authors 
were members of the Moscow Society.
In view of all this, one would expect Merezhkovskii to hail Vekhi, 
but he did not. He lambasted it, because he had come to the following 
conclusions: first, that the revolution of 1905 had religious significance: it 
was the beginning of the Apocalypse, the prelude to the establishment of the 
Kingdom of God on Earth; second, that the atheistic intelligentsia was the 
carrier of the Christian principle of freedom, it was practicing “Christianity 
without Christ”; third, that Jesus was a revolutionary and Christianity and 
revolution are two aspects of the same phenomenon, with Christianity 
being “revolution in the divine category” and revolution “religion in the 
human category”; and fourth, that autocracy, Orthodoxy, and meshchanstvo 
(philistinism) were faces of The Beast, but since autocracy was dead 
and Orthodoxy was dying, meshchanstvo was the most dangerous face.3 
Implicitly, meshchanstvo included such bourgeois values as moderation, 
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compromise, practicality, material well-being, personal responsibility, and 
self-discipline, some of the very qualities promoted by the Vekhi authors. 
Merezhkovskii urged Russians to turn the political revolution into 
a “religious revolution” that would culminate in a society in which Jesus 
Christ is the only ruler; love is the only law; and the “truths” of anarchism 
and socialism (personal freedom and community, respectively) have 
been reconciled. Merezhkovskii’s “religious revolution” featured the 
destruction of the state, the death of the Orthodox Church, and its rebirth 
as a revolutionary body, an ally of the intelligentsia in a fight for freedom. 
Politically, he was closest to the anarchistic Social Revolutionaries (SRs), 
even meeting with some of them in October 1905. In January 1906, 
fearful of publishing their book Le Tsar et la Révolution in Russia, the 
Merezhkovskiis left for Paris; they returned to St. Petersburg in July 1908. 
By then, a “second wave” of symbolists—Aleksandr Blok, Andrei Belyi, 
and Viacheslav Ivanov—had emerged, but Merezhkovskii was still in- 
fluential.
His “religious revolution” entailed a new set of eschatological dualisms. 
In the essay “Prorok russkoi revoliutsii (k iubileiu Dostoevskogo)” 
(“Dostoevskii, Prophet of the Russian Revolution,” 1906), he counterposed 
earth and heaven and interpreted the revolution of 1905 as a revolt of the 
earth against the otherworldliness of “historical Christianity.” In an essay 
titled “Revoliutsiia i religiia” (“Revolution and Religion,” 1907), he treated 
the Roman papacy and the Russian tsardom (tsarstvo) as negative dualisms 
that originated in the same idea, theocracy, but proceeded along opposite 
paths. In the west, the Roman papacy became a state. In the East, the state 
absorbed the church. “In both cases there occurred the identical abolition of 
the Church, the kingdom of love and freedom, the kingdom of God, by the 
state, the kingdom of enmity and violence, the kingdom of godlessness.”4 
According to Merezhkovskii, autocracy reflects, in external political form, 
an internal religious need, the need of the human soul for Divine oneness, 
monotheism: one tsar on earth, one God in heaven. That is why the 
overthrow of the Russian autocracy has “deep religious significance” (189). 
The bulk of “Revolution and Religion” was devoted to the interplay of 
the two phenomena in Russia from the time of the Old Believers (the first 
dissidents, in his view) to Nikolai Novikov, Petr Chaadaev, Gogol’, Vladimir 
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Solov’ev, Tolstoi, Dostoevskii, and the Russian decadents (symbolists 
in the 1890s); the latter were the “first self-generated mystics in Russian 
educated society outside any church tradition” (214). In the last section, he 
proclaimed that “The end of Orthodoxy is the end of Autocracy and vice 
versa…. There is no Orthodoxy without the Roman Caesar just as there is 
no Catholicism without the Roman archpriest.” By the “end of Orthodoxy” 
he meant the triumph of the “new religious consciousness,” that is, the 
triumph of his interpretation of Christianity: “Only the lie of Orthodoxy 
[Autocracy] is rejected” (218–19). When the revolutionary and religious 
movements fuse, Russia will emerge from the “Orthodox Church and the 
Autocratic Tsardom into the universal church of the One Archpriest and 
the universal Tsardom of the one Tsar—Christ” (221).
Clearly, Merezhkovskii and the Vekhi authors were on different 
wavelengths. Merezhkovskii favored extreme solutions, opposed politics 
and law per se, rejected nationalism,5 and expected a miraculous break 
with the old order. As Marshall Shatz and Judith Zimmerman point out, his 
attack on Vekhi “was an attack on the contributors’ recognition, in various 
ways, of Russia’s need for a solid structured, autonomous set of political 
and social institutions…. Hence Signposts criticized the intelligentsia for its 
negative attitudes toward the main elements of this structure: the state, the 
rule of law, national consciousness, historical tradition, etc. Hence also, the 
book’s rejection of revolution in favor of gradualism, political education, 
and respect for historical continuity.”6 
Merezhkovskii’s At tack on Vekhi
Merezhkovskii titled his attack on Vekhi, made in April 1909, “Sem’ 
smirennykh” (“Seven Humble Men”).7 He starts out by saying that it is 
difficult to tell the truth to those one is close to, and he was close to some 
of the Vekhi authors. Nevertheless, he has decided to speak out because the 
matter is so important. He also writes that in judging the Vekhi authors, 
he is judging his former self (“In beating them, I beat myself ”), but that 
his mea culpa should not be taken as an attempt to “sugarcoat” the pill; its 
bitterness may be the saving medicine (71). There is thus a complex and 
polemical combination of self-knowledge and superior sagacity, and of 
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turning the rhetorical weaponry of Vekhi back on itself, in Merezhkovskii’s 
attack. 
“Seven Humble Men” consists of a series of bullet-like summaries of 
the articles followed by longer attacks on those by Sergei Bulgakov, Mikhail 
Gershenzon, and Struve. Merezhkovskii pounced on words or phrases 
that struck him as particularly outrageous, in some instances magnifying 
them to the point of distortion and/or pushing them to an extreme 
conclusion. That said, he raised important questions and deployed his 
extensive knowledge of Russian and European history and literature in his 
attack.
Merezhkovskii began his onslaught with a reference to Raskol’nikov’s 
dream (in Dostoevskii’s novel Prestuplenie i nakazanie [Crime and 
Punishment, 1866,]) in which a little mare yoked to a huge wagon is beaten 
to death for not heeding the owner’s commands. The wagon, Merezhkovskii 
explained, is Russia; the little mare is the Russian intelligentsia, and the Vekhi 
authors beat her with words. Nikolai Berdiaev accuses the intelligentsia of 
“populist obscurantism”; Semen Frank, of “sectarian fanaticism”; Bulgakov, 
of “social hysteria”; Bogdan Kistiakovskii, of “lack of legal consciousness”; 
and Struve, of “bottomless frivolity.” Gershenzon calls the intelligentsia 
a “frightened herd,” an “assembly of the sick.” Aleksandr Izgoev indicts it 
for “onanism, the sexual life of a seventeen-year-old” (72).
“Suddenly the little horse kicks: the intelligentsia affirms that it has the 
all-purifying fire—liberation” (72), but the beating continues. Gershenzon 
reviles the intelligentsia as a “monster that looks like a human being.” 
Bulgakov condemns it for “heroic sanctimoniousness” and “self-deification” 
and calls it a “legion of demons.” Frank accuses the intelligentsia of 
a “Hottentot morality”8 and “hooliganistic violence”; Izgoev charges it with 
“murder, plunder, thievery, of all kinds of debauchery and provocation.”
“But the little mare doesn’t die.” With her last strength, she tries to pull 
the wagon. Still, the beating goes on. Gershenzon urges the intelligentsia to 
bless the state authorities (vlast’) that with bayonets and prisons still protect 
us from the people’s wrath (72). Merezhkovskii found this (infamous) 
statement particularly outrageous, and repeated it (80).
“Suddenly there is a miraculous transformation.” Like the little boy 
in Raskol’nikov’s dream, Bulgakov embraces the dead mare. The Russian 
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intelligentsia becomes the beautiful Shulamite seeking her beloved (in 
the Song of Songs). This is an allusion to Bulgakov’s statement that the 
intelligentsia, having refused Christ, unconsciously yearns for Him. “He 
stands and knocks at that heart, that proud, recalcitrant intelligentsia 
heart…. Will His knock someday be heard?” “Seven humble men,” 
Merezhkovskii continued sardonically, seven colors of the rainbow that 
merge into one whiteness, into a “common cause” (49). 
Turning to Gershenzon’s “Preface,” Merezhkovskii noted that the 
words “faith” and “religious” are in quotation marks for good reason. The 
Vekhi authors have different faiths. Berdiaev and Bulgakov are Orthodox 
Christians. Struve, if he is a Christian at all, is not Orthodox. Gershenzon, 
Frank, and Izgoev are believers, but not Christians. Kistiakovskii’s religion 
is unknown. Actually, Struve was Orthodox. Gershenzon, Frank, and 
Izgoev were Jewish, but Gershenzon has been called a “Jewish Slavophile” 
and Frank converted to Christianity in 1912. 
Gershenzon also said that despite “seeming contradictions,” i.e., on 
the “religious” nature of the intelligentsia, the contributors have a common 
platform, namely that the “inner life of the individual is the only creative 
force in human society.” Merezhkovskii vehemently objected to this 
statement, not because he disputed the importance of the “inner life of the 
individual,” but because, in his view, affirming that the individual is the 
only creative force in human society “means that there is no Christianity,” 
because “Christianity affirms that the creative force of the person (lichnost’) 
is not the only one, that the religious limit of the person is union, sobornost’, 
sociality, the church as the body of Christ, a new divine-human I, only in 
which can the fullness of every separate human being be realized” (74). 
Sobornost’, the social ideal of the Slavophiles, Solov’ev, and many others, 
connotes an organic community whose members retain their individuality. 
The erudite Merezhkovskii knew that sobornost’ had an explicitly Christian 
origin, the Church as the body of Christ.
There is no personal salvation outside the social, Merezhkovskii 
continued. “‘Then all will be one, as You Father in me and I in You, and so 
they will be one in Us.’ The Church is founded on this principle; annihilate 
it and you annihilate her. If the religious force of the person is the only 
one, then there is no religious force in society, no church, no Christianity, 
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no Christ. This is not a ‘seeming contradiction’ or a small matter, but 
a bottomless abyss into which everything disappears.” 
Finding holes in the Vekhi authors’ “common platform,” Merezhkovskii 
compared them to seven doctors seeking a life-saving medicine. Berdiaev 
prescribes “religious philosophy”; Frank, “religious humanism”; Bulgakov, 
“Christian asceticism”; Struve, “a mystique of the state”; Izgoev, “love for 
life”; Kistiakovskii, an “authentic legal consciousness”; and Gershenzon, 
“making the monster into a human being.” They seek the truth (pravda), 
but truth is not love and a rainbow is not a bridge (over the abyss). 
Indeed, their “common platform” is only a common hatred, 
Merezhkovskii charged. In so doing, he turns a key aspect of the Vekhi 
critique against Vekhi itself and uses Bulgakov to expand on his theme. The 
basic idea of the symposium, the hidden axis around which everything turns, 
is encapsulated in Bulgakov’s words: “The concept of revolution is negative; 
it has no independent content, but is characterized only by destructiveness. 
Therefore the pathos of revolution is hatred and destructiveness.” Bulgakov 
did not say this in Vekhi. What he did say is that the Russian revolution 
developed enormous destructive energy, like a great earthquake, but that its 
constructive forces were much weaker. Still, Merezhkovskii had a point. It 
was their opposition to revolution that united the Vekhi authors.
Bulgakov’s conclusion is implicit but obvious, Merezhkovskii 
contended. If revolution is destruction, hatred, and negation, then reaction, 
the restoration of what has been destroyed, is creation; the extinction of 
hatred is love and the negation of a negation is an affirmation. Finally, 
if revolution is anti-religion, then reaction is religion and perhaps the 
reverse, religion is reaction, a conclusion already reached by the enemies 
of religion (75–76). This is an example of Merezhkovskii’s practice of 
taking a statement to an extreme conclusion, thereby misrepresenting the 
author’s views. Here is another example: “Following Bulgakov’s conclusion, 
we proceed from a ‘terrible judgment’ on the Russian intelligentsia, the 
Russian revolution, to a ‘terrible judgment’ on all European culture,” which 
was forged in the crucible of revolution. Here, he exaggerates Bulgakov’s 
anti-Europeanism. But Merezhkovskii was right when he observed that 
Christian ascetics esteemed by Bulgakov as the possessors of Christ’s 
truth (istina) regarded all European culture as anti-Christian and that St. 
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Seraphim of Sarov condemned the entire Enlightenment as the work of 
the anti-Christ. 
Merezhkovskii then posited two conceptions of world history. One 
affirms endlessness, perpetual development, the inviolable law of causality. 
For this conception, free will, the indispensable premise of religion, is 
a metaphysical and teleological superstition. The other conception affirms 
an end, a break, overcoming the external law of causality by inner freedom, 
by the intrusion of the transcendental order into the empirical, which 
seems to be a miracle but is really the fulfillment of another law, a higher law 
incommensurate with the empirical. Every development is a preparation, 
a maturation, the beginning of a break, the beginning of the end. The 
freedom of the Son is not the destruction but the fulfillment of the law 
of the Father. The first conception is scientific, evolutionary; the second is 
religious, revolutionary. In the last analysis, and only in the last analysis, 
they are not opposed. Every break is a limit, the end of development, a goal 
in the teleological order. Every development is a preparation, a maturation, 
the beginning of a break, the “beginning of the end,” a cause in the 
determinist order. In this sense, evolution and revolution are two sides, the 
immanent and the transcendental, of the universal historical dynamic (76).
The apocalypse was given to us as a primarily Christian understanding 
of world history, Merezhkovskii continued, “catastrophic, revolutionary, 
bounded, and cut short.” Lightning, thunder, fire, and earthquakes, 
are vessels of the anger of the Lord. Battles, uprisings, national defeats 
(presumably he had the Russo-Japanese War in mind), horses knee-deep 
in blood, corpses of kings devoured by birds of prey, all these signify the 
fall of the Great Babylon, the greatest of all revolutions, the final storm. 
Compared to this, all previous revolutions are pallid summer lightning. 
Babylon, the Kingdom of the Beast, is indeed destroyed, but the Kingdom 
of God is created. “The rapture [vostorg] of destruction is the rapture of 
the creator; the rage of hatred is the rage of love.” But Bulgakov sees only 
negation, only hatred and destruction, while to Struve the apocalypse is 
only an anecdote (Merezhkovskii here exaggerates by trivialization Struve’s 
opposition to the apocalyptic mind-set). Summarizing this aspect of his 
critique of Vekhi, Merezhkovskii stated: “To reject the positive religious 
content not only in the empirical but in the mystical revolution means to 
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reject the apocalypse—the entire Christian eschatology, the entire Christian 
dynamic of the Coming Christ and consequently, of the Advent of Christ, 
because the Coming and the Advent are one” (77).
The revolutionary conception of world history was born in 
Christianity, Merezhkovskii contended. Only among Christian peoples do 
we find an endless search for the City of God, the unconscious teleology 
that fires the heart of the Russian people to the present day. We find it in 
the schismatic sectarians, in the intelligentsia, and in all Russian apostates. 
(Merezhkovskii’s rejection of “historical Christianity” made him an apostate 
in his own way.) This unconscious eschatological feeling is what makes the 
intelligentsia national (narodnyi)—at least, more national than the authors 
of Vekhi, who confuse Babylon with Jerusalem. For them the liberation 
movement ends with the October Manifesto. So, without the name of God, 
the intelligentsia is—according to Merezhkovskii’s polemical conclusion—
closer to God than are the Vekhi authors. The intelligentsia “is not yet with 
Christ but Christ is with them.” 9 Merezhkovskii never stopped trying to get 
the intelligentsia to accept Christ. His goal was a Christian intelligentsia.
Turning to Gershenzon’s article, “Tvorcheskoe samosoznanie” 
(“Creative Self-Cognition”), Merezhkovskii objects to the author’s negative 
view of Peter the Great and of the intelligentsia (Peter’s spiritual descendants, 
according to both Gershenzon and Merezhkovskii). In “Seven Humble 
Men,” Merezhkovskii’s view of Peter was uniformly positive.10 He praised 
Peter as the first intelligent, the first Russian apostate, and the first Russian 
revolutionary, and pointed out that none other than Aleksandr Pushkin 
called Peter the greatest revolutionary. He accused Gershenzon of wanting 
to crush Peter like a fly (an exaggeration) and of demonizing both Peter 
and the intelligentsia. “To spit on Peter means to spit in Russia’s face” (79). 
Unlike the Slavophiles, Merezhkovskii approved of Peter’s reforms, 
especially his opening of a “window on the West.” He believed that Peter 
had no choice but to subdue the obscurantist, blindly traditional church. 
Moreover, by the time Peter abolished the Patriarchate, the Orthodox 
Church was already dead, morally and spiritually. Merezhkovskii considered 
Peter’s ability to break with the past in order to make a frenzied leap into 
the future the most Russian of all Russian traits. Seeing the same trait in the 
intelligentsia, Merezhkovskii claimed that it would complete Peter’s work by 
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liberating Russia. “It was not for nothing that the Decembrist Revolt began 
at the pedestal of the Bronze Horseman” (79). He ignored Gershenzon’s 
charge that the intelligentsia stifled individuality, self-knowledge, and 
personal development, charges Merezhkovskii himself had made in his 
1892 lecture and for years after that.
As for Struve’s article, “Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia” (“The Intelligentsia 
and Revolution”), Merezhkovskii lambasts Struve’s depiction of the 
intelligentsia and his apotheosis of the state. He accuses Struve of attempting 
to flee to pre-Petrine Russia and the year 1612, when the Muscovites drove 
out the Poles in a battle with anti-state “thievery.” Although Struve did 
not name the present-day Hermogens, Minins, and Pozharskiis, it is clear 
that he considered the intelligentsia the “thieves.” Struve considers anti-
religion and anti-state positions to be two sides of the same apostasy. In 
this, and only in this, according to Struve, is the key to understanding the 
revolution. To Merezhkovskii, the “key” is the intelligentsia’s religiousness, 
which Struve dismissed as a “legend.” 
To Hermogen, Minin, and Pozharskii, the mystique of the state lay in 
the idea of autocracy, Merezhkovskii continued. But where is the mystique 
in constitutional monarchy? In imperialism? In the Third Duma or 
Stolypin’s ministry as objects of faith? Struve is grasping at straws. Although 
Merezhkovskii objected to Struve’s mystique of the state, he believed that 
the people do need a mystique. The idea of Autocracy, however, is a mystical 
temptation. “Perhaps the chief sin of the intelligentsia, the chief difference 
between the Russian intelligentsia and the people, is that the intelligentsia 
not only failed to overcome this tempting mystique, but did not even feel 
it” (80). The people still do, Merezhkovskii asserted. In fact, he himself 
had succumbed to it. In his study of Tolstoi and Dostoevskii (1900–01), 
he had called the autocrat the visual symbol of God on earth. But then he 
realized that every autocrat is a pretender who attempts to take God’s place. 
Previous revolutions have resulted in the victory of yet another pretender 
(or despot), like Cromwell, Robespierre, and Napoleon. He wanted the 
Russian religious revolution to end the cycle of revolution and despotism 
altogether. 
Merezhkovskii also addressed Bulgakov’s views on autocracy. He 
quoted Bulgakov’s statement that “in the soul of the Russian people there 
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has always been a battle between the precepts of Fr. Sergius and those 
of the Zaporozhian Sech, of Razin and Pugachev.” “But Bulgakov knows 
and we know” that Father Sergius posited an unbreakable tie between 
Orthodoxy and autocracy. The intelligentsia broke, or tried to break, that 
tie—Merezhkovskii was here referring to the religiousness he discerned in 
the intelligentsia, not to their views on the Orthodox Church. He objected 
to Bulgakov’s description of the intelligentsia as a “legion of demons” and 
his desire to expel them from Russia. Like Fr. Sergius, “Bulgakov sees the 
salvation of Russia in her only national idea, in her universal historical 
calling of messianism.” The “national idea,” Bulgakov says, “is based first 
of all on messianism, into which national feeling naturally flows. That is 
how Dostoevskii, the Slavophiles, and Vladimir Solov’ev understood [it]” 
(81). This is yet another example of a certain shared heritage and ideas, 
in the context of radical ideological difference, for Merezhkovskii was 
a Slavophile and messianist too, in his own way. He believed that Russians 
were the first universal people (an idea he took from Dostoevskii), that the 
apocalypse would begin in Russia, and that the Russian spirit would save 
the world.
“Bulgakov knows and we know,” Merezhkovskii continued (conflating 
Slavophilism and the state ideology of Nicholas I), that Slavophile 
messianism consisted of three links tightly soldered together: Orthodoxy, 
autocracy, and nationality. Bulgakov wants to exclude autocracy, but what 
then, he asked, will connect Orthodoxy and nationality? What will be the 
embodiment and dynamic of the Orthodox Church outside historical 
power? These are good questions, followed by a hypothetical answer. “If 
the soul of Russia is Orthodoxy, then the body is autocracy” (81). “There 
is no soul without a body and no body without a soul. There is no Roman 
Catholicism without the Pope, the head of the Church. There is no Eastern 
Christianity without Caesar, also the head of the Church, not only in 
historical experience but according to messianic revelation” (81). In other 
words, Orthodoxy is the soul of autocracy and autocracy is the body of 
Orthodoxy.
Merezhkovskii repeated this idea in an article titled “K soblaznu 
malykh sikh” (“On the Temptation of the Little Ones”).11 The subject of 
the article was an open letter by Berdiaev to Metropolitan Antonii, in 
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response to the latter’s open letter welcoming Vekhi and condemning the 
“new religious consciousness” as a “dangerous heresy.” To Merezhkovskii’s 
dismay, Berdiaev agreed. By the time Merezhkovskii returned to St. Pe- 
tersburg, Berdiaev had returned to the Orthodox Church and was 
denouncing the “new religious consciousness” as a heresy. In the open 
letter, Berdiaev called the Orthodox Church his “spiritual mother” and 
accepted the state as necessary for sinful humanity (whereas at one point 
during the revolution of 1905 he had advocated Christian anarchism).12 
Berdiaev also said that even though “we overcame temptation” (the “new 
religious consciousness”) he realized that “for many of our brothers, 
overcoming temptation is terribly difficult.” Of course, Merezhkovskii did 
not consider the “new religious consciousness” a mere temptation. Most 
objectionable to him, however, was Berdiaev’s distinction between the 
empirical, human church, which can err, and the mystical, divine Church, 
which preserves eternal truth (istina). Merezhkovskii believed that the 
divine and the human cannot be separated; because Jesus Christ, the 
Godman, was both. He accused Berdiaev of confusing Christ and anti-
Christ and urged him to overcome that temptation (as Merezhkovskii 
himself had done): “When I began the trilogy Christ and Antichrist, it 
seemed to me that two truths existed—Christianity, the truth of heaven, 
and paganism, the truth of the earth—and that the absolute religious 
truth lay in the future union of these two truths. But as I was finishing it, 
I already knew that the union of Christ and Antichrist was a blasphemous 
lie: I knew that both truths—of heaven and earth—had already been 
united in Jesus Christ.”13
Time and again, Merezhkovskii insisted that empirical objections 
to the idea of absolute monarchy (edinovlastie) have no force, because 
the issue is not transitory forms of a single power, but its eternal limits, 
not that which is, but that which may or must be. So, “just as abuse of 
papal power does not invalidate the idea of the papacy, the abuse of 
tsarist power does not invalidate the idea of the kingdom (tsarstvo).” Even 
Dostoevskii asserted that “under autocracy such freedoms were possible 
that republicans never even day dream about.” And in Solov’ev’s theocracy, 
the tsar is the indispensable member of the triad of tsar, prophet, and 
priest. Merezhkovskii objected to Dostoevskii’s idealization of autocracy 
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and to the tsar’s central place in Solov’ev’s theocracy. In Merezhkovskii’s 
version of theocracy, Jesus is the only ruler. 
Merezhkovskii predicted that constitutional monarchy would fail 
because the people did not understand the principle of shared power. They 
would ask, “Is the Tsar the Lord’s anointed or is he not?” Seeking to regain 
their lost sense of cosmic unity, they would turn to a new and terrible form 
of Caesaropapism. He turned out to be right: Stalin became the autocrat 
and the new god. 
“Our contemporary slavophiles are groping in the dark,” Merezhkovskii 
concluded, but they would not find Russia’s “national face.” This is an 
allusion to an article by Struve, in which he accused the intelligentsia of 
an “anemic” and “colorless” cosmopolitanism.14 Merezhkovskii objected to 
aspects of slavophilism but, as noted above, was himself a Slavophile, and 
a messianist, in his own way. 
Merezhkovskii contended that Vekhi demonstrated the opposite of 
what it set out to prove. It proved instead that Russian liberation has hidden 
religious meaning and that “liberation will be religious and religion will be 
liberation” (83). He concluded his attack on Vekhi with a battle-cry that 
echoes—and outdoes—the rhetorical flourishes with which seven of the 
eight Vekhi essays end: “The Lord lives, our souls live. Long live the Russian 
intelligentsia and Russian freedom” (83). It is indicative of the complexity 
and diversity of currents around Vekhi that Vasilii Rozanov (1856–1919), 
another leading member of the St. Petersburg Religious-Philosophical 
Society, faulted Merezhkovskii’s attack on Vekhi and praised the Vekhi 
authors for battling their past, i.e., the passionate Marxist and positivist 
convictions they had once held. For Rozanov, the symposium shows that 
the intelligentsia lives, and not only lives but has a great future ahead 
of it, a limitless road. The Vekhi authors did not “kill the intelligentsia” 
(a reference to the slain mare), they killed themselves and were resurrected; 
they were buried and revived. “How can a specialist in Christian affairs 
[like Merezhkovskii] fail to understand this?” 15
At the beginning of this section, I noted that Merezhkovskii pounced 
on words and phrases he considered particularly outrageous. Reading his 
attack on Vekhi and his articles against Struve, one would not know that he 
agreed with them on matters of personal freedom and the importance of the 
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inner life, and that he shared their desire to create a new religious culture 
and a new Russian person—a new Russian person with different qualities, 
of course: Merezhkovskii’s ideal person would be daring, courageous, and 
willing to break with the past and make a frenzied leap into the future. 
A Larger Polemic I. Merezhkovskii vs. Struve
Merezhkovskii and Struve had been at loggerheads since early 1908, when 
Struve published an article titled “Velikaia Rossiia” (“Great Russia”).16 
Their dispute centered on the question of the state, and of the state and 
culture. Taking his title from Stolypin’s speech to the Second Duma, Struve 
explained that, “to us,” “Great Russia” means a new Russian statehood 
(gosudarstvennost’) “that relies on the historical past of our country and 
its living cultural traditions, but is at the same time creative, and like all 
creativity, is revolutionary in the best sense of the word.” He wanted the 
state to institute a “revolution from above” that would raise the cultural 
and economic level of the people, release their creative energies, respect 
personal freedom, emancipate the Jews, and grant autonomy to the Poles. 
Economic progress and patriotism would overcome ethnic differences and 
dampen revolutionary fervor. Apropos of foreign policy, one of Struve’s 
goals was Russian domination (both economic and cultural) of the Black 
Sea basin and the Near East. 
To accomplish all of this, the Russian state must be strong; its strength 
must be based, at least in part, on economic development, and the state 
must pursue a “politics of power.” Power is not a rational but a religious 
principle. Every vital state, for example Great Britain, always has been 
and always will be imperialistic. The idea of an eternal peace is utopian. 
“Nietzsche talked about the coldness of the state.17 On the contrary, its rays 
warm all aspects of national life.”18 
Struve considered the state a mystical entity, a living organism, a col- 
lective person. Citizens are comparable to the cells of a body and are 
motivated (partly) by will. Loyalty to the state is above reason, an expression 
of an innate human striving, religious in nature, to transcend the limited 
sphere of personal existence. The sacrifices people willingly make in war 
cannot be explained by reason alone. Struve praised Otto von Bismarck for 
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solving the Prussian political crisis of the 1860s by “taking possession” of 
the “national idea” and unifying Germany. Presumably Struve had in mind 
the impasse between the tsar and the first two Dumas. Bismarck created 
a powerful state without degrading the people or destroying the law, by 
organically combining historical traditions with new and democratic state 
institutions. Struve also praised Oliver Cromwell, calling him the most 
important creator of English state power, because he instilled self-discip-
line in the people, labor discipline in particular—a quality, he said, that 
Russians lack. 
Merezhkovskii denied each point.19 “Great Russia” is a terrible 
artificial being, like Hobbes’s Leviathan; “living Russia will stifle in its dead 
embrace.” Struve’s patriotism is another word for barbarism. Nation is 
a beast to nation. In war, one beast falls on another and bites off chunks of 
meat, he said, giving the Franco-Prussian war as an example. Bismarck is 
a “beast in capital letters.” But man is not a beast; he tries to rise above 
animal existence. 
Struve’s “politics of power” reminded Merezhkovskii of “laughing 
lions,” “blond beasts,” and other items from the Nietzschean inventory 
that Merezhkovskii claimed to have jettisoned. He also claimed that 
Struve is a utopian. Turning reaction into a revolution from above requires 
as much of a miracle as turning stones into bread, or a serpent into 
a fish. Man must strive toward religious truth. The state is not a religious 
conception: it is godless, inherently unprincipled, and hostile to human 
personality. Though Struve advocates equal rights for Jews and autonomy 
for the Poles, if raison d’état so required he would persecute them.20 
Merezhkovskii may have been right. Struve advocated equal rights for 
Jews, but he also defended the Russian people’s right to its “attractions 
and repulsions,” especially since among certain sectors of the Russian 
people “the force of repulsion from Jewry is very great.”21 A few years 
later, Struve resigned from the presidency of the St. Petersburg Religious-
Philosophical Society because he thought it devoted too much attention 
to the Beilis Case (1911–13). Mendel Beilis, a Jew, was accused of ritual 
murder, on charges trumped up by the government in order to divert 
popular anger from itself to the Jews. Merezhkovskii was one of Beilis’s 
most vociferous defenders. Rozanov’s expulsion from the Religious-
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Philosophical Society because of a series of articles in which he claimed 
not only that Beilis was guilty, but that ritual murder is a Jewish tradition, 
was largely his doing. 
Merezhkovskii also disputed Struve’s contention that the state is 
a creator of culture. Culture can flourish without a powerful state, he 
argued, giving ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, the disunited Germany 
of Goethe and Schiller, and the Jews as examples. Goethe and Schiller 
would be impossible in Bismarck’s Germany. Macedonia and Prussia 
lowered the cultural level of Athens and Weimar. The Jews, “the most 
anarchistic of all peoples,” gave the world Christianity. He did not mention 
the Ten Commandments, presumably because he rejected law per se. To 
Merezhkovskii, freedom was the absence of law. 
He also pointed out that Struve ignored the combination of 
apocalypse and revolution in Cromwell’s “prophet soldiers” as well in the 
American Puritans from whom the French Revolution borrowed the idea 
of the rights of man. Struve is a “zoological patriot” and a “maximalist” 
whose real religion is the state. 
Struve replied that Merezhkovskii’s views were “the last gasp of 
slavophilism” and, at the same time, “the last anchor of the Russian 
revolution.” By making the state his enemy, Merezhkovskii has “turned 
the police psychology inside out” and entered into the blind alley of 
pure destructiveness. Macedonian culture was the universal form of 
Hellenism; Christianity was as much a product of Hellenism as of the 
Hebrews, and the greatness of Bismarck is a historical fact. Bismarck was 
not a miracle worker (an allusion to Merezhkovskii’s belief in miracles), 
but with brilliant daring and power he managed to turn reaction into 
a revolution from above. Bismarck’s Germany gave us Wagner and 
Nietzsche. Cromwell is greater than Stenka Razin, Carlyle is greater than 
Bakunin, and the dangers of chaos and anarchy are the greatest of all. 
Merezhkovskii should realize that religious communities like Calvin’s 
Geneva are the greatest threats to personal freedom. Both he and 
Struve deployed their knowledge of European history on behalf of their 
arguments.
Struve also contended that apocalypticism does not solve real 
problems, and that Merezhkovskii’s apocalypticism is a materialization 
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of the Kingdom of God. Jesus said that “The Kingdom of God is Within 
You.” True mystics regard religion as a purely spiritual force.22 In a pre-
vious essay, Struve had given Tolstoi as an example of a purely spiritual 
Christianity. Merezhkovskii replied that Tolstoi was an anarchist and as 
such an opponent of “Great Russia” in any form. 
Filosofov (the third of the “Merezhkovskiis”) entered the fray with an 
article titled “Spor vokrug ‘Vekh’” (“The Dispute about Vekhi,” 1909). One 
of his main points is that the supra-personal Leviathan state that Struve 
advocated in “Great Russia” contradicted the liberal individualism he 
had advocated in an earlier article, “Religiia i sotsializm” (“Religion and 
Socialism,” 1909).23
Merezhkovskii and Struve disagreed on other issues as well. Struve 
opposed dogmatism in religion and politics; Merezhkovskii sought new 
Christian dogma. His article “Bor’ba za dogmat” (“Struggle for Dogma,” 1908)24 
was a response to Struve’s essay “Intelligentsiia i narodnoe khoziaistvo” (“The 
Intelligentsia and the National Economy,” 1908),25 in which Struve advocated 
a new religious attitude to the economy in order to increase production 
and sanction the creation of wealth. In this context, Struve mentioned Max 
Weber’s book on the Protestant ethic. Merezhkovskii accused Struve of 
a dogmatism of his own in the form of reliance on economic processes. 
To Merezhkovskii, dogma was the building block of a religious-social 
cosmos and the point of departure of a religious society: “Without dogma, 
cosmos becomes chaos.” The content of dogma is non-rational, outside 
reason. “Dogma is a crystal of revelation.” “Every dogma is a revelation. 
Every revelation will be a dogma.” Christian revelation is revolutionary. 
Christ rejected Jewish law and the iron yoke of Greco-Roman slavery 
in favor of freedom, he argued, and freedom is the testament of the first 
Christians.26 Merezhkovskii should have known that Jesus did not reject 
Jewish law: that was Paul’s doing. Jesus said, “Think not that I am come 
to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy but to fulfill. 
For verily, I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle 
shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled” (Matthew 5:17–18). 
Merezhkovskii interpreted Jesus’s statement to mean that there would be no 
law in the Kingdom of God on Earth. Dogma is dynamic, Merezhkovskii 
continued. It can become obsolete or turn into sterile dogmatism. For 
— 281 —
D. S. Merezhkovskii Versus the Vekhi Authors
example, the living dogma of the great (French) revolution—liberty, 
equality, fraternity—turned into “dead dogmatism, the basis of bourgeois-
capitalist slavery.” Accusing the clergy of “dogmatic scholasticism,” 
Merezhkovskii desired a new revelation of eternal truth to be resolved in 
dogma, and proclaimed that “in the final analysis, the issue is which dogma 
will save Russia.” He considered adogmatism a negative conception that 
cannot combat nihilism. “True dogma is not a burden, but wings.” “The 
struggle for a saving truth is a struggle for dogma.” “Dogma in religious 
consciousness is a ray of light; in religious activity, it is a sword.”27
Merezhkovskii and Struve called each other utopians. Merezhkovskii 
was indeed a utopian, but he raised important questions about the viability 
of a constitutional monarchy and the moral ambiguities of Struve’s “politics 
of power.” He was correct in challenging as utopian Struve’s contention that 
reaction could be turned into a revolution from above.
A Larger Polemic II. Economic Development and Rule by Law 
Berdiaev, Frank, and Bulgakov advocated economic development, not to 
enhance state power but to abolish poverty by creating wealth—material 
and spiritual—and increasing production. In his contribution to Vekhi, 
Berdiaev wrote that “in the thought and feelings of the Russian intelligentsia, 
the claims of distribution and equalization always outweighed the claims 
of production and creation” (2). In 1906, he had advocated a “neutral 
socialism” (as opposed to what he called “socialism as religion”), which 
would guarantee everyone the necessities of life. Frank asserted in his Vekhi 
essay that it was time “we advanced from distribution and the struggle for it 
to cultural creation and the production of wealth.” However, he maintained, 
in order to produce wealth, one must love it, and “the Russian intelligentsia 
does not love wealth.” Indeed, it hates and fears it. “In [the intelligentsia’s] 
soul, love of the poor turns into love of poverty” (148). And, in the same 
critical spirit, Frank argues that the intelligentsia “values only distribution, 
not production or accumulation, only equality in the enjoyment of goods and 
not their actual abundance” (150). Frank considered wealth a metaphysical 
concept that includes culture. He disapproved of the American ideal of 
mass prosperity, because he considered it overly materialistic. Like many 
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educated Europeans, he regarded Americans as uncultured; he once called 
the United States “Genghis Khan with a telegraph.” 
Bulgakov viewed the struggle with poverty as a moral obligation, 
partly because he had experienced poverty personally and had witnessed 
its destructive moral effects. In March 1909, he presented a lecture, 
“Narodnoe khoziaistvo i religioznaia lichnost’” (“The National Economy 
and the Religious Person”), in which he advocated the formation of 
an Orthodox work ethic that emphasized personal responsibility, self-
discipline, and hard work subsumed in an Orthodox metaphysics.28 His 
purpose was to combat Marxist materialism, on the one hand, and the 
apostolic communism preached by the Christian Brotherhood of Struggle 
on the other. His ideal was a modern industrialized Christian society and 
a Christian economy based on love of neighbor and the mystical unity 
of all humankind, a society in which the material necessities of life were 
available to all. 
Merezhkovskii certainly favored cultural creation, but he objected to 
emphasizing economic development, first because it was a secular goal, 
and second because the Vekhi authors who advocated it had been Marxists. 
Merezhkovskii probably viewed their desire to increase production as a re-
sidue of Marxist materialism. And since he assumed that the Apocalypse 
was imminent, he could also assume that there would be no poverty in the 
City of God on Earth. 
Merezhkovskii did not respond specifically to Kistiakovskii’s defense 
of law, even though he agreed with Kistiakovskii on personal freedom and 
the inviolability of the person. This was not just because Merezhkovskii 
opposed law per se, but also because he believed that these goals could be 
accomplished by love. Fond of contrasting “the eternal freedom of love” 
with the “eternal slavery of law,” he regarded law itself as violence and as 
a snare of the devil, who makes law appear necessary by endowing it with 
the semblance of reason.29 People obey the law not out of conviction but 
because they fear punishment. A vehement opponent of capital punishment, 
he claimed that the difference between legal force, which holds violence 
in reserve, and actual violence is only a matter of degree; both are sinful. 
Autocracy and murder are merely the most extreme forms of force. Once 
people realize that force is evil, the state will collapse. Deprived of the 
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means to enforce its will, it cannot exist. “No violence, no law; no law, no 
state.”30 Religious revolution is not violence; it is the refusal to use violence. 
After the Third Revelation, love will become an active force; people will 
find the strength to “live in love,” which they now lack. Love is Christ’s 
commandment; it is a terrible commandment because it is so difficult, but 
to deny love is to deny God. The power of love, not force and violence, must 
prevail. Only when voluntary acceptance of Christ’s law (love) replaces 
legal force will people be free.31
One would think that by refusing to accept violence, Merezhkovskii 
was advocating passive resistance (like Tolstoi), but he waffled on the use 
of terror. To him the crucial question—whether love for a higher ideal 
makes it “necessary to kill or impossible to kill”—was still unresolved. The 
solution of the religious issue of the use of force requires a miracle.32 He 
said this in a review of Kon’ blednyi (Pale Horse), a novel written by the 
SR terrorist Boris Savinkov, a personal friend. Moreover, in a final minor 
twist on the question of law, despite his rejection of it Merezhkovskii used 
the law when it suited his purpose. For example, when the government 
confiscated the manuscript of his play Smert’ Pavla I (The Death of Paul I, 
1908), Merezhkovskii sued the government under the relaxed censorship 
laws of 1906 and won. The manuscript was returned to him. Similarly, when 
the government confiscated the manuscript for his novel Aleksandr I i De-
kabristy (Alexander I and the Decembrists, 1913) he sued the government 
and got his manuscript back. 
Conclusion
Merezhkovskii’s attack on Vekhi, and his quarrel with Struve and certain 
other Vekhi authors, stemmed from profound religious and political 
disagreements. Appalled by the violence and chaos of revolution, they 
advocated a constitutional monarchy, rule by law, personal responsibility, 
and finding realistic solutions to Russia’s problems. Merezhkovskii opposed 
the state and law per se, expected divine intervention, and was willing 
to accept violence and chaos as part of the apocalyptic transition to the 
Kingdom of God on Earth. What the Vekhi authors considered virtues, 
Merezhkovskii considered meshchanstvo. Put differently, Merezhkovskii 
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was a maximalist; the Vekhi authors were moderates, though not all of them 
remained moderates. Their disagreements show that the intellectual battles 
of the time were not just between secularists and believers, but among 
believers as well.
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feuerBach, kanT, dosToevsk ii:
The Evolution of “Heroism” and “Asceticism”  
in Bulgakov’s Work to 1909
Rut h  Co at e s
Sergei Bulgakov famously structures his essay for Vekhi, “Geroizm 
i podvizhnichestvo. (Iz razmyshlenii o religioznoi prirode russkoi 
intelligentsii)” (“Heroism and Asceticism [Reflections on the Religious 
Nature of the Russian Intelligentsia]”), around the binary opposition 
expressed in its title. Sections one to four develop a portrait of the Russian 
intelligent as a self-glorifying “hero” bent on saving the Russian people, 
while sections five to seven describe the type of the Christian ascetic who 
serves the world in a spirit of humility. Bulgakov argues that Russia requires 
the second type, for the first will lead her to destruction. The worldview 
expressed in his essay is the most Christianized of all those of the Vekhi 
contributors, and, more specifically, it is the only one to be colored by 
Russian Orthodoxy. The symposium captures Bulgakov midway on his 
intellectual trajectory from orthodox Marxism via Kantian idealism to the 
Orthodox priesthood.1 The philosophical premises of his argument are 
still Kantian, but the tone is religious. Nevertheless, Bulgakov has yet to 
find his own Orthodox voice; instead he relies almost entirely upon that of 
Dostoevskii, not least for the heroism/asceticism opposition itself.
Russian Orthodox culture has always been constructed on the 
fundamental opposition of the sacred and the profane.2 Since the time of 
the seventeenth-century schism, the forces ranged against orthodoxy have 
been equated with the Antichrist, and the notion of a false religion, pseudo-
orthodoxy, has become established. In modern secular Russian culture no 
one has assimilated this ancient archetype more than Dostoevskii. In his 
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artistic system of values, the image of Christ, the God-man (Bogochelovek),3 
the center of the Orthodox faith and the treasure of the Russian people, 
is set against the image of the man-god (chelovekobog), the all-powerful 
human pseudo-savior that is the fantasy of the deracinated atheistic 
socialist intelligent. In Brat’ia Karamazovy (The Brothers Karamazov, 1881), 
the novel with which Bulgakov most closely engages, the opposition is 
embodied in Ivan/the Grand Inquisitor and the elder Zosima/Christ. The 
spiritual fate of Russia, for Dostoevskii, depends upon a choice between the 
God-man and the man-god.
Nevertheless, the manifest parallels between Dostoevskii and Bulgakov 
that are apparent even from this brief summary are by no means fixed. They 
have been arrived at by a process of evolution which can be traced through 
an examination of some of the essays Bulgakov wrote prior to Vekhi. The 
object of this chapter is to analyze the development of the terms “heroism” 
and “asceticism” in Bulgakov’s early work in order to shed light not only 
on his dynamic relationship with Dostoevskii, but also on his developing 
understanding of and sympathy for his native Orthodox tradition.
Heroism
Dostoevskii made the term chelovekobog his own, but it derives indirectly 
from the thought of two German philosophers, both Young Hegelians 
and proponents of atheism: Ludwig Feuerbach, best known for his Die 
Wesenheit des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity, 1841) and Max 
Stirner, author of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (The Ego and its Own, 
1844). It is known that Dostoevskii was familiar with the ideas of Feuerbach 
and Stirner, both from discussions with his early mentor Belinskii and from 
meetings of the Petrashevskii circle.4 Neither Feuerbach nor Stirner actually 
themselves use the German equivalent of chelovekobog (Menschgott) or the 
abstract nouns chelovekobozhie and chelovekobozhestvo (Menschgottum).5 It 
is likely that these derive instead from the critical reception of Feuerbach’s 
system as anthropotheism. In fact, to designate his “new philosophy” 
Feuerbach briefly employs the Greek-derived term anthropotheism 
(Anthropotheismus) in his short monograph Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform 
der Philosophie (Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy, 1842).6 
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Walicki, and after him Frank, both cite the petrashevets Nikolai Speshnev as 
a probable mediator between the German philosophers and Dostoevskii.7 
Their claim is based on a letter, not actually addressed to Dostoevskii, in 
which Speshnev writes, “Anthropotheism [Antropoteizm] is also a religion, 
only a different one. It divinizes a new and different object, but there is 
nothing new about the fact of divinization.… Is the difference between 
a god-man and a man-god really so great?”8 Did Dostoevskii take the term 
chelovekobog from Speshnev, and was Speshnev concretizing the abstract 
noun chelovekobozhie to mark the progression from a Feuerbachian to 
a Stirnerian worldview?
These questions are relevant because much of the interest in Bulgakov’s 
reception of Dostoevskii lies in the tension between Feuerbach and Stirner, 
between chelovekobozhie and the chelovekobog. In his 1905 essay “Religiia 
chelovekobozhiia u L. Feierbakha” (“Ludwig Feuerbach’s Religion of Man-
Godhood”), Bulgakov demonstrates a thorough knowledge of the polemics 
between the two. His exposition of Feuerbach’s work is geared around two 
main points. First, he discusses the fact that Feuerbach’s position is not 
strictly speaking atheism, but anthropotheism (antropoteizm) (77–78):9 
his objective was “not to abolish religion, but to humanize it.”10 Humanity 
was to re-appropriate the divine essence it had projected onto an illusory 
god, to take back what was its own. In Feuerbach’s words: “Man is the god 
of man: homo homini deus est” (75). Second, he emphasizes that what is 
divinized by Feuerbach is not the self but the human species, humanity 
as a whole: “His homo homini deus est should be translated thus: the 
human race is the god of the human individual, the species is the god of 
the specimen [vid est’ bog dlia individa]” (79). The individual person is 
limited and flawed; only the human race as a whole is perfect. Thus the 
divine predicates—goodness, truth, immortality—have their locus in 
humanity. Stirner’s answer to Feuerbach’s “positive, humanistic” atheism 
is a more radical amoralistic, individualistic, atheism (91–2). In Bulgakov’s 
view, Stirner correctly exposed Feuerbach’s anthropotheism as just another 
manifestation of religion; he debunked the latter’s divinization of humanity 
as another form of enslavement of the individual, and he mocked his 
sentimental attachment to moral values as having no foundation. “Mir 
geht nichts über Mich”—“There is nothing higher than Me,” was Stirner’s 
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response to homo homini deus est (92). Thus, according to Bulgakov, “Stirner 
is the truth, the disclosed secret, of Feuerbach” (97). Feuerbach leads 
to Stirner.
Nevertheless, Bulgakov devotes only one chapter of his essay to the 
Feuerbach-Stirner polemics. The essay makes it clear that at this time 
Stirner, and his successor Nietzsche, are not essential to Bulgakov. Rather, 
his overriding objective is to counter Feuerbachian anthropotheism as 
an integral and central part of his polemic with Marxism. In Bulgakov’s 
view, expressed in this essay and elsewhere, supposedly scientific theories 
of social progress of all complexions are the inheritors of Feuerbach, as 
they all accord humanity the highest value, even in those cases, such as 
Marxism, in which their founders disavowed Feuerbach’s sentimentalism 
(as the late Engels did): all are atheistic humanists. “Their atheism is just as 
much an anthropotheism [antropoteizm] as Feuerbach’s, and in this sense 
all its representatives, regardless of their shade, are in principle opposed to 
the more radical atheists Nietzsche and Stirner, who in the name of atheism 
also deny anthropotheism, and having denied the heavenly God, do not 
want an earthly divinity either” (99). In what follows I shall argue that 
Bulgakov’s obsession with Feuerbach and his connection with Marxism 
strongly affects Bulgakov’s initial reception of Dostoevskii, focusing on 
his reading of Ivan Karamazov in the 1901 essay “Ivan Karamazov kak 
filosofskii tip” (“Ivan Karamazov as a Philosophical Type”). Analysis of 
Bulgakov’s essay for Vekhi, however, reveals a discernible shift away from 
the Feuerbachian chelovekobozhie and towards the Stirnerian chelovekobog 
as the prototype for the “hero”-intelligent. This shift brings Bulgakov into 
a position of greater agreement with Dostoevskii’s worldview, as indeed the 
essay as a whole demonstrates.
“Ivan Karamazov as a Philosophical Type” is one of the essays included 
in the 1903 collection Ot marksizma k idealizmu (From Marxism to 
Idealism). An examination of the references to Dostoevskii in the collection 
as a whole reveals the overwhelming importance of Ivan Karamazov to 
Bulgakov during this transitional period: eleven out of twelve references are 
to Ivan, the “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor,” or the philosophical issues that 
Bulgakov associates with these. (The twelfth reference is to Dostoevskii’s 
“Pushkin Speech ”—delivered on the occasion of the unveiling of the Pushkin 
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monument in Moscow in 1880—in the context of a discussion of the problem 
of nationalism: the “Pushkin Speech” will dominate Bulgakov’s thinking 
later, in the Vekhi essay.) One reason for this is that Bulgakov identifies with 
Ivan, whose condition in the novel, like Bulgakov’s own, “is one of mistrust, of 
a loss of faith in the old, which has not yet been replaced by the new” (88).11 
This transitional status of Ivan is reinforced by the position accorded to the 
essay in the collection: fourth, immediately after the three essays included 
to represent Bulgakov’s Marxism (dating from 1896–98), and thus the first 
properly transitional text.
Another reason for the prominence of Ivan and the “Legend” in the 
collection concerns the precise nature of Bulgakov’s interest in man-
Godhood at this time. After all, there are several other loci classici treating 
this theme in Dostoevskii’s oeuvre—Raskol’nikov’s “Napoleon” theory, 
Kirillov’s suicide rationale, Shigalev’s theory of despotism, the character of 
Stavrogin—with all of which Bulgakov was of course familiar. But these 
are all treatments of the chelovekobog, the strong, self-willed, unprincipled 
individual with charismatic power over the ordinary majority. As such they 
lend themselves less well as material through which to polemicize with the 
chelovekobozhie of scientific socialism.
It is of course possible to object that Ivan Karamazov has been 
associated just as much, if not more, with the theme of amoralistic 
individualism (“If God does not exist, all is permitted”) as with the theme 
of atheistic humanism. And indeed, it is very interesting to observe how 
Bulgakov manipulates Dostoevskii’s material to fit his own philosophical 
and political agenda. This manipulation can be illustrated by examination of 
Bulgakov’s treatment of Ivan’s protest against the suffering of the innocent, 
and through his interpretation of the “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor.”
After introducing the theme of man-Godhood through a presentation 
of Ivan’s views on the matter as quoted to him by his hallucinated devil, 
Bulgakov moves on to a discussion of Ivan’s well-known rejection of a divine 
order which tolerates the unacceptable suffering of innocent children. Ivan, 
he argues, cannot accept the premise that present suffering can be justified 
by future happiness. Bulgakov presents this as a rejection of eudaemonism, 
the theory whereby the value of an action is determined by the degree of 
its capacity to produce happiness. In his polemic with Marxism he is at 
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this time arguing that socialism built on a positivistic foundation replaces 
religion with belief in progress, which offers as a justification for present 
suffering under capitalism the happiness of the free humanity of the future 
order. Bulgakov rejects this as a form of eudaemonism, arguing that a valid 
ethics must do justice to the principle, derived originally from the Gospel 
but now established within contemporary consciousness, of the essential 
equality of persons as moral subjects. It is unjust to require that those living 
now, or in the past, should sacrifice their happiness for the sake of future 
beneficiaries.
In using Ivan to demonstrate his own argument, Bulgakov is either 
blind to, or deliberately overlooks, the obvious fact that Ivan is objecting 
not to the theory of progress and the socialist paradise, but to the Christian 
concept of heaven, and not to the notion that the suffering of children 
benefits others now or in the future and is therefore justified, but that 
the happiness of those same children in the next life makes up for their 
suffering on earth. Had he not overlooked this, Bulgakov would have had 
to acknowledge that his hero Ivan is diametrically opposed to Bulgakov 
himself on the question of theodicy. While Ivan cannot be reconciled to 
accepting a justification for suffering that is inaccessible to his “Euclidean” 
mind, Bulgakov argues at length elsewhere in From Marxism to Idealism 
that the moral meaningfulness of our lives is predicated upon the fact that 
we have to deal with evil as it presents itself in our experience, namely, 
as irrational, while accepting in faith that, in the metaphysical sphere, evil 
has a rationale (227–29).12 As it is, Bulgakov recruits Ivan as an ally in the 
fight against scientific socialism. Thus he is here interested in reading Ivan 
as a character who struggles with the moral implications of his atheism 
rather than as a character who struggles with the apparent injustice of the 
Christian world conception.
In his polemics with scientific socialism Bulgakov also argues that the 
belief in progress and the future new human being depends of necessity 
on an act of faith—that it is a pseudo-religious belief, which is therefore 
also subject to doubt. In his presentation of the “Legend of the Grand 
Inquisitor” Bulgakov shifts the dominant of his interpretation of Ivan from 
the character who struggles with the moral implications of his atheism 
to the character who harbors doubts about the capacity of humanity to 
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achieve man-Godhood (as opposed to the desirability of it doing so) (99). 
Humans are too weak to take up the challenge of freedom, thinks the 
Grand Inquisitor/Ivan (100). Against the grain of the usual interpretation, 
Bulgakov reads this idea not as a riposte to Christianity (though he does 
not suppress the object of the Grand Inquisitor’s polemic in his summary 
of the story) but as a riposte to scientific socialism’s dream of a transformed 
humanity: “to the question as to whether humanity is capable of leaving 
its present, debased condition and making room in itself for the onset of 
a new, free, autonomous moral life, of carrying out the task allotted to it in 
the future, the Grand Inquisitor answers with a spiteful and passionate ‘no’” 
(102). This ambiguous and curious wording (the reference to a “present, 
debased, condition” and “future” onset of a free life) reveals again what is 
Bulgakov’s primary motive for using Dostoevskii at this stage in his career, 
namely to refute the theory of progress. In order to foreground the concept 
of man-Godhood in the first sense of a transformed collective humanity, he 
does not exploit the obvious potential for exposing the Inquisitor as a man-
God in the second, Stirnerian sense.
When Bulgakov does eventually address the problem of the despotic 
ruler, it is once again to use Dostoevskii’s material as a vehicle to air 
another of the arguments central to his conflict with Marxism, namely that 
as a positivistic worldview it cannot philosophically justify its core value 
of equality, and that its theory of progress is predicated on a disregard 
for the equal value of all. He argues that the Grand Inquisitor is anti-
Christian (anti-Christ) in the sense that he rejects the Christian precept 
of the moral equality of all humans before God (which Bulgakov sees 
re-stated in the Kantian dictum that the person must be viewed not as 
a means but an end in itself) and replaces it with the pagan (pre-Christian) 
differentiation between the ethics of the master and the ethics of the slave. 
Not unexpectedly, Bulgakov draws a comparison to Nietzsche’s neo-
pagan, anti-Christian ethics, also pointing out that the latter regarded 
the emergence of a master-race as the goal of history (104–05). Bulgakov 
states that Dostoevskii wanted to show how an atheistic ethics is always in 
danger of reverting to pagan norms: “People are equal in God, but they are 
not equal in nature, and this natural inequality defeats the ethical ideal of 
their equality wherever this ideal is voided of its religious sanction” (104). 
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The connection with paganism and the point about people being unequal in 
nature are surely not Dostoevskii’s, but Bulgakov’s own. Still, what is most 
striking is that Bulgakov resists making the usual and apparently obvious 
point that the “Legend” illustrates how, for Dostoevskii, socialism must 
always end in tyranny. This entrenched view of Dostoevskii’s, founded 
on the premise that socialism is intrinsically atheistic, is precisely the 
one that Bulgakov is fighting to overcome, so it is not surprising that he 
does not want to draw attention to it here. Though Bulgakov agrees that 
Marxism is intrinsically atheistic, the new ideological position that he is 
forming at this time is that social democracy as such is not only compatible 
with philosophical idealism and with Christianity, but that its values of 
justice and equality have no foundation without them. Thus Bulgakov’s 
conclusion about Dostoevskii and socialism is a blatant imposition of his 
own view upon Dostoevskii: the latter “regarded the socialist worldview 
… as something of the order of a moral illness, but an illness of growth, as 
a transitional worldview that preceded a higher synthesis which, I might 
add, would consist in the merging of the economic demands of socialism 
with the principles of philosophical idealism, and the justification of the 
former by means of the latter” (109).
Though “Heroism and Asceticism” is not “about” Dostoevskii, its 
argument and vision are much closer to him than the essay discussed above 
that is “about” him. We can speculate that the change in emphasis has to do 
with “events.” Between 1900 and 1905, Bulgakov’s polemic with Marxism and 
other forms of positivistic socialism was conducted on the plane of theory. 
“Heroism and Asceticism,” on the other hand, is an analysis of the Russian 
intelligentsia based on Bulgakov’s experience both of the revolution of 1905 
(which inspired the Vekhi symposium) and of the second State Duma of 
1907, of which Bulgakov was a member. In confronting the political reality 
facing Russia at this time, the apparent inability of the radical left to engage 
with the political process and effect concrete reforms, Bulgakov willy-nilly 
psychologizes his objections to chelovekobozhie in the form of a critique of 
the leaders of the revolution seen as so many chelovekobogi.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that Bulgakov is the only 
Vekhi contributor to develop the theme of “the heroism of self-worship,” 
the savior mentality, in his critique of the intelligentsia. On the other 
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hand, both Nikolai Berdiaev and especially Semen Frank highlight the 
theme of anthropotheism.13 Defending absolute values, Berdiaev sees the 
intelligentsia’s “worship of man and worship of the people” as idolatrously 
replacing love of God and the truth (6), and concurs with the earlier 
Bulgakov in regarding scientific positivism as a “special religion” (8). 
For Frank, faith in the future happiness of the people “takes the place 
of authentic religion in the consciousness of the atheistic intelligentsia” 
(142), and he actually rehearses Stirner’s challenge to Feuerbach that 
only amorality can derive from the rejection of absolute values (135).14 
However, in his analysis of the contradiction in terms that is the 
intelligentsia’s ideology of “nihilistic moralism” (seen as embodying the 
tension between Feuerbach and Stirner), Frank nevertheless contends 
that, in the classic Russian intelligent, moralism displaces nihilism (149). 
Bulgakov’s new emphasis on the self-worship of the intelligent, rather 
than the latter’s worship of the people, reflects his greater immersion in 
Dostoevskii relative to the other contributors: he makes ten references 
to the novelist in his essay, while Berdiaev mentions him only once, and 
Frank not at all.15
If Bulgakov has previously focused on scientific socialism as 
a pseudo-religion, as anthropotheism, in “Heroism and Asceticism” the 
focus is on the intelligentsia as a pseudo-religious sect. Dostoevskii is 
explicitly credited by Bulgakov with being the first person to point out 
the intelligentsia’s religious traits (20).16 In his turn, Bulgakov draws 
our attention to its spirit of martyrdom, its utopianism, its Puritanism, 
and its dogmatic fundamentalism on the question of atheism, which he 
wittily describes as the faith into which all members of the intelligentsia 
are uncritically baptized (22). And if previously Bulgakov has analyzed 
as a philosophical consequence of Feuerbach’s thesis the tendency to 
deify the common people, in “Heroism and Asceticism” he notes that 
the intelligentsia’s intense feeling of guilt before the Russian people is the 
atheist’s reassignment of the Christian’s sense of her or his guilt before 
God (21).
Further, as indicated above, if Bulgakov has been previously 
preoccupied almost exclusively with Feuerbach’s and Marxism’s “religion 
of man-Godhood,” within a few paragraphs of the third chapter of 
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“Heroism and Asceticism” this theme transmutes into the theme of self-
worship. Thus he begins the chapter by stating, “The intelligentsia rejects 
Christianity and its standards and appears to accept atheism. In fact, 
instead of atheism, it adopts the dogmas of the religion of man-Godhood, 
in one or another of the variants produced by the Western European 
Enlightenment, and then turns this religion into idolatry.” However, he 
goes on to argue that “the basic tenet” of man-Godhood—the “belief 
in the natural perfection of man and in infinite progress ... effected by 
human forces”—leads to “man [putting] himself in place of Providence 
and [seeing] himself as his own savior” (26). He concludes that the essence 
of man-Godhood is self-worship. In Russia, the intelligentsia sees itself as 
the savior of the Russian people, as Russia’s hero: “Heroism—for me, this 
word expresses the fundamental essence of the intelligentsia’s world-view 
and ideal, and it is the heroism of self-worship” (26–27). Later on in the 
essay he will state unequivocally that “the hero … is the man-God” (39).
As we saw, in the Feuerbach essay of 1905 Bulgakov regarded 
Feuerbach and Stirner as ideological opposites, despite their shared 
atheism. The former had a substitute religion, that of chelovekobozhie; the 
latter had no religion except the elevation of the self. In “Heroism and 
Asceticism” Bulgakov admits a synthesis of the two, despite being aware 
of the ideological tension between them, as is apparent in the following 
statement: 
Our intelligentsia is almost unanimous in striving for collectivism, for 
the closest possible communality of human life, but its own temperament 
renders the intelligentsia itself an anti-communal, anti-collective force, 
since it bears within itself the divisive principle of heroic self-affirmation. 
The hero is to some extent a superman, confronting his neighbors in the 
proud and defiant pose of a savior. (29) 
This insight had been reached by Dostoevskii long before. Unlike 
Stirner’s Einziger, his chelovekobogi (Raskol’nikov, the Grand Inquisitor) 
are interested in the social sphere, and see themselves as the saviors of 
mankind. They combine egoism, or at least desire to rule, with altruism. 
In Russia, illogically, “Stirner” did not supersede “Feuerbach.” Rather, 
egoistic amoralism, the logical outcome of materialistic atheism, existed 
side by side with faith in humanity and devotion to its cause. In “Heroism 
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and Asceticism” Bulgakov understands this, which brings him into line 
with Dostoevskii’s own treatment of the man-Godhood theme.
Asceticism
We should view Bulgakov’s engagement with asceticism in the context of 
the widespread preoccupation with the relationship between the “spirit” 
and the “flesh” in the culture of late imperial Russia. Since about 1900, 
in pursuit of a “new religious consciousness” and under the influence 
of Nietzsche, the literary avant-garde, led by Viacheslav Ivanov, Dmitrii 
Merezhkovskii, and Vasilii Rozanov, had set its face against the institutional 
Church, among other reasons because of its perceived denigration of 
the material world and bodily life. This perception was connected with 
the resurgent dominance of monasticism in Russia and the fact that the 
Church leadership was appointed from the (celibate) monastic clergy. 
A second reason asceticism was viewed with great hostility was because 
it was considered selfish to pursue one’s own salvation in isolation from 
society at a time of unprecedented social and political upheaval. In this 
respect, Dostoevskii’s passionate advocacy in The Brothers Karamazov of 
the Russian monastery and the institution of holy elders as the source 
of Russia’s salvation fell on stony ground, despite the popularity that he 
otherwise enjoyed in the first quarter of the twentieth century.17 Thus 
Bulgakov’s Dostoevskian defense of the Christian ascetic in “Heroism 
and Asceticism” constituted a bold, counter-cultural move. It also marked 
a significant shift in his own, originally rather negative, appraisal of 
asceticism.
Bulgakov’s most extensive treatment of asceticism prior to “Heroism 
and Asceticism” is found in a 1903 essay entitled “Ob ekonomicheskom 
ideale” (“On the Economic Ideal”).18 The terms used in his article are 
exclusively asketizm and its derivatives, where asketizm is opposed to 
hedonism, so it is true to say that Bulgakov moved between 1903 and 
1909 from gedonizm i asketizm to geroizm i podvizhnichestvo. I will 
comment on the shift in terminology in due course. In 1903 Bulgakov had 
abandoned the philosophical materialism of Marxism and was working 
toward a justification of the Marxian beliefs in social justice and equality 
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on the basis of Kantian idealism. His essay employs a rigorous Kantian 
methodology to scrutinize the value of wealth as one of the foundational 
values of political economics (the other is justice), and specifically to 
solve the economic problem of luxury. The question Bulgakov poses is: 
how justified is the relative ideal of wealth when examined in the light of 
the absolute ideal of the good?
Bulgakov sets up an opposition between two inadequate materialistic 
attitudes to wealth, which he will go on to resolve idealistically. These 
inadequate attitudes are at one extreme Epicureanism, the validation 
of the sensual world as the only existing one through the embrace of 
hedonistic consumption: this is the attitude of both materialist varieties 
of socialism, including Marxism, and contemporary capitalism.19 At 
the other extreme is asceticism, which is deemed to be a materialism of 
a negative type, recognizing the world as exclusively sensual and rejecting 
it out of hand. Asceticism regards the body and its life as an absolute 
evil, and strives to liberate the spirit from the material sphere (271). 
Asceticism is intrinsically anti-cultural: it denies economics, whose 
premise is the validity and desirability of the growth of needs, and it 
denies history as a record of common human endeavor, admitting only of 
a moral individualism based on the need to save one’s own soul (272–73). 
Thus the definition of asketizm that Bulgakov is working with is: “denial 
of the world.”
I would contend that Bulgakov’s attitude to asceticism as defined 
above is primarily derived from Vladimir Solov’ev, in terms of both the 
content of his view and the methodology that he uses to establish the 
“correct” attitude to the problem of wealth. From an essay, published in the 
same year, “Chto daet sovremennomu soznaniiu filosofiia Vl. Solov’eva?” 
(“What Does the Philosophy of V. Solov’ev Give to Contemporary 
Consciousness?”), we know that Bulgakov was familiar with Solov’ev’s 
work in 1903, and what his essential evaluation was of it at this stage.20 
Like Solov’ev in Chteniia o bogochelovechestve (Lectures on Godmanhood, 
1878), he identifies as the “pessimistic philosophy of asceticism” first neo-
Platonism, then Buddhism. (Schopenhauer and Tolstoi are adduced as 
contemporary examples.) His basic approach to cultural history is also 
the same as Solov’ev’s: hedonism and asceticism are seen as “abstract 
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principles,” one-sided responses to the problem of the body and its needs 
that ought to be supplanted by a higher, that is, a historically more recent, 
integral approach (and this methodology perhaps constrains Bulgakov 
into a very narrow interpretation of asceticism) (280).
What is interesting, though, in the light of the Vekhi essay, is that 
Bulgakov perceives asceticism in Christianity to be the same “denial of the 
world.” The ascetic worldview “was adopted by an ascetic understanding of 
Christianity that is closer to Buddha than to Christ. Based on a one-sided 
and therefore untrue interpretation of the Gospels’ teaching on wealth, 
this worldview often transforms God’s world into the exclusive kingdom 
of Satan, into which not a single ray of divine light penetrates.” To which 
aspect of Christian culture is Bulgakov referring? Surely to the extreme 
ascetic practices of the heroes of the Christian East, judging by a list of these 
heroes cited in a footnote to illustrate his point that the motto of the ascetic 
is: “mortify your flesh, curtail your needs, reject wealth as a temptation and 
the greatest of evils” (272). This suggests that in 1903 Bulgakov was not 
yet familiar with the hesychastic tradition that had so recently undergone 
a revival in his own country, that he had not yet read the ascetic writings 
collected in the Philokalia, that he was unaware of its teaching about the 
spiritual rewards of the ascetic life, and particularly that he had not learned 
of the teaching about the participation of the body in those rewards. It is 
certainly clear that he had not yet met his future friend, the defender of 
asceticism Pavel Florenskii.21 On the evidence of the sources that he cites, 
Bulgakov’s knowledge is drawn from scholarly works like M. Korelin’s 
Vazhneishie momenty v istorii srednevekovogo papstva (Important Moments 
in the History of the Medieval Papacy, 1901) and those of Protestant 
theologians like Adolf von Harnack (Das Wesen des Christentums, 1900) 
and Francis Peabody (Jesus Christ and the Social Question, 1903).
It is also highly probable that Bulgakov’s view of Christian asceticism 
is colored by his reading of Solov’ev, whose hostility toward monasticism 
was expressed many times in his career, most memorably in the essays 
“Ob upadke srednevekovogo mirosozertsaniia” (“On the Collapse of the 
Medieval World-Conception,” 1891) and “Zhiznennaia drama Platona” 
(“The Life Drama of Plato,” 1898). It is well known that Solov’ev perceived 
monks to have turned their backs on a needy world in order to pursue 
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their own private salvation, whereas according to him their duty was to 
Christianize the world. The moral task of Christianity was seen by Solov’ev 
to be social, not individual. As a Christian socialist, Bulgakov naturally 
sympathized with Solov’ev’s moral vision. Indeed, displaying typical 
Solov’evian historicism, he states in his essay that the ascetic worldview, 
with its rejection of history and social morality, is alien to contemporary 
Europeans, part of an outworn phase in human development that cannot 
be revisited (272).
Asceticism as “denial of the world,” we can see, is unacceptable to 
Bulgakov. In “On the Economic Ideal” he is defending the “world,” the 
material-bodily principle, as an economist. The basic premise is Kantian: 
the ideal of wealth should not be rejected, but rather subordinated to the 
higher ideal of the good. Bulgakov’s defense for this is that material wealth 
is a prerequisite for spiritual growth.22 The meaning of human existence is 
to serve the highest principle, the absolute good, by means of spiritual labor 
(272). This act of service is a free choice, made in the light of conscience 
and of the consciousness of one’s duty (Kant’s categorical imperative). 
The process is also the objective: through the service of a higher ideal 
a person grows spiritually and becomes more and more free—that is, 
morally developed. Perfection, however, is an unattainable ideal lying 
beyond the bounds of history and the individual life. But in order to begin 
this process of spiritual service and spiritual growth, one must first have 
attained a certain level of material wealth, or must experience freedom 
from poverty. Below a certain level of prosperity, humans are the slaves of 
nature and cannot fully exercise free moral choice. A negative asceticism 
is of no use to the poor (and is therefore inappropriate in Russia). Culture 
is the record of the spiritual labor of human beings, but without material 
well-being, there can be no culture (275–79).
This argument anticipates an important point made against asceticism 
in the Vekhi symposium, where it is taken by the other contributors, as it was 
in 1903 by Bulgakov, to mean “denial of the world.” This argument is made 
in connection with the theme of culture-building in the widest possible 
sense, from the production of wealth through the creation of a legal state to 
the writing of philosophy, and is a product of the same Kantian framework 
that Bulgakov is using in 1903. At its greatest extreme, denial of the world 
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incorporates denial of life itself. The Vekhi contributors are unanimous in 
regarding the Russian intelligentsia as ascetics in this sense, and thus as 
psychologically unfit for the urgent task of reforming Russia. For example, 
Berdiaev observes an “ascetic view of philosophy” that militates against the 
development of independent and original national thought (2). Aleksandr 
Izgoev is pessimistic about the intelligentsia’s potential for creating culture 
given its cult of martyrdom: it “has formed a peculiar monastic order of 
people who have condemned themselves to death, and, moreover, to the most 
rapid death possible” (85). Frank points out a fundamental contradiction 
between the exclusively material ideal that the intelligentsia holds out 
for the people and the psychological fact that “the Russian intelligentsia 
does not love wealth,” of either the spiritual or the material kind (148). To 
a greater extent than any of the other contributors, Frank repeats Bulgakov’s 
earlier argument that Russia is too poor to afford asceticism: her priority 
must be to produce wealth.
But for Bulgakov in “On the Economic Ideal,” once a certain level 
of material wealth has been achieved, the ascetic method, if not the 
philosophy of asceticism, acquires a positive value and comes into play 
as an essential moral practice for maintaining a person’s spiritual growth. 
It does this by ensuring that our natural hedonism—a love of the good 
things of life—does not become a negative hedonism—enslavement 
to materialistic values and material goods. People in wealthy societies 
are always going to be tempted by negative hedonism, and will only be 
able to overcome this temptation through conscious moral effort, or 
askesis (uprazhnenie). Failure to do so will lead in due course to cultural 
collapse.23 Luxury, then, cannot be defined objectively. Luxury is the 
victory of sensuality over the spirit, whether in an individual or a society. 
Thus Bulgakov wants to see the philosophy of asceticism as having been 
surpassed, although its method is presented as a timeless feature of our 
moral being. His main concern seems to be to Christianize Kantian 
ethics, to replace its apparently effortless exercise of duty with a vision 
of moral choice as a difficult and unending struggle for self-mastery. At 
the same time, Bulgakov wants to bring ascesis out of the monastery and 
into society: “Our time knows ascetics whose lives are a constant feat of 
the spirit [podvig dukha], constant sacrifice and self-negation, although 
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nowadays one encounters these ascetics more frequently in the world 
than in the monastery or the desert” (282).
“Heroism and Asceticism” represents a development of this argument, 
and of course an application of it to the Russian intelligentsia. Now thinking 
about asceticism in a different way, as “self-overcoming,” Bulgakov has gone 
beyond his fellow contributors, who are still applying a notion of asceticism 
as “rejection” or “denial,” whether of the world, as we have seen, or of the self. 
For them asceticism is seen negatively from the point of view of a Kantian 
emphasis on culture-building and individual responsibility. Since 1903 
Bulgakov, on the other hand, has moved deeper into the psychology and 
culture of Orthodoxy, and his understanding of the moral life, though still 
wholly compatible with Kantian ethics, has become further Christianized. 
Both the changes and the original Kantian position are reflected in 
Bulgakov’s choice of vocabulary. The most significant new terms are of 
course the Slavonic podvizhnichestvo (asceticism) and podvizhnik (ascetic) 
(deriving from the noun podvig—“exploit,” “feat,” “heroic deed”), but also 
smirenie (humility), grekh (sin), and poslushanie (“penance” or “obedience”). 
The morphology of podvizhnichestvo conveys the element of struggle in 
moral choice more effectively than the Greek askesis (exercise), which 
connotes a sense of discipline that seems to fit better with the Kantian 
notion of duty. The terms smirenie and particularly grekh personalize the 
Kantian imperative to aspire to the Good. One is humbled more in the 
presence of a superior being than that of a principle, and one sins not 
against an ideal but against a Person. Grekh also reinforces powerfully the 
notion of struggle in the exercise of our “free” will. The choice between 
right and wrong is not merely a rational act (as Kant implies), but an effort 
of the will that must first overcome an innate tendency to do the wrong 
thing. Thus Bulgakov writes of “the power of sin, its agonizing weight, its 
ubiquitous and profound influence on all human life” (36). Nevertheless, 
some truly Kantian/Protestant vocabulary and concepts remain, including: 
dolg (duty)—which is frequently mentioned, obiazannosti (obligations), 
samokontrol’ (self-control), samodistsiplina (self-discipline), and the like.
Nevertheless, asceticism is being used differently in the Vekhi essay, as 
part of a polemic against the Russian intelligentsia. The binary opposition 
geroizm/podvizhnichestvo is not, as was the opposition gedonizm/asketizm, 
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a false opposition of two equally flawed attitudes to be reconciled in 
a higher synthesis, but an irreconcilable opposition of an attitude presented 
as essentially false to one presented as essentially correct. This is of course 
the opposition of man-Godhood and Godmanhood, of divinized humanity 
(the intelligentsia “hero”) and Christ the God-man, or the ascetic-imitator 
of Christ: “Is the standard for examining oneself the image of the perfect, 
Divine personality [Bozhestvennoi lichnosti], incarnate in Christ? Or is it 
self-deified man in one of its earthly, limited guises (humanity, the people, 
the proletariat, or the superman)—a projection, in the last analysis, of one’s 
own ego in a heroic pose?” asks Bulgakov (36). In fact, it is misleading to 
use the abstract noun bogochelovechestvo, with its Solov’evian ring, because 
in the essay Bulgakov actually only uses the proper noun Bogochelovek, and 
that only once, as he prefers to refer directly to Khristos—Christ. This is 
because this essay is written primarily and indeed overwhelmingly under 
the influence not of Solov’ev but Dostoevskii, who at this point clearly 
colors Bulgakov’s interpretation of asceticism. Dostoevskii explored the 
struggle between atheistic socialism and Christianity through the medium 
of fiction, and thus preferred embodiments of the man-god and the saintly 
Christian to their philosophical abstractions. This suits Bulgakov’s purpose 
as he opposes the Russian intelligent intent on saving the world to an image 
of the Christian citizen doing penance within it (39).
It will be said that Dostoevskii was more interested in saintly elders 
and the “God-bearing” Russian people than in doctors, engineers, and 
lawyers. One response to this is that Bulgakov’s citizen-ascetics are his 
vision of the humbled intelligentsia “proud men” that Dostoevskii called 
for in his “Pushkin Speech,” which Bulgakov mentions with approval in his 
essay. Dostoevskii wished to reunite a deracinated intelligentsia with the 
people, and this is the theme with which Bulgakov ends his essay. In his 
previous work he had condemned Dostoevskii’s religious nationalism for its 
politically conservative and romantic attitude to the question of the rule of 
law,24 but in “Heroism and Asceticism” the national idea is defended against 
the intelligentsia’s cosmopolitanism, which overlooks the importance for the 
people of the Orthodox faith. The people’s “ideal is Christ and his teaching, 
and their standard is Christian asceticism,” claims Bulgakov after Dostoevskii 
(44–45), and he even follows Dostoevskii in identifying the people’s ascetic 
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ideal with the Orthodox monasteries and elders in their midst: “Like the icon-
lamps glimmering in the monastery cloisters, whither the people throng- 
ed through the centuries in search of moral support and instruction, these 
ideals, this light of Christ, illumined Rus’” (45). Thus, under the influence 
of Dostoevskii and the logic of his man-god/God-man opposition, 
Bulgakov sympathetically reconnects the ideal of the citizen-ascetic with 
its monastic source. 
As Bulgakov emerges from Marxism, he begins to place greater emphasis 
on the psychology of atheism than on its philosophy. As he emerges from 
Kantianism he begins to invest more in the concrete human personality 
than in the theoretical individual. By the time he wrote “Heroism and 
Asceticism,” he saw the human being as a genuine agent whose efficacy rests 
on a choice between pride and humility, self-elevation and self-effacement. 
Humility is not seen as inactivity or as the mark of a weak character, but 
as a constant battle for perfection on the model of Christian asceticism. 
Meanwhile, perfection is no longer a philosophical ideal but a personal 
God: “The Christian saint is the person who, by means of continuous 
and unremitting effort [podvigom], has most completely transformed 
his personal will and his empirical personality until they are permeated 
to the fullest possible measure with the will of God. The model of total 
permeation is the God-man, arriving ‘not to do his own will, but the will 
of His Father that sent him’” (39–40). Bulgakov is indebted to Dostoevskii 
for his vision of Russia as the battleground on which Christianity fights the 
atheistic forces of modernity for control of the country’s future.
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